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FOREWORD
The United States Courts of Appeals are of ever increasing importance
in the federal judicial system. The overwhelming caseload of the United
States Supreme Court restricts its ability to resolve many inter-circuit conflicts, with the result that more and more a body of circuit law is developing.
The practitioner must know the law of the circuit in which a controversy
arises.
Economic changes are subtly affecting the Tenth Circuit. The development, for the national good, of the natural resources of the six-state Tenth
Circuit, will probably produce many conflicts among national, regional, and
local interests. The resolution of these expected controversies will substantially involve the federal courts within the Tenth Circuit. The task of these
courts, and of the advocates who appear in them, presents a challenge which
may not be ignored.
The foregoing emphasizes the importance of the Denver Law Journal's
Annual Survey of the Tenth Circuit decisions. Its critiques enable both lawyers and teachers to keep abreast of decisional trends, to come forward with
constructive suggestions, and to contribute to the solution of the problems
which are bound to arise. The Survey should be required reading for all
federal practitioners--and for all federal judges.
JEAN

October 31, 1980

S.

BREITENSTEIN

THE JUDGES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT
CHIEF JUDGE OLIVER SETH
Judge Seth was born in New Mexico in
1915 and grew up in Santa Fe. He received
his A.B. degree from Stanford University in
1937 and his LL.B. from Yale in 1940.
During World War II he served as a Major
in the U.S. Army and was decorated with the
Croix de Guerre. Judge Seth has been a
director of the Santa Fe National Bank, chairman of the Legal Committee of the New Mexico Oil and Gas Association, and counsel for
the New Mexico Cattlegrowers' Association.
He has also been a regent of the Museum of
New Mexico and a director of the Santa Fe
Boy's Club. In 1962 he was appointed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit by President John F. Kennedy. He
has been Chief Judge since 1977.

JUDGE ROBERT H.
McWILLIAMS
Judge McWilliams was born in Salina,
Kansas in 1916 and moved to Denver in 1927
where he has lived ever since. He received his
A.B. and LL.B. degrees from the University of
Denver. In 1971, he was awarded an Honorary Doctor of Law degree from the
University.
During World War II, Judge McWilliams
served in the United States Army and was
with the Office of Strategic Services. He has
served as a Deputy District Attorney, a Colorado district court judge, and was a member
of the Colorado Supreme Court for nine years
prior to his appointment to the Court of
Appeals.
Judge McWilliams is a member of the Judicial Conference Committee on the Administration of the Criminal Law, Phi Beta Kappa,
Omicron Delta Kappa, Phi Delta Phi, and
Kappa Sigma. He was sworn in as a Judge of
the United States Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit in 1970.

JUDGE WILLIAM J.
HOLLOWAY, JR.
The son of a former Oklahoma governor,
Judge Holloway was born in Hugo,
Oklahoma, in 1923. He and his family moved
to Oklahoma City in 1927. He served as a
First Lieutenant in the Army during World
War II. He then returned to complete his
undergraduate studies at the University of
Oklahoma, receiving his B.A. in 1947. He
was graduated from Harvard Law School in
1950.
In 1951 and 1952, Judge Holloway was an
attorney with the Department of Justice in
Washington, D.C. Afterwards, he returned to
private practice in Oklahoma City where he
was appointed to the Tenth Circuit by Lyndon B. Johnson. He is a member of Phi Beta
Kappa and Phi Gamma Delta.

JUDGE JAMES E. BARRETT
The son of the late Frank A. Barrett, who
served as Wyoming's Congressman, Governor,
and U.S. Senator, Judge Barrett was born in
1922 in Lusk, Wyoming. He attended the
University of Wyoming for two years prior to
his service in the Army during World War II.
After the War, he attended Saint Catherine's
College at Oxford University. He received his
LL.B. from the University of Wyoming in
1949. In 1973 he was given the Distinguished
Alumni Award from his alma mater.
Prior to his appointment, Judge Barrett
had been involved in private practice in Lusk
and had served as County and Prosecuting
Attorney for Niobrara County; Town Attorney for the towns of Lusk and Manville; and
attorney for the Niobrara County Consolidated School District.
In 1967 he was
appointed by Governor Stanley K. Hathaway
to serve as Wyoming Attorney General and he
remained in that position until 1971.
Judge Barrett is a member of the Judicial
Conference Subcommittee on Federal Jurisdiction, the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review, and is a trustee of
Saint Joseph's Children's Home. He was
appointed to the Court in 1971.

JUDGE WILLIAM E. DOYLE

JUDGE MONROE G. McKAY

Judge Doyle was born in Denver in 1911
and received his A.B. from the University of
Colorado in 1940. He obtained his LL.B. and
J.D. degrees from George Washington University. He served as Deputy District Attorney for Denver from 1938 until 1941, a
Colorado district court judge in 1948 and
1949, and Chief Deputy District Attorney
from 1949 until 1952. During 1959-61 he was
a Justice on the Colorado Supreme Court.
Judge Doyle has been a Visiting Professor
of Law at the University of Colorado and a
Professor of Law at the Westminster College
of Law (University of Denver College of Law)
in Denver. He is a former Chairman of the
Judicial Conference Committee to Implement
the Magistrates' Act and is presently a member of the Judicial Conference Committee on
the Administration of the Bankruptcy System.
He is a member of the Order of the Coif, the
Order of Saint Ives, Pi Sigma Alpha, and Phi
Alpha Delta.
fie was appointed to the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals in 1971 following ten years
as a United States District Judge for the District of Colorado.

Judge McKay was born in Huntsville,
Utah, in 1929 and lives in Provo. He was
graduated from Brigham Young University in
1957 with high honors. He received his J.D.
from the University of Chicago and became
the law clerk for Justice Jesse A. Udall of the
Arizona Supreme Court in 1960. From 1961
to 1974, Judge McKay was with the firm of
Lewis and Roca in Phoenix, taking two years
out to serve as Director of the United States
Peace Corps in Malawi, Africa. He was a law
professor at Brigham Young University from
1974 until he was appointed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in 1977.

JUDGE JAMES K. LOGAN

JUDGE STEPHANIE K.
SEYMOUR

Judge Logan was born in Quenemo, Kansas, in 1929. He received his A.B. from the
University of Kansas in 1952 and was graduated magna cum laudt from Harvard Law
School in 1955. He went on to be U.S. Circuit Judge Walter Huxman's law clerk in
1956 and then practiced with the Los Angeles
firm of Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher.
He
became Dean of the University of Kansas
Law School in 1961 and served in the capacity until 1968.
Since 1961 he has been a visiting professor
at Harvard Law School, The University of
Texas Law School, Stanford University, and
the University of Michigan. He was a commissioner for the U.S. District Court from
1964 until 1967 and was a candidate for the
U.S. Senate in 1968.
Judge Logan is a Rhodes Scholar, a member of Phi Beta Kappa, Order of the Coif,
Beta Gamma Sigma, Omicron Delta Kappa,
Pi Sigma Alpha, Alpha Kappa Psi, and Phi
Delta Phi. He has co-authored numerous
books on estate planning and administration.
In 1977 he was appointed to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

Judge Seymour was born in Battle Creek,
Michigan, in 1940. She graduated from
Smith College, magna cum laudr, in 1962 and
earned her J.D. from Harvard Law School in
1965. She was admitted to the Oklahoma bar
in 1965.
Judge Seymour has practiced law in Boston, Massachusetts, 1965-1966; in Tulsa,
Oklahoma, 1967; and Houston, Texas, 19681969. Most recently, she has practiced with
the Tulsa firm of Doerner, Stuart, Saunders,
Daniel & Anderson from 1971 to 1979. Judge
Seymour is a member of Phi Beta Kappa, and
the American, Oklahoma, and Tulsa County
Bar associations. She served as a bar examiner from 1973 through 1979.
Judge Seymour was appointed to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit by President Carter in 1979.

SENIOR JUDGE JOHN C.
PICKETT

SENIOR JUDGE DAVID T.
LEWIS

Judge Pickett was born in Ravenna,
Nebraska, in 1896. He received his LL.B.
degree from the University of Nebraska in
1922. In 1920, he was a pitcher for the Chicago White Sox. During World War I, he
served as a Second Lieutenant.
From 1935 until 1949, Judge Pickett was
Assistant United States Attorney for the District of Wyoming; in 1949, he was United
States Attorney. He is a past member of the
Judicial Conference and has served as Chairman of the Judicial Conference Advisory
Committee on the Administration of the
Criminal Law.
Judge Pickett was appointed to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit
in 1949 and has been a Senior Judge since
January 1, 1966.

Judge Lewis was born in Salt Lake City,
Utah, in 1912. He received his B.A. degree
and his J.D. from the University of Utah. In
1971, he was awarded an Honorary Doctor of
Laws degree from his alma mater. During
World War II, Judge Lewis served in the
Criminal Investigation Division of the Army
and in 1947-48 he was a member of the Utah
Legislature. He was a Utah district judge
from 1950 to 1956.
Judge Lewis has been a member of the
Judicial Conference of the United States since
1970 and was elected Chairman of the Conference of Chief Circuit Judges in 1974. He
was voted the "Judge of the Year" in 1974 by
the Utah State Bar Association.
Judge Lewis is a member of the Order of
the Coif and Phi Delta Phi.
He was
appointed to the Tenth Circuit in 1956 by
President Dwight D. Eisenhower. He became
a Senior Judge on December 3, 1977.

SENIOR JUDGE JEAN S.
BREITENSTEIN

SENIOR JUDGE DELMAS C.
HILL (Retired)

Judge Breitenstein was born in Keokuk,
Iowa, in 1900. His family moved to Boulder,
Colorado, in 1907. After graduation from the
University of Colorado, where he received his
A.B. in 1922 and LL.B. in 1924, he served as a
Colorado Assistant Attorney General from
1925 until 1929. He was an Assistant United
States Attorney from 1930 until 1933.
Between 1933 and 1954, he practiced law in
Denver. In 1954, he became a United States
District Judge.
Judge Breitenstein has served as Chairman
of the Judicial Conference Committee on
Intercircuit Assignments and is a past president of the Denver Law Club.
A member of Phi Beta Kappa, Order of the
Coif, and Phi Alpha Delta, Judge Breitenstein
holds LL.D. degrees from the University of
Colorado and the University of Denver. He
was appointed to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals in 1957 and became a Senior Judge
on July 31, 1970.

Judge Hill was born in Wamego, Kansas,
in 1906. He received his LL.B. from Washburn College in 1929. From 1929 to 1943 he
practiced law in Wamego, serving as an Assistant U.S. Attorney from 1934 to 1936. He
was general counsel for the Kansas State Tax
Commission from 1937 to 1939 and Chairman of the State Democratic Committee from
1946 to 1948. During World War II he was a
Captain in the U.S. Army. In 1945, he
assisted in the prosecution of General
Yamashita in Manila. He was a U.S. District
Judge from 1949 until 1961 when he was
appointed to the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals. Judge Hill became a Senior Judge
on April 1, 1977.
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
OVERVIEW

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals entertained administrative law
cases of considerable number and variety during the recent term. In general,
the court's treatment of these cases was characterized by the traditional deference to the agencies' underlying decisions, and the court stayed well within
the confines of the Administrative Procedure Act's scope of judicial review.I
Where an agency's interpretation of a pertinent statute was clearly unreasonable, however, or where an administrative record was insufficient to support an agency's findings and conclusions, the court did not hesitate to
reverse a decision and remand the matter for further deliberation.
In several of its more notable decisions, the Tenth Circuit undertook
3
2
constructions of the Government in the Sunshine Act and the Privacy Act.
4
Both statutes are relative newcomers to the realm of administrative law and
have not yet been the subjects of substantial litigation. Thus, the Tenth
Circuit's analyses of certain of their provisions represent contributions to the
limited body of interpretive material. Another noteworthy decision this
term considered an association's standing to represent its members in an action challenging the Department of Health, Education and Welfare's sexual
equality regulations for athletic programs. The court's ruling may well facilitate the first major attack'on these controversial requirements.
This article will survey twenty-seven of the Tenth Circuit's administrative law decisions. 5 Sheer numbers prevent a thorough analysis of each case,
but an attempt has been made to comment on questionable results and rulings of special significance.
I.

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

In Brice v. Day 6 the Tenth Circuit rejected the argument that exhaustion
of administrative remedies cannot be required when a party seeks to vindi1. See 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1976).
2. 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1976).

3. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976).
4. The Sunshine Act became effective in 1977 and the Privacy Act became effective in

1974.
5. Additional administrative law cases reviewed and decided by the court of appeals during the year but not incorporated into this discussion include: Patterson v. National Transp.
Safety Bd., No. 79-1426 (10th Cir., May 27, 1980) (affirmed FAA's suspension of mechanic's
certificate); Selman v. Califano, 619 F.2d 881 (10th Cir. 1980) (affirmed district court's affirmance of Social Security Administration's denial of airline pilot's request for classification as independent contractor); Fry Bros. Corp. v. HUD, 614 F.2d 732 (10th Cir. 1980) (held that wage
determinations under Davis-Bacon Act are not subject to judicial review); Cowell v. National
Transp. Safety Bd., 612 F.2d 505 (10th Cir. 1980) (affirmed FAA's revocation of airman and
airman medical certificates); Terry v. National Transp. Safety Bd., 608 F.2d 418 (10th Cir.
1979) (affirmed FAA's suspension of commercial pilot's certificate); David v. Erdmann, 607
F.2d 917 (10th Cir. 1979) (reversed ruling of Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & Firearms refusing

import permit for pistol that was collector's item). See aLro notes 174 & 205 imfta.
6. 604 F.2d 664 (10th Cir. 1979), cert & id, 444 U.S. 1086 (1980).
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cate his constitutional rights in an action for monetary damages. The two
petitioners were prisoners at a federal penal institution in Oklahoma. Each
had filed suit in district court alleging that overcrowded conditions in the
facility subjected them to cruel and unusual punishment 7 in violation of the
eighth amendment. 8 The lower court summarily disposed of both cases on
the ground that neither prisoner had used the formal procedures for review
of prisoners' complaints. 9
On their consolidated appeal, the petitioners urged that the exhaustion
doctrine does not apply to situations where constitutional rights are at stake,
at least when the relief requested is monetary compensation. They argued
that the available administrative procedure did not provide for such an
award; thus, the inadequacy of the administrative remedy obviated the exhaustion prerequisite of judicial action. °
The court of appeals relied on two very different grounds to justify its
ultimate holding that the petitioners were indeed obliged to exhaust their
administrative remedies. In analyzing the claims, the court first observed
that the petitioners sought to establish a private right of action for damages
under a constitutional amendment, an approach similar to those actions recognized by the United States Supreme Court in Bi'ens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents 11 and Davs v. Passman.12 To maintain such an action three criteria
must be satisfied. First, the complaining party must assert the violation of a
constitutionally protected right. Second, the party must have no means to
enforce the right other than through the judiciary. And, finally, the complaining party must demonstrate that monetary relief will satisfactorily re13
dress the alleged constitutional violation.
With these requirements in mind, the Tenth Circuit determined that
facts would have to be developed to assess the validity of the petitioners'
cause of action. The court of appeals concluded that an administrative inquiry by the Bureau of Prisons would facilitate such a fact-finding process,
likening it to discovery in an ordinary civil case. The court explained that
this procedure should be utilized before the petitioners could properly seek
14
relief in the courts.
In addition to recognizing the need for an administrative proceeding to
evaluate the strength of the petitioners' claims, the court of appeals acknowledged the peculiar nature of the petitioners' status as prisoners. ' 5 In effect, it
deferred to the administrative machinery already in place for the resolution
of prisoners' grievances, thereby adhering to previous holdings reflecting a
7.
8.

Id. at 665.
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.

9. 604 F.2d at 665.
10. Id.
11. 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (private damages action recognized for violation of fourth amendment right to freedom from unlawful searches and seizures).
12. 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (private damages action recognized under fifth amendment due
process clause, U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl. 3, for alleged sex discrimination).
13. 604 F.2d 2d at 666 (citing Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); Bell v. Wolfish, 442
U.S. 520 (1979); Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978)).
14. 604 F.2d at 666-67.
15. Id. at 666.
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fervent desire to minimize judicial involvement with prison administration.' 6 The court concluded that the orderly and efficient disposition of prisoners' problems required the use of administrative channels. Petitions to a
court for relief cannot be "tickets to an immediate confrontation with the
guards and supervisors outside the prison and in the courtroom no matter
how they are framed."' 17 Thus, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district
court's dismissal of the prisoners' complaints. The appellate court added
that in such circumstances a trial court would be equally justified in retaining jurisdiction of a case while referring it to prison officials for administrative review before taking further action itself. 18
II.

RIPENESS

An attempt by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) to
clarify orders disapproving a natural gas supplier's emergency curtailment
plan created further confusion when one of the supplier's customers sought
judicial review of the agency's action. In General Motors Corp. v. FERC19 the
Tenth Circuit held that an "Order Clarifying Prior Order," issued by the
FERC, was not sufficiently "final" to permit review, and the court therefore
20
dismissed the petition before it.
Cities Service Gas Company, the supplier, proposed a restriction on new
service connections in anticipation of possible reductions in the quantity of
natural gas available to meet its existing customers' demands. The plan provoked a number of hearings and a plethora of orders. Initially, FERC refused to approve the Cities Service proposal because it did not include an
index indicating consumers' use requirements as of January 1, 1978. 2 ' In a
second order, the Commission called for further hearings and provided that
high priority customers could anticipate continued service connections by
their supplier.2 2 A subsequent order indicated that the FERC was uncertain
whether to require the use index after all but cautioned that the agency
might impose an index "as of January 1st" 23 and warned that new connec24
tions would be made at the gas distributors' risk.
The FERC detected an air of uncertainty among consumers and suppliers following this third order. Therefore, it issued one additional order denominated "Order Clarifying Prior Order" and announced that any index
of requirements ultimately imposed would not incorporate the January date
but would be prospective in application.25 The petitioner, General Motors,
16. See Martinez v. Aaron, 570 F.2d 317 (10th Cir. 1978); Mower v. Swyhart, 545 F.2d 103
(10th Cir. 1976); Marchesani v. McCune, 531 F.2d 459 (10th Cir. 1976); Rivera v. Toft, 477
F.2d 534 (10th Cir. 1973); Daugherty v. Harris, 476 F.2d 292 (10th Cir. 1973); Perez v. Turner,
462 F.2d 1056 (10th Cir. 1972); Smoake v. Willingham, 359 F.2d 386 (10th Cir. 1966).
17. 604 F.2d at 667.
18. Id. at 668.
19. 607 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1979).
20. Id. at 331.
21. Id. at 332.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. ld.
25. Id.
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objected to this decision, requested a rehearing, and upon denial of the request, appealed from the order.
The Tenth Circuit determined that the challenged order was merely a
"segment of ongoing hearings, and relate[d] to a subject not yet decided." ' 26
Thus, the court concluded that the order was not final and, therefore, was
not a proper matter for judicial scrutiny.2 7 The Commission had made no
decision to exact an index of requirements from Cities Service but had stated
only that any index requested would take effect prospectively. "This may be
a prehearing indication of [the FERC's] position, but this is not a matter ripe
' ' 28
for judicial review.
Additionally, the petitioner challenged the Commission's manner of issuing the clarification order, alleging that FERC could not properly enter
such an order without additional hearings. It further contended that the
agency had relied on events outside the administrative record to reach its
decision. 29 The appellate court refused to sustain these objections, holding
that the Commission had authority to change its position on the requirements index and on the applicable dates. 30 It found that the FERC had
adequately explained the reasons for the change and concluded that new
supporting evidence was unnecessary. 3 1 "[Tihe Commission may act in a
pending case without a petition requesting action. The Commission has a
continuing duty to consider the consequences of actions it has taken in ongoing proceedings, and to make adjustments it considers to be in the public
32
interest. "
III.

PRIMARY JURISDICTION

The doctrine of primary jurisdiction endeavors to promote harmony between the judiciary and the administrative agencies. When a claim for relief
falls within the jurisdiction of both a court and an agency, the former may
suspend its proceedings and refer issues within the agency's authority and
expertise to it for resolution. Referral is not mandatory, but it is often done
to achieve uniformity in the application of certain statutes and regulations
and to utilize an agency's specialized knowledge so that final disposition of a
33
matter will be intelligent and accurate.
In Sunflower Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Kansas Power & Light Co.34 the
Tenth Circuit reviewed the propriety of a district court's invocation of the
primary jurisdiction doctrine to justify both its refusal to entertain an antitrust action involving certain public utilities and its referral of the matter to
26. Id. at 333.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 332.
30. Id. at 333.
31. Id. at 334.
32. Id.
33. Seegene'rally United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59, 63-65 (1956); Far East
Conference v. United States, 342 U.S. 570, 574-75 (1952); 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
TREATISE §§ 19.01, .07 (1958); K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 19.01
(1976).
34. 603 F.2d 791 (10th Cir. 1979).
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the Federal Power Commission (FPC) for resolution. The plaintiff, Sunflower Electric, a cooperative that sold electric energy to its Kansas members, alleged in its complaint that the defendants had unlawfully combined
and conspired to monopolize the supply of "firm bulk power." Additionally,
it alleged that a contemplated merger of several of the defendant power
companies would violate the antitrust laws. 35 The district court perceived a
possibility of conflict between a judicial resolution of the merger issue and
the FPC's ultimate disposition of the merger application before it. 36 That
court also identified a need for the agency's expertise in the matter. Thus, it
elected to stay the antitrust action pending the agency's resolution of the
37
merger question.
The Tenth Circuit, however, concluded that the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction did not apply to the proceeding. After a lengthy review and
analysis of the lower court's opinion, 38 of the underpinnings of primary jurisdiction, 39 and of the leading case law, 4° it reversed the lower court's decision
and remanded the case for a trial on the merits. 41 The appellate court's
reasoning was based on several considerations. First, it noted that public
utilities are not immune from the federal antitrust laws. 42 Next, it examined
the extent of the FPC's jurisdiction over the "interstate transmission of electricity" at the time Sunflower Electric commenced its lawsuit. 43 Finding
35. Id. at 793. Sunflower Electric based its claims on sections one and two of the Sherman
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976).
36. A public utility may not sell or lease its facilities or merge or otherwise consolidate with
another utility until it has obtained the government's approval. &ee 16 U.S.C. § 824b(a) (1976).
37. The district court relied primarily on the Supreme Court's decision in Ricci v. Chicago
Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289 (1973). Among other things, Rzcci counsels a court to abstain
from judicial review when "some facets of the dispute... are within the statutory jurisdiction"
of an agency. Id. at 302.
38. 603 F.2d at 793-95.
39. Id. at 795-96.
40. Id. at 796-98.
41. Id. at 799.
42. The court of appeals relied primarily on the Supreme Court's decision in Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). Ricci and Oiler Tailreach different conclusions
about the administrative and judicial roles in antitrust actions involving regulated industries,
prompting Professor Davis to observe that reconciling the two decisions "seems rather difficult."
K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw OF THE SEVENTIES § 19.06 (1976).
The source of the conflict stems from a desire to accommodate, to the greatest extent possible, both federal antitrust and other regulatory schemes. The problem is recurring.
It arises when conduct seemingly within the reach of the antitrust laws is also at least
arguably protected or prohibited by another regulatory statute enacted by Congress.
Often, but not always, the other regime includes an administrative agency with authority to enforce the major provisions of the statute in accordance with that statute's
distinctive standards, which may or may not include concern for competitive considerations.
Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. at 299-300.
Ricci advocated deference to an agency's jurisdiction, at least when it is not immediately
clear whether the antitrust laws apply to the industry or transaction in question. Id. at 301-08.
Oiler Tail, however, in a factual setting involving power companies, held that public utilities are
clearly not insulated from antitrust liability and found that the FPC had no authority to provide remedies sufficient to redress the alleged violations. 410 U.S. at 373-74. Under those circumstances there seemed to be no reason for the district court to delay its review of the antitrust
claims.
43. 603 F.2d at 798. With the creation of the Department of Energy and the transfer of the
FPC's powers to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), the latter agency received additional authority with respect to the transmission of power. See id. at 793 n. 1. The
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that the Commission principally had responsibility for rates and charges 44
and that prior judicial edicts 45 disapproved of its ordering interconnections
of facilities or coordinated power development by utilities, 46 the court of
appeals concluded that the FPC had clearly "lacked authority to deal with
the problems which were present in the district court case. . . . [T]he referral to the Commission was a futile move. . . . [I]t would have been merely
a postponement of the day for coming to grips with the monopolizing issue." 4 7 Thus, the Tenth Circuit concluded that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction was not relevant to the matter; a trial on the merits of the
plaintiff's claims could properly proceed. The mere possibility of a conflict
between a judicial decision and the agency's disposition of the merger appli48
cation was not enough to require abstention.
On rehearing, the court of appeals considered the effect of the Public
Utility Regulatory Policies Act, 49 which amended the Federal Power Act
and increased the FERC's regulatory authority,5 0 on its earlier disposition of
Sunflower Electric. Acknowledging the general rule that a change of law must
be given effect in a pending case, 5 ' the court nevertheless invoked a limitation on the rule that prevents its application if "manifest injustice" might
52
result or if a statute and its legislative history indicate a contrary intent.
The court of appeals found that a referral of the case to the FERC would
53
create additional delays and further prolong an already protracted lawsuit.
At bar Sunflower seeks treble damages . . . . injunctive relief in
the form of wheeling and power interconnects, and attorneys' fees.
It is possible that it would not be deprived of its rights in this regard if the matter were to be transferred to the Commission. It is
certain, however, that they [sic] would suffer delay and a hazard of
54
complete denial because a delay of this kind is frequently critical.
In the congressional conference report to the Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act, the Tenth Circuit found expressions of an intention to preserve
the courts' jurisdiction over actions involving public utilities that arise under
the antitrust laws. 55 This legislative history lent further support to the court
of appeals' conclusion that the new law could not be applied in Sunflower
court did not apply the Federal Power Act's amendments that created the broader authority
because Congress did not expressly give them retroactive effect. Id. at 798.
44. Id.
45. E.g., Conway Corp. v. FPC, 510 F.2d 1264 (D.C. Cir. 1975), afd, 426 U.S. 271 (1976).
See a/so Richmond Power & Light v. FERC, 574 F.2d 610 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
46. 603 F.2d at 799.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 798. See also Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. at 377.
49. Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3117 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2645 (Supp. III 1979)).
.50. See note 43 supra.
51. 603 F.2d at 800.
52. Id. (quoting Bradley v. Richmond School Bd., 416 U.S. 696, 711 (1974)).
53. Sunflower Electric instituted the action in 1975. 603 F.2d at 793.
54. Id. at 801.

55. "[It is not intended that the courts defer actions arising under the antitrust laws pending a resolution of such matters by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. . . . T]he
courts have jurisdiction to proceed with antitrust cases without deferring to the Commission for
the exercise of primary jurisdiction." H.R. REP. No. 95-1750, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 68, repninted
in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.NEws 7659, 7802.
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Electric to work a referral to the agency even though the FERC could, with
its new powers, grant the relief that the plaintiff requested. Thus, there
proved to be "no escape from the conclusion that the cause must be heard by
56
the district court."
IV.
A.

SCOPE OF AUTHORITY

Price Support Loans

The plaintiff in Hiatt Grain & Feed,Inc. v. Bergland,57 a class action, challenged the authority of the Secretary of Agriculture to promulgate regulations authorizing price support loans to cooperatives for wheat and feed
grains. 58 Relying on the pertinent statutory language and on congressional
policy, as well as on the agency's construction of the controlling statute, 59 the
Tenth Circuit held that the Secretary had such authority and affirmed the
6°
district court's judgment.
The plaintiff argued that the statute authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to make loans to "cooperators" 6 1 contemplates that assistance will be
given to producers. Hiatt Grain urged that farmers' marketing cooperatives
are not producers and, therefore, are not cooperators within the meaning of
the controlling law. 6 2 Observing that cooperatives are merely an aggregation of individual producers63 and noting that a cooperative must be approved by the Secretary to be eligible for a price support loan, 64 the court of
appeals focused on statutory language directing the Secretary to furnish
price supports "through loans, purchases, or other operations,' 65 and "through
the Commodity Credit Corporation and other means available to him." 66 In
these phrases the court found evidence of sufficient congressional guidance
and direction to justify the agency's action. It also pointed to long-standing
congressional interest in promoting the use of marketing cooperatives to implement farm programs. 6 7 In the appellate court's view, this policy, coupled
with the express language of the statute, allowed only one conclusion.
Evidence of the agency's construction of the statutory mandate to make
price supports available further persuaded the court of the propriety of the
Secretary's wheat regulations. Acting on the assumption that it had the requisite authority, the agency had on previous occasions allowed loans to cooperatives for such other commodities as cotton, peanuts, and rice. 68 The court
identified these actions as "a clear interpretation demonstrated by parallel
56. 603 F.2d at 802.
57. 602 F.2d 929 (10th Cir. 1979), cerl. demed, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980).

58. 602 F.2d at 930.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

Id. at 931-33.
Id. at 933-34.
Id. at 931.
See 7 U.S.C. § 1428b (Supp. III 1979).
602 F.2d at 932.
Id.
7 U.S.C. § 1441 (1976) (emphasis added).
IM. § 1421(a) (emphasis added).
602 F.2d at 933.

68. Id.
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programs," 69 and, in keeping with the judicial policy of according great
weight to an administrative body's construction of the laws it is directed to
execute, 70 the court found this evidence sufficient to uphold the challenged
regulations. 7 ' The court of appeals also presumed congressional awareness
72
of the agency's prior conduct with respect to price supports, implying that
Congress could have acted to prohibit loans to cooperatives had it disapproved of the practice.
In disposing of the plaintiff's allegation that procedural infirmities attended the promulgation of the regulation, 73 the appellate court noted that
the agency had furnished a reasoned decision based on an economic analysis
and an impact statement. Furthermore, it had complied with the Adminis74
Thus, the regulation
trative Procedure Act's rulemaking requirements.
was free of defects.
B.

Distributionof Royalty Oil

Unlike the administrative interpretation of the controlling statute in Hiatt Grain & Feed, which the Tenth Circuit found to be consistent with a rea75
sonable interpretation and with congressional directives, the Secretary of
76
to the Mineral
the Interior's construction of the O'Mahoney Amendment
Lands Leasing Act of 192077 was rejected by the court in Plateau, Inc. v. De79
Acpartment ofthe Intertor78 as being inconsistent with the legislative intent.
cordingly, the court of appeals upheld the district court's invalidation of
certain regulations enacted by the agency governing the distribution of royalty oil 80 to refineries. 8 1
The plaintiff, a small oil refinery, objected to the Secretary's conditioning eligibility for sales of royalty oil on satisfaction of the Small Business
82
Plateau argued
Administration's criteria for a "small business enterprise."
that Congress had expressly limited recipients to refineries lacking a source
for crude oil supplies; thus, any attempt by the3 agency to impose further
8
restrictions exceeded the scope of its authority.
84
Following a brief review of the legislative history, the Tenth Circuit
sided with the plaintiff, concluding that "the amendment itself identifies the

69. Id.
70. See Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 4 (1965).
71. 602 F.2d at 934.
72.

Id. at 933.

73. Id. at 934.
74.

See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (1976).

75. 602 F.2d at 934.
76. Act of July 13, 1946, Pub. L. No. 79-506, 60 Stat. 533 (1946) (codified in 30 U.S.C.
§ 192 (1976)).
77. 30 U.S.C. §§ 181-263 (1976).
78. 603 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1979).
79. Id. at 164.
80. According to the appellate court, "[r]oyalty oil is received as in-kind payment for royalties from oil and gas leases on federal lands." Id. at 161 n. 1. The Secretary of the Interior is
authorized to sell such oil to refineries. Id. at 161 n.2.
81. Id. at 164.
82. Id. at 161. Set 30 C.F.R. § 225.2 (1978); 13 C.F.R. § 121.3-9(a)(1) (1980).
83. 603 F.2d at 163.
84. Id.
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refineries it is intended to benefit. The challenged regulation goes beyond
what Congress authorized," 8 5 The court rejected the Secretary's claim to
broad, unfettered discretion in the administration of the royalty oil program.
Noting the variations in the agency's application of the statute, as reflected
in regulations promulgated through the years since its enactment, 86 the
court advised that "even if the Secretary had followed a consistent pattern of
administrative interpretation, to the extent such interpretation might have
been inconsistent with the congressional mandate, it would have been unavailing."
C.

87

Product Efctieness Standards

On a question of first impression concerning the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA) power under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and
Rodenticide Acta to establish and regulate effectiveness standards for pesticides, the Tenth Circuit rejected the agency's interpretation of its statutory
authority and confined it to a limited regulatory scheme. In SL. Cowley &
Sons Manufacturing Co. v. EPA89 the petitioner appealed the EPA's cancellation of the registration of Cowley's Original Rat and Mouse Poison. The
EPA justified its action on the ground that the poison did not meet mini9°
mum effectiveness standards for rodenticides.
The court of appeals distinguished the agency's legitimate authority to
sanction the misbranding and inaccurate labelling of products from the
EPA's assumed ability to enforce effectiveness criteria. "[T]he agency has a
duty under the statute to insure that the product satisfies" claims of efficacy
accompanying it; but, "[niothing in either the scheme or the specific language hints at a broader standard." 9 1 In reversing the EPA's cancellation
order, the appellate court directed that the registrant manufacturer was enti92
tled to a hearing only on charges of improper labelling.
D.

TransportationMatters
In Walker Field, Colorado, Pubhc Airport Authority v. Adams9 3 the Tenth

Circuit held that the Secretary of Transportation has broad discretion under
the Airport and Airway Development and Revenue Act 94 in granting
financial assistance for airport improvements. The plaintiff challenged the
Secretary's attempt to require Mesa County and the City of Grand Junction,
Colorado to act as sponsors and assume financial obligations for the local
airport's construction project. The two political subdivisions refused to cosponsor the venture. The plaintiff airport authority made improvements
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 164.
Id. at 163.
Id. at 164.
7 U.S.C. §§ 135-135k (1976).
615 F.2d 1312 (10th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1313.
Id. at 1314.
Id.
606 F.2d 290 (10th Cir. 1979).
49 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1742 (1976).
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with its own funds, but the government declined to reimburse it without the
95
participation of the City and the County in the grant agreement.
Agreeing with the Secretary of Transportation's contention that he had
statutory authority to impose reasonable and necessary terms and conditions
on grants made under the Airport Development Act, 96 the district court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a legally cognizable claim. 9 7 The
Tenth Circuit also adopted the Secretary's argument and further pointed to
statutory provisions directing the Secretary to insure that sufficient funds are
available to cover construction expenses not shared by the federal government. 98 Relying on these broad mandates, the appellate court ignored the
airport authority's argument that neither the City nor the County fell within
the statutory definition of a sponsor. 99
The plaintiff, joined by the State of Colorado as amicus, also claimed a
violation of the constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental immunity, alleging that the Secretary's actions effectively overrode the State's express policy of promoting the financial independence of airport facilities.'00 The
court, however, disposed of this argument in short order, citing the federal
government's recognized authority to impose conditions on the funds it disburses to the states. Furthermore, the court of appeals found no conflict
between the Secretary's requirement and the Supreme Court's instruction in
NationalLeague of Cities v. UseryI0 that financial conditions cannot "displace
the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional
10 2
governmental functions.'
Judge McKay, in dissent, opined that the majority's insistence that the
challenged administrative action imposed "no direct, mandatory terms and
conditions" on the state and its subdivisions and the majority's further assumption that the state and its agencies, such as the Walker Field Airport
Authority could, by declining federal grants, easily avoid obligations exacted
by the federal government, 10 3 were superficial rationales for the decisions.
The dissenting judge noted that few states are financially able to provide all
services to their citizens without some federal assistance.
The possibility of refusing federal grants is often only apparent, not
real . . . . When grants have risen to this level of necessity, attached conditions must withstand close constitutional scrutiny similar to that applied in National League of Cities to direct regulation of
state governmental structure. The federally imposed requirements
here fail to survive that scrutiny. 1° 4
95.

606 F.2d at 293.

96. The Secretary pointed to statutory language directing him to offer project grants
"upon such terms and conditions as [he] considers necessary to meet the requirements of this
subchapter and the regulations." 49 U.S.C. § 1719 (1976).
97. 606 F.2d at 294. The district court also found that if a cause of action did in fact exist,
the United States Court of Claims had exclusive jurisdiction over it. Id.
98. Id. at 296.
99. See id. at 295-96.
100. Id. at 297.
101. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
102. 606 F.2d at 297 (quoting National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. at 852).
103. 606 F.2d at 297.
104. Id. at 299 (McKay, J., dissenting).
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On constitutional grounds and on general principles of federalism, Judge
McKay would have reversed the district court's judgment.' 0 5
In what was probably a last frantic effort, the States of Kansas and
Minnesota and the City of Nashville, Tennessee requested judicial assistance
to avert the termination of passenger rail service in their respective locales.
Their action on appeal, Kansas v. Adams, 10 6 sought reversal of a lower court's
dissolution of an order temporarily restraining the cessation of service. To
support their position, they urged that the Secretary of Transportation's
preparation of a plan for reduction of passenger service violated a number of
federal laws,' 0 7 including the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA)10 8 and the Clean Air Act, 10 9 and was, therefore, improper and unauthorized.
The Tenth Circuit upheld the district court's action and affirmed its
denial of a preliminary injunction. After reviewing the language and the
legislative history of the Amtrak Reorganization Act of 1979,110 which incorporated and adopted the Secretary of Transportation's recommendations,
the court of appeals concluded that the Congress had closely scrutinized and
ultimately ratified the plan and had approved the procedures the agency
used to restructure the rail system.II' In thus lending its imprimatur to the
administrative report, the Congress effectively made the plan its own. "[W]e
have," the court said, "a direct Congressional decision designing the basic
rail system, without the necessity of following [NEPA's procedural provisions]." 1 1 2 Mindful of the sacred principle of the separation of powers, the
Tenth Circuit refused to inquire further into the wisdom of the surrogate
13
legislative determination.'
Even in this era of airline deregulation, it appears from the Tenth Circuit's third transportation decision that air carriers remain subject to some
administrative oversight. In fact, the court's holding in FrontierAirlines, Inc. V.
CAB' 14 indicates that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978'15 implies that
with respect to attempted departures from established routes, airlines are
still at the mercy of the federal regulators.
Frontier notified the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) early in 1979 of its
intention to discontinue service to Alamogordo and Silver City, New Mexico. When the ninety-day notice period had elapsed without a replacement
carrier having entered the market, the CAB ordered Frontier to continue its
105. Id. at 300.
106. 608 F.2d 861 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 963 (1980).
107. Id. at 863-64.
108. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1976). The other acts and regulations allegedly violated by
the Secretary's action were the Amtrak Improvement Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-421, 92 Stat.
923 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 45 U.S.C.), the National Historic Preservation Act,
16 U.S.C. §§ 470-470t (1976), and certain guidelines issued by the Council on Environmental
Quality, 40 C.F.R. §§ 1500.1-1501.4 (1980).
109. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (Supp. 11 1978).
110. Pub. L. No. 96-73, 93 Stat. 537 (1979) (codified in scattered sections of 45, 49 U.S.C.).
111. See generally 608 F.2d 864-66.
112. Id. at 866.
113. Id. at 867.
114. 621 F.2d 369 (10th Cir. 1980).
115. Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 49 U.S.C.).
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service for several additional thirty-day intervals. Even after a new airline
offered to establish routes to the two communities, the CAB ordered Frontier
to maintain "back-up" service until it could be certain the new carrier was
capable of handling the routes. Disgruntled by its inability to ease out of the
Alamogordo and Silver City runs, the airline sought judicial review of the
Board's "back-up" orders." 16
Disposing quickly of the CAB's mootness argument" 17 and the agency's
1
allegation that Frontier had not exhausted its administrative remedies, 3
the Tenth Circuit proceeded to review the Board's authority under the 1978
Airline Deregulation Act. The court found that concomitant with the
agency's express statutory authority to order an airline to serve a route until
a replacement carrier steps in 1 19 is the implied authority to request an airline to provide support service until the new carrier is established on the
route. "The statutory grant of the greater implies a grant of the lesser, i.e.,
the power to compel actual service carries with it the power to order back-up
service. '"120 The court considered this ruling necessary to effectuate the legislative intent "that no small community shall be left without essential air
services, on a continuing basis." 1 2i As in Hiatt Graih & Feed, Inc. v. Bergland'122 the Tenth Circuit found additional support for its decision in the
agency's construction of the applicable statute insofar as it was reasonable
123
and comported with the apparent congressional intent.
V.

SUFFICIENCY OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE RECORD

Two cases required the Tenth Circuit to consider the need for and sufficiency of an administrative record. United States V. X-Otag Plus Tablets 124 involved a challenge to the district court's refusal to remand a case for
development of an administrative record. In Midwest Maintenance & Construction Co. v. Vela,' 2 5 on the other hand, the inadequacy of the existing record
precluded the district court from upholding an agency's decision.
The appellant in the X-Otag Plus Tablets case was a pharmaceutical
manufacturer of a prescription drug used to relieve muscular pain.' 26 The
116. 621 F.2d at 370.
117. "A 30-day order of the type here involved is almost a classic example of a matter which
is 'capable of repetition, yet evading review.' " Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125
(1973)).
118. In light of the Board's virtual certainty that it had authority to issue back-up orders, "it
is very doubtful that the Board would have vacated its back-up orders had a motion for reconsideration been filed." 621 F.2d at 371. Apparently, the court felt that the likely futility of an
appeal to the agency exempted Frontier from the exhaustion requirement. See American Fed'n
of Gov't Employees v. Acree, 475 F.2d 1289 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Additionally, administrative
remedies need not be pursued "where the question is solely one of statutory interpretation." 621
F.2d at 371 (citing McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185, 197-98 (1969)).
119. See 49 U.S.C. § 1389(a)(6) (Supp. III 1979).
120. 621 F.2d at 372.
121. Id. at 371-72.
122. See 602 F.2d 929 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1073 (1980). For a discussion of
Hi;att Grain & Feed, see text accompanying notes 57-71 supra.
123. 621 F.2d at 372.
124. 602 F.2d 1387 (10th Cir. 1979).
125. 621 F.2d 1046 (10th Cir. 1980).
126. 602 F.2d at 1389.
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Food and Drug Administration (FDA) seized a quantity of the drug and
instituted condemnation proceedings.' 27 It also sought an injunction to prevent shipments of the drug in interstate commerce.' 28 To justify these enforcement actions, the government contended that X-Otag Plus was a "new
drug" within the meaning of the Food and Drug Act 129 and could not be
introduced into interstate commerce until a new drug application or an abbreviated new drug application had been approved by the FDA. 130 The
manufacturer had in fact submitted the required applications 1 3 1 but had not
132
done so prior to circulating the drug for public consumption.
The district court was called upon to determine whether the FDA's decision to commence an enforcement action by way of condemnation constituted a declaratory order 133 requiring development of an administrative
record. 134 That court concluded the FDA's allegation that X-Otag Plus was
a "new drug" was not such an order but was, rather, an assertion of probable
135
cause, which was necessary to support the enforcement action.
The Tenth Circuit agreed and affirmed the lower court's refusal to remand the case to the FDA. Crucial to its decision was a finding that the
condemnation proceeding had been brought against only one drug manufacturer and involved only a limited quantity of the drug.' 3 6 These circumstances removed it from the realm of a declaratory order and obviated the
need for a formal record. The court distinguished Rutherford v. United
States,' 37 which, the appellant urged, required a remand to the FDA, noting
that in Rutherford the agency had classified laetrile as a "new drug" and
banned its distribution without issuing a formal rule or producing a record
to support its decision. The court found that the district court had ample
evidence to uphold the FDA's assertion that X-Otag Plus was a "new drug"
for probable cause purposes, and the appellate court concluded that the
manufacturer had had an opportunity at trial to rebut the FDA's case before
38
an injunction or destruction order was issued. '
The Tenth Circuit also upheld the trial court's finding that the government had established by a preponderance of the evidence that X-Otag Plus
was a "new drug" for purposes of the condemnation proceeding. ' 39 But, the
court of appeals reversed the lower court's destruction order, concluding that
127. The FDA has authority to seize any misbranded or adulterated food, drug, or cosmetic
item introduced into interstate commerce. Se 21 U.S.C. § 334 (1976).

128. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(d), 332(a) (1976).
129. Id. § 321(p)(1).
130. See id. § 355(a).
131. 602 F.2d at 1389-90.
132. Id. at 1390.
133. The Supreme Court has defined a declaratory order as a "self-operative industry-wide
regulation." Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 147 (1967). Sergenerally I K. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 4.10 (1958).
134. United States v. X-Otag Plus Tablets, 441 F. Supp. 105, 108 (D. Colo. 1977).
135. Id. at 109.
136. 602 F.2d at 1390.
137. 542 F.2d 1137 (10th Cir. 1976).
138. 602 F.2d at 1390.
139. Id. at 1391.
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the statutory language allowing destruction of condemned articles 140 is "advisory rather than mandatory and clearly implies that the court has some
14
discretion over the time and manner of destruction." 1
In Midwest Maintenance & Constructzon Co. v. Vela 142 the appellant sought
review of a ruling by the Secretary of Labor declaring its ineligibility to bid
on government contracts for a three-year period. The appellant corporation
was awarded a contract to maintain and repair certain federally owned
equipment in several regions in Texas. Federal law requires contractors
working for the government to pay wages compatible with those paid to
other employees "in the locality"' 14 3 but in no event should compensation
fall below the minimum wage' 44 provided in the Fair Labor Standards
Act. 145 Many government contracts include a wage determination with
which a contractor must comply. Midwest had received such a scale for
counties adjacent to where it performed its contract, but it had been given
nothing to indicate appropriate remuneration in the county where the work
46
was to be done.1
As Midwest was nearing completion of the contract, the Department of
Labor disclosed that the company had paid its employees less than the
amounts specified in the wage determination for the neighboring regions,
although it had paid more than the federal minimum wage. 147 Midwest, of
course, challenged the agency's attempts to force Midwest to compensate for
the alleged underpayments, and the dispute culminated in the filing of an
administrative complaint that charged the company with violations of certain sections of the Service Contract Act. 148 An administrative law judge
found Midwest liable for underpayments totalling $61,337.24; 14 9 the administrator of the Wage and Hour Division upheld the decision; and the Secretary of Labor imposed the ineligibility sanction. The district court
150
subsequently affirmed these rulings.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit rejected the finding that Midwest had
waived or relinquished its rights to obtain a clarification of the applicable
wage scale by failing to do so in a timely manner. The appellate court also
repudiated a finding that the company had taken advantage of competing
bidders when the contract was initially awarded. Both conclusions, the
court said, lacked support in the administrative record.151
The court also had to consider the meaning of "locality" as used in the
Service Contract Act 152 because the locality determines the appropriate
140.

21 U.S.C. § 334(d)(1) (1976).

141. 602 F.2d at 1391.
142. 621 F.2d 1046 (10th Cir. 1980).
143. 41 U.S.C. § 351(a)(1), (2) (Supp. III 1979).
144. Id. § 351(b)(1).
145. 29 U.S.C. § 206(a)(1) (1976).
146. 621 F.2d at 1047.
147. Id.
148. See 41 U.S.C. § 351(a)(1), (2) (Supp. III 1979).
149. 621 F.2d at 1048.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 1049.
152. 41 U.S.C. § 351(a)(1) (1976). See text accompanying notes 143-145, supra.
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wage. Midwest argued that locality meant the place of performance, but the
agency disagreed and designated it as the location of the federal contracting
facility. 15 3 The Tenth Circuit attempted to find support for the agency's
contention in the record of the proceeding. 154 Observing that neither the
administrative law judge nor the wage and hour administrator had discussed
the terms of the bid invitation or the contract, the court noted the ambiguities in both documents and chided the government for failing to specify the
meaning of "locality."' 155 Furthermore, the agency's failure to analyze the
contract and to indicate the reasoning underlying its ultimate definition of
the word proved fatal. On the basis of the "miserable administrative record" 156 the appellate court refused to decide whether the place of performance or the location of the contracting facility controlled the compensation
rate. Thus, the court was unable to alleviate the void created by the absence
of appellate decisions on the issue. 1 57 The Tenth Circuit Court further concluded that the agency had failed to establish a "rational basis" for its decision.' 58 Accordingly, the court set aside the ineligibility sanction and
remanded the case to the district court with instructions that the matter be
159
returned to the Department of Labor for further proceedings.

VI.

ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCH WARRANTS

The United States Supreme Court's decision in Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc.16° indicates that administrative inspections of private premises conducted without warrants violate the fourth amendment's 61 prohibition
against unreasonable searches. In conformity with the Court's mandate, and
after officers of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) had been denied entry, the Department of Labor obtained a warrant ex parte to search the New Mexico plant of the W & W Steel Company
to confirm the existence of unsafe conditions as alleged by an employee. The
company subsequently contested the validity of the warrant in Marshallv. W
& WSteel Co., 1 6 2 charging that the agency had had no authority to obtain
the warrant ex parte and without notice. W & W Steel argued that the
regulation enabling the Department to secure inspection warrants 163 was invalid. The company asserted that the regulation had been improperly
amended by reason of the agency's failure to provide notice of the change
and opportunity for comment. 164
153. 621 F.2d at 1049.
154. The applicable standard for judicial review in this case provided that the agency's
finding would be conclusive if supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 1048.
155. Id. at 1050.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1049.
158. Id. at 1051.
159. Id.
160. 436 U.S. 307 (1978).
161. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
162. 604 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir. 1979).
163. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4 (1979).
164. 604 F.2d at 1325. The regulation was amended in 1978 to define "compulsory process," which the agency is authorized to employ to gain entry to private establishments for inspections, to include ex parte warrants. See 29 C.F.R. § 1903.4(d) (1979).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:2

In its review of the matter, the Tenth Circuit observed that the
Supreme Court seemed to approve the issuance of ex parte warrants in its
Barlow's opinion. 165 Having thus briefly considered the constitutionality of
ex parte warrants 66 and thereby implicitly holding that the Secretary of
Labor could properly procure one, the Tenth Circuit accepted the agency's
argument that the challenged amendment was an interpretive rule.' 67 As
such, it was expressly exempt from the Administrative Procedure Act's notice and comment requirements 168 and was, therefore, validly promulgated.
The court of appeals also agreed that the employee's written complaint
and his supplemental written statement together with the OSHA compliance officer's account of his attempts to verify the complaint were sufficient
evidence to justify a finding of probable cause to support issuance of the
inspection warrant. The court rejected the company's contention that the
scope of the warrant was too broad.' 69 Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's order holding the W & W Steel Company in contempt and imposing a fine for its repeated refusals to admit an OSHA
70
inspector bearing the search warrant.
VII.

COMPULSORY PROCESS

One realm of the administrative scheme in which the judiciary is able to
take an active role is that involving the enforcement of compulsory process.
Although many agencies have statutory authority to issue subpoenas and
summonses, 17 1 the documents have no independent force. 172 Thus, if a
party chooses not to comply with an agency's request for information during
the course of a proceeding, the agency must seek judicial assistance to com73
pel submission to its directive.'
The Tenth Circuit considered several compulsory process cases during
the past year. Significant for their sheer numerosity are those cases the court
summarily disposed of involving the enforcement of Internal Revenue Service (IRS) summonses. Three opinions' 74 merit brief consideration here be165.
166.
167.

See 436 U.S. at 319-20.
604 F.2d at 1325 n.1.
Id. at 1325-26. For a discussion of the force and effect of interpretative rules, see I K.

DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 5.03 (1958);

1 K.

DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw

TREATISE §§ 7.8-.18 (2d ed. 1978).
168. See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (1976).
169. 604 F.2d at 1326.
170. Id. at 1326-27.
171. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 1464(d) (1976) (Federal Home Loan Bank Board); 15 U.S.C.
§ 79r(c) (1976) (Securities and Exchange Commission); 49 U.S.C. § 1484(b) (1976) (Civil Aeronautics Board); 49 U.S.C. § 1903(b)(1) (National Transportation Safety Board).
172. Seegenerally I K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE §§ 3.11, 3.12 (1958).
173. The Administrative Procedure Act authorizes courts to enforce compulsory process and
establishes the appropriate standard for review.
On contest, the court shall sustain the subpoena or similar process or demand to the
extent that it is found to be in accordance with law. In a proceeding for enforcement,
the court shall issue an order requiring the appearance of the witness or the production of the evidence or data within a reasonable time under penalty of punishment for
contempt in case of contumacious failure to comply.
5 U.S.C. § 555(d) (1976).
174. The opinions discussed in this section were ordered by the court to be published. Two
additional compulsory process opinions were issued for publication, both of which were consoli-
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cause they were the bases for the court's multiple affirmances of the district
courts' 1 75 decisions to enforce the challenged process.
In United States v. Income Realty & Mortgage, Inc. 176 and in United States v.
MacKay1 " the court of appeals relied on two Supreme Court decisions to
reject the taxpayers' arguments that the IRS summonses had been issued
improperly for the purpose of pursuing tax fraud investigations. The leading
case of United States v. Powell1 78 established, and the case of United States v.
LaSalle National Bank1 79 further refined, the test for ascertaining whether an
IRS summons has been issued for the permissible function of determining
civil tax liability or for the impermissible purpose of substantiating suspicions of criminal conduct. To justify its use of the summons power, the Service must show that its investigation is being conducted for a legitimate, that
is, a civil, purpose; that its request for documents or testimony relates to that
purpose; that the information sought is not already in its possession; and that
the statutory procedure has been followed. 8 0° Furthermore, the summons
must be issued before the IRS has recommended a criminal investigation by
the Department of Justice, and it must appear that the civil liability claims
will be pursued as well. 18 Finally, the taxpayer carries the substantial burden of proving that the IRS has instituted compulsory process in bad
faith. 182
On the basis of the record before it, which apparently indicated to the
appellate court that the Supreme Court's requirements had been met, the
Tenth Circuit concluded in Income Realty that the district court had properly
ordered enforcement of the summonses at issue. The court of appeals also
found insufficient evidence of harrassment to support the taxpayer's
charge. i83 Similarly, in MacKay, the court carefully reviewed the Powell and
LaSalle decisions 1 8 4 and scrutinized the record for evidence that the requisite
conditions had been met.' 8 5 Ultimately, it affirmed the district court's judgment enforcing the challenged IRS summons.1 86 Despite substantial criminal overtones to the Service's investigation, the court could not conclude that
the effort was solely in pursuit of a criminal sanction. "The activities of the
dations of multiple appeals. See United States v. Omohundro, 619 F.2d 51 (10th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Traynor, 611 F.2d 809 (10th Cir. 1979). Eighteen more enforcement opinions
were not issued for publication.
175. The federal court for the District of Colorado was beseiged by these summons challenges. It heard 17 cases. The District of Wyoming and the Western District of Oklahoma were
responsible for the balance.
176. 612 F.2d 1224 (10th Cir. 1979).
177. 608 F.2d 830 (10th Cir. 1979).
178. 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
179. 437 U.S. 298 (1978). See generally Note, The Institutional
Good Faith Testfor Enforcement of
an Internal Revenue Service Summons: United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 56 DEN. L.J. 639
(1979).
180. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. at 57-58; United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437
U.S. at 312.
181. United States v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 437 U.S. at 318.
182. Id. at 316. "Without doubt, this burden is a heavy one." Id.
183. 612 F.2d at 1226.
184. 608 F.2d at 832-33.
185. Id. at 833-34.
186. Id. at 834.
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agents were entirely consistent with the [LaSalle] concept that criminal tax
'8 7
fraud charges and civil penalties are interrelated."'
In UnitedStates v. Fahey' a8 two taxpayers attempted to prevent enforcement of a summons with the novel contention that the federal government
has no constitutional authority to initiate civil suits against United States
citizens. Therefore, the taxpayers argued, a court is without jurisdiction to
enforce an IRS summons or, apparently, any other agency's compulsory
process. The Tenth Circuit's four-paragraph opinion, cited frequently in
subsequent enforcement decisions,' 8a9 rejected this admittedly "creative" argument as "frivolous."
The court of appeals also had occasion to consider the exercise of an
agency's subpoena power. NLRB v. Dutch Boy, Inc. 19 0 challenged a district
court's enforcement of three subpoenas duces tecum issued by the National
Labor Relations Board (NLRB). While preparing for hearings on unfair
labor practice charges that had been filed against Dutch Boy, the NLRB
subpoenaed certain documents belonging to the company. When the latter
refused to produce all of the requested materials, the Board sought judicial
assistance. Dutch Boy also attempted to enforce a subpoena initially
granted it to obtain certain of the NLRB's records, which was subsequently
revoked by an administrative law judge. The lower court, however, dismissed Dutch Boy's application for enforcement, asserting that it lacked jurisdiction over the matter. 19 1
The Tenth Circuit, affirming the decision below, carefully limited the
issues on appeal to those concerning enforcement of the NLRB subpoenas
and thwarted Dutch Boy's attempts to interject for review certain alleged
procedural irregularities in the administrative law judge's revocation of its
subpoena. 19 2 The court found no fault with the district court's dismissal of
the company's claim, holding that a district court has no power "to hear a
private application for enforcement of a subpoena."' 93 Additionally, the
court found evidence in the record indicating that the documents sought by
the NLRB satisfied the prerequisites for issuance of a subpoena in that they
" 'relate[d] to or touch[ed] the matter under investigation.' "194 Therefore, it
187. Id. at 833. In the course of its analysis, the Tenth Circuit rejected, as contrary to
LaSa/le's directive, the taxpayers' "somewhat ingenious argument" that the burden of proving
bad faith should shift to the government when a taxpayer has shown that the IRS is seeking
information for a criminal prosecution. Id. at 833.
188. 614 F.2d 690 (10th Cir. 1980).
189. A number of taxpayers in the court's unpublished opinions, perhaps unaware of the
Fahey decision, raised this argument. See, e.g., United States v. Youmans, No. 79-1437 (10th Cir.
Mar. 28, 1980); United States v. Pielstick, No. 79-1885 (10th Cir. Mar. 28, 1980); United States
v. Kelderman, No. 79-1873 (10th Cir. Mar. 28, 1980).
190. 606 F.2d 929 (10th Cir. 1979).
191. Id. at 931.
192. See id. at 933.
193. Id. at 932. The appellate court's statement seems broad enough to include any subpoena issued by an agency to a private party. The case cited in support of this proposition,
however, holds only that the NLRB's subpoenas may not be enforced by a private party in a
district court. Judicial action is appropriate only in a proceeding to review the Board's final
order in a matter. Se Wilmot v. Doyle, 403 F.2d 811, 814-16 (9th Cir. 1968).
194. 606 F.2d at 932 (quoting Cudahy Packing Co. v. NLRB, 117 F.2d 692, 694 (10th Cir.
1941)).
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concluded that the lower court had not arbitrarily enforced the Board's sub95
poenas or abused its discretion and therefore could not be reversed.'
Dutch Boy also failed in its attempt to assert that the NLRB had issued its
subpoenas solely to harrass the company. The court of appeals held that
Dutch Boy had not met its burden of establishing the agency's improper
purpose. 196
VIII.

GOVERNMENT LARGESSE

An apparent conflict between state and federal welfare laws occasioned
the controversy before the Tenth Circuit in Nolan v. De Baca.' 9 7 In implementing its plan for the federally funded Aid to Families with Dependent
Children program (AFDC), the State of New Mexico promulgated a regulation that reflected an aspect of its community property system. Specifically,
the State required one-half of the income earned by the spouse of an eligible
child's natural or adoptive parent to be treated as income of the natural or
adoptive parent. ' 98 The spouse's legal obligation to support the child was
not a concern. In the Nolans' situation this computation substantially reduced the AFDC payments to the children. 199 Although the mother had no
actual income, she was credited with one-half of the sum that her husband,
who was her children's nonadoptive stepfather, earned. This constructive
income was deemed available to meet the children's needs.
Claiming that New Mexico's regulation blatantly conflicted with the
pertinent regulation enacted by the Federal Department of Health, Education and Welfare (HEW), which prohibits consideration, in the calculation
of AFDC benefits, of funds available to family members who have no legal
duty to support the dependent children, 2° ° Mrs. Nolan instituted an action
against the State's Department of Health and Social Services. She sought an
injunction forbidding the agency to enforce the regulation and succeededin
district court. That tribunal found the Supremacy Clause20 ' controlling and
20 2
granted a motion for summary judgment in Mrs. Nolan's favor.
Acknowledging the well-established rule20 3 that local AFDC regulations "may not contravene Social Security Act provisions or valid HEW reg2 °4
ulations," the Tenth Circuit affirmed the lower court's decision.
"Operation of appellant's community property regulation obviously contra'20 5
venes the federal act and HEW's regulation."
195. 606 F.2d at 932.
196. Id. at 933.
197. 603 F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1979).
198. Id. at 812-13.
199. Before the regulation was adopted their benefits totaled $163.00 per month; after promulgation of the regulation the monthly payments dropped to $2.00. Id. at 811.
200. 45 C.F.R. § 223.90(a) (1979).
201. U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
202. Set 603 F.2d at 811.
203. See King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333 (1968).
204. 603 F.2d at 812-13.
205. Id. The Tenth Circuit heard several other cases during the year involving various
forms of federal financial assistance to individuals. Edwards v. Califano, 619 F.2d 865 (10th
Cir. 1980) and Markham v. Califano, 601 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1979), concerned social security
benefits. In Edwards, the court reversed the district court's alfirmance of HEW's denial of child
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RIGHTS OF FEDERAL EMPLOYEES

Two cases reviewed by the Tenth Circuit considered the rights of governmental employees under certain federal statutes.2 0 6 Both involved relatively narrow issues.
In Hurley v. UntedStates20 7 the appellant, making his second appearance
208
before the court of appeals, sought construction of the Back Pay Act,
which authorizes payment to a federal employee of all remuneration that he
or she would have received had he or she not been the victim of "an unjustified or unwarranted personnel action."' 20 9 He contended that the damages
award he received following a determination that he had been unjustifiably
transferred from his Federal Aviation Administration post in Texas to a position in Oklahoma should have included his sizeable claim for a per diem
travel allowance. Hurley reasoned that during the period of his illegal transfer he was on travel status and, accordingly, was entitled to appropriate com2
pensation. io
The court of appeals, however, ruled that the Back Pay Act does not
encompass travel expenditures, thereby affirming the district court's denial
of the appellant's claim. The statute permits reimbursement only of pay an
employee would normally have received in the absence of the government's
erroneous action.211 Finding support in a decision from the United States
Court of Claims, 2 1 2 which rejected an identical argument, the Tenth Circuit
declined the proffered invitation "to engraft a provision that is not a part of
2 13
the Act."
Resolution of the petitioner's claim in Philh/ps v. Merit Systems Protection
Board2 14 necessitated an analysis of the application of the Civil Service Reinsurance benefits on the ground that the agency had not rebutted the statutory presumption of
death arising from the father's unexplained absence of seven years. 619 F.2d at 868. The court
affirmed a denial of disability benefits in Markham, holding that the evidence sustained a finding
that the claimant was not so disabled as to be incapable of engaging in gainful employment.
601 F.2d at 536. Finally, in Gutierrez v. Califano, 612 F.2d 1247 (10th Cir. 1979), the Tenth
Circuit reversed the lower court's order declaring a claimant eligible for Black Lung benefits
after HEW had reached a contrary decision. The appellate court determined that data relied
upon by the lower court to reach its decision had been improperly evaluated and were insufficient to overcome substantial evidence offered by the agency to support its denial of an award.

Id. at 1249.
206. A third case, Stritzl v. Uisted States Postal Serv., 602 F.2d 249 (10th Cir. 1979), reviewed a discharged federal employee's right to a hearing; it is therefore treated in Part X Procedural Due Process, fira at 23 1.A fourth decision interpreting federal employees' rights under the
Privacy Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976), is discussed in detail in Part Xl." The Privacy Act, infia at
238.
207. 624 F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1980).
208. 5 U.S.C. § 5596 (1976).
209. Federal regulations define "unjustified or unwarranted personnel action" as "an action
of commission . . .or of omission . . . which thereby resulted in the withdrawal, reduction, or
denial of all or any part of the pay, allowances, or differential ... otherwise due an employee."
5 C.F.R. § 550.802(c) (1980).
210. 624 F.2d at 94.
211. /d. at 94-95.
212. Morris v. United States, 595 F.2d 591 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
213. 624 F.2d at 95.
214. 620 F.2d 217 (10th Cir. 1980).
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form Act of 1978.215 Phillips was removed from his position in the
Merchant Marine in 1973. He appealed to the Civil Service Commission,
which upheld the action, and to the Board of Appeals and Review, which
affirmed the Commission's decision. Subsequently, a federal district court
heard the case and remanded it to the Merit Systems Protection Board, successor to the Civil Service Commission, 21 6 for a new hearing including certain witnesses who had previously been unavailable. Following this hearing
the Board affirmed the Commission's initial decision, and Phillips sought
review by the court of appeals. The Merit Systems Protection Board, assert2 17
ing that the appellate court lacked jurisdiction, moved for dismissal.
The Tenth Circuit examined the provisions of the Civil Service Reform
Act that authorize judicial review of the Board's final orders in a federal
court of appeals. It focused, however, on a savings clause that makes the
statute inapplicable to administrative proceedings pending on the statute's
effective date. With the assistance of a regulation promulgated by the Merit
Systems Protection Board specifying that an agency proceeding is considered
pending or "existing" when "the employee has received notice of the proposed action," 2 18 the court concluded that the new law did not apply to the
case under consideration. 2 19 The petitioner had been notified of the personnel action before the Reform Act became effective even though the final
adverse decision had been rendered after the statute's effective date. Granting the motion to dismiss, the court of appeals explained that Phillips' suit
could be initially instituted only in a federal district court or in the court of
claims. 220 The Tenth Circuit thus joined five other circuits that have
22
reached a similar conclusion. '
X.

PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS AND THE RIGHT TO A HEARING

In two very different factual settings the Tenth Circuit rejected contentions that requirements of due process and of correct administrative procedure mandated hearings. Stritzl v.United States Postal Service 222 involved a
r 2 23
discharged federal employee, and Colorado v. Veterans Administration
concerned the liability of state-supported educational institutions for overpayments of veterans' educational benefits.
Edwin Stritzl, a post office employee, was terminated for poor work
habits and low productivity prior to the expiration of his ninety-day probation period. He was discharged without a hearing, and, after unsuccessful
attempts to appeal the action through the American Postal Workers Union
215. Pub. L. No. 95-454, 92 Stat. 1111 (1978) (codified in scattered sections of 5, 15, 28, 31,
38, 39, 42 U.S.C.).
216. For the court's summary of the 1979 reorganization of the Civil Service Commission,
see 620 F.2d at 218.
217. 620 F.2d at 218.
218. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.191(b) (1979).
219. 620 F.2d at 219.
220. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 1491 (1976).
221. The court's ruling conforms with those of the First, Third, Fifth, Eighth, and District of

Columbia Circuits. See cases cited in 620 F.2d at 219.
222. 602 F.2d 249 (10th Cir. 1979).
223. 602 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1979).
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and the Civil Service Commission, he filed suit in the District Court for the
District of Colorado. He alleged that the conditions of his termination violated the Postal Reorganization Act 224 and the due process clause of the fifth
amendment.2 25 The trial court rejected Stritzl's arguments, and, on appeal,
2 26
the Tenth Circuit upheld the judgment for the Postal Service.
The appellate court, in its review of the statutory and constitutional
claims, first observed that the federal government has traditionally imposed
a probationary status on new employees. During the period of probation an
employee's rights are limited, and he or she is subject to termination for good
cause without either a hearing or an opportunity to appeal. The court also
noted that the postal workers' union acknowledges, and apparently accepts,
this "historical fact," for the collective bargaining agreement affords proba22 7
tionary employees no access to the union's grievance procedures.
The court then turned to Stritzl's contention that the Postal Reorganization Act's hearing requirement 228 changed this policy. The statute expressly protects "employment rights," 229 and the appellate court agreed with
the district court that a probationary employee, lacking such rights, cannot
be considered a true employee for purposes of the statutory directive.
We do not regard this statutory language as creating new substantive "employment rights." Specifically, we do not regard the statutory language here relied on as creating a right whereby
probationary employees are entitled to receive a hearing before
their probationary employment is terminated. If Congress had intended to create such an employment right for probationary employees, it would have said so in clear 30and understandable
2
language. Congress did not do so, however.
Accordingly, the Tenth Circuit refused to step where Congress had deemed
2 31
it unnecessary to tread.
In dictum, apparently intended to shed additional light on the Postal
Reorganization Act's fair hearing requirement, the court instructed that this
provision is limited by other sections of the statute authorizing the inclusion
of grievance procedures in collective bargaining agreements. 232 Thus, such
procedures may be valid although they conflict with the notion of a fair
233
hearing as contemplated by the Act.
Finally, the Tenth Circuit held that the Postal Service had not deprived
Stritzl of a liberty interest by disseminating information about his perform224. Pub. L. No. 94-421, 90 Stat. 1303 (1976) (codified in scattered sections of 39 U.S.C.).
The act directs that employees be given "an opportunity for a fair hearing on adverse actions."
39 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976).
225.

U.S. CONST. amend. V, cl.3.

226. 602 F.2d at 250-51.
227.

Id. at 251.

228. 39 U.S.C. § 1001(b) (1976).
229. Id.
230. 602 F.2d at 251.
231. See id. at 251-52.
232. Id. at 252.
233. The court cited a decision from the Seventh Circuit, Winston v. United States Postal
Serv., 585 F.2d 198 (7th Cir. 1978), as authority for this proposition.
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ance as a postal clerk. 234 Stritzl had argued that the Golden, Colorado post
office's release of a negative evaluation of Stritzl's performance to the Littleton, Colorado postmaster violated a liberty interest and required a hearing. The court of appeals ruled, however, that the Postal Service's
unfavorable characterization of Stritzl was not comparable to the "badge of
infamy" identified by the Supreme Court in Wisconsin v. Constantineau235 nor
was it the type of "stigma" the Court contemplated in Board of Regents v.
Rolh. 236 Quoting from one of its 1976 opinions, 23 7 the Tenth Circuit concluded that Stritzl had failed to establish a liberty interest worthy of constitutional protection. " '[N]othing present in this case indicates appellant has
had such a stigma imposed upon him as to foreclose future employment op-

portunities.'

"238

In Colorado v. Veterans Administration,239 the State of Colorado attempted
to establish its right to a hearing in matters concerning its liability to the
Veterans Administration (VA) for excess educational benefits paid by the VA
to veterans enrolled in local colleges and universities. In an action brought
in the United States District Court for the District of Colorado, 2 40 the State
challenged the constitutionality of a provision of the Educational Assistance
Program 24 ' that authorizes the VA to seek reimbursement from an educational institution for payments made to an ineligible student through some
fault or omission attributable to the institution.2 42 Additionally, the State
contended that the procedure used by the VA to establish liability violated
243
constitutional and statutory hearing requirements.
The district court held the disputed statute constitutionally sound, finding the state's liability "a simple matter of a contractual duty flowing from
the school to the state certifying agency to the VA," 244 which had been incurred when the state agreed to monitor and report on student status as a
condition to participation in the benefit program. The trial court ruled that
such imposition of liability is rationally related to a legitimate governmental
234. 602 F.2d at 252-53.
235.

400 U.S. 433 (1971).

236. 408 U.S. 564 (1972).
237. Weathers v. West Yuma County School Dist., 530 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1976).
238. 602 F.2d at 253 (quoting Weathers v. West Yuma County School Dist., 530 F.2d 1335,
1339 (10th Cir. 1976)).
239. 602 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1979).

240. The district court's decision in this suit is reported in Colorado v.Veterans Administration, 430 F. Supp. 551 (D. Colo. 1977).
241. The Educational Assistance Program is established and administered according to the
provisions set forth in 38 U.S.C. §§ 1651-1698, 1700-1766, 1770-1796 (1976). The challenged
statute provides that:
Whenever the Administrator finds that an overpayment has been made to an eligible
person or veteran as the result of (1) the willful or negligent failure of an educational
institution to report as required . . . to the Veteran's Administration excessive absences from a course, or discontinuance or interruption of a course by the eligible
person or veteran, or (2) false certification by an educational institution, the amount
of such overpayment shall constitute a liability of such institution, and may be recovered . . . in the same manner as any other debt due the United States.
38 U.S.C. § 1785 (1976).
242. Colorado v. Veterans Administration, 430 F. Supp. at 558.
243. Id. at 560.
244. Id. at 558.
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function,2 4 5 and it also concluded that the practice does not offend the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity. 246 After a consideration of the alleged
procedural defects, however, the lower court agreed with the state's contention that the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)247 required a hearing as a
part of the VA's adjudication of a school's liability for overpayments. 248
While acknowledging that the agency had in fact afforded some opportunity
for a hearing, the court nevertheless reasoned that "[b]ecause liability determinations against educational institutions are subject to judicial review,...
those determinations [must] follow the procedures outlined in the Adminis' 249
trative Procedure Act."
Both the State of Colorado and the VA appealed the district court's
judgment to the Tenth Circuit, which upheld the finding of constitutionality, agreeing with the lower court's contractual analysis. 250 An amendment 25 ' to the challenged statute, however, justified-and perhaps
necessitated-a modification of the decision on the procedural issue. The
appellate court observed that the amendment allows an offset of overpayments against fees owed to an institution as compensation for compliance
with the statutory reporting requirements only if a school does not contest
the VA's claim or if a court has reviewed and upheld the VA's finding of
liability. 252 The court also noted that the VA must sue to collect overpayments it believes are due just as it would sue to collect any other debt. 25 3
Given this express access to a judicial forum, "the administrative proceed' 254
ings . . . become somewhat less significant.
The Tenth Circuit found neither an express directive nor a "clear indication" that the applicable statute required an adversary hearing on the record as contemplated by the APA. 255 Stating that the APA creates no
hearing rights that do not already exist, the court of appeals concluded that
the Act did not apply to the VA's overpayment claims. Satisfied that a collection action would assure the accuracy of the VA's determinations of overpayment liability, 256 the Tenth Circuit modified the district court's
judgment to the extent that it imposed on the Veterans Administration the
245. Id.
246. Id. at 559.
247. 5 U.S.C. §§ 500-559, 701-706 (1976).
248. 430 F. Supp. at 561.
249. Id. (citing Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, modifwtd, 339 U.S. 908 (1950)).
250. Colorado v. Veterans Administration, 602 F.2d 926, 927 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. dnud,
100 S. Ct. 663 (1980).
251. GI Bill Improvement Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-202, tit. III, § 304(a)(1), 91 Stat. 1433
(1977) (amending 38 U.S.C. § 1785 (1976)).
252. Prior to its amendment, the statute had authorized the VA to recover overpayments to
a school by referring the claim to the General Accounting Office for collection in court and by
offsetting the payments against other amounts due the school from the VA. 38 U.S.C. § 1784
(Supp. 1 1977).
253. 602 F.2d at 928. Set 38 U.S.C. § 1785 (Supp. 1 1977) (overpayments "may be recovered . . . in the same manner as any other debt due the United States.").
254. 602 F.2d at 928.
255. See 5 U.S.C. § 554 (1976).
256. "[T]he section expressly provides for a suit for collection at the end of the administrative road, and there is no setoff for reporting fees any longer . . . . Any right to review the
agency determination is during the course of the suit brought by the United States to collect."
602 F.2d at 928-29.
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requirement of a hearing.

2 57

XI.

THE SUNSHINE ACT

The Tenth Circuit had occasion during this past year to construe the
Government in the Sunshine Act (the Sunshine Act). 258 In Hunt v. Nuclear
Regulatoy Commission 25 9 the court of appeals considered the Sunshine Act's
applicability to deliberations of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board
(ASLB) and concluded that it does not apply. Thus, meetings 26° of the
ASLB need not be open to the public. The decision is especially significant
in light of the present controversies attending the use of nuclear power and
the structural soundness of existing and proposed nuclear facilities. Additionally, the basis for the court's ruling is instructive because it highlights the
value of statutory definitions.
The case had its origin in a request submitted to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) by the Public Service Company of Oklahoma for a
license to construct a nuclear power plant. During the agency's consideration of the application an internal report prepared by the General Electric
Company became relevant to several matters. General Electric had previously contracted with the Public Service Company to furnish the nuclear
steam supply system for the proposed power plant, and it was reluctant to
disclose the report, which allegedly contained trade secrets. Eventually,
however, the company agreed to produce the document on the condition
that the sessions of the ASLB at which it was used would be closed to the
2 61
public.
The appellant, a resident of Tulsa, which is near the site of the proposed
facility, challenged in federal district court the decision to hold in camera
hearings. His complaint asserted that this practice would violate the Sunshine Act and sought a temporary restraining order as well as permanent
injunctive relief.2 62 The lower court, however, after a detailed analysis of
the legislative history, 263 concluded that the statute does not apply to adjudicatory hearings before the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board. 264 It dismissed the case, and the disappointed plaintiff appealed.
In its opinion affirming the district court's judgment, the Tenth Circuit
examined the composition and functions of the NRC and the ASLB, as well
as the relationship between the two. 265 The NRC consists of five members
who are presidential appointees. It is responsible for processing the applications of utility companies wishing to construct nuclear power facilities, and
its staff conducts the initial review of all such applications. Subsequently,
257. Id. at 929.
258. 5 U.S.C. § 552b (1976).
259. 611 F.2d 332 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1084 (1980).
260. The word "meetings" must necessarily be used liberally here, given the court's ultimate
construction of the statute. See text accompanying notes 266-272, infta.
261. 611 F.2d at 333.
262. Id.
263. See generally Hunt v. NRC, 468 F. Supp. 817, 820-22 (N.D. Okla. 1979).
264. Id. at 822.
265. See generally 611 F.2d at 334-35.
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hearings are conducted by a three-member Atomic Safety and Licensing
Board, and, at this stage, the NRC becomes an independent party in the
licensing process. The Board is established by the NRC, but it is not a fixed
entity; its members are selected from a panel of experts appointed by the
Commission, and the composition of any given Board may change from
hearing to hearing. Essentially, the ASLB is the Commission's adjudicatory
arm.
The court of appeals undertook to discover whether the ASLB is an
agency within the meaning of the Sunshine Act. Agencies subject to the
open meeting requirements of the statute are those "headed by a collegial
body," the majority of whose members are appointed by the President with
the Senate's advice and consent. 266 The composition of the ASLB obviously
267
precludes its characterization as such an agency.
The Sunshine Act also encompasses agencies' subdivisions, however,
and the lower court went to great lengths to determine whether the statutory
language, "subdivision thereof, ' ' 26 8 referred back to agency or to collegial
body. With the assistance of the legislative history, the district court decided
that the reference was to collegial body. 269 Were agency not defined in
terms of its presidentially appointed fellows, the Board would seem by any
ordinary understanding to be a subdivision of the NRC. But, because the
ASLB includes no Commission members, it cannot be a subdivision of the
collegial body.
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court's interpretation of the
statute's definition of subdivision 270 and found additional support for the
position in the definitions of "meeting" and "member." 2 71 The former consists of the deliberations of agency members, who are, in turn, defined as
' 272
those individuals belonging to the "collegial body heading an agency.
Only these specific deliberations are open to the public. Whatever else the
Atomic Safety and Licensing Board may do, it clearly does not hold "meetings" because it has no "members."
Although the court of appeals found adequate support for the district
court's decision in the Sunshine Act itself, it briefly considered the NRC's
regulations implementing the statute, which specifically exclude from coverage those "subdivisions" of the "agency" not composed of members of the
governing collegial body. 2 73 It also observed that other agencies have
promulgated similar rules. 274 Thus, the court implicitly exercised a form of
the traditional judicial deference to an agency's reasonable interpretation of
27 5
the laws it must execute.
266. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(a)(1) (1976).
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.
273.
274.
275.

611 F.2d at 335.
Hunt v. NRC, 468 F. Supp. at 820-21.
Id. at 821.
611 F.2d at 336 & n.2.
5 U.S.C. § 552b(a)(2), (3) (1976).
Id. § 552b(a)(3).
611 F.2d at 337.
Id. at 337 n.3.
Se Part IV- Scope of Authorit,, supra at 217.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

19811

Without having to resort to the Sunshine Act's authorized exemptions, 2 76 which the court probably would have had to strain to apply, 27 7 the
Tenth Circuit declared that the NRC may properly close meetings of certain
of its branches lying beyond the reach of the statute's definitions. Clearly,
the Sunshine Act does not expose administrative deliberative processes as
completely as might be desired. 2 78 The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Hunt
highlights the loopholes, and its close definitional analysis may prove helpful
to other agencies seeking solid support for their endeavors to escape the man279
date of the Sunshine Act.
Appellant Hunt lost his battle with the NRC on another front as well.
When the Chairman of the ASLB panel hearing the Public Service Company's application for a construction permit requested spectators to leave the
hearing room prior to the Board's consideration of General Electric's internal report, Hunt and a companion refused to leave. To make their point
they chained themselves to the doorframe of the hearing room. The hearing
was delayed while a marshall cut the chains and removed the two men, who
were ultimately charged and convicted by a magistrate for disrupting government employees in the performance of their official duties. 280 The district court affirmed the conviction, and the defendants appealed.
In United States v. Rankit 28 ' the Tenth Circuit upheld the lower court's
judgment. To justify their conduct, the defendants had argued that the Sunshine Act forbade the closure of the ASLB hearing and that, therefore, the
federal employees were not performing official duties when conducting-or
attempting to conduct-the in camera hearing. 282 The Hunt decision disposed of the first part of their contention, but the court of appeals added
that even if the defendants had correctly construed the Sunshine Act, they
would have had no defense to the charges against them. An individual's
good faith belief in the propriety of his or her actions does not excuse conduct that impedes administrative proceedings.28 3 "[T]he defense of 'good
faith belief' is no defense. The defendants could not thus take the law in
284
their own hands."
276. See 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c) (1976).
277. The statute does, however, allow closed meetings when disclosure of "trade secrets and
commercial or financial information obtained from a person and privileged or confidential" is
likely to occur. 5 U.S.C. § 552b(c)(4) (1976).
278. See 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE § 5:44 (2d ed. 1978).

279. The district court found only one other judicial interpretation of the statutory definitions in Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. United States Parole Comm'n, No. 78-1016 (E.D. Pa.
Mar. 30, 1978). Hunt v. NRC, 468 F. Supp. at 821. The Pennsylvania court reached a similar
conclusion.
280. Hunt and his companion had violated 41 C.F.R. § 101-20.304 (1978).
281. 616 F.2d 1168 (10th Cir. 1980). The facts discussed in the preceding paragraph are set
forth in 616 F.2d at 1169.
282.

Id. at 1169-70.

283. Id. at 1170. See also
United States v. Young, 614 F.2d 243 (10th Cir. 1980); Armstrong
v. United States, 306 F.2d 520 (10th Cir. 1962).
284. 616 F.2d at 1170.
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THE PRIVACY ACT

It has been suggested that the Privacy Act 28 5 may not prove to be as
universally significant a law as the Freedom of Information Act. 286 But,
"[flor some individuals, for example federal employees concerned about the
contents of their personnel files, the Act may provide new rights and remedies of substantial importance. "287 In Parks v. Internal Revenue Service, 288 the
Tenth Circuit gave substance to this prediction.
The Parks plaintiffs, employees of the Internal Revenue Service (IRS),
complained to the federal district court in New Mexico that lists of IRS
employees who had not purchased government savings bonds were supplied
to other IRS employees for use in soliciting additional sales of the bonds.
Plaintiffs contended that this disclosure violated the Privacy Act's general
prohibition against furnishing "any record which is contained in a system of
records" without the consent of the "individual to whom the record pertains." 289 The use made of the lists could not, they argued, be characterized
as "routine" 29° and as such be made exempt from the disclosure proscription;29 1 nor could the agency establish that its officers and employees needed
the lists "in the performance of their duties."' 292 The district court was not
persuaded, however, and it dismissed the plaintiffs' action after concluding
293
that the disclosure was, in fact, part of a "routine use."
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit reversed the lower court's judgment of
dismissal, declaring that the plaintiffs had stated a claim under the Privacy
294
Act sufficient to entitle them to monetary compensation from the agency.
The court of appeals found evidence in the statute's legislative history that
indicated that by restricting dissemination of personnel records Congress expressly intended to protect federal employees "who do not comply with organization norms and standards" from "internal blacklisting." ' 295
Furthermore, the appellate court concluded that the agency's use of the lists
in question could not be routine, primarily because the IRS had not followed the notice and comment procedure required by the Privacy Act for
designating a routine use. 2 96 Therefore, the Tenth Circuit found that the
plaintiffs' claims adequately alleged a violation of the Privacy Act's general
proscription against disclosure.
285.
286.
287.

5 U.S.C. § 552a (1976).
5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976).
W. GELLHORN, C. BYSE, & P. STRAuss, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw, CASES AND COMMENTS 622 (7th ed. 1979).
288. 618 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1980).
289. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(b) (1976).
290. A "routine use" is "the use of [a] record for a purpose which is compatible with the
purpose for which it was collected." Id. § 552a(a)(7).

291. See id. § 552a(b)(3).
292. See id. § 552a(b)(1).
293. 618 F.2d at 680.
294. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4) (1976) (allows minimum damage award of $1,000 for intentional or willful violations of the Act).
295. 618 F.2d at 681 n.1 (quoting S. REP. No. 93-1183, 93d Cong., 2d Sess., repn'ntedr
11974] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 6916, 6966). Congress specifically cited nonparticipation
in savings bond programs as an example of a failure to follow "organizational norms." Id.
296. 618 F.2d at 681-82. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(e) (1976).
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To be entitled to relief for an allegedly illegal disclosure, a party must
also plead that he or she has suffered some "adverse effect" from the circulation of the confidential information. 297 Thus, the court's inquiry was not
complete upon its conclusion that the complaint sufficiently alleged a violation of the statute. Noting that the Privacy Act is rooted in the tort of invasion of privacy, the court of appeals reasoned that "the invasion of the right
. . . is the essence of the action." 298 Such conduct may not cause pecuniary
damage, but mental and psychological harm are foreseeable consequences.
Therefore, the appellate court found the plaintiffs' allegations of psychological distress and embarrassment sufficient to establish the requisite adverse
effect. 299 That the claims tended to show an injury personal to the plaintiffs
3°°
necessarily alleviated any standing problem.
Having found the allegations concerning a violation of the Privacy Act
and its resultant harmful impact ample to sustain the plaintiffs' cause of
action, the Tenth Circuit next considered whether the plaintiffs had adequately contended that the actions of the agency's officials were so intentional and willful as to warrant the award of damages authorized by the
statute. 30 1 Notwithstanding the absence of specific declarations of intentional and willful conduct, the court concluded that the facts which the
plaintiffs had alleged permitted an inference of misconduct descending to
the prescribed levels of impropriety. 30 2 While the employees were entitled to
seek damages, the court of appeals held that they were not entitled to the
injunctive relief which they had requested. Those sections of the Privacy Act
authorizing the issuance of injunctions contemplate their use as aids in
amending an individual's record and in ordering production of records im03
The court found no provision
properly withheld from a requesting party. 3
permitting injunctions to restrain other violations of the Act. "[W]here...
not
the statute provides for certain special types of equitable relief 3but
4
relief."
injunctive
to
right
broad
a
imply
to
proper
not
is
it
others,
Several of the district court's holdings in the Parks case did survive the
Tenth Circuit's scrutiny. Specifically, the court of appeals affirmed the ruling below that certain IRS employees were improperly joined as defendants
30 5
In
inasmuch as the Privacy Act only authorizes suits against an agency.
addition, the appellate court agreed that, under the existing circumstances,
the National Treasury Employees Union had no standing to sue the IRS,
3 °6
either on its own behalf or for its members.
297. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1) (1976).
298. 618 F.2d at 683.
299. Id.

300. Id.
301. When a court determines that an agency "acted in a manner which was intentional or
willful, the United States shall be liable to the individual in an amount equal to the sum of (A)
actual damages . . . but in no case . . . less than the sum of 51,000; and (B) the costs of the
" 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(4) (1976).
action ..
302. 618 F.2d at 683.
303. See 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(2), (3) (1976).
304. 618 F.2d at 684.
305. Id See also 5 U.S.C. § 552a(g)(1) (1976).
306. 618 F.2d at 684-85.
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In this case of first impression 30 7 the Tenth Circuit construed the Privacy Act with an eye toward effectuating Congress' "self-help enforcement
program" that encourages litigation by individuals. "[I1t is only through this
process that the objects of the Act can be realized." '30 8 The court strictly
enforced the congressional directive to the administrative agencies to publish
information about the records they maintain and to give notice and an opportunity for comment on all routine uses of such records. It is clear from
the court's opinion that an agency cannot claim routine use as a defense to a
challenged disclosure if the use has not been specifically included in the re30 9
quired public notice.
While holding the agencies to a high standard in the use and circulation
of the records they maintain, the Tenth Circuit was liberal in its application
of the statutory conditions for a damages action. It gleaned from the Act
three sets of allegations necessary to shield a complaint from a dismissal motion, but it is apparent from the Parks decision that a plaintiffs pleading
burden is not heavy. A complaint must first allege a cognizable violation of
the Privacy Act. Next, it must contain evidence of some personal detriment
to plaintiff arising from the alleged violation. The Tenth Circuit has made it
clear that psychological harm qualifies as an "adverse effect," although it
remains to be seen both how severe the damage must be to warrant compensation and what financial awards it may yield. And, finally, the complaint
must indicate, although it need not specifically allege, that the agency's conduct was willful or intentional. Some evidence that administrative officials
knew of the improper disclosure and did nothing to prevent it is likely to
suffice. The allegations must reveal the conduct to be something more than
mere negligence but less than "premeditated malice." 3 10 The requirements
identified by the court should prove to be useful guidelines to future plaintiffs seeking to vindicate their statutory privacy rights.
In Parks, the Tenth Circuit made clear its intention to interpret the
Privacy Act "in the spirit which attended its enactment" so as to afford maximum protection for the "very sensitive. . right of an individual to be free
of unnecessary invasions of his privacy.13 11 Soon after rendering the Parks
decision, the court had an opportunity to indulge in construction of another
section of the statute. Resolution of the dispute in Volz v. Department ofJustice3t 12 required an analysis of an investigatory-materials exemption3 13 to the
Privacy Act's general mandate that allows an individual access to federal
records concerning the individual. In its review, the court of appeals acknowledged and endeavored to uphold the legislative desire to protect the
privacy not only of those about whom the federal government collects information but also of those who assist the government in compiling its informa307. d. at 679.
308. Id. at 685.
309. Id. at 681-82.
310. Id. at 683.
311.
d. at 685.
312. 619 F.2d 49 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 397 (1980).
313. Ske 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j), (k) (1976) (general and specific exemptions to statute's disclosure policy).

1981]

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

tion. As Volz indicates, sometimes the interests of the latter group outweigh
those of the former.
James Volz was an agent for the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
who was suspended briefly for disciplinary reasons. While probing his conduct, the FBI obtained information from a lawyer acquainted with Volz.
The information was provided under an express promise from the agency
that it would preserve the informant's confidentiality. Subsequently, the
FBI agreed to relinquish to Volz all materials compiled during its disciplinary investigation, and the lawyer informant released the Bureau from its
promise as to almost all of the information he had furnished. Volz demanded disclosure of the balance of the lawyer's communications to the FBI
but his request was refused. He commenced an action in federal district
court under the Privacy Act and obtained an order for the release of the
withheld material. 31 4 On the government's appeal, however, the Tenth Cir3 15
cuit reversed the lower court's decision.
The court of appeals stated the issue in the case to be whether the statutory exemption from disclosure of information furnished under a promise of
confidentiality 3 16 is applicable when "the source of the information is known
but the specific confidential information itself is not known to the party seeking disclosure." 31 7 After observing that the primary purposes of the exemption are to protect the privacy of the government's informants and to
encourage the divulging of material, but confidential, information that
would otherwise elude the government's grasp, the court concluded that disclosure of information provided by a source whose identity is no longer a
secret would, nevertheless, defeat these ends. The court also found that such
disclosure would discourage individual cooperation with the agencies as well
Therefore, the
as deter future voluntary disclosures to requesting 31parties.
8
court of appeals nullified the order for production.
314. Like the plaintiffs in Parks, Volz availed himself of the statutorily authorized private
civil action, see id. § 552a(g)(l); unlike those individuals, however, he requested a form of injunctive relief explicitly recognized by the statute. See id.§ 552a(g)(3)(A).
315. 619 F.2d at 49-50.
316. Id. at 50.
317. The head of any agency may promulgate rules . . to exempt any system of
records within the agency from [disclosure] . . . if the system of records is(5) investigatory material compiled solely for the purpose of determining suitability,
eligibility, or qualifications for Federal civilian employment, military service, Federal
ofsuch
contracts, or access to classified information, but onl to the extent that the disclosure
material would reveal the identit ofa source who furnished mnformat ion to the Government under an
express promise that the identily of the source would be held in confidence.
5 U.S.c. § 552a(k)(5) (1976) (emphasis added).
318. 619 F.2d at 50. The court also reversed the district court's award of attorney's fees and
costs to the plaintiff, reasoning that he had not "substantially prevailed" to the extent necessary
to justify recovery of such expenses. Id. The Privacy Act authorizes an assessment against the
federal government of fees and costs incurred in obtaining relief from an agency's unlawful
refusal to release records if "the complainant has substantially prevailed." 5 U.S.C.
§ 552a(g)(3)(b) (1976).
Judge Doyle filed an opinion dissenting from the reversal of the attorney's fee award. He
enumerated six factors courts are to weigh when determining whether to order the reimbursement of a prevailing party, see 619 F.2d at 51 (Doyle, J., dissenting), and observed that the court
of appeals had considered none of them in rendering its decision. He expressed a desire to
"approve the modest award in the interests of promoting the public interest." Id.
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The key to the Tenth Circuit's decision lies in its recognition of an "inextricable connection between the source and the substance of a confidential
disclosure." 3 19 But, it appears that in its fervor to promote the objectives of
the Privacy Act, the court of appeals neglected the plain language of the
exemption. 320 Certainly the source and the information are connected, but
the bond may not be "inextricable." The exemption voices concern for the
identity of the source; 32 1 the promise of confidentiality it contemplates seems
to extend to that identity and not to the substance of the knowledge furnished. It would seem that material acquires its confidentiality because the
informant desires anonymity. Likewise, this special status should change
when the donor's identity is known, provided that his or her identity has not
been revealed by the agency either deliberately or inadvertently in breach of
its promise or has not been otherwise improperly disclosed. Indeed, the
source's voluntary release of an agency from its undertaking to preserve confidentiality would seem to indicate a lack of concern for continued secrecy.
The Tenth Circuit's opinion in Volz v. Department ofJuslice effectively
precludes a literal reading of the Privacy Act's investigatory materials exemptions and extends the restriction, which should be narrowly construed, 322 beyond its statutory scope. This result may have no substantial
effects, but the court's gloss seems clearly at odds with the statute's direction.
Under the Volz facts, the Tenth Circuit's eagerness to protect privacy is mis32 3
placed.
319. Id. at 50.
320. See 2A C. SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.01 (4th ed. 1973).
321. 5 U.S.C. § 552a(k)(5) (1976). For the text of the statute see note 317 supra.
322. See Nemetz v. Department of the Treasury, 446 F. Supp. 102, 105 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
323. The federal district court in Nemetz v. Department of the Treasury, 446 F. Supp. 102
(N.D. I11.1978) emphasized throughout its opinion that protection of the identity of a confidential source is the primary focus of the section 552a(k)(5) exemption.
It is clear on the face of the statute that only iformation which would identt_5 the source of
confidential information may be exempted by agency regulation. Thus, the government's argument that all information received under a promise of confidentiality is exempt must
be rejected at the outset. To the extent Section 552a(k)(5) applies it exempts only information which would reveal the identity of the source.
Id. at 104 (emphasis added). See also id. at 106-07. The district court expressly distinguished the
Privacy Act's confidentiality exemption from that included in the Freedom of Information Act,
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(D) (1976), which exempts all information obtained from a confidential
source. 446 F. Supp. at 104 n.I.
Both the Nemetz case, and a recent decision from the Fourth Circuit, Ryan v. Department
of Justice, 595 F.2d 954 (4th Cir. 1979), would have an agency seeking to claim a disclosure
exemption under the Privacy Act make certain specific showings. In Ryan, the court of appeals
required evidence that the agency had promulgated rules specifically exempting designated systems of records from the Privacy Act's disclosure provisions. The Fourth Circuit Court also
expected explicit evidence of the agency's reasons for invoking a claim of exemption for such
records. 595 F.2d at 957-58. See also 5 U.S.C. § 552a(j) (1976). The Nemetz opinion similarly
required promulgation of regulations exempting the records at issue, 446 F. Supp. at 104, and
further insisted that "general averments of promises of confidentiality are insufficient" to justify
immunity from disclosure under section 552a(k)(5). Id. at 105. The narrow scope of the exclusion "requires finding a promise of confidentiality as to each source sought to be withheld." Id.
See also Larry v. Lawler, 605 F.2d 954 (7th Cir. 1978) (dictum); Mervin v. Bonfanti, 410 F.
Supp. 1205 (D.D.C. 1976).
In Pole, the Tenth Circuit imposed no similar conditions on the agency's claim for exemption of the information gathered from its "confidential" source.
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STANDING

Although standing lurked as a peripheral issue in Parks v. InternalRevenue
Service, 324 it created no major obstacle to jurisdiction. The Tenth Circuit
did have one opportunity, however, to consider exclusively whether a plaintiff had "alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure that concrete adverseness" 325 necessary to create a case or controversy, which is a constitutional prerequisite ofjudicial review. 326 Resolution
of the customarily difficult standing question was further compounded by
the plaintiff's status as an association seeking to vindicate the interests of its
327
members.
In 1976, the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) brought
suit in the United States District Court for the District of Kansas challenging
the Department of Health, Education and Welfare's (HEW) controversial
regulations 328 that require educational institutions to provide equal athletic
opportunities for both male and female students. 329 The NCAA purported
to represent both itself and its member institutions; the latter did not join
individually in the action. After an extensive review of the extent law of
330
standing as articulated by the Supreme Court in a number of opinions
and after a detailed analysis of the NCAA's allegations, the district court
dismissed the case. 33 ' It held that the NCAA lacked standing to challenge
the regulations on its own behalf for the principal reason that "the prospect
of any injury at all is. . .purely speculative and dependent upon the hypothetical actions" of its member institutions. 332 The court further ruled that
324.
325.

618 F.2d 677, 633, 685 (10th Cir. 1980). See Part XII" The Ptwacy Act, supra at 238.
Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.

326.
327. For a discussion of the problems attending associations' standing, see Note, Standng to
Assert Constitutionaljus Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REV. 423 (1974); Note, From Net to Sword: Organizational Representatves Litigating Their Members' Claims, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 663.

328. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41 (1979).
329. Critics argue that HEW exceeded its authority under title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976), in promulgating the regulations. The contention
is that the agency impermissibly extended the scope of the statute by forbidding sex discrimination not only in educational programs receiving federal financial assistance but also in those
programs deemed to be benefiting from funds used by actual recipients. "In HEW's view, the
only test of coverage is whether the ... institution is a recipient of any federal assistance; if so,
all activities of the agency come within the provisions of the Act." Kuhn, Tile IX: Emploment
and Athletics are Outside HEW'sJurisdiction,65 GE.OL.J. 49, 63 (1976).

Athletic programs are not routinely funded by the government, but the regulations require
schools and universities receiving federal benefits in other programs to provide equal opportunities "in any interscholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletics offered ... and no recipient shall provide any such athletics separately" on the basis of sex. 45 C.F.R. § 86.41(a)
(1979). The stakes for noncompliance are high; an institution found to have permitted or condoned sex discrimination may lose its federal financial assistance. See 20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).
For a detailed discussion of specific ways HEW has allegedly expanded the reach of title
IX, see Note, Title IX Sex izucn)mation Regulations: Impact on Pn'ate Education, 65 Ky. L.J. 656,

684-88, 689-94 (1977).
330. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977);
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422
U.S. 490 (1975); United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S.
727 (1972); Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970); Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
331. NCAA v. Califano, 444 F. Supp. 425, 439 (D. Kan. 1978).
332. Id. at 433. The NCAA alleged that the regulations, insofar as they conflicted with the
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the association had no standing to sue as a representative of its members
because it had not alleged facts sufficient to support a finding of actual or
threatened harm to them. 33 3 Likening the NCAA's action to a request for
pre-enforcement judicial review, the district court concluded that

U]udicial consideration of the claims . . . would merely embroil
the court in abstract disagreement over the scope and validity of
the entire Title IX regulatory scheme so far as it relates to athletic
programs and activities at the post-secondary educational level.
Because the parties have through various possibilities of judicial
review an adequate forum for testing the [regulations] in a concrete
enforcement situation, the court sees neither a practical334need nor a
lawful excuse for . . . review of the kind sought here.
To its undoubted chagrin, the district court may well find itself involved in that "abstract disagreement," for on appeal the Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded the decision. 335 Although the court of appeals agreed
with the lower tribunal's holding that the NCAA lacked standing to sue on
its own behalf,336 the appellate court concluded that the complaint alleged
sufficient facts to confer standing on the association as a representative of its
337
members.
In most instances, an individual or an organization cannot assert the
rights of third parties in a legal action. Those parties must protect their
interests themselves. 338 The Supreme Court has recognized, however, that
in some circumstances, an entity, such as a trade association, may be an
339
Accordappropriate vehicle for vindicating the rights of its members.
ingly, the Court has developed three conditions that must be met before an
association may represent its members in a judicial proceeding. First, it
must appear from the facts alleged that the individual members themselves
would have standing to sue. 34 0 It must further appear that "neither the
claim asserted nor the relief requested" requires the active participation of
an individual member. 34 And, finally, the interests that the association
seeks to protect in its suit must be "germane" to the purpose for which it
34 2
exists.
The Tenth Circuit reviewed the NCAA's allegations in light of these
association's rules, would force members to withdraw from the NCAA or compel the NCAA to
change its rules. Id. at 431-32.
333. Id. at 434-39.
334. Id. at 439.
335. NCAA v. Califano, 622 F.2d 1382, 1392 (10th Cir. 1980).
336. Id. at 1387.
337. Id. In a concurring opinion Judge McKay expressed agreement with the majority's
holding that the NCAA had standing as a representative of its members. He submitted, however, that that ruling obviated any need for deciding whether the association could sue in its
own right. The section of the court's opinion discussing this issue he termed "mere dictum." Id.
at 1392 (McKay, J., concurring).
338. Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S. 44 (1943).
339. See, e.g., Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975).
340. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. at 341; Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. at 511.
341. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. at 333.
342. Id.
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three requirements. Turning first to the standing of the members as individuals, the court scrutinized the complaint for evidence that the members had
sustained "injury in fact" from the challenged regulations. 343 It rejected the
district court's "ungenerous reading" of the pleadings and found that injury
to the educational institutions comprising the NCAA could effectively be
inferred from the allegations. "Compulsion by unwanted and unlawful government edict is injury per sr. Certainly the cost of obeying the regulations
constitutes injury. ' 344 The court also found that the schools were harmed
insofar as the regulations prevented them "from developing their intercollegiate sports programs as they see fit."' 3 4 5 The court of appeals saw further
evidence of injury in a "change in the status quo" compelled by the regulations. 346 Although the complaint itself included no specific claim of direct
injury to the members' rights and interests, the court was willing to find such
347
injury on the basis of the information it did contain.
Because the NCAA challenged a governmental agency's authority, the
Tenth Circuit ruled that the members, if they sued individually, would have
to satisfy the Administrative Procedure Act's (APA) standing requirement.
The APA requires a showing that the complaining party has suffered a "legal wrong" from the agency's action or has been otherwise "adversely affected or aggrieved . . . within the meaning of a relevant statute. ' 34 The
Tenth Circuit adopted the Supreme Court's "zone of interests" test 349 to
3 50
determine whether the member institutions could qualify under the APA.
In a rather strained interpretation, the court determined that the NCAA and
its members had an interest in invalidating HEW's regulations, an interest
that properly lay within Title IX's instruction to the agencies to implement
the prohibition against sex discrimination using rules and regulations "con343. " 'Injury in fact' means concrete and certain harm ....
[I]t must be certain to happen." 622 F.2d at 1386. The court implicitly acknowledged the substantial confusion shrouding the standing doctrine when it observed that "[s]uch injury in fact is the one constant
element in the judicial statements about standing." Id.
344. Id. at 1389.
345. Id.
346. Id. at 1390.
347. See generaly id. at 1388-89.
348. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1976).
349. See Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150
(1970). Standing concerns "whether the interest sought to be protected... is arguably within
the zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statute . . . in question." Id. at 153.
350. See general'y 622 F.2d at 1386, 1389-90. The court equated Data PAcessing's zone of
interests analysis with the APA's "adversely affected or aggrieved" requirement. Thus, it concluded that to be aggrieved means to be arguably within the statute's protected zone of interests. Id. at 1386. Admittedly, the issue is confused and eludes precise definition, but it seems
that the more proper analysis is just the reverse of the court's suggestion; that is, if one can
identify the rights and interests that a law is intended to protect and can "arguably" find one's
own interests within its reach, then when an agency allegedly violates the statute, one becomes
an aggrieved or adversely affected party with standing to sue. To have an interest lying within
the statutory zone is not the same as to be aggrieved by an agency's action. Rather, the former
is a condition precedent to the latter. See generally Association of Data Processing Serv. Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. at 153.
In any event, the Tenth Circuit liberally interpreted the zone of interests requirement,
concluding that it would be satisfied if a "sensible relation" could be found "between some
subject of the statute and the plaintiff's interest in the outcome of the litigation." 622 F.2d at
1386.
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' 35
sistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute." ' The court considered this directive as indicative of a statutory design to protect against
3 52
Accordingly, the court found
unnecessary and unwarranted regulation.
that the interest of the NCAA and its members fell within the statute's protective zone. An alleged violation of the statute gave them standing to seek
3 53
redress.

Having found that the institutional members of the NCAA had sustained actual injury sufficient to entitle them to sue HEW in their own right,
the Tenth Circuit next inquired whether the interests at stake in the case
related to the NCAA's organizational objectives. Among the association's
avowed purposes are the initiation and improvement of intercollegiate athletic programs and the preservation of institutional control of intercollegiate
sports.3 5 4 Although the member institutions' interests necessarily extend beyond those of the NCAA to other educational programs, the court found
that inasmuch as the litigation attacked regulations affecting sports activities, the members' interests could be deemed compatible with the association's purposes. Therefore, the NCAA was arguably a suitable
representative.3 55 The court, however, was not willing to assume that the
members supported the association's endeavor on their behalf. In fact, it
acknowledged that many NCAA member institutions also belonged to the
Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (AIAW), which had intervened as a defendant to support HEW's regulations, and the court recognized that the NCAA's litigation goals could be entirely incompatible with
the dual members' desires. 356 This potential absence of uniform interests is
relevant to the constitutional standing requirement, for if an organization's
members do not support its motives but instead align themselves with the
opposition, then no case or controversy actually exists, and a court has no
authority to exercise its jurisdiction. 357 Thus, the Tenth Circuit imposed a
qualification on the test for associational standing, which would in some circumstances compel an organization to identify precisely its members' concerns and to ascertain whether a true identity of interests exists. If this task is
not performed, then a court might not be able to determine whether the
interests which an association purports to represent are "germane" to its purpose.
We hold that when an association does not have standing in its
own right, and it is not clear which side of the lawsuit the association's members would agree with, one or more of the members
351.

20 U.S.C. § 1682 (1976).

352. See 622 F.2d at 1390. In fact, Title IX was enacted to assure women of educational
opportunities equal to those available to men. In a broader sense, the statute protects both
sexes' interests in equal access to education by attempting to insure that discrimination on the
basis of sex does not occur in federally funded educational programs. If anything, the statute
endorses additional regulation rather than discouraging it. Perhaps, however, the Tenth Circuit
found this connection sufficient to satisfy its "sensible" relationship variation on the zone of
interests test. See note 350 supra.
353. 622 F.2d at 1390.
354. Id. at 1391.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. Id. at 1391-92.
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must openly declare their support of the association stance, and
they must do so through those officials authorized to bring suit on
their behalf. Moreover, if more members of the association declare
against the association's position than declare in favor of it, the association does not have standing, for
then the parties in the lawsuit
358
most likely would not be adverse.
Apparently, an additional allegation must henceforth appear in complaints
filed by organizations seeking to represent the interests of third parties who
comprise their membership. Even those that would seem to have standing to
sue in their own right would be well advised to allege an identity of interests
because it seems impossible to predict when a court will agree with an association's claim of injury in fact. Because the NCAA's complaint included a
statement evidencing its members' support for the lawsuit, 359 the NCAA satisfied not only the Tenth Circuit's new requirement but the Supreme Court's
test as well. The organization and its constituents were not at odds.
Finally, the appellate court considered whether individual participation
of the NCAA's members was necessary to a fair resolution of the controversy.
Finding issues of law common to all and observing that the injunctive and
declaratory relief requested would, if granted, benefit the members equally,
the court concluded that their direct involvement was not essential. 36° Having completed its analysis of the NCAA's claims and their relationship to the
standing prerequisites for a representative of third parties' interests, the
Tenth Circuit found no bar to the association's maintenance of its suit challenging HEW's athletic regulations. Accordingly, the court of appeals re36
versed and remanded the district court's decision. 1
Certainly the two decisions in NCAA v. Califano exemplify the flexibility
of the third party standing doctrine. 362 Whereas the district court was strict
and exacting in its interpretation of the rule and its application to the plaintiff's allegation, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was more generous in its
analysis and was willing to infer claims of injury where no specific ones were
made. The appellate court's examination of existing standing law does not
illuminate this muddled realm, and segments of its reasoning are notably
contorted; 363 nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit's identity of interests criterion
3
represents a concrete addition to the law of standing. 6
The case, however, has a significance apart from this contribution. The
Tenth Circuit's holding that the NCAA has standing to bring its action may
358. Id. (emphasis in original).

359. Id. at 1392.
360.

Id.

361.

Id.

362.

See generally J.

NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW 79-82 (1978).
363. See notes 350 & 352 supra and accompanying text.
364. A student commentator observed in 1974 that the courts have not often considered
how to resolve the problem of competing interests within an organization, which eliminate the
organization's efficacy as a true representative of its members. "[O]ffensive use of organizational representation is relatively new and organizations usually use it in safe situations. As the
procedure becomes more established, organizations will make less conservative use of it. The
courts will then have to consider the permissible limits of the action." Note, From Net to SwordOrganizationalRepresentatives Litigating Their Menbers' Claims, supra note 327, at 671.
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facilitate a significant challenge to the validity of the athletic regulations. A
federal district court in Ohio found one of HEW's requirements unconstitutional, 365 but there has apparently been no broad attack on the entire reguHEW's employment regulations, 3 66 purportedly
latory scheme.
promulgated pursuant to Title IX, 367 have been invalidated by several federal courts 368 on the ground that they exceed the agency's scope of authority
under the statute and duplicate rules enacted in accordance with Title
VII's 36 9 mandate. It is not inconceivable that upon close analysis a court
would find the controversial athletic regulations similarly excessive. 370 And,
certainly, the NCAA seems a logical entity to launch the offensive, if only for
371
the sake of streamlining the litigation.
CONCLUSION

The number of administrative law cases heard during the past year indicates that the federal government has made its presence known and felt
within the realm of the Tenth Circuit's jurisdiction. In resolving the myriad
controversies generated by governmental actions, the court of appeals adhered to traditional rules and applied established legal principles. Accordingly, its decisions seem sound, if not otherwise notable. The Sunshine and
Privacy Act opinions, however, are likely to enhance the relatively meager
collection of cases construing and interpreting those statutes. Furthermore,
the standing ruling in NCAA v. Califano may ultimately have a significant
impact on collegiate athletic programs. Only in Volz v. Department ofjusice
does the court seem clearly to have overstepped statutory bounds.
Diane L. Burkhardt

365. Yellow Springs Exempted Village School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Ohio High School Athletic Ass'n, 443 F. Supp. 753 (S.D. Ohio 1978). "To the extent it authorizes recipients of federal
aid to deny physically qualified girls the right to compete with boys in interscholastic contact
sports, Subsection (b) of 45 C.F.R. 86.41 is violative of the Fifth Amendment and must be held
to be unconstitutional." Id. at 759.

366. 45 C.F.R. §§ 86.51-.61 (1979).
367. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1686 (1976).
368. See, e.g., Junior College Dist. v. Califano, 455 F. Supp. 121 (E.D. Mo. 1978), aft'd, 597
F.2d 119 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 467 (1979); Brunswick School Bd. v. Califano, 449 F.

Supp. 866 (D. Me. 1978), affdsub noma., Islesboro School Comm. v. Califano, 593 F.2d 424 (lst
Cir.), ceri. denied, 100 S. Ct. 467 (1979); Seattle Univ. v. United States Dep't of Health, Educ. &
Welfare, 16 Empl. Prac. Dec. 8241 (W.D. Wash. 1978); Romeo Community Schools v. United
States Dep't of Health, Educ. & Welfare, 438 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. Mich. 1977), aJ'd, 600 F.2d
581 (6th Cir.), cert. dented, 100 S. Ct. 467 (1979).
369. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1976).
370.

See generally Kuhn, note 329 supra.

371. The NCAA has approximately 862 member institutions. I ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AsSOCIATIONS (14th ed. N. Yakes & D. Akey eds. 1980). Their participation as plaintiffs could
make the proceeding unwieldy and unnecessarily protracted. Structuring the suit as a class
action might alleviate some problems, but obtaining class certification would impose additional
hurdles. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c).

ANTITRUST
OVERVIEW

During the past year, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has considered several antitrust issues involving matters at the forefront of antitrust
law. Questions such as state action antitrust immunity, the insurance industry's exemption from the antitrust laws, contribution among antitrust violators, and the Sherman Act's jurisdictional reach were all considered by the
appellate court during the period of this survey. These issues will be discussed in the context of the decisions that purported to resolve them. In
addition, two decisions of lesser importance will be briefly digested.
I.

THE SHERMAN ACT VERSUS FEDERALISM:

A

CLASH BETWEEN

GIArrS

A.

Introduction

The Sherman Act has been called the "Magna Carta of free enterprise,"' yet the scope of this central charter of our national economic policy
was not defined by Congress when it adopted the Act. The contours of the
antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, have been delineated, instead, by the judiciary. On occasion, the antitrust statutes have
brushed up against the tenet of federalism. Whether the action of states and
their subdivisions come within the purview of the antitrust laws, when governmental acts have an anticompetitive impact, is a question the Supreme
Court rarely addressed prior to the 1970's. Although recent decisions of the
Court have dealt unsatisfactorily with shaping the contours of state immunity from the antitrust laws, the Court has clearly drawn an immunity template by which to judge state activity. It is the duty of the federal courts to
follow Supreme Court pronouncements. In Community Commur'cations Co. v.
City of Boulder,2 the Tenth Circuit court was faced with the competing concerns of our national economic policy, on the one hand, and the pressing
needs of a municipality to freely carry out its governmental functions, on the
other. The Tenth Circuit court rendered a decision in conflict with the
Supreme Court's most recent dictates on state immunity from the antitrust
laws. The court of appeals may have heard the siren call of the tenth
amendment. 3 The Tenth Circuit judges also had to confront critical
problems which the Supreme Court has left in the wake of its attempt to
define state immunity.
This section of the antitrust survey will attempt to analyze the Tenth
Circuit's decision in light of the Supreme Court's recent state antitrust im1. United States v. Topco Assocs. Inc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972). The Sherman Act, one
of the major pieces of antitrust legislation, is found at 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976).
2. 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980).
3. The tenth amendment proclaims that "the powers not delegated to the United States
by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the states respectively, or
to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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munity decisions. An effort will also be made to briefly explain the problems
inherent in the present state immunity doctrine and the pressing need for its
change, a need which may have been the driving force behind the decision
in Community Communications Co.
B.

The Birth of a Doctrine: "State Action" Immunity

The first antitrust law was passed by Congress in 1890 in response to a
growing awareness of the harmful economic consequences apparent in the4
concentration of economic power in the hands of the few and the mighty.
The legislative history of the Act is devoid of any congressional concern with
anticompetitive acts of government. 5 A federal court was first faced with the6
task of determining the scope of the Sherman Act in Lowenstein V. Evans.
The court held that the state could not be attacked for its monopolistic activ-7
ities since the state was neither a person nor a corporation amenable to suit.
8
The Supreme Court's decision in Olsen v. Smith gave lower courts the first
guidelines on state immunity from the federal antitrust law. The Olsen
Court refused to allow harbor pilots, unlicensed by the state, to attack the
state's licensing statute as a restraint on trade. The Court found that Congress had evinced an express desire to allow state regulation of this activity,
and that the state's immunity from the antitrust laws would adhere, unless
9
Congress expressed a clear statement to the contrary. In the same year that
antitrust immunity is
that
state
clear
equally
Olsen was decided, it became
parties. In Northprivate
on
may
bestow
not a transferable gift which a state
ern Securities Co. v. United Slates,' 0 the Court refused to immunize the activities
of two railroads, merging in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act, simply because the railroad's actions were legal under state law. A state cannot
impart immunity to private parties by declaring their anticompetitive actions legal.
After the Northern Securities decision, no major advance in the state action immunity doctrine occurred for almost forty years. I The United States
4. The Interstate Commerce Act of 1887, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (current version codified at

49 U.S.C. § 1 (1976)), created a commission to prevent rate discrimination by railroads. The
next year saw anti-monopoly planks in the platforms of both major political parties. A. NEALE,
THE ANTITRUST LAWS OF THE U.S.A. 12 (2d ed. 1970). The Fifty-first Congress, in authorizing
the Sherman Act, declared itself to be protecting the public interest by attacking "these great
trusts, these great corporations, these large moneyed institutions." 21 CONG. R.c. 2562 (1898).

5. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943).
6. 69 F. 908 (D.S.C. 1895).
7. Id. at 911. In Chattanooga Foundry & Pipeworks v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390

(1906), Justice Holmes declared that a city may sue under the Sherman Act. He interpreted the
term "person" in section 8, the general definitions paragraph of the Act, to include municipalities; thus, under section 7 of the Sherman Act (replaced by section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15

U.S.C. § 15 (1976)), the city was deemed to be a person injured in its "business or property" and
capable of collecting treble damages.
8. 195 U.S. 332 (1904).

9. Id at 344-45.
10. 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
11. See note 7 supra. In Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S. 159 (1942), the Court extended Chattanooga Foundry & Pipeworks v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390 (1906), to its logical end. The

Court held that a state, like a city, was a "person" under section 7 of the Sherman Act and
could, therefore, bring an antitrust action against private parties.
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Supreme Court did not again address the immunity of states as defendants
in an antitrust action until the seminal decision of Parker V. Brown.' 2 According to the California statute challenged by the plaintiff in Parker, a state
advisory commission was authorized to supervise a program restricting competition among farmers in order to maintain stable prices along the distributive chain. The plaintiff, a packer and producer of raisins, sought an
injunction ' 3 against the state officials involved in the program, claiming that
the state agricultural act was in violation of the Sherman Act. Chief Justice
Stone, scrutinizing the legislative history and the language of the Sherman
Act, found nothing to suggest
that its purpose was to restrain a state or its officers or agents from
activities directed by its legislature. In a dual system of government in which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign,
save only as Congress may constitutionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control over its
14
officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress.
The lack of reference to state anticompetitive behavior in the legislative history 15 convinced the Court of the impropriety of expanding the scope of the
antitrust laws to encompass state action. The Court found the alleged anticompetitive acts to be no more than the legitimate enactment and enforcement of state legislation. Furthermore, an examination of the federal statute
concerning agricultural proration 16 reinforced the Court's view of the antitrust immunity issue. Because the federal act also restricted competition in
the marketing of agricultural products, there was no conflict with the state's
proration program. 7
After the Parkerdecision another long hiatus set in before the Court had
occasion to consider again the scope of state immunity from the antitrust
12. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). The immunity doctrine born of this decision occasionally will be
referred to in this comment as "Parker immunity."
13. The injunction was sought pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976).
14. 317 U.S. at 350-51.
15. In Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 420-21 (1978), Chief Justice Burger noted that Congress' silence on the anticompetitive actions of states is not necessarily
dispositive of the state immunity issue. In the years immediately surrounding the Sherman
Act's passage, the Court had strictly construed the jurisdictional requirement of interstate commerce. Manufacturing, as an isolated activity, was deemed not to constitute interstate commerce and Congress was precluded from regulating it. Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888).
States were said to have broad powers to regulate business activities within their borders.
United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895). Because of the Court's narrow posture on
the jurisdictional reach of the interstate commerce clause, it may have appeared improbable to
Congress that the Court would permit suits against the states and their subdivisions for violations of the Sherman Act. Several commentators have also made this criticism. See, e.g., Slater,
Antitrwst andGovernment Actn. A FormulaforNarrowingParker v. Brown, 69 Nw. U.L. REV. 71, 83
(1974).
16. Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937, 7 U.S.C. § 601 (1976).
17. 317 U.S. at 354. The Court determined that Congress, in enacting the federal agricultural marketing act, contemplated state programs similar to California's restrictions. Both acts
were consistent in that they sought to achieve a parity price, the federal statute expressly and
the state program by its effect. Evidence of this consistency of purpose was displayed by a loan
agreement between California and the federal Commodity Credit Corporation, which loan was
approved by the Department of Agriculture. Id. at 356.
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laws. ' 8 Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar'9 provided that opportunity. The Court
struck down the state and local bar associations' minimum fee schedules as
price fixing violative of section 1 of the Sherman Act. The state bar's defense, that its activities were immune from suit as state action, was not persuasive. The Goldfarb Court read Parkeras requiring a showing that the state,
acting as sovereign, had compelled the challenged activities. 20 The defendants, however, could point to no Virginia statute, state court decision, or
state supreme court rule that required the minimum fee schedule. The status of the Virginia bar as an appendage of the state 2 ' did not, of its own
force, cloak the bar with immunity from the Sherman Act.
The Court's next reflection on state action antitrust immunity focused
not on a state-related entity, as in Goldfarb, but concentrated instead on private parties involved in a state program. In Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.,22
Justice Stevens wrote the majority decision, joined, however, by only four
other members of the Court in parts I and 111.23 The private utility, Detroit
Edison, which allegedly had unlawfully restrained competition in its sale of
electric light bulbs, 24 was held not to be immune from the federal antitrust
laws, even though the state regulatory commission had approved of the challenged actions of the utility, and even though the defendant could not discontinue those actions without the state commission's consent. The Court
found the following facts to be determinative: the state had expressed no
opinion as to the propriety of a utility-sponsored light-bulb program; the
responsibility for initiating the light-bulb program belonged to the utility;
the market for light bulbs was not a regulated area of the economy; and the
light-bulb program was not necessary to the state's regulation of its electric
utilities. 25 While the Cantor decision does little to clarify the Court's state
18. The Court's decision in Schwegmann Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384
(1951), concerned an issue related to, but distinct from, state antitrust immunity. The Court
weighed the validity of a state's economic regulations under the doctrine of preemption. In
Schwegmann, the Court found Louisiana's Fair Trade Law, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 391-396
(West 1965) (repealed by 1977 La. Acts No. 709 § 1), to be inconsistent with the Miller-Tydings
Amendment to section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970) (amended by Consumer
Goods Pricing Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-145, § 2, 89 Stat. 801) (repealing Miller-Tydings
Amendment). Other decisions peripherally implicating the state action immunity doctrine,
before Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773 (1975),\were: Eastern R.R. Presidents'
Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight Inc., 365 U.S. 127 (1961); and Continental Ore Co. v.
Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
19. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
20. Id. at 790.
21. The Virginia Bar Association was granted the authority to issue decisions in matters of
legal ethics. Id. at 791.
22. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
23. Chief Justice Burger concurred separately because he disagreed with what he interpreted as Justice Stevens' narrow view of Parker immunity. He emphasized that state action
immunity may extend beyond state officials because the" 'threshold inquiry.., is whether the
acivity is required by the state acting as sovereign.' " 428 U.S. at 604 (quoting Goldfarb v.
Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 790 (1975)) (emphasis added). Justice Blackmun concurred
only in the judgment. 428 U.S. at 605-15.
24. The plaintiff, a retail druggist who sold light bulbs, alleged that Detroit Edison's practice of providing free light bulbs to its customers was a tying arrangement. Plaintiff asserted
that the utility took advantage of its monopoly in the distribution of electricity to unreasonably
restrain competition in the retail light bulb market. S-t section 3 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 14 (1976).
25. 428 U.S. at 600.
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action test, it may point to the emphasis on state compulsion in the antitrust
immunity doctrine. Detroit Edison, regardless of its status as a public utility,
failed to receive immunity because the state had not compelled its challenged actions.
The importance of state compulsion was reemphasized in Bates o. State
Bar of Arizona.26 Primarily a decision grounded on first amendment concerns, Bates also included an antitrust challenge to the Arizona Supreme
Court's disciplinary rule restricting advertising by attorneys. Justice Blackmun, in an opinion distinguishing Coldfarb and Cantor from Bates, held that
the Arizona Bar was immune from the antitrust laws. The most cogent factors in the Bates analysis were the state supreme court's promulgation and
enforcement of the advertising restriction, the important state interest in regulating attorneys, and the Court's acknowledgment that the state, through
its supreme court, was the real defendant.
On the eve of one of the most far-reaching decisions in state action jurisprudence, the two most relevant criteria for obtaining Parker immunity were
that the challenged restraint was "compelled by direction of the State acting
as a sovereign, ' 27 and that the party seeking immunity was the state or an
agency 28 of the state. Only the latter of these considerations was present in
City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co. 29 The Lafayette Court considered the quantum of state involvement in the activities of political subdivisions necessary to qualify them for immunity from the antitrust laws.
The immunity issue arose out of an antitrust counterclaim by a private
utility, Louisiana Power and Light Co., against two cities that owned and
operated competing electric utilities. 30 The majority decision is reminiscent
of Cantor, in that only five members of the Court concurred in a segment of
this opinion. 31 The majority held that Parker immunity is not automatically
32
granted to a city simply because of its status as a subdivision of the state.
The holding was more complicated however, because, while Chief Justice
Burger acknowledged that municipal status, by itself, was not sufficient to
26. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
27. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421 U.S. at 791.
28. "Agency" in this context is used in a generic sense, to indicate that the entity was
created by the state and had no independent significance outside of that relationship.
29. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
30. The cities, Lafayette and Plaquemine, Louisiana, originally brought suit against Louisiana Power & Light Co. for, tnter alia, refusing to wheel power and for boycotting the cities, in
order to retain sole control over electric bulk power in the area, in violation of sections 1 and 2
of the Sherman Act. "Wheeling of power" means that a utility allows its transmission lines to
be used by another. See Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973). The
private utility counterclaimed, alleging that the two cities had violated section 1 of the Sherman
Act and section 3 of the Clayton Act by, inter alia,
using long term supply agreements to exclude
competition and requiring customers of Louisiana Power & Light to purchase electricity from
the cities if they desired continued water and gas service. 435 U.S. at 392 nn.4-6.
31. Chief Justice Burger again concurred separately, this time only in Part I of Justice
Brennan's opinion and in the judgment. 435 U.S. at 418-26.
32. Justice Brennan was concerned that "tilf municipalities were free to make economic
choices counseled solely by their own parochial interests and without regard to their anticompetitive effects, a serious chink in the armor of antitrust protection would be introduced at odds
with the comprehensive national policy Congress established." 435 U.S. at 408. The Court
remanded this case to the district court to determine, according to the Court's state action
immunity test, if the city-run public utilities were immune from the antitrust counterclaim.
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confer antitrust immunity, 33 the thrust of his concurrence focused on the
commercial nature of the cities' actions. 34 The Lafayette plurality set out a
test for determining Parker immunity: The test requires a showing that the
challenged activity was "engaged in as an act of government by the State as
sovereign, or, by its subdivisions pursuant to state policy to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service." ' 35 This test, by using the
phrase "pursuant to state policy," appears to incorporate the state "compulsion" test of Goldfarb, as the Chief Justice noted. 36 In his concurrence, Chief
Justice Burger suggested that he would require more than state compulsion
of the challenged restraint; immunity should not adhere unless its absence
would foil the state's regulatory scheme. 37 No clear test of state action antitrust immunity emerged from the Lafayette decision because of the differing
views expressed in the plurality opinion and in the Burger concurrence. No
similar ambiguity, however, is found in the Court's most recent antitrust
immunity decision.
In the Court's unanimous opinion in California Retail Liquor Dealers Assoctation v. Midca/ Aluminum, Inc.,38 California's wine pricing system was found
to enjoy no immunity from the Sherman Act. 39 Justice Powell explained the
Court's understanding of Parkerimmunity. The test for state action antitrust
immunity came from the opinion in Bates, reconfirmed by the plurality in
Lafayette: "First, the challenged restraint must be 'one clearly articulated
33. "There is nothing in Parker v. Brown, or its progeny, which suggests that a proprietary
enterprise with the inherent capacity for economically disruptive anticompetitive effects should
be exempt from the Sherman Act merely because it is organized under state law as a municipal-

ity." 435 U.S. at 418 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (citation omitted).
34. "There is nothing in this record to support any assumption other than that this is an
ordinary dispute among competitors in the same market." Id. at 419.

35. Id. at 413.
36. Id. at 425 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
37. Id. at 426. Chief Justice Burger's reliance on the municipalities running their own
utilities, as opposed to merely regulating private utilities, has led one commentator to interpret
the Chief Justice's concurrence as favoring a blanket immunity for state subdivisions whose
anticompetitive activities could be categorized as "governmental". See The Supreme Court, 1977

Term, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1, 281 (1978).
38. 445 U.S. 97 (1980). Justice Brennan did not participate in the decision of this case.
However, since Justice Brennan wrote the plurality opinion in Lafayette, it is hardly likely that

he would have dissented in Mdcal.
39. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., a wholesale distributor of wine in California, sought an injunction in the state court of appeals to prevent enforcement of California's wine price-fixing

program. Midcal Aluminum, Inc. v. Rice, 90 Cal. App. 3d. 979, 153 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1979).
Under CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 24866 (West 1964), vineyards and wine wholesalers were

required to set prices through a fair trade contract or post a price list governing the price retailers and consumers had to pay for wine. Anyone in the distributive chain selling below the set
price was subject to state sanction. Id. § 24880. Midcal sought the injunction after it was
charged with violating the state program by the Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control.
The state court of appeals found the wine pricing program to be violative of section 1of the
Sherman Act. The appellate court held that the state department which enforced the wine
scheme lacked immunity. Additionally, the state's defense that section 2 of the twenty-first
amendment protected the state program was dismissed. Cf Rice v. Alcoholic Beverage Control
Appeals Bd., 21 Cal. 3d 431, 579 P.2d 476, 146 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1978) (distilled liquor fair trade
law did not confer antitrust immunity). The California Supreme Court declined to hear Mideat
and the state agency decided against seeking a writ of certiorari from the United States
Supreme Court. The California Retail Liquor Dealers Association, a trade association of independent retail liquor dealers, sought a writ of certiorari from the Supreme Court as an intervenor.
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and affirmatively expressed as state policy;' second, the policy must be 'actively supervised' by the state itself."4° While the California wine pricing
scheme met the state policy criterion, it failed at the second hurdle. The
Court saw no evidence of active state supervision. The statutory scheme did
not include state review of price schedules or fair trade contracts, nor was it
mandated that such schedules and contract terms be set by California. The
state merely enforced private agreements.
The Facts in Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder

C.

41

In Community Communications, the Tenth Circuit court was faced with an
42
appeal by the defendants from the district court's order of a preliminary
injunction against the city. Community Communications Company (CCC)
holds a non-exclusive franchise from the City of Boulder to operate a cable
43
There are, at the present
television company within Boulder's city limits.
issued by the city is
franchise
time, no other cable franchisees. The permit or
actually no more than a contract, enacted in the form of an ordinance. The
city council, alleging a reconsideration of its cable television goals, passed an
44
ordinance on December 19, 1979, imposing a ninety-day moratorium on
CCC's cable expansion in Boulder. Concurrently, the city revoked and reen45
The city, preparing to
acted CCC's franchise to include the moratorium.
drafted a model ordimarket,
television
its
cable
for
applicants
other
seek
nance and sought comment from the cable industry. The ordinance was to
46
Subsequent to Boulder's
be negotiated and enacted in lieu of a contract.
actions, CCC brought suit against the city and against those parties involved
47
in a recently organized cable television corporation, alleging that the enactment of the two new ordinances violated, inter aha, section 1 of the Sher40. 435 U.S. at 410 (citing 430 U.S. at 362).
41. 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980).
42. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Colo.

1980).
43. CCC, together with its predecessor, has operated in Boulder since 1964. The city's
twenty-year contract with the cable television firm is in the form of an ordinance. Under this
ordinance, CCC can string cable over the entire city either for a cable television system or for a
community antenna system (CATV). CCC's system is involved in retransmission, not program
origination. Since February 1980, CCC has utilized its newly developed satellite capability. Its
program content has expanded greatly from its former schedule, which comprised only Denver
and Cheyenne television stations. Cable is strung via utility poles, most of which are jointly
owned by the Colorado Public Service Company and Mountain Bell Telephone Company.
CCC has obtained a license from the utilities to use their poles. Id at 1036.
44. Boulder, Colo. Ordinance 4473 (Dec. 19, 1979).
45. Boulder, Colo. Ordinance 4472 (Dec. 19, 1979).
46. Some of the more interesting features of the model ordinance include:
the city's right to purchase the cable company, at a price excluding good-will and
limited to depreciated investment; the city's right of prior approval of every company
contract; rate regulation; the city's right to change rates at any time; a 5% franchise fee
(two and one-half times the present fee); a requirement for five leased access channels;
a complaint procedure monitored by the city manager, with a liquidated damage provision; a requirement to continually upgrade company facilities to state-of-the-art conditions; and a requirement for renegotiation, at specified intervals, of rate structures,
free or discounted service, services provided, programming offered, and human rights.
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d at 710 (10th Cir. 1980) (Markey,
J., dissenting).
47. The other defendants were Boulder Communications Co. (BCC), a partnership, and
the individual partners. The plaintiff alleged that BCC conspired with Boulder officials to uni-
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48
man Act.

At the preliminary hearing on the requested injunction, the city defended its conduct on the basis of Parkerimmunity. Boulder asserted that its
status as a home rule city, as provided by Colorado's Constitution, 49 made
50
its action in regulating cable television tantamount to action of the state.
The district court held that the city lacked immunity from the Sherman Act,
and found that CCC could suffer "irrevocable injury" without the requested
injunction. The lower court found the city's method of regulating CCC to
be dispositive. In light of the Lafayette and Midcal decisions, the court decided that the city's use of "an offer and acceptance mechanism" was not
"characteristic of utility regulation," and therefore, was not a form of government regulation deserving of antitrust immunity. 5 1 The district court
was unimpressed with Boulder's home rule argument. The court found that
the regulation of cable television touched upon matters beyond local concern, justifying federal intervention through the application of the Sherman
Act. No discovered case law characterized cable television as a matter of
52
local concern.
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, Chief Judge Seth, speaking for the
appellate court, 53 reversed the district court, finding that the city was imlaterally alter CCC's franchise based on BCC's desire to become the exclusive city-wide cable
television franchisee.
48. Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), reads, in pertinent part: "Every
contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or
"
commerce among the several States . . . is declared to be illegal ....
49. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6 gives cities in Colorado with a population of at least two
thousand people the power to adopt a charter authorizing the city to enact legislation in matters
of local concern. Such legislation supersedes any inconsistent state law. Conrad v. City of
Thornton, 191 Colo. 444, 553 P.2d 822 (1976). Colorado has a very broad home rule provision:
From and after the certifying to and filing with the secretary of state of a charter
framed and approved in reasonable conformity with the provisions of this article, such
city or town and the citizens thereof shall have. . . all other powers necessary, requisite or proper for the government and administration of its local and municipal matters ....
COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6.
50. Presumably, Boulder's authority to contract with companies and regulate cable television within its bounds is based on the Colorado Constitution, which provides authority over
"works or ways local in use and extent.
... Id. at § 1. This provision is made applicable to
home rule cities, other than Denver, through art. XX, § 6 of the Colorado Constitution. A
cable television system must run cable over public ways to operate.
51. 485 F. Supp. at 1039.
52. On July 1, 1980, after both the district court's preliminary injunction against Boulder
and the Tenth Circuit's reversal of that order, the Boulder City Council passed Ordinance 4515.
This ordinance became effective August 21, 1980. It permanently limited CCC's right to expand cable television service outside of the one-third of the city it had reached prior to July 1,
1980. On August 5, 1980, in the district court, Judge Matsch again issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the ordinance limiting CCC's growth. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, No. 80-M-62 (D. Colo. filed Sept. 5, 1980) (memorandum
opinion).
53. According to CCC, the City of Boulder continually stressed the urgency of a decision
from the court of appeals. An initial order, reversing the district court decision, came down one
day after the appellate argument. Supplemental Brief of CCC in Support of Petition for
Rehearing en banc at 2, Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704 (10th
Cir. 1980), rehearng detid (Oct. 1, 1980). It is interesting to note that the appellate court characterized the proceedings below as involving a request for a temporary restraining order. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d at 705 (10th Cir. 1980). The district
court, however, clearly considered CCC to have moved for a preliminary injunction. 485 F.
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mune from the reach of the Sherman Act. This conclusion was based upon
the nature of Colorado's constitutional home rule provisions and a recent
Colorado Supreme Court decision, Manor Vail Condominium Association o. Town
of Vail. 54 The court of appeals held that the Manor Vail decision indicated
Colorado's acknowledgment of the local nature of cable television regulation. 55 The appellate court reasoned, therefore, that since Boulder's home
rule status entitled the city to legislative preeminence in matters of local
concern, its promulgation of the challenged ordinances was equivalent to
state action. This deduction led Chief Judge Seth to inquire into the city's
actions surrounding the enactment of the cable television ordinances to determine whether they met the Supreme Court's pronouncements in Lafayette
and Mtdca/. In the court's view, Boulder satisfied the two criteria of the state
action antitrust immunity test enunciated in Midcal: Boulder had "clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed" a policy on cable television through
its city council transcripts and through the moratorium ordinance. The policy to halt CCC's growth was "actively supervised by the state," that is, by
the home rule city, through enactment and enforcement of the moratorium
ordinance. Apparently as dictum, the court of appeals found the "governmental" nature of Boulder's involvement in the cable television business sup56
portive of the city's immunity stance.
Subsequent to the filing of the majority opinion in Community Communications, Judge Markey 57 authored a vehement and lengthy dissent. This dissent was grounded upon a first amendment analysis of the city's action
which prevented new listeners and the cable television company from connecting. 58 Judge Markey did treat at length the antitrust claim and the
Supp. at 1036. A preliminary injunction is issued after a hearing where notice has been previously given to the opposing party. In contrast, a temporary restraining order may be issued ex
parte, without an adversary hearing. See 11 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2947 at 426 (1973).

54. 602 P.2d 1168 (Colo. 1980). In this suit, the plaintiff claimed that Vail's rate structure
for its cable television franchise violated the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. The Colorado Supreme Court upheld the rate structure, for it was not "wholly arbitrary" or "invidious discrimination" against the plaintiff, a cable television customer. 604 P.2d
at 1172. No challenge appears to have been made to Vail's authority to regulate the cable
television franchise, nor was the city's right to grant the franchise contested.
55. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d at 706-07 (10th Cir.
1980).
56. See Chief Justice Burger's concurrence in Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 426, and note 37 supra
and accompanying text.
57. Chief Judge Markey, of the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, sat
by designation. Judge Markey filed a separate dissent more than a month after the majority
opinion was handed down.
58. The plaintiff also had asserted a claim based on the first amendment, because of Boulder's restrictions on CCC's ability to reach more listeners. The district court brushed this claim
aside, noting that the first amendment issue was not ripe; however, the court cautioned the city
that its regulations must be carefully articulated to avoid conflict with the first amendment.
485 F. Supp. at 1040.
The nature of the antitrust section of the Tenth Circuit Survey does not permit an extensive treatment of the serious first amendment concerns raised by Judge Markey. The dissent
would have upheld the district court's preliminary injunction because the moratorium on
CCC's future growth appeared to be a "prior restraint" on speech. In the context of this decision, a "prior restraint" refers to government repression of intended communication. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975). Judge Markey considered CCC's
activities in carrying programming signals, as opposed to originating programming, to be en-
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immunity defense. Nevertheless, he considered this analysis subordinate to,
albeit supportive of, his first amendment views requiring the preliminary
59
injunction to be upheld.
The dissenting opinion focused on the dictates of the majority decision
in Lafayette. Judge Markey rejected Chief Judge Seth's conclusion that home
rule status cloaked Boulder with the mantle of state action, leading to immunity. Whereas the Supreme Court found no automatic immunity for the
plaintiff-cities in Lafayette,6° the dissent reasoned that the Tenth Circuit majority's position undermined the Supreme Court's view of state action antitrust immunity. Judge Markey could find no Colorado policy on cable
television regulation, nor could he find a state policy of replacing competition in the cable television business with anticompetitive regulation. 6 1 The
dissent, in agreement with the lower court, concluded that cable television
did not appear to be solely a matter of local concern in light of the Supreme
Court's pronouncement in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co.,62 which
stated that cable operators were engaged in interstate commerce. Basically,
Judge Markey did not accept the notion that the dictates of federalism,
which spawned the Parker immunity doctrine, placed home rule cities in the
position of sovereign states so as to justify municipal antitrust immunity.
This conclusion seemed especially evident where the state offered no guidance or supervision to the city in dealing with the challenged activity.
A final point of difference between the dissent's view and the majority
opinion concerned the distinction Chief Justice Burger had mentioned in his
concurrence in Lafayette, the distinction between governmental and proprietary activity. Chief Judge Seth found that Boulder's regulation of cable television, as opposed to the city's actual operation of that industry, supported
his immunity view. Judge Markey emphasized that Boulder's regulation of
CCC, through an ordinance which was no more than a contract between the
city and CCC, was hardly typical of "governmental" activity. 63 Judge Marcompassed nonetheless within the protection of the first amendment. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d at 713 (10th Cir. 1980) (Markey, J., dissenting). The
dissent cited the oft-quoted language of Red Lion Broadcasting v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969),
that "[i]t is the right of viewers and listeners . . . which is paramount . . . . [Tihe First
Amendment [protects the] marketplace of ideas. . . rather than [give] countenance [to] monopolization of that market." Id. at 390. The dissent did not find Boulder's police power concern
for the public ways or its attempt to find a single cable operator for the city to be tantamount to
a compelling governmental interest justifying the first amendment infringement which Judge
Markey perceived.
59. The appellate court has the power to affirm a judgment on grounds not necessarily
110.25 [1] (2d ed. 1979).
relied on by the court below. See 9 MOORE's FEDERAL PRAcTICE
60. Lafayette and Plaquemine, Louisiana, are not home rule cities, although Louisiana's
Constitution does allow a city to adopt a home rule charter. 435 U.S. at 434 n. 15 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
61. In re Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 73 PuB. U. REP. 3D 161, 175 (1968) (Public
Utilities Commission of Colorado refused to regulate cable television until the state legislature
takes action to bring cable operators within the jurisdiction of the commission). Colorado currently has no statutes or administrative regulations pertaining to cable television.
62. 392 U.S. 157, 168-69 (1968). The Court found CATV systems to be in interstate commerce and therefore within the regulatory control of the FCC through the Communications Act
of 1934, 47 U.S.C. § 153(a) (1976).
63. Judge Markey echoed the district court's position on the city's manner of regulating
CCC. See 485 F. Supp. at 1039.
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key considered that Chief Justice Burger's Lafayette concurrence was overemphasized by the Tenth Circuit court, in disregard of the thrust of both the
majority and plurality sections of the Supreme Court's opinion in Lafayette.
D.

The Tenth Circuit. Lost in a Supreme Court Labyrinth

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Community Communications,
reached its conclusion by finding Boulder's home rule status and its lack of
direct participation in the operation of the cable television business to be
highly significant. Combining these facts with a strained interpretation of
the Manor Vail decision, the appellate court was able to conclude that Boulder met the two-part test for state action antitrust immunity as set out in the
Supreme Court's latest Parker immunity decision, Midcal. The following
analysis will consider the court's reasoning and conclusions.
Community Communications differs from Lafayette in two respects: Boulder
is regulating rather than operating an industry, and unlike the cities in Lafayette, Boulder has home rule status, giving it preeminence in matters of exclusive local concern vis-A-vis the state. Focusing on the doctrine of home rule
and Chief Justice Burger's concurrence in Lafayette, these factors might appear to justify a result that differs from Lafayette. On a closer analysis of
these tenets of the Tenth Circuit's decision, however, it is clear that their
value in justifying Boulder's antitrust immunity has been greatly overstated.
The appellate court's conclusion, that Boulder's actions in regulating
cable television are tantamount to those of the state, is premised on the notion that cable television is solely a matter of local concern. It is only when a
home rule city in Colorado legislates on an exclusively local matter that the
city has preeminence over contradictory state laws. 64 The court's categorization of the cable television business as an exclusively local matter fails to take
note of contradictory case law.6 5 Even if it is assumed that such cases are not
apposite, the Tenth Circuit's reliance on the Colorado Supreme Court's decision in Manor Vail as evidence of the exclusively local nature of cable television regulation is misplaced. In Manor Vail, the plaintiff had argued that the
city's rate structure for cable television customers denied it equal protection
of the laws. Vail's ability to franchise a cable television firm and to set rates
was not challenged by the plaintiff and was not mentioned in the opinion.
Assuming that the Colorado Supreme Court, in a proper case, would rule
that Vail had the power to franchise and set cable television rates, this would
not be dispositive of the exclusively local nature of cable television. Colorado has no policy, case law, or statute concerning cable television regulation. Under Colorado law, a home rule city may legislate on matters of state
64. See note 49 supra.
65. Se, e.g., United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 180-81 (1968) (CATV
deemed an enterprise within interstate commerce and therefore subject to regulatory authority
of the FCC). Cf. TV Pix, Inc. v. Taylor, 304 F. Supp. 459 (D. Nev. 1968), afdper cunam, 396
U.S. 556 (1970) (the district court ruled that a CATV system was in interstate commerce; however, under the preemption doctrine, the state statute regulating CATV as a public utility did
not conflict with the commerce clause) In TV Pir, the lower court commented that CATV's
character was more local than national.
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and local concern in the absence of state law or regulation. 66 Therefore,
granting that Manor Vail stands for the proposition that Colorado home rule
cities may franchise and set rates for cable companies, the decision conclusively proves only the obvious: Colorado has not entered the area of cable
television regulation. There is no support for the view that the Colorado
court would find inconsistent municipal law to take precedence over an expressed state policy in this area.
Reliance on the Manor Vail decision led the Tenth Circuit court to a
second misconception. This decision dealt with a constitutional challenge to
Vail's regulatory behavior; antitrust issues were not involved. In Community
Communications, Boulder's ability to franchise and set rates for CCC was not
in dispute. The issue was whether the city's allegedly anticompetitive conduct was beyond the reach of the Sherman Act. The Manor Vail decision
gave no guidance on the ability of home rule cities to act in an anticompetitive fashion in regulating cable television.
Home rule status fails to be of conclusive significance for another reason. The Lafayette and Midcal decisions are inconsistent with a Parker immunity view that would allow mere home rule activity to equal state action. In
Lafayette, the only Supreme Court decision to focus on the antitrust immunity of municipalities, both the majority and the dissent were aware of the
doctrine of home rule. 6 7 However, the Court did not, even in a passing footnote, make any reference to a possible distinction in treatment between
home rule cities and those cities with more limited authority. While this
negative conclusion is certainly not dispositive, it bears consideration when
the Midcal Court's latest interpretation of the Parker immunity test is examined. The dissent in Lafayette had justifiably complained that the plurality's test for antitrust immunity was unclear: that sovereign acts of the states
and their subdivisions are immune when they are "pursuantto state policy to
displace competition. '" 68 Justice Stewart, dissenting in Lafayette, was not cer69
tain whether state authonty suffices or whether state compulsion is necessary.
If state authority is sufficient, a stronger case for the significance of home
rule might be available. But the Supreme Court's most recent antitrust immunity decision, Mdcal, does not allow a general grant of state authority to
provide federal antitrust immunity. Not only must the "challenged restraint
• . . be . . . 'clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy'
' 70
. . . [but] the policy must be 'actively supervised' by the State itself.
Within this succinct test, home rule cities can find no comfort. The Midcal
criteria were created as a template to be placed over the activity of a state as
a means of determining antitrust immunity. Mtdcal points to the focus of all
the Court's antitrust immunity decisions: the state itself must be actively
66. See Greeley Police Union v. City Council, 191 Colo. 419, 553 P.2d 790 (1976); Woolverton v. Denver, 146 Colo. 247, 316 P.2d 982 (1961).
67. 435 U.S. at 408 (plurality opinion) (noting that most counties, municipalities and
townships have broad authority for general governance). Id. at 434-35 n. 15 (dissenting opinion)
(pointing out that petitioner-cities did not have home rule charters, but that Louisiana has a
statutory home rule provision).
68. Id. at 435.
69. Id.
70. 445 U.S. at 105 (citations omitted)(emphasis added).
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involved in the challenged restraint, giving its imprimatur to the allegedly
anticompetitive actions. Colorado has made no provision for cable television
regulation either in its constitutional provision for home rule or in its statutes
and regulations; nor did the Colorado Supreme Court mandate the anticompetitive regulation of cable television in Manor Vail, all of which points to a
conclusion at odds with the Tenth Circuit.
The Supreme Court's Midcal opinion clarifies another point of contention. Chief Justice Burger appears to have abandoned his distinction between governmental activity and proprietary activity. This 8-0 decision
contains not a word about such a dichotomy. This is particularly telling
because the challenged activities of the State of California in Midcal could
hardly have been more "governmental". The Mdcal case involved a state
program of authorizing and enforcing wine price schedules and fair trade
contracts generated through private agreements. 71 The Tenth Circuit's use
of the governmental/proprietary distinction to support its immunity decision in Community Communications appears inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's present focus.
The Tenth Circuit court seems to have been led astray by focusing on
Boulder's ability to regulate cable television in general. The real issue, however, concerned the city's ability to act anticompetitively with impunity. If
the issue had been framed in this fashion, Boulder's home rule status and the
city's manner of regulating CCC would have taken their proper place as
secondary considerations. Under the Supreme Court's two most recent
Parker immunity decisions, the threshold inquiry should have been whether
the challenged anticompetitive policy came from the state. Colorado's silence on the ability of its cities to regulate cable television in an anticompetitive fashion should have been dispositive in this case. The Tenth Circuit's
reluctance to follow the Supreme Court's present Parkerimmunity test is understandable, however, when the potential impact of this test upon municipalities, other political subdivisions, and states is considered. 72 The
following section will briefly discuss the competing concerns that must be
balanced in articulating a test of state action immunity from the antitrust
laws.
E.

Federal Expansion Overruns State Sovereignty

Chief Justice Burger, in his concurrence in Lafayette, commented on the
ever-expanding concept of interstate commerce with its concomitant effect of
extending the reach of the antitrust laws. 73 The point is well taken, in light
of the Supreme Court's most recent pronouncement on subject matter juris71. Id.
72. See generally Handler, Antitnsi-1978, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1363 (1978); Kennedy, Of
Lawyers, Lightbulbs and Raisins: An Analysis of the State Action Doctrine Under the Antitrust Laws, 74
Nw. U.L. REV. 31 (1979); Posner, The Proper Rationship Between Stte Regulations and the Fedtral

Antitrust Laws, 49 N.Y.U. L. REV. 693 (1974); Comment, National League of Cities andtMe Parker
Doctnie- 7te Staius of Stale Sooercign( Under Me Commece, Clause, 8 FORDHAM URB. L. J. 301
(1980); Note, The State Action Antloust Defense for Local Covernent.

12 URB. LAw. 315 (1980).
73. 435 U.S. at 420-22 (Burger, C.J., concurring).

A State Authorization Approach,
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diction under the Sherman Act. This decision, McLain v. Real Estate Board of
New Orleans, Inc., extends the purview of the Sherman Act to any defendant
whose effect on interstate commerce is as peripheral as an interstate broker74
age receiving out-of-state financing.
The federal expansionist trend has not been limited to the antitrust
laws. Cities no longer can assert the good faith immunity defense in suits
charging them with violating an individual's civil rights under the fourteenth amendment. 75 Another area of encroachment on the states has occurred through a broad reading of section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of
1871.76 The Court has expanded the reach of section 1983 to include private
actions against the states for violations of federal statutory law as well as for
77
constitutional infringements.
In the context of congressional expansion into areas once thought to be
beyond the reach of the national government, the Midcal and Lafayette decisions are not remarkable. The present test of state immunity from the antitrust laws, however, fails to strike the proper balance between a national
economic policy and the sovereign functions of states and their political subdivisions.
There is little doubt that if every municipality and other political subdivision in this country acted in an anticompetitive manner, motivated by
their own sense of self-interest, economic dislocation and subversion of the
federal antitrust laws would occur. Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in
Lafayette expressed a fear of such a distortion of the efficiency of free markets
78
Reif the immunity doctrine automatically included state subdivisions.
gardless of how one views the scope of the federal antitrust laws, it is the
present test of state action immunity that fails to consider our federalist system.
The plurality in Lafayette did not consider National League of Cities v.
79
to be relevant to the issue of municipal antitrust immunity.80 In
Usey, a 5-4 majority held that Congress' use of the commerce clause is limited when federal law attempts to "directly displace the States' freedom to
structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental funcThe Court's Parker immunity test may conflict with Usery
".
tions. . ."8'
when a municipality is sued for anticompetitive behavior in an area that can
be considered a "traditional government function." The Usey decision demonstrates the inherent problem in the Supreme Court's current thinking on
municipal antitrust immunity: compliance with the Midal test may significantly interfere in state and local governmental functioning.
Usey

74. 444 U.S. 232, 244 (1980). See notes 165-67 ifta and accompanying text.
75. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
76. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
77. Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980).
78. 435 U.S. at 407-08.
79. 426 U.S. 833 (1976). Use7y invalidated a federal wage law that provided for a minimum wage for state and local government employees. The Court stated that the added expense
of compliance would interfere with the integral operations of the states.
80. 435 U.S. at 412 n.42.
81. 426 U.S. at 852.
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As the dissent in Lafayette pointed out, the Court's antitrust immunity
test does not consider the manner in which states have delegated powers to
municipalities.8 2 States rarely express an anticompetitive policy or supervise
83
such a policy when they delegate authority to their political subdivisions.
Thus, most municipal activities initiated before the Lafayette decision will not
be immunized under the Court's present test. One effect of the Court's Midcal and Lafayette tests will be increased state intervention in municipal activities to ensure compliance with the antitrust immunity test.84 Alternatively,
states may refuse initially to share power with the cities, preferring to avoid
the intimate involvement in municipal affairs necessary to provide antitrust
immunity.8 5 The ability of cities to enact programs that are tailored to the
special needs of their citizenry, or to react to modern problems with innova86
tive solutions may be hampered by a fear of the federal antitrust laws.
The terror that the treble damages provision 87 produces in the hearts of
antitrust defendants will be equally felt by government defendants involved
in private antitrust suits. It is conceivable that an antitrust damage award
might bankrupt a city. 8 Extremely large damage awards against cities may
directly affect the citizenry by reducing local government programs and
services. 8 9 States themselves may suffer financially from antitrust damage
awards if they are forced to bail out bankrupt cities, satisfying the cities'
90
judgments.
All of these potential adverse consequences from the Court's present
view of Parker immunity are illustrative of the problems inherent in balancing the concept of federalism-with its allowance for state sovereignty in our
governmental system-against a national economic policy which extolls free
market enterprise. Alternatives to the current immunity test as articulated
in Mdeal may lie in an equitable defense9 t to treble damages when a munic82. 435 U.S. at 434-38 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
83. See generally Vanlandingham, Muncsoal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 269, 280-83 (1968).
84. A recent state statute authorizing New York to participate with New Jersey in the
organization of industrial development projects reflects the impact of the Lafayette decision. The
statute specifically authorizes local governmental anticompetitive behavior. N.Y. UNCONSOL.
7
LAWS § 71 1(g) (65) (McKinney 1979).
85. See, e.g., Northern Sec. Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904). In Lafayette, Justice
Stewart commented on the dearth of state legislative history, making it extremely difficult to
support an argument of legislative intent to provide municipal immunity. 435 U.S. at 436-37
(Stewart, J., dissenting).
86. On the municipal problems inherent in the Court's present Parker immunity doctrine,
see Comment, National League of Cities and the Parker Doctriene The Status of State Sovereignty
Under the Commerce Clause, 8 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 301, 336-42 (1980).

87. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
88. 435 U.S. at 442 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun pointed out that
Louisiana Power & Light Co. sought $540 million in treble damages, amounting to $28,000 per
family, equally divided among the residents of Plaquemine and Lafayette, Louisiana.
89. See Federal Antitrust Immunity. Exposure of Muncalalites to Treble Antitrust Damages Sets
Limit For New Federalism City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light Co., 11 CONN. L.
REv. 126, 140 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Federal Antitrust Intmunity].
90. "A recent study revealed that the statutes of 15 states provided for a State receiver or
state agency to act as a receiver when a local government unit defaults on its financial obligations." ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, CITY FINANCIAL
EMERGENCIES:

91.

THE INTERGOVERNMENTAL DIMENSION 77 (1973).

See Federal Antitrust Immu'ny, mupra note 89, at 142.
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ipality is found to have violated the antitrust laws, or in injunctive relief in
lieu of damages. 92 Possibly, as Professor Handler has suggested, 93 municipal
anticompetitive conduct should be left to the states to handle through state
antitrust laws.
However rough the present attempt by the Supreme Court is in striking
the balance and articulating a satisfying Parker immunity test, it is clear that
the test we now have is not ambiguous. The Court and Congress should
each be urged to consider the ramifications of the present immunity test.
Until such time as a new balance is struck, however, federal courts will have
the obligation to adhere to the dictates of Midcal and Lafayette when confronted with municipalities seeking immunity from the antitrust laws.
II.

THE BAR TO THE INSURANCE INDUSTRY'S ANTITRUST EXEMPTION:

THE "BoYco'TT EXCEPTION" TO THE MCCARRAN ACT

In Card v. National Life Insurance Co. ,94 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals waded into an area that lately has received an unusual amount of attention from the Supreme Court: the statutory exemption from the antitrust
laws afforded to the insurance industry. 95 The McCarran-Ferguson Act 96
(McCarran Act) excludes from antitrust liability every person or entity in
the "business of insurance," ' 97 to the extent that their activity is "regulated
by state law," 98 unless such activity is an act of "boycott, coercion or intimi99
dation."
92. 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1976) provides for injunctive relief. Under Section 26, any party in a
private antitrust suit may seek an injunction when injury is alleged under the Sherman or Clayton Acts.
93. Handler, Antitrust-1978, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1363, 1388 n.160 (1978). Professor Handler and the Colorado Attorney General's Office took the same position before the National
Commission for the Revision of Antitrust Laws and Procedures. Both expressed the belief that
the states should control anticompetitive state action through state antitrust laws. Id.
94. 603 F.2d 828 (10th Cir. 1979).
95. Set Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979); St. Paul Fire
& Marine Ins. Co. v. Barry, 438 U.S. 531 (1978).
96. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011- 1015 (1976). The Act provides, in relevant part:
Congress hereby declares that the continued regulation and taxation by the several States of the business of insurance is in the public interest, and that silence on the
part of the Congress shall not be construed to impose any barrier to the regulation or
taxation of such business by the several States.

ld. § 1011. The statute continues:
(a) The business of insurance, and every person engaged therein, shall be subject to the laws of the several States which relate to the regulation or taxation of such
business.
(b) No Act of Congress shall be construed to invalidate, impair, or supersede
any law enacted by any State for the purpose of regulating the business of insurance,
or which imposes a fee or tax upon such business, unless such Act specifically relates to

the business of insurance: Provided, That. . .the Clayton Act, and. . . Federal Trade
Commission Act. . . shall be applicable to the business of insurance to the extent that
such business is not regulated by State Law.
Id. § 1012. The McCarran Act further provides:
(b) Nothing contained in this chapter shall render the said Sherman Act inapplicable to any agreement to boycott, coerce, or intimidate, or act of boycott, coercion,
or intimidation.
Id. § 1013.
97. Id. § 1011.

98. Id. § 1012(b).
99.

Id. § 1013(b).
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Congress passed the McCarran Act in 1945 in response to a precedentsetting decision by the Supreme Court in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Association,' ° ° which held, for the first time, that the business of insurance was an activity in interstate commerce. 10 ' Congress and the dissenting
justices in South-Eastern Underwriters feared that this extension of federal
power under the commerce clause would invalidate state regulation of the
insurance industry because of the preemption doctrine. 10 2 The McCarran
Act's main thrust was to allow state regulation and taxation of the insurance
industry. 10 3 The insurance industry exemption from the federal antitrust
10 4
laws was added as a proviso.
The Tenth Circuit's decision in Card did not concern the McCarran Act
as a whole; the opinion only discussed the scope of the term "boycott," as
used in the Act. Before discussing the phrase "boycott, coercion or intimidation" as contained in the McCarran Act, it should be understood that a
defendant in an antitrust suit who asserts the McCarran Act's exemption
need only prove that it is indeed in the "business of insurance," and that the
activity that has been challenged as a restraint of trade is "regulated by state
law." The meaning of both these phrases has been scrutinized by federal
courts to determine the scope of such broad language.' 0 5 If a plaintiff is to
successfully negate a defendant's McCarran Act antitrust exemption, he
must show that the defendant, who has met the McCarran Act's requirements, has boycotted, coerced or intimidated the plaintiff. Such a showing
100. 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
101. The South-Eastern Underwrzters decision reversed a seventy-five year old precedent established in Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1868), which had declared insurance not to be
"a transaction of commerce." Id. at 183.
102. Federal preemption, through the supremacy clause, is imposed sparingly today. State
law will be deemed invalid where it conflicts with federal law, City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air
Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973); or when Congress has clearly decided to so occupy an area
by regulation that even consistent state law will be declared invalid, Florida Lime & Avocado
Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963). At the time of the passage of the McCarran
Act, the preemption doctrine was thought to have a broader scope than it does today; thus,
federal regulation of insurance could have invalidated even consistent state law. See Sullivan &
Wiley, Recent Antitrust Developments.- Defming The Scope ofExemptons, Expanding Coverage and Ref)5ing the Rule ofReason, 27 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 265, 270-71 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Recent Antitrust
Developments].
103. Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 429 (1946).
104. 15 U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1976).
105. In SEC v. National Sec., Inc., 393 U.S. 453 (1969), the Court outlined those activities
which fall within the "business of insurance": "[T]he fixing of rates...
the selling and advertising of policies . . . , the licensing of companies and their agents . . . , [tihe relationship
between insurer and insured, the type of policy which could be issued, its reliability, interpretation and enforcement--these [are] the core of the 'business of insurance.'" Id. at 459-60. Recently, in Group & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205 (1979), the Court held that
petitioner's agreements with pharmacies, to make it attractive for policyholders to patronize
pharmacies that limited their profit margins on drug sales, did not qualify as "the business of
insurance." For other cases defining this phrase, see Nedrow, The McCarranControvers." Insurance
and the Antitrust Law, 12 CONN. L. REv. 205, 210-45 (1980).
The requirement that insurance be "regulated by state law" to avoid antitrust liability, 15
U.S.C. § 1012(b) (1976), is met by a general authorization or prohibition of "certain standards
of conduct." California League of Ind. Ins. Producers v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 175 F. Supp.
857, 860 (N.D. Cal. 1959). A general scheme of regulation which failed to specifically include
the defendant's challenged restraint was, nonetheless, said to meet the "regulated by state law"
test in Ohio AFL-CIO v. Insurance Rating Bd., 451 F.2d 1178 (6th Cir. 1971).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL
has been called the "boycott exception"'

6

[Vol. 58:2

to the McCarran Act.

Before the Supreme Court's decision in St. Paul Fire & Martne Insurance
Co. v. Barry,'0 7 the federal courts had been polarized over their interpretation of the boycott language in the McCarran Act. The first federal court to
define the boycott language took a narrow view, considering that only the
"blacklisting" of insurance companies or agents by a group of insurers was
sufficient to meet the boycott exception.' 0 8 Both the Fifth and Ninth Circuits adopted such a view.109 Other circuits, however, have found that the
boycott exception extends to any boycotting conduct that would violate the
Sherman Act."10 The usual definition of a boycott, within the prohibitions
of the Sherman Act, is any concerted action to exclude a competitor from
the market. " 'I
In Barry, the Court settled this conflict at its extremes, but left the middle latitudes open to lower court interpretation. The Supreme Court was
faced with the issue of whether the McCarran boycott exception applied to
disputes between policyholders and insurers. Justice Powell, writing for the
Court, resoundingly answered in the affirmative."t 2 The respondents, plaintiffs below, were physicians who brought a class action suit against the four
insurers who carried medical malpractice insurance in the state where-the
physicians practiced. Allegedly, these insurers had conspired so that three of
the companies refused to deal with the physicians; thus, the doctors were
forced to seek coverage from the fourth insurer, and that company had
changed the rules of coverage to favor insurers.' 13 The Court made clear
that it was deciding only whether the insurers were acting to "boycott" the
physicians within the "boycott exception" to the McCarran Act. There was
no issue as to whether the insurers' acts were related to the business of insur106. The phrase "boycott, coercion and intimidation" will be referred to merely as the
"boycott exception", since courts appear to treat these terms synonymously. See, e.g., United
States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n., 322 U.S. 533, 535-36 (1944). Setalso Recent Antitrt
Developments, supra note 102, at 278 n.59.
107. 438 U.S. 531 (1978).
108. Transnational Ins. Co. v. Rosenlund, 261 F. Supp. 12 (D. Or. 1966). This court came
to its definition of "boycott" based upon the legislative history. See 91 CONG. REC. 1087 (1945)
(remarks of Rep. Allen).
109. See, e.g., Meicler v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 506 F.2d 732 (5th Cir. 1975); Addrisi v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y, 503 F.2d 725 (9th Cir. 1974).
110. See, e.g., Proctor v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 561 F.2d 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977),
vacatedfor reconsiderationtnlight ofGroup Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205
(1979), at 440 U.S. 942 (1979); Monarch Life Ins. Co. v. Loyal Protective Life Ins. Co., 326 F.2d
841 (2d Cir. 1963) (dictum), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 952 (1964).
111. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTrrRusT, § 83 at 229 (1977). A group
boycott to exclude a competitor from the market is a per se violation of the Sherman Act.
Kor's Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959). Some activities are considered
to be so economically egregious as to be per se unreasonable, and therefore, violative of section 1
of the Sherman Act. United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 401 (1927) (price
fixing). Not all concerted refusals to accede to the demands of a trader in the market are per se
violations of section 1. E.g., Deesen v. Professional Golfers' Ass'n., 358 F.2d 165 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 385 U.S. 846 (1966) (PGA's rules for participation in golf tournaments, while excluding
Deesen, were a reasonable restraint to aid in the management of the professional sport).
112. 438 U.S. at 552-55. Justice Stewart filed a dissent in which Justice Rehnquist joined.
d. at 555.
113. Id. at 535.
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ance, or whether the state regulated that business.1 4 Justice Powell defined
a boycott in generic terms as "a method of pressuring a party with whom
one has a dispute by withholding, or enlisting others to withhold, patronage
or services from the target."' 15 The Court stated that "the term 'boycott' is
not limited to concerted activity against insurance companies or agents or,
16
more generally, against competitors of members of the boycotting group."'
The Court, however, did stop short of the more expansive reading of the
term adopted by some lower courts. The majority held that a "boycott"
within the McCarran Act is not synonymous with all activity that constitutes
a per se violation of the Sherman Act."i 7 Almost as an afterthought, Justice
Powell reminded the parties that the threshold inquiry in a charge of boycott
is that there is concerted activity; an individual actor alone cannot "boycott." The boycott exception now encompasses concerted action against policyholders. The Court has left unanswered the question of to what extent
conduct beyond concerted action against insurers, agents, or policyholders
will come within the definition of "boycott."
The Tenth Circuit's recent decision in Cardv. National Life Insurance Co.
is consistent with the Supreme Court's general premise that a boycott is concerted activity to withhold "patronage or services from the target."' 1 8 The
plaintiffs in Card, a general insurance agent and the corporation he headed,
charged a life insurance company (National Life), a broker-dealer, 1 9 and
employees of the life insurance firm' 20 with a section 1 Sherman Act violation. Card contended that these defendants and National Life's general
agents association had conspired together to terminate Card's general
agency contract with National Life. 12 1 The defendants asserted that Card
was terminated because he had violated his contract by seeking another general agency agreement with a competing insurer. In the district court, the
defendants affirmatively pleaded that the McCarran Act exempted them
from Sherman Act liability. The lower court agreed and granted summary
judgment for the defendants.' 22 The trial court based its conclusion primarily on the plaintiffs failure to show concerted activity aimed at harming
114.
115.

Id. at 540 n.9.
Id. at 541.

116. Id. at 552.
117.

Id. at 545 n. 18. Business activities that are traditionally considered per se unreasonable

and therefore violative of the antitrust laws are: price fixing, horizontal division of markets,
resale price maintenance, and group boycotts.

2 E. KINTNER, FEDERAL ANTrrRusT LAW

§ 9.20, at 57-58 (1980).
118. 438 U.S. at 541.
119. Equity Services, Inc., the broker-dealer, was not a party to the appeal. The district
court held that Equity Services was not in the business of insurance and could not seek exemption from suit under the McCarran Act. Card v. National Life Ins. Co., No. 74-446 (D. Colo.
Dec. 9, 1977) (mem.).
120. Lawrence Leyland, executive vice-president of National Life Insurance Co. and William Ryan, a general agent for National Life Insurance Co., were both dismissed from the suit
by the district court's order of August 6, 1974. Brief for Appellee at 2, Card v. National Life Ins.
Co., 603 F.2d 828 (10th Cir. 1979).
121. 603 F.2d at 829.
122. The district court and the plaintiffs agreed that, for purposes of the McCarran Act, the
defendants were in the "business of insurance" and defendants' activities were regulated by the
State of Colorado. Id. at 832.
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Card;1 23 secondarily, the district court found that National Life's termination of Card lacked the qualities24of a "boycott": it was not a systematic
exclusion from the marketplace.1
1 25
The Tenth Circuit
The court of appeals affirmed the lower court.
court placed the main emphasis on the boycott issue rather than on the issue
of concerted action. Judge Doyle, speaking for the court, held that under
27
of the meaning of "boycott"
either a narrow view' 26 or an expansive view'
in the McCarran Act, the defendants' conduct did not disqualify them from
t 28
The appellate court confirmed the lower
the Act's antitrust exemption.
court's view of concerted activity, finding that all of the defendants were a
part of National Life Insurance Co.

The court of appeals did not choose to define the scope of the McCarran Act boycott exception. The appellate court viewed this complaint as a
breach of contract action. National Life alleged that Card was dismissed for
entering into a general agency agreement with another life insurance company in violation of National Life's rules. Judge Doyle did not perceive how
Card's termination of employment could amount to a boycott.
The Card decision is consistent with other federal court decisions on similar facts. i29 Aside from the issue of the propriety of insurance companies
130
the Tenth Circuit's opinion
having an exemption from the antitrust laws,
in Card upholds the integrity of the meaning of "boycott" in the antitrust
lexicon. I31
123.

The boycott claim focused on National Life, an agent/employee of that firm, and an

association of National Life's agents, which was not a named defendant in the suit. The district
judge found that among these defendants, there were no two separate parties capable of acting
in a concerted fashion. See the discussion of intra-enterprise conspiracy at notes 182-84 infra
and accompanying text.
124. Brief for Appellee at 19, Card v. National Life Ins. Co., 603 F.2d 828 (10th Cir. 1979).
125. Judge McKay concurred, but only so far as the majority opinion affirmed the district
court's conclusion that the defendants had exhibited no concerted action. 603 F.2d at 834.
126. See notes 108-109 supra and accompanying text.
127. See note 110 supra and accompanying text.
128. 603 F.2d at 832-33.
129. Black v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 429 F. Supp. 458 (W.D. Pa. 1977), aj'd, 571 F.2d
571 (3d Cir. 1978); Blackley v. Farmers Ins. Group, Inc. [1976-2] Trade Cas. 69,787 (D. Utah
1976).
130. See NATIONAL COMMISSION FOR THE REVIEW OF ANTITRUST LAWS AND PROCEDURES, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL, 244-45 (1979) (calling for
the repeal of the McCarran Act; anticompetitive activities of insurance companies that are protected by the Act are not considered by the Commission to be essential to the survival of insurance companies).
131. It is interesting to note that, assuming the presence of concerted activity in Card, the

facts alleged at the preliminary hearing bear considerable similarity to cases where judges have
found such behavior to be reasonable. See, e.g., Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian
Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970). In Hawaiian
Oke, two distillers, which had used the same distributor and were both dissatisfied with his
performance, agreed to terminate his contract and replace him with another distributor. The
Ninth Circuit could not find this action unreasonable per se because the distillers had not coerced the terminated distributor's market conduct; the exclusion of competition was merely
incidental to the distillers' agreement to transfer their business. Similarly, in Molinas v. NBA,
190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961), the concerted activity of the NBA in excluding Molinas for
gambling was not a per se violation, and indeed, was considered reasonable.
A Tenth Circuit decision reminiscent of the facts in Card, although in another context, is
Farnell v. Albuquerque Publishing Co., 589 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1978). In Fame/I, the plaintiff
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III.

CONTRIBUTION AMONG ANTITRUST DEFENDANTS

The thorny area of contribution among antitrust violators, with its multidimensional considerations and policy arguments, 132 was broached by the
Tenth Circuit court in Olson Farns,Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc. 133 The issue of
contribution among antitrust defendants has been hotly contested of late,
both by scholars 134 and by the federal courts.135 The genesis of this conflict
can be traced to the fact that antitrust defendants are subject to joint and
several liability for the treble damages possible under section 4 of the Clayton Act.' 36 Since Congress has made no provision in regard to contribution
in the antitrust laws, 13 7 defendants in an antitrust litigation have had to
was fired from his newspaper management position because of insubordination. Farnell had
refused to cease selling newspapers independently, in violation of company policy. The court of
appeals held that he lacked standing to bring a Sherman Act or a Clayton Act complaint, for
under section 4 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), Farnell could not show injury "by
reason of" anything in the antitrust laws. For a discussion of the standing requirements for suits
under the antitrust laws, see notes 169-70 infra and accompanying text.
132. An analysis of the competing policy considerations concomitant to a right of contribution in suits under the antitrust laws is beyond the scope of this survey. Several of these policy
concerns will be discussed, however, in the context of the Tenth Circuit's contribution decision.
For a significant and thoughtful analysis of the contribution issue in antitrust law, in general,
and a critical assessment of the Tenth Circuit's views, in particular, see Note, Contribution and
Antitrust Policy, 78 MICH. L. REV. 890 (1980).
133. [1979-2] Trade Cas. 79,699 (10th Cir. 1979), reheang en bane granted, No. 77-2068 (10th
Cir. Dec. 27, 1979) (Olson Farms ). A companion case, decided on the same day, achieved the
same result. Olson Farms, Inc. v. Countryside Farms, Inc., No. 78-1773 (10th Cir., Nov. 8,
1979) (Olson Farms 11). Olson Farms I stemmed from an antitrust conspiracy suit, alleging that
Olson Farms and Oakdell Egg Farms, Inc. had conspired to price-fix and to monopolize the
purchase of eggs from fourteen producers. Olson Farms was found liable for damages, but only
an injunction issued against Oakdell Farms. The jury verdict was affirmed in Cackling Acres,
Inc. v. Olson Farms, Inc., 541 F.2d 242 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1122 (1977).
Olson Farms II, based on the same complaint as Olson Farms I, covered damages subsequently incurred as a result of continued antitrust violations. The defendants in Olson FarmsII
have entered a settlement, accompanied by an order of dismissal with prejudice. Olson Farms
II, No. 78-1773, slip op. at 4 (10th Cir. Nov. 8, 1979). The appeal in Olson Farms Ylconcerned
the district court's dismissal of Olson Farm's cross-claim against Egg Products Co., Snow White
Egg Co., Countryside Farms, Inc., and a third-party complaint against Safeway Stores, Inc., all
for contribution or indemnity. The court of appeals found the arguments it had set forth in
Olson Farms Icompelling in the companion decision. Judge Holloway, as he did in Olson Farms
1, concurred only in the denial of indemnity, finding the Eighth Circuit's decision in Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979),
persuasive on the issue of contribution.
134. See generally Schwartz, Simpson & Arnold, Contribution in Private Actions Under the Federal
Antitrust Laws, 33 Sw. L. J. 779 (1979); Note, Contribution Among Antitrust Violators, 29 CATH. U.
L. REV. 669 (1980); Note, Contribution in PnateAntitrustActions,93 HARV. L. REV. 1540 (1980);
Note, Contribution Among Antitrust Defendants, 33 VAND. L. REV. 979 (1980).
135. Compare Professional Beauty Supply, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d
1179 (8th Cir. 1979) (joint antitrust tortfeasors have a right of contribution) and Heizer Corp. v.
Ross, 601 F.2d 330, 333 (7th Cir. 1979) (approving of ProfessionalBeauty Supply in dictum) with
Wilson P. Abraham Constr. Corp. v. Texas Indus., Inc., 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. granted
sub nom., Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 351 (1980) (contribution unavailable to antitrust violators) and Goldlawr, Inc. v. Shubert, 276 F.2d 614, 616 (3d Cir. 1960)
(contribution declared unavailable to antitrust violators in dictum).
136. See City of Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipeworks, 127 F. 23 (6th Cir. 1903),
aft'd, 203 U.S. 390 (1906). A violation of the antitrust laws is considered a tort. See Vines v.
General Outdoor Advertising Co., 171 F.2d 487, 491-92 (2d Cir. 1948) (L. Hand, J.).
137. Unlike the antitrust laws, the federal securities laws provide for contribution in certain
instances. See The Securities Act of 1933, § 11(0, 15 U.S.C. § 77k(f) (1976) (false registration
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argue the equity of their position.
Only one federal appellate court has decreed that there exists an equitable right to contribution among antitrust violators. In ProfessionalBeauty Suppo, Inc. v. National Beauty Supply, Inc.,138 the Eighth Circuit held that
antitrust defendants are entitled to pro rata contribution, when, on a case-bycase determination, the trier of fact finds contribution appropriate.139 The
litigation in ProfessionalBeauty Supply arose from a section 2 Sherman Act
complaint charging National Beauty Supply (National) with attempting or
conspiring to monopolize the beauty supplies market. La Maur, Inc., a
manufacturer of beauty supplies, was brought into the suit by National on a
third-party complaint for contribution. National allegedly prompted La
Maur to terminate Professional Beauty Supply's franchise with La Maur
and to grant National an exclusive dealership. The district court had dismissed the third-party complaint for contribution based on rule 12(b)(6) of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The appellate court reviewed only this
12(b)(6) dismissal.
The Eighth Circuit court in ProfessionalBeauty Supply stressed the fairness that is implicit in a right to contribution' 40 and rejected the five arguments La Maur adduced against such a right. 14 1 These arguments,
considered germane by most courts, 142 are: 1) Congress provided for contribution in the securities laws;1 43 therefore, congressional silence on the right
of contribution in the antitrust laws demonstrates a legislative intent to exclude this right; 2) contribution will cause plaintiffs to lose control of their
lawsuits through the defense tactic of impleading numerous third-party defendants; 3) contribution may deter settlement; 4) antitrust litigation is inherently complex and contribution can only further such complexity; and 5)
contribution would vitiate the deterrent effect of placing the burden of treble
damages on one antitrust violator. The Eighth Circuit court answered these
arguments by focusing upon two points. The appellate court asserted that
federal courts could handle the added complexity of contribution through
the prudent use of severance. Furthermore, the Professional Beauty Supply
court found that there was no proof that the concentration of the treble
damage award on one of several possible violators was any more of a deterrent than spreading damages among all of them.44
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has chosen a route different from
statement); The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 9(e), 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1976) (willful manipulation of security prices); and The Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 18(b), 15 U.S.C.
§ 78r(b) (1976) (filing a misleading statement with SEC). See Professional Beauty Supply, Inc.
v. National Beauty Supply, Inc., 594 F.2d 1179, 1184 (8th Cir. 1979), for cases citing a federal
common law right of contribution in specific instances. In addition, for a list of most of the
states that have either enacted a right to contribution or promulgated such a right through state
court decisions, see Schwartz, Simpson & Arnold, Contnlbution in iivate Actions Under the Federal
Antitrust Laws, 33 Sw. L. J. 779, 786 nn.49-51 (1979).
138. 594 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1979).
139. Id. at 1182, 1186.
140. Id. at 1185.
141. Id. at 1183.
142. See note 134 supra.
143. See note 137 supra.
144. 594 F.2d at 1188.
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that of the Eighth Circuit. In Olson Farms I, the court of appeals affirmed the
district court's rule 12(b)(6) dismissal of Olson Farms' request for a declara145
from Safeway
tory judgment which sought contribution or indemnity
1 46
Olson Farms had been adjudged liable in a priceStores and others.
fixing conspiracy under section 1 of the Sherman Act and for conspiracy to
monopolize under section 2147 of that Act. Oakdell Farms, a co-conspirator,
only suffered the issuance of an injunction. Olson Farms, in collusion with
many other egg buyers, had induced egg producers to sell eggs to the conspirators at a depressed price. Olson Farms paid a judgment of almost $2.5
million. 148 This figure was obtained by trebling all the damages suffered by
the egg producer-plaintiffs, including damages incurred from sales to conspiring buyers not party to the suit.'

49

In the Tenth Circuit's decision, the court of appeals considered the
three arguments relied on by Olson Farms in seeking a right of contribution:
1) federal decisions have created a common law right to contribution in particular instances; 150 2) there is a federal common law right to contribution in
rule 1Ob-5 suits;

15 1

and 3) the Eighth Circuit's decision in ProfessionalBeauty

Supply mandates a right to contribution.
The appellate court, addressing the contribution issue, found that Olson
145. As an alternative to contribution from its co-conspirators, Olson Farms sought indemnification. The indemnification claim was framed as a demand for the damages Olson Farms

had paid that were attributable to its co-conspirators. The Tenth Circuit previously had commented that such a demand was inconsistent with the nature of indemnification-a desire to be

compensated for all damages. Thomas v. Malco Refiners, Inc., 214 F.2d 884, 885 (10th Cir.
1954). Nonetheless, the Tenth Circuit court addressed the issue of indemnification. A party
adjudged liable for damages may seek indemnification if its liability is the result of a legal
relationship to the actual wrongdoer. Tortious conduct that is imputed, vicarious, or constructive may give rise to indemnification. See United Airlines v. Wiener, 335 F.2d 379, 398-99 (9th
Cir. 1964). Olson Farms, as an intentional tortfeasor, with no legal relationship to its co-conspirators, was denied indemnification. [1979-2] Trade Gas. at 79,704.
146. Judge Holloway, in concurrence, did not accept the majority's position on contribution, finding Professiona/ Beauty Supp/y compelling. The damages that Olson Farms had paid
amounted to $2,405,580 with accrued interest. When Judge Holloway compared this amount
to the damages actually attributable to Olson Farms, $99,656 (trebled, this amounted to
$298,968), the inequity in denying contribution became apparent. The other egg buyers involved in the conspiracy were unjustly enriched by the denial of contribution.
147. Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) makes it unlawful for "[any] person
• . . [to] monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person
or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States .
Id.

148. The judgment was for $1,950,827.23. Olson Farms subsequently paid the judgment,
which, with interest, totaled more than $2,400,000.
149. The untrebled amount was calculated by including the damages incurred by the egg
producers from sales to Olson Farms, Safeway Stores, Inc., Egg Products Co., Snow White Egg
Co., Countryside Farms, Inc., and Gusto Marketing Systems, Inc. The jury whose verdict was
upheld in Cackling Acres did not specifically find that these other buyers were liable; however,
the court of appeals in Olson Farms I found such an inference reasonable. [ 1979-2] Trade Cas. at
79,700 n.4.
150. The court mentioned Olson Farms' reference to Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 504
F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975) (unintentional tortfeasor has right of
contribution). [1979-2] Trade Cas. at 79,701.
151. In DeHaas v. Empire Petroleum Co., 286 F. Supp. 809 (D. Colo. 1968), modifid on other
graundrs, 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970), a federal district court held that a violator of rule lOb-5,
17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1978), could seek contribution. There is provision for this right in other
sections of the securities laws. See note 137 supra.
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15 2
it.
Farms' status as an "intentional" tortfeasor weighed heavily 5 against
3
which had
The decision in Sabre Sh'ppig Corp. V. American President Lies,

vigorously denied a right of contribution to an intentional tortfeasor, was a
persuasive precedent to the court of appeals. The Tenth Circuit court, in
analyzing the majority and dissenting opinions of the Professional Beauty Supp/y decision, was impressed by the substantial competing concerns present in
the conflict over contribution. The court further noted that most states that
provide a right to contribution among joint tortfeasors do so by statute.
The Fifth Circuit's recent decision in Wilson P Abraham Construction Corp.
v. Texas Industries, Inc. 154 paralleled the Tenth Circuit's reflections on the
contribution dilemma. This Fifth Circuit holding provided the appellate
court with the final impetus to decide to await congressional action, rather
than to create by judicial fiat a right of contribution among antitrust violators. 155
152. Olson Farms, while claiming that it was a passive antitrust violator, was adjudged
guilty of attempting to and conspiring to monopolize; both charges require a showing of specific
intent. See, e.g., Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594, 626 (1953)
(attempt to monopolize); American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 147 F.2d 93 (6th Cir. 1944),
af'd, 328 U.S. 781, 808-09 (1946) (conspiracy to monopolize).
Olson Farms claimed that it was a passive violator because some courts have been willing
to allow contribution between unintentional tortfeasors. E.g., Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc.,
504 F.2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 978 (1975). The early common law rule on
contribution came from Merryweather v. Nixan, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799), which denied
the right of contribution to an intentional tortfeasor. By the twentieth century, the American
courts had, for the most part, glossed over Merryweather'sactual holding and denied contribution
in both intentional and negligent torts. Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago B. & Q.R.R., 196
U.S. 217 (1905). See Schwartz, Simpson & Arnold, Contribution in PrivateActions Under the Federal
Antitrust Laws, 33 Sw. L. J. 779, 781-84 (1979).
153. 298 F. Supp. 1339, 1346 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). Using the term "unintentional" to describe
the actions of an antitrust violator is bound to cause confusion. In tort liability, one who acts
with intent desires "to bring about a result which will invade the interests of another in a way
that the law will not sanction." W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS § 8 at 31 (4th
ed. 1971). Obversely, an unintentional or negligent act is done by one who knows the danger to
be a foreseeable risk and not a substantial certainty. Id. at 32. It is difficult to conceive of an
unintentional antitrust violation, especially when section 1 of the Sherman Act is involved; one
who conspires, contracts, or combines to restrain trade can hardly be said, as a matter of law,
not to know of the harmful effect involved. See Schwartz, Simpson & Arnold, Contribution in
Private Actions Under the Federal Antitrust Laws, 33 Sw. L. J. 779, 792-93 (1979). Cf Comment,
Contribution in Private Antitrust Suits, 63 CORNELL L. REv. 682 (1978) (the author suggests a right
of contribution for unintentional violators of the antitrust laws, but never explains how one can
be an unintentional antitrust violator). Possibly, the line of demarcation between unintentional
and intentional antitrust violators is drawn at the point where a defendant's conduct is no
longer judged by a per se standard and must instead be unreasonable to constitute a violation of
the antitrust laws.
154. 604 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. grantedsubnom., Texas Indus., Inc. v. RadcliffMaterials, Inc., 101 S. Ct. 351(1980).
155. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals granted a petition for a rehearing en bans in Olson
Farms, Inc. v. Safeway Stores, Inc., [1979-21 Trade Cas. 79,699 (10th Cir. 1979), in No. 77-2068
(10th Cir. Dec. 27, 1979). The rehearing was held on September 16, 1980.
It appears that the United States Supreme Court will soon decide the issue of contribution
among antitrust violators. The Fifth Circuit affirmed, without published opinion, a denial of
contribution rights in In re Corrugated Container Antitrust Litigation, 606 F.2d 319 (5th Cir.),
affg 84 F.R.D. 40 (S.D. Tex. 1979). A petition for certiorari had been granted sub nom.
Westvaco Corp. v. Adams Extract Co., 100 S. Ct. 3008 (1980). Subsequently, certiorari was
dismissed, Westvaco Corp. v. Adams Extract Co., 101 S. Ct. 311(1980). The Court has recently
granted, however, the petition for certiorari filed in the Abraham Construction case, 604 F.2d 897
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IV.

INTERSTATE COMMERCE AND THE SHERMAN ACT

The decision in Crane v. IntermouilainHealth Care,Inc. 156 turned upon the
jurisdictional requirement of interstate commerce under the Sherman
Act. ' 57 The Tenth Circuit court affirmed 158 the district court's 12(b)(1) dismissal, reasoning that the plaintiff's antitrust complaint failed to disclose
that the defendants' restraint had a "substantial effect on interstate com59
merce." 1
The plaintiff Crane, a pathologist, complained that the defendants had
conspired to prevent him from performing pathological services at Cottonwood Hospital, a facility owned and operated by Intermountain Health
Care. In Crane's allegation of boycott, he charged that the defendants had
restrained the practice of pathology at the hospital, as well as inhibited his
own practice.
The court of appeals based its decision upon a prior Tenth Circuit case
involving a similar situation. In Wolf v. Jane Phllips EpiscopalMemorial Medical Center,160 the complaint asserted that the plaintiff, an osteopath, and all
other local osteopaths had been denied the opportunity to join the medical
staff of the local hospitals, and were therefore unable to admit patients to
those hospitals. The Tenth Circuit court held that the complaint showed
only an insubstantial effect on interstate commerce. The court in Wolfconsidered that the goods and services which the hospitals had purchased in
interstate commerce were irrelevant to the plaintiff's showing of Sherman
Act jurisdiction. The defendants' alleged actions did not restrain their
purchases in interstate commerce, nor was it demonstrated that the plain(5th Cir. 1979), cert.
granled sub noma., Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 101 S. Ct.
351(1980).
Another contribution case, Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union, 606 F.2d
1350 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cer. granied 100 S. Ct. 3008(1980), will be decided this term. Northwest
At/hnes raises the issue of contribution in an employment discrimination suit brought under
section 703(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1976).
156. [1980-11 Trade Cas. 77,593 (10th Cir. 1980), rehearingen bancgranted,No. 78-1346 (10th
Cir. Sept. 16, 1980).
157. The modern notions of Congress' authority under the commerce clause stem from
Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. Ill (1942). From the time of this watershed decision, federal
power has been expanded by a broadening of the interpretation of interstate commerce to include activities which have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The interstate commerce requirement differs between actions brought under the Sherman Act and those brought
under the Clayton Act. The Sherman Act speaks to "restraint[s] of trade or commerce among
the several states"; thus a substantial effect on commerce meets the Sherman Act's jurisdictional
requirement. See Hospital Building Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hospital, 435 U.S. 738, 743 (1976).
A stricter jurisdictional standard pertains to the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27 (1976), since it
encompasses "person[s] or activities [that are] within thefw of interstate commerce." Gulf Oil
Co. v. Copp Paving Co., 419 U.S. 186, 195 (1974) (emphasis added). Unlike the Sherman Act,
the Clayton Act dictates that the Act is violated only when one is engaged in interstate commerce generally, and has restrained trade during the course of interstate commerce. See J. VON
KAuNOWSKI, 16A ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION, §§ 12.03-12.03[2] (1979).
158. Judge McKay concurred only in the result. Crane v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc.,
[1980-1] Trade Cas. 77,593, 77,596 (10th Cir. 1980) (McKay, J., concurring).
159. Id. When there is an effect on interstate commerce that is substantial and adverse,
subject matter jurisdiction under the Sherman Act will attach. Mandeville Island Farms, Inc.
v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 234 (1948).
160. 513 F.2d 684 (10th Cir. 1975).
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tiff's purchases from interstate commerce had been substantially reduced.
The court's conclusion was that the practice of medicine was wholly an intrastate activity. 161
The Tenth Circuit panel in Crane felt that Wolfcompelled the court to
follow precedent until such time as an en banc court reconsidered their stance
regarding medical services and the Sherman Act's jurisdictional require62
ment. The court of appeals has decided to reconsider its position in Crane,1
a decision possibly prompted by the Supreme Court's recent opinion in McLain v. Real Estate Boardof New Orleans, Inc. 163 The Crane panel had cited the
Fifth Circuit's McLain decision, a decision that the Supreme Court subsequently reversed.164
In McLain, the plaintiffs asserted that various real estate brokers, firms,
and trade associations had conspired to fix real estate commissions on the
sale of residential property, in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Both the district court and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals found the
defendants' activities to be local in nature and without a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. In reversing the Fifth Circuit, the Supreme Court held
that the plaintiffs could show Sherman Act jurisdiction by "demonstrat[ing]
a substantial effect on interstate commerce generated by respondents' brokerage activity."' 16 5 The Court concluded that it was unnecessary to show
"that the unlawful conduct itselfhad an effect on interstate commerce."'1 6 6
The amount of out-of-state funds that flowed into New Orleans to finance
residential properties met the interstate commerce test which the Court had
enunciated.
The ripples from the McLain decision may permit the Sherman Act to
extend to almost all business activities. Realistically, the Court's only current limitation on jurisdiction under the Sherman Act is that a defendant
whose activities have an insubstantial effect on interstate commerce is beyond the purview of the Act. 1 67 Considering the Supreme Court's view of
the interstate commerce requirement of the Sherman Act, the Tenth Circuit's en banc review of Crane may possibly lead to a reversal of the panel's
decision.
V.

A.

CASE DIGESTS

Comet Mechanical Contractors, Inc. v. E A. Cowen Construction, Inc. 168
Section 4 of the Clayton Act

169

is a familiar citation to any party in an

161. The Tenth Circuit court came to the same conclusion in Spears Free Clinic & Hosp. v.
Cleere, 197 F.2d 125, 126 (10th Cir. 1952).
162. A rehearing en bane was held on September 16, 1980.
163. 444 U.S. 232 (1980).
164. McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, Inc., 583 F.2d 1315 (5th Cir. 1978), vacaed,
444 U.S. 232 (1980).
165. 444 U.S. at 242.
166. Id. (emphasis added).
167. Id. at 246.
168. 609 F.2d 404 (10th Cir. 1980).
169. Section 4 of the Clayton Act states:
Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything
forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue therefor in any district court of the United
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antitrust suit, for it contains the ominous treble damages provision of the
antitrust laws.1 70 Section 4 also contains the standing requirement for all
violations of the Sherman and Clayton Acts.17 1 The prerequisite of antitrust
standing is that the plaintiff must have been injured in his "business or
property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws."' 172 While this
condition precedent appears simple to apply, federal courts have created a
body of antitrust standing law 113 that is the antithesis of this succinct standing statute. 174
The Tenth Circuit has been consistent in its decisions concerning antitrust standing, always equating the "by reason of" language in section 4
with a proximate cause showing of an antitrust injury. 17 5 The Tenth Circuit's analytical treatment of antitrust standing, however, has not dissipated
the confusion present in this area of the law.
In Comet Mechanical Contractors,Inc. v. EA. Cowen Construction, Inc. ,176 the
Tenth Circuit court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment
to the defendants. The plaintiff, a construction subcontractor, alleged that
the defendants had conspired to inflate bids for the construction of public
buildings in order to force subcontractors and suppliers to pay a "kickback"
to the Governor of Oklahoma. The plaintiff alleged that E.A. Cowen ConStates in the district in which the defendant resides or is found or has an agent, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by
him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.
15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976).
170. Section 1 of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 12 (1976) defines the "antitrust laws" to
include the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976), and the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27
(1976).
171. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976). For the text, see note 169 supra.
172. Id. (emphasis added).
173. Two main problems in antitrust standing have concerned 1) the type of plaintiff who
may bring suit, and 2) the interjection into standing analysis of a proximate cause test based-on
the section 4 Clayton Act language requiring the injury to occur "by reason ofanything forbidden
in the antitrust laws." 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1976) (emphasis added).
As to the first problem, courts have taken two views. Courts have looked to the "target" of
the alleged violation to determine whether the plaintiff is within the "area of the economy
which is endangered by a breakdown of competitive conditions in a particular industry." Conference of Studio Unions v. Loew's, Inc., 193 F.2d 51, 55 (9th Cir. 1951), cert. dented, 342 U.S.
919 (1952). Alternatively, courts have examined the nature of the plaintiff's business or relationship to the defendant. Eg., Pitchford v. PEPI, Inc., 531 F.2d 92 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 426
U.S. 935 (1976) (corporate officer, as an employee of company injured by antitrust violation,
lacked standing); Nationwide Auto Appraisers Serv., Inc. v. Association of Cas. & Sur. Cos., 382
F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1967) (franchisor had no standing to sue for injury to franchise).
The interjection of proximate cause into antitrust standing has led some courts to decide
the merits of an antitrust complaint under a standing analysis based exclusively on pretrial
information. E.g., Southern Concrete Co. v. United States Steel Corp., 535 F.2d 313 (5th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1096 (1977); Bowen v. New York News, Inc., 522 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 936 (1976). The confusion created by this approach has prompted
leading authorities in the area to express concern over the analytical techniques employed. Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical Frameworkfor Antitrust Standng, 86 YALE L.J. 809, 835-40 (1977).
174. See generally Berger & Bernstein, An Analytical Frameworkfor Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE
L.J. 809 (1977); Tyler, PrivateAntitrust Litigation The Problem of Standing, 49 U. OF COLO. L. REV.
269 (1978); Comment, Standingto Sue Under Section ofthe Clayton Act. irect Injury, Target Area, or
Twilight Zone, 47 Miss. L.J. 502 (1976).
175. See Jones v. Ford Motor Co., 599 F.2d 394 (10th Cir. 1979); Farnell v. Albuquerque
Publishing Co., 589 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1978); Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727
(10th Cir.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973); Nationwide Auto Appraisers Serv., Inc. v. Association of Cas. & Sur. Cos., 382 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1967).
176. 609 F.2d 404 (10th Cir. 1980).
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struction, the successful bidder, had granted Comet Mechanical Contractors,
the plaintiff, a subcontract by oral promise, then reneged when Comet refused to contribute to the kickback. The district court stated that the plain177
tiff lacked standing to sue; the court of appeals agreed.
The Tenth Circuit court conceded that Comet had been injured in its
"business or property" as that term is defined in section 4 of the Clayton Act.
The plaintiff lacked standing, however, because it could not meet the "by
reason of" requirement of section 4, a test that the court had articulated in
Reibert v. Atlantic Richfild Co. 178 The Reibert court created two conjunctive
requirements that plaintiffs must satisfy in order to comply with the "by
reason of" language of section 4: "1) there [must be] a causal connection
between an antitrust violation and an injury sufficient to establish the violation as a substantial factor in the occurrence of the damage; and 2) . . .the
illegal act [must be] linked to a plaintiff engaged in activities intended to be
protected by the antitrust laws."' 79 The court of appeals determined that
Comet had failed to meet the second prong of the Reibert test. Comet failed
this test for two reasons. The plaintiff was not a bidder in the relevant market, which the appellate court defined as the market in general construction
contracts. The court further held that even in the subcontract market, the
alleged bribe was unrelated to an antitrust violation. No allegation of a conspiracy to restrain competition in securing subcontracts had been made.
The aspect of Comet's complaint which, of its own force, should have
been fatal to the plaintiff's cause was the lack of a nexus between the alleged
request for money to further a bribe and any substantive violation of the
antitrust laws. It appears that the complaint failed to state an antitrust violation. The court's focus on standing only obscures and confuses the merits
of the case. The Tenth Circuit is not alone in this approach to standing.' 80
Nonetheless, there is a need for all circuits to reevaluate their antitrust standing doctrines-to separate substantive law from standing requirements-so
that neither fatally intertwines with the other.
B.

Skyview Distributing,Inc. v. Mller Brewing Co. 181

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals treated the issue of concerted action under section 1 of the Sherman Act in Skyv'ew Distributing,Inc. v. Miller
Brewing Co. The appellate court reversed the district court's 12(b)(6) dismissal, finding that the complaint adequately alleged a combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade within section 1 of the Sherman Act. Skyview had
been a distributor of Miller's beer, while also carrying other brands. The
plaintiff alleged that Miller, under a plan to eliminate beer distributors carrying beer other than Miller's, induced Skyview into another market, created a new distributorship, Star Distributing Company, and eventually
supplanted the plaintiff with Star. Skyview asserted that this plan restrained
trade, by allowing Miller to fix prices, and extended Miller's market control,
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Id. at 406-07.
471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.), cert. den ied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973).
609 F.2d at 406 (quoting 471 F.2d at 731).
See notes 173-74 supra.
620 F.2d 750 (10th Cir. 1980).
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by depriving its competitors of local distributors for their beers. The Tenth
Circuit noted that the district court dismissed the complaint because the
lower court had determined that the plaintiff's injuries occurred before Star
Distributing was created. If this were true, Miller Brewing's actions were
unilateral, and unilateral anticompetitive behavior does not violate section 1
of the Sherman Act.18 2 The court of appeals, however, determined that
Star's creation three days before Miller Brewing terminated Skyview's distributorship provided "ample time for a conspiracy in restraint of trade to
come into being."' 18 3 The appeals court felt that it was not necessary to
explore the nature of the relationship between Miller Brewing and Star Distributing to determine whether they were separate entities who could con84
spire in violation of section 1; apparently, this was assumed.'
The court of appeals read Skyview's complaint as alleging more than
the mere substitution of a distributor. Generally, a producer may with im8 5
punity replace its distributor with another according to its business needs.'
Star's takeover was alleged to be in furtherance of an anticompetitive plan,
8 6
however, and thus was sufficient to withstand a 12(b)(6) motion.1
Mark H. Boscoe
182. Under section 1 of the Sherman Act, the unilateral actions of a business, even if harmful to competitors, are not unlawful. "[C]ontract[s], combination[s] or conspirac[ies] in restraint
of trade . . ."are prohibited by section 1; none of these activities can be accomplished by one
entity. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 149 (1968). The unilateral substitution of one
distributor for another does not violate section 1. See Scanlan v. Anheuser-Busch, 388 F.2d 918
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 916 (1968).
183. 620 F.2d at 752.
184. The Tenth Circuit did not elaborate on the nature of the association between Miller
and Star, other than to state that the plaintiff alleged that "Miller Brewing Company caused
the Star Distributing Company to be formed for the express purpose of eventually taking over
Skyview's distributorship.
...620 F.2d at 752.
Two or more associated corporations will not automatically be considered so closely linked
that they could not, as a matter of law, conspire as separate entities. The Supreme Court has
declared that "common ownership and control does not liberate [corporations] from the impact
of the antitrust laws .... " Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S.
211, 215 (1951) (parent and wholly-owned subsidiary found to have conspired). Apparently,
the Second Circuit has carved out an exception to the Court's views in Kwefer-Stewart when
affiliated companies do not compete with each other. Beckman v. Walter Kidde & Co., 316 F.
Supp. 1321, 1326 (E.D.N.Y.1970), af'dper curran, 451 F.2d 593 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 408
U.S. 922 (1972). But seeCromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials Equip. Corp., 543 F.2d 501, 511-12
(3d Cir. 1976) (mere presence of two legally distinct corporations is sufficient for a conspiracy).
The bounds of an "intra-enterprise" conspiracy that will satisfy the concerted action requirement of section 1 of the Sherman Act has never been distinctly demarcated. See generally 16 J.
VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION, § 6.01[21 (1979 & Supp. 1980);
Note, Intra-Enterprire Conspiraty Under Section I ofthe Sherman Act: A Suggested Standard, 75 MiCH.
L. REV. 717 (1977).
Based on the dearth of evidence available on the Miller Brewing-Star Distributing relationship, a decision that, as a matter of law, Miller and Star could not have conspired would have
been precipitous. Miller and Star are not competitors; if the lower court, on remand, were to
accept the Second Circuit's view of conspiracy, summary judgment for the defendants might be
appropriate. See 16 J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTrrRusT LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION,
§ 6.01[2]e (1979).
185. Craig v. Sun Oil Co., 515 F.2d 221, 223 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 829
(1976); Feddersen Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 180 F.2d 519, 522 (10th Cir. 1950). See gneralyJoseph
E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert.
dentied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970).
186. See Natrona Serv., Inc. v. Continental Oil Co., 435 F. Supp. 99, 110 (D. Wyo. 1977),
aq'd, 598 F.2d 1294 (10th Cir. 1979).

COMMERCIAL LAW
OVERVIEW

Bankruptcy filings were at record levels in 1980' so it is no surprise that
appeals from bankruptcy decisions dominate the commercial area of the
Tenth Circuit survey. As of September 1, 1980, there were 3,888 bankruptcies filed at the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Colorado alone, and filings were higher in the other districts of the Tenth
Circuit. 2 Bankruptcy cases outnumbered all other types of commercial cases
during the period of this survey, 3 but all of the appeals were decided under
the now largely superseded Bankruptcy Act.4 To be useful to the practicing
attorney this comment will suggest how the bankruptcy decisions would
have differed had they been made under the new Bankruptcy Code, 5 and
references to the new Code will be provided in the footnotes. Additionally,
this comment will review a banking law appeal from Utah and will summarize bankruptcy decisions that would remain unchanged under the Bankruptcy Code. 6 Finally, it will consider other cases in commercial law.
I.

PRIORITY IN BANKRUPTCY

The policy of the bankruptcy laws is to distribute the bankrupt estate
equally among the various creditors. For reasons of policy and fairness, however, Congress has establilhed a system of priorities requiring higher ranking
claims to be satisfied in full before lower ranking claims are satisfied at all.
The priority in bankruptcy given to a corporation created by Congress was
7
the concern in Turner . Tennessee Valley Authoriy.
In Turner, the Tenth Circuit held that the Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA), a corporation created by Congress, was entitled to the governmental
priority given by statute. The bankrupt, Agricultural Business Company,
Inc., owed the TVA money for fertilizer that the TVA had produced and
sold to it. TVA claimed that it fell within the statutory provision 8 giving
priority to entities of the United States. 9 The trustee in bankruptcy objected
to granting a priority to the TVA because he felt that the debt owed to the
1. Wall St. J., Aug. 28, 1980, at 1, col. 5; Rocky Mtn. News, Aug. 11,1980, at 83-84.
2. Interview with JoAnn Vigir, Intake Deputy Clerk, and Sharon Howard, Supervising

Clerk, Bankruptcy Court, Denver, Colorado (Sept. 17, 1980).
3. This survey runs from June 1, 1979 to May 31, 1980.
4. 11 U.S.C. §§ I to 1200 (1976).
5. Id. §§ 101 to 1501 (Supp. III 1979). The new Code was enacted as Pub. L. No. 95-598,
92 Stat. 2549 (1978), on November 6, 1978 and became effective on October 1, 1979.
6. 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 to 1501 (Supp. III 1979).
7. 613 F.2d 783 (10th Cir. 1980) (decided under the Bankruptcy Act).
8. The old Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 104(a) (1976), provided that "[tlhe debts to have
priority, in advance of the payment of dividends to creditors, and to be paid in full out of
bankrupt estates, and the order of payment shall be. . .(5) debts other than for taxes owing to
any person, including the United States, who by the laws of the United States is entitled to
priority." The new Bankruptcy Code, II U.S.C. §§ 501 to 510 (Supp. III 1979), does not contain a comparable provision.
9. 613 F.2d at 784.
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TVA was not a debt owed to the government. 10
The court of appeals was not persuaded by the trustee's argument that
Sloan Shipyards Corp. v. United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp. I" established that the TVA could not claim that it was a part of the federal
government.' 2 The court distinguished Turner from Sloan Shipyards with the
observation that the sole stockholder of the TVA is the United States Government while the stockholders of the United States Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corporation could include private persons.' 3 Confining Sloan to
its facts, the court noted that in United States v. Remund 14 the Farm Credit
Administration, an unincorporated administrative unit of the United States
Government, was entitled to priority in bankruptcy.
The test the court alluded to for determining whether a corporation is a
governmental entity is based upon the government's control over the corporation, the purpose of the corporation, and the government's responsibility
for the corporation's actions.' 5 The government is permitted to carry on its
operations through corporations, 16 and, as the Tenth Circuit noted, other
courts have referred to the TVA as an "instrumentality of the United
States,"' 7 as "an administrative arm of the executive department,"' 8 and as
"a wholly owned government corporation . . . the United States in action.' 9 The court stated that unless the statute creating the TVA expressly
20
denied it priority status, then the priority existed.
Under the old Bankruptcy Act, the order of priority was 1) costs and
expenses of administration, 2 ' 2) wages and commissions of claimants, 22 3)
reasonable costs and expenses incurred by creditors in certain situations, 23 4)
taxes due the United States, a state, or a subdivision of the state, 24 5) debts,
other than taxes, owed to any person, including the United States, who by
federal law is entitled to priority. 25 Non-tax debts owed to the government
fell within a separate statutory provision, which specifically gave priority to
26
entities of the United States Government.
10. Id. at 785. 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1976) provides that if a person indebted to the United
States becomes insolvent, "the debts due the United States shall be first satisfied." See note 26
infta.
11. 258 U.S. 549 (1922).
12. 613 F.2d at 785.
13. Id. at 786.
14. 330 U.S. 539 (1947).
15. 613 F.2d at 786 (quoting Cherry Cotton Mills v. United States, 327 U.S. 536, 539
(1946)).
16. Federal Crop Ins. Corp. v. Merrill, 332 U.S. 380, 384 (1947).
17. Tennessee Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 134 (1938).
18. Morgan v. TVA, 115 F.2d 990, 994 (6th Cir. 1940).
19. Ramsey v. United Mine Workers, 27 F.R.D. 423, 425 (E.D. Tenn. 1961).
20. 613 F.2d at 787.
21. 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1) (1976).
22. Id. § 104(a)(2).
23. Id. § 104(a)(3).
24. Id. § 104(a)(4).

25.
26.

ZI. § 104(a)(5).

31 U.S.C. § 191 (1976) provides that
Whenever any person indebted to the United States is insolvent . . . the debts
due to the United States shall be first satisfied; and the priority established shall extend as well to cases in which a debtor, not having sufficient property to pay all his
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Under the new Bankruptcy Code, a governmental entity, such as the
TVA, is not given priority in bankruptcy. 27 The Code has altered the order
of priorities and now includes administrative expenses first 28 together with
statutory fees and charges assessed against the bankrupt's estate. 29 Second
priority is given to unsecured claims for debts incurred after the commencement of an involuntary bankruptcy proceeding but before appointment of a
trustee and entry of the order for relief,30 that is, during the so-called "involuntary gap." 3 ' The third priority is for unsecured claims for wages, salaries,
or commissions. 32 Fourth are unsecured claims for contributions and payments to employee benefit plans, 33 and fifth priority is given to the unsecured claims of individuals 34 who, prior to the commencement of the case,
deposited money with the bankrupt for the purchase, lease, or rental of property or the purchase of services for their personal, family, or household
use. 35 The unsecured tax claims of federal, state, and local governments
36
have sixth priority.
When enacting the Code, Congress specifically omitted claims of the
United States for debts due and owing. It then amended the law giving
38
37
priority to such debts to exclude its application to the Bankruptcy Code.
Therefore, a claim by a governmental entity, such as the TVA, does not have
priority under the Code.
II.

THE DISCHARGE OF MEDICAL MALPRACTICE DEBTS

The Tenth Circuit addressed the issue of whether bankruptcy is an alternative to medical malpractice insurance in Franklin v. Frst NationalBank of
Albuquerque. 39 An osteopathic surgeon had a medical malpractice judgment
taken against him by default. He subsequently instituted bankruptcy proceedings and listed as dischargeable debts the judgment entered against him
in the prior medical malpractice action. The "creditors" objected to the disdebts, makes a voluntary assignment thereof, or in which the estate and effects of an
absconding, concealed, or absent debtor are attached by process of law, as to cases in
which an act of bankruptcy is committed.
27. .ee 11 U.S.C. § 507 (Supp. III 1979).
28. Id. § 507(a)(I).
29. Bankruptcy court costs are an example of such fees. See generall 28 U.S.C. §§ 19111929 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
30. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2) (Supp. III 1979).
31. Id. § 502(f) (Supp. 11 1978). For a discussion of the "involuntary gap," see COLLIER ON
BANKRUPTCY §§ 502.06, 549.02, -.06 (15th ed. 1979).
32. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(3) (Supp. III 1979).
33. Id. § 507(a)(4). According to the legislative history, this section overrules United States
v. Embassy Restaurant, Inc., 359 U.S. 29 (1958), and falls into line with the realities of modem
labor contract negotiations. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 357-58 (1977).

34. Neither partnerships nor corporations are included in this category.
35. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(5) (Supp. I11 1979).
36. Id. § 507(a)(6). Taxes due generally include income taxes, property taxes, withholding
taxes, employment taxes, and excise taxes, but not fines or penalties which do not represent
compensation for actual pecuniary loss. Id.
37. See 31 U.S.C. § 191 (1976). See also note 26 supra.
38. 31 U.S.C. § 191 (Supp. 11 1978) was amended by Pub. L. No. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2549
(1978), on November 6, 1978 to provide that "[t]he priority established under this section does
not apply . . . in a case under Title I1."
39.

615 F.2d 909 (10th Cir. 1980).
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4°
There is no indication
charge of the debts under the Bankruptcy Act.
42
41
whether the judgment against Franklin was based upon a contract, tort,
or hybrid 43 theory. The bankruptcy judge held that the state court record
was ambiguous as to one plaintiff, an adult, and unambiguous as to the
other plaintiff, a child. 44 Thus, the bankruptcy judge, without going behind
the record, found Franklin's conduct to be willfil and malicioyis and concluded that the debt was not dischargeable as to the guardian of the minor.
The judge also ordered an evidentiary hearing to evaluate the doctor's conduct as to the minor's mother. 45 The district court affirmed the bankruptcy
court.
46
Both courts relied on Ral v. Nicholas in deciding that the court
should be confined to a review of the judgment and record of the prior state
court proceedings and not take additional evidence. Niholas was overruled,
47
however, by Brown v. Felsen, wherein the Court held that the bankruptcy
court is not confined to a review of the judgment and record in the prior
state court proceedings when considering the discharge of respondent's
debt. 48 Thus, in Frank/in the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and
remanded the matter, ordering the bankruptcy court to look behind the rec49
ord of the state court proceeding to consider the conduct of the physician.

The court of appeals never had the opportunity to consider the important issue concerning the dischargeability in bankruptcy of a physician's
50
malpractice debts. Under both the Bankruptcy Act and the new Bank5
ruptcy Code ' a debt for an injury arising from the willful and malicious
conduct of the debtor toward another is not dischargeable in bankruptcy.
"Willful," according to the legislative history of the new Code means "deliberate or intentional. '5 2 The term malicious is not defined in the legislative
40. 11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (1976). Under the new Bankruptcy Code, the objection would be
based upon 11 U.S.C. § 523(6) (Supp. III 1979), which states that there is no discharge from a
debt arising from "willful and malicious injury by the debtor to another entity or to the property of another entity." While fraud was hinted at in the decision, see 615 F.2d at 910, the fraud
discussed by the Bankruptcy Code does not appear to be the type of fraud which would be the
basis of a malpractice suit, that is, fraud in the concealment. II U.S.C. § 523(4) (Supp. III
1979) provides no discharge for debts arising from fraud or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity.
41. W. PROSSER, THE LAw OF TORTS § 32 (4th ed. 1971). See, e.g., Brown v. Moore, 247
F.2d 711 (3d Cir. 1957). But see Kennedy v. Parrott, 243 N.C. 355, 90 S.E.2d 754 (1956) (physi-

cian's agreement to accept individual as patient does not create contract in ordinary sense of
term but creates status or relationship).
42. A tort action is based upon a doctor's negligent breach of duty to his patient.
43. A hybrid tort-contract action most often sounds in tort. See Brown v. Moore, 247 F.2d
711 (3d Cir. 1957); Noel v. Proud, 189 Kan. 6,367 P.2d 61 (1961).
44. 615 F.2d at 910.
45. Id.
46. 510 F.2d 160 (10th Cir.), cert. dented, 421 U.S. 1012 (1975).
47. 442 U.S. 127 (1979). For a comment on Brown v. Felsen, see Overview, Commercial
Law, Sixth Annual Tenth Circuit Suroey, 57 DEN. L.J. 165, 165-66 (1980).
48. 442 U.S. at 138-39.
49. 615 F.2d at 911.
50. 11 U.S.C. § 35(a) (1976).
51. Id. § 523(4) (Supp. III 1979).
52. H.R. REP. No. 95-595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 365, rpnntedin [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 5963, 6320.
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history,53 but in a legal sense a willful injury and a malicious injury are
nearly identical.5 4 The legislative history does not address the discharge of
medical malpractice judgments.
The exceptions to discharge are related to actions in tort and not to
breaches of contract. 55 The malpractice action, however, must be framed as
an intentional tort because debts for injuries caused by negligent, careless,
and unintentional behavior are apparently not within the discharge exception for willful and malicious injuries. 56 A malpractice judgment can be
brought within the exception by showing that the injury resulted from an
intentional disregard of a duty owed to the patient, 57 which includes abandonment and assault. Gross negligence is the equivalent of an intentional
wrong under the exception to discharge, where it is defined as a willful disre58
gard of the rights of others.
Imagine the following scenario. Based upon the pleadings and judgment in the trial court, a physician is found guilty of "unintentional" malpractice. Rather than pay the judgment creditor, the physician declares
bankruptcy, has his malpractice debts discharged, and leaves the injured
creditor with a useless malpractice judgment. Thus, the Bankruptcy Code
leaves an outlet for a physician who is adjudged liable to a patient for malpractice; instead of paying the creditor the physician might have the debt
discharged in bankruptcy.
This opportunity for evasion conflicts with the policy of helping those
who have been injured by the intentional or unintentional mistakes of physicians. A malpractice suit is the best method a person has to remedy a wrong
that a physician has committed.5 9 Nothing in the Bankruptcy Code can be
interpreted to prevent the discharge of debts incurred for unintentional malpractice torts or breaches of contracts with patients. Therefore, in a malpractice suit the complaint ought to be drafted in terms of an intentional
tort or gross negligence so that when a judgment is rendered against the
physician, the debt will not be dischargeable in bankruptcy.
III.

BRANCH BANK OR DRIVE-IN FACILITY

In Utah v. Zions First National Bank6° the court of appeals found that a
53. Id.
54. See MacLean v. Scripps, 52 Mich. 214, 17 N.W. 815 (1883); Rea v. Motor Ins. Corp.,
48 N.M. 9, 144 P.2d 676 (1944).
55. Allen v. Lindeman, 164 N.W.2d 346 (Iowa 1969).
56. 11 U.S.C. § 523(6) (Supp. III 1979). See In re Byrne, 296 F. 98 (2d Cir. 1924); Robinson
v. Early, 248 Cal. App. 2d 19, 56 Cal. Rptr. 183 (1967); Panagopulos v. Manning, 93 Utah 198,
69 P.2d 614 (1937).
57. Flanders v. Mullin, 80 Vt. 124, 66 A. 789 (1907) (doctor who intentionally injures a

patient in a way not essential to the operation performs a willful and malicious act in the
required sense).
58. Saueressig v. Jung, 246 Wis. 82, 16 N.W.2d 417, 419 (1944). Additionally, wrongful
death judgments are not dischargeable.
59. S. KLAw, THE GREAT AMERICAN MEDICINE SHOW 95-109 (1975). Set S. JONAS,
HEALTH CARE DELIVERY IN THE UNITED STATES (1977). Bul ste H. LEWIS & M. LEWIS, THE
MEDICAL OFFENDERS 264-65 (1970) (malpractice suits may be good for plaintiffs, but they are
expensive to the doctor and the insurer); D. STROMAN, THE MEDICAL ESTABLISHMENT AND
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILIrY 161-82 (1976).
60. 615 F.2d 903 (10th Cir. 1980).
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national bank had established a branch bank in violation of both state 6 ' and
federal 62 law by maintaining a drive-in facility 271 feet from the bank's
main structure. While the court was careful to follow precedent by not allowing the national bank to maintain the drive-in facility, the decision is not
necessarily the correct one, for it perhaps lessens the competitiveness of the
Zions First National Bank in the banking market of Ogden, Utah.
in fi..t
Utah is a state which allows limited branch banking. 3 That Is,
64
is
permitbranch
banking
class cities, those with 100,000 or more people,
ted. 65 In second class cities, however, which, like Ogden, have between
60,000 and 100,000 people, branch banking is not authorized if a bank is
already in the community. An exception is allowed if the existing bank is
attempting to establish a branch by taking over another bank in the commu66
nity.
The Comptroller of the Currency ruled initially that Zions could legally
establish a drive-infacziy on Zions' corner property. 6 7 The appellate court,
however, gave no weight to the Comptroller's ruling, finding instead that
Zions' drive-in facility was actually a branch bank and not permitted by
state or federal law. 68 "Branch" is defined identically under Utah and federal law. 6 9 The court found that Zions' drive-in facility was a branch bank
under Utah law. Since this "branch bank" was not contiguous to the main
bank structure, as state law required, nor within the exception established by
the Utah Commissioner of Financial Institutions allowing a facility to be
maintained immediately across the street from a bank if it is connected to
70
the banking house by a pneumatic tube or other means of transmission,
the court reasoned that the facility was an unauthorized branch bank. Specifically, the court was influenced by the presence of structures between the
main bank and the facility, although the bank apparently had built the facility as near to the bank as possible.
The court of appeals used the correct definition of a branch bank 7 ' but
incorrectly found that the bank's drive-in facility was a branch bank. It
relied on First National Bank v. Dickinson in which the Supreme Court had
said that a branch bank is "any place for receiving deposits or paying checks
or lending money apart from the chartered premises." 72 In Dickinson, the
Court had ruled that an armored car similar to a "mobile drive-in" facility
61.

UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-3-6 (1953).

62. 12 U.S.C. § 36(c), (1) (1976).
63. See Gup, A Review of Staie Laws on Branch Banking, 88 BANKING L.J. 675 (1971).
64. UTAH CODE ANN. § 20-1-1 (1953).
65. Id. § 7-3-6.
66. Id.
67. 615 F.2d at 905.
68. Id.
69. UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-3-6 (1953). 12 U.S.C. § 36(l) (1976) provides that
the term 'branch' as used in this section shall be held to include any branch bank,
branch office, branch agency, additional office, or any branch place of business located
in any State or Territory of the United States or in the District of Columbia at which
deposits are received, or checks paid, or money lent.
70. UTAH CODE ANN. § 7-3-6 (1953).
71. Id.
72. 396 U.S. 122 (1969).
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and a receptacle for money located one mile from the bank were branch
banks and, therefore, were not permitted by Florida law. However, in separate dissents, Justices Stewart and Douglas argued with the majority's rationale, 73 stating that the practices of the facilities in question were not those
of a branch bank and that the Comptroller's decision should not be overturned, absent overriding reasons. The Tenth Circuit believed that the facts
in Dickinson applied to Zzons, which led the appellate court to its conclusion
74
that the drive-in facility was a branch bank.
The appellate court erred in finding that the Utah drive-in facility was
a branch bank. Although the differences between a branch bank and drivein facility are not easily distinguished, they do exist. 75 A branch bank offers
complete banking services including receiving deposits, cashing checks, and
lending money. Drive-in facilities, on the other hand, which are commonly
used by banks, are only for depositing money and cashing checks; they do
not lend money. Furthermore, drive-in facilities often stay open beyond regular banking hours as a convenience to customers.
The Tenth Circuit applied the branch bank rule too harshly. The court
did recognize that the Dickinson rule should not be rigidly or mechanically
applied. 76 Other factors "such as the distance separating the main bank
from the added facility, the presence or absence of intervening structures
• . . and the availabilityofother locations for attached expansion may be considered."' 77 In Zions, the facts indicated that the bank was unable to establish a
facility on its own property and could not purchase surrounding property for
a facility. 78 Therefore, Zions established the facility on property located as
near the bank as possible. 79 The court maintained a rigid stance by not
considering Zions' efforts to purchase contiguous property ° and incorrectly
noted that the other factors cited in Dicktson were not in Zions' favor. 8 1
While it is true that electronic banking facilities are considered branch
banks under the federal statutory definition, 82 the Zions facility was not an
electronic banking facility. Therefore, decisions in electronic facility situations are not as sufficiently analogous to Zions' situation as the court of ap8 3
peals believed.
73. Id. at 138.
74. 615 F.2d at 906.
75. See, e.g., NEB. REV. STAT. § 8-157 (Reissue 1977), in which the Nebraska Legislature
prohibited branch banks but allowed auxiliary teller offices (drive-in facilities). These are what
the Zions First National Bank apparently maintained.
76. 615 F.2d at 906.
77. Id. (emphasis added). See Nebraskans for Independent Banking, Inc. v. Omaha Nat'l
Bank, 530 F.2d 755 (8th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 426 U.S. 310 (1976) (remanded in light of
new state legislation).
78. 615 F.2d at 904.
79. Id. at 904-05.
80. Id. at 906.
81. Id.
82. State Banking Bd. v. First Nat'l Bank, 540 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1976), cer. denied, 429
U.S. 1091 (1977); Independent Bankers Ass'n of America v. Smith, 534 F.2d 921 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 429 U.S. 862 (1976). See alro Illinois v. Continental Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 535 F.2d
176 (7th Cir. 1976); Missouri v. First Nat'l Bank, 538 F.2d 219 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S.
941 (1976). See Banking Decsrns, CBCT as Branch Banks, 94 BANKING L.J. 159 (1977).
83. 615 F.2d at 906.
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the court erred by stressing that
84
Zions' branch would violate the doctrine of competitive equality estab85
Zions' facility perhaps increased competilished by the McFadden Act.
tion in the Ogden market area and should have been approved as a matter
of public policy. Obviously, if other national and state banks in Ogden can
maintain drive-in facilities and Zions cannot, Zions will be at a competitive
86
disadvantage. Competition is important in formulating banking policy,
87
and despite objections to branch banking, certain types of branch banking
88
The Tenth Circuit would have been in line with
increase competition.
modern banking policy if it had allowed Zions to maintain the drive-in facility, unless doing so would have given Zions an unfair advantage over its
89
competitors.
The distinction between Zions' drive-in facility and an actual branch
bank is slight, but Zions' facility must have improved the bank's competitiveness in the Ogden market. Therefore, the court, in recognizing the competitive equality doctrine, could properly have found for Zions.
IV.

THE SELLER'S RIGHT OF STOPPAGE UNDER THE U.C.C.

An interesting interplay between the Uniform Commercial Code
(U.C.C.), the bankruptcy laws, and certain liens against the government occurred in In re Murdock Machine & Engineering Co. ,9 where a conflict arose
between the United States Government and Ramco Steel, two creditors of
the Murdock estate. Specifically, Murdock addressed the unique question of
whether a seller may stop delivery of goods under section 2-705 of the U.C.C.
as against a good faith purchaser for value.
On May 13, 1975, Murdock, a Utah corporation, filed a petition seeking
to be adjudged bankrupt. On May 22, Ramco, without knowledge of Murdock's petition, made its last shipment of steel to Murdock. All steel was sold
on credit to Murdock, delivery F.O.B. Buffalo, New York, the place of shipment. Upon learning of the bankruptcy petition on May 23, 1975, Ramco
stopped delivery of steel held in Indiana; another delivery was stopped on
84. Id. at 907. Some maintain that national banks, which have venue wherever they are
located arc at a competitive advantage. See Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank v. Bougas, 434 U.S.
35 (1977); Bell & Work, National Banks in Courts.: Unequal Drotectizon, 94 BANKING L.J. 484 (1977).
See also Dunne, Citizens & Southern Nat'l Bank v. Bougas: Closing the Cap, 95 BANKING L.J.
307 (1978).
85. Pub. L. No. 69-639, 44 Stat. 1224 (1927) (codified in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
According to J. WHITE, BANKING LAw (1976), "[tlhe McFadden Act of 1927 established 'competitive equality' between national banks and state banks which were members of the Federal
Reserve system by allowing both to establish 'inside' branches---within the municipality of their
main banking facilities-in those states that permitted branch banking." Id. at 478.
MAYER, THE BANKERS (1974).
See H. BARGER, MONEY, BANKING, AND PUBLIC POLICY 239-42 (2d ed.

86.

See M.

87.

Id. at 87.

1968).
88. De novo branch banking, for example, requires those interested in opening branch
banks to start new institutions rather than acquire established banks. See H. BARGER, supra
note 87.
89. The modern trend is to allow branch banking. See J. WHITE, BANKING LAW (1976).
90. 620 F.2d 767 (10th Cir. 1980).
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June 11, 1975. The steel was shipped to an Indiana warehouse and ultimately reshipped to Utah.
Unknown to Ramco, Murdock intended to use the steel to fulfill a contract with the United States. The contract between Murdock and the
United States contained a title-vesting clause providing that title to Murdock's materials vested in the United States immediately upon Murdock's
receipt of the materials. 9 1 Thus, the United States claimed that Ramco's
statutory right to stop delivery of the steel in transit was exercised subject to
the title that had vested in the United States immediately after Murdock
had acquired title to the steel at the point of shipment. 92 Ramco argued
that since Murdock did not obtain possession of the steel, the United States
did not acquire title. 93 According to the court of appeals, the United States,
in effect, urged that the Uniform Commercial Code not be followed. Additionally, the United States claimed that it had a lien on the property by
virtue of having taken title. The court, however, felt that Ramco had obtained the first lien; that is, under the Uniform Commercial Code, Ramco's
94
Title
lien attached immediately when Murdock filed for bankruptcy.
could not have vested in the government until the steel was shipped from
Buffalo, New York. 9 5
Ramco argued that its lien on the steel or the proceeds derived from it
remained valid, even if the title had vested in the government, citing Arm97
strong v. United States96 and United States v. Alabama to support its contention. The government analogized to the principle that no creditor can
obtain a lien against a public work to which the United States has taken title
91. The title-vesting clause in the Murdock-United States contract reads:
Immediately upon the date of this contract, title to all parts; materials; ... acquired or produced by the contractor (Murdock) and allocated or properly chargeable
to this contract under sound and generally accepted accounting principles and practices shall forthwith vest in the Government; and title to all like property thereafter
acquired or produced by the contractor and properly chargeable to this contract as
aforesaid, shall forthwith vest in the Government upon said acquisition, production, or
allocation.
Id. at 769.
92. Id. Under U.C.C. § 2-401(2), "F.O.B." means that title passes at the time and place of
shipment, which was Buffalo, New York in this instance.
93. 620 F.2d at 769.
94. Id. at 770. U.C.C. § 2-702(1) provides: "Where the seller discovers the buyer to be
insolvent he may refuse delivery except for cash including payment for all goods theretofore
delivered under the contract, and stop delivery under this Article." U.C.C. § 2-705(1) provides:
"The seller may stop delivery of goods in the possession of a carrier or other bailee when he
discovers the buyer to be insolvent." Generally, to stop delivery a seller must establish that the
buyer is insolvent within one of the three tests established in U.C.C. § 1-201(23). Matsushita
Elec. Corp. of America v. Sonus Corp. 362 Mass. 246, 284 N.E.2d 880 (1972). U.C.C. § I201(23) provides: "A person is 'insolvent' who either has ceased to pay his debts in the ordinary
course of business or cannot pay his debts as they become due or is insolvent within the meaning
of the federal bankruptcy law."
95. 620 F.2d at 770.
96. 364 U.S. 40 (1960) (state-created materialman's lien, which attached to a privately
owned vessel under construction for the government, remained valid after title vested in the
government).
97. 313 U.S. 274 (1941) (while lands owned by the United States cannot be taxed by the
state, as far as prior state tax liens are concerned the United States stands in no different position from other purchasers of land who take the land after the tax date).
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without the government's consent. 98 However, this rationale did not support the government's position, for the liens in Ansonia were against public
works while in Murdock the liens were against personal property. 99 Thus, the
United States obtained title to Murdock's steel subject to Ramco's right to
withhold possession. oo
Advancing a public policy argument, the court of appeals noted that in
UnitedStates v. Kmbell Foods, Inc. 101 the Supreme Court held that the priority
of private liens and liens arising from the lending programs sponsored by the
Small Business Administration and the Federal Housing Administration is to
be determined by state priority rules. Although Kmbell is expressly limited
to federal claims arising from these government loans, 10 2 the Tenth Circuit
found K'mbell persuasive. The court recognized that businessmen must be
able to rely on codified rights and duties.' 03 Additionally, the government
should not be allowed greater rights than others in the marketplace. Further, state commercial laws do not frustrate government programs, and sellers should not be required to investigate every sale to see if the government is
lurking in the background with a superior right. ° 4 The court observed that
the government could easily have worked within the framework of state laws
to ensure its receipt of the steel. 10 5 Like large businesses, the government
06
can work within the idiosyncracies of each state's commercial code.'
The government urged that it was a good faith purchaser for value.
But, the court distinguished Ramco's stoppage of goods before Murdock received them from section 2-702(3) of the U.C.C., 10 7 which limits a seller's
right to reclaim goods by the rights of a good faith purchaser for value.' 0 8 A
good faith purchaser is not so explicitly protected from a seller's right of
stoppage, however.10 9 Therefore, the seller's right to stop goods in transit 110
is effective even if title has passed to the buyer. I'
The court of appeals then reduced Murdock to a seldom litigated issue:
whether a seller may stop delivery of goods under section 2-705 of the Uniform Commercial Code as against a good faith purchaser for value. The
98. See United States v. Ansonia Brass & Copper Co., 218 U.S. 452 (1910).
99. 620 F.2d at 771.
100. Id.
101. 440 U.S. 715 (1979).
102. Id. at 740.
103. 620 F.2d at 772.

104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. U.C.C. § 2-702(3) provides: "The seller's right to reclaim under subsection (2) is subject to the rights of a buyer in ordinary course or other good faith purchaser under this Article
(Section 2-403). Successful reclamation of goods excludes all other remedies with respect to
them."

108. See U.C.C. § 2-403 (discussion of good faith purchasers).
109. 620 F.2d at 774.
110. Stoppage in trauitu is defined as "[tihe act by which the unpaid vendor of goods stops
their progress and resumes possession of them, while they are in course of transit from him to the
purchaser, and not yet actually delivered to the latter." BLAcK's LAw DICTIONARY 1273 (5th
ed. 1979).
111. Amoco Pipeline Co. v. Admiral Crude Oil Corp., 490 F.2d 114 (10th Cir. 1974).

1981]

COMMERCIAL LAW

court found only one relevant case' 1 2 in which a federal district court held
that until delivery of the goods, the rights of a good faith purchaser for value
are subject to the seller's right of stoppage. The Tenth Circuit concluded
that delivery of the goods to a bailee constitutes a delivery. Since the government did not contend that the steel had been delivered to it and since the
bailee, the Indiana warehouse, asserted that Murdock did not have physical
or constructive possession of the goods in the warehouse, the steel in question
was never delivered to either Murdock or the government.
As an aside, the court speculated that the steel might have been consigned under non-negotiable straight bills of lading.' 3 Even under the federal statute which deals with bills of lading, however, the government was
subject to Ramco's right of stoppage.' 1 4 The Court also noted that the equitable right of stoppage in transitu defeated the rights of good faith purchasers
for value.' 15 Finally, since Ramco was unaware of Murdock's transfers to
the government, it could not possibly have acquiesced in the government's
purchase. Such acquiescence would have made applicable the official comments to section 2-705 of the U.C.C., which indicate that receipt of the goods
by a subpurchaser acquiesced in by the seller bans the seller's stoppage of
goods in transit." 16
V.

A.

CASE DIGESTS

Admiralty Liens in the Tenth Circuit

It has always seemed likely that a case involving admiralty liens would
not appear in the Tenth Circuit, but such a case did surface during the past
term in an appeal from an Oklahoma bankruptcy decision. In R#e Petroleum
Co. v. Cbro Sales Corp.,117 Rifle was the debtor in possession in a chapter 11
bankruptcy proceeding, filed on June 2, 1978, in Oklahoma. On June 5,
112.
113.

Ceres, Inc. v. ACKI Metal & Ore Co., 451 F. Supp. 921 (N.D. Ill. 1978).
620 F.2d 774. The court said:
The provisions of the Code concerning documents of title support our conclusion
that a good faith purchaser for value does not cut off the seller's right to stop delivery
of goods in transit. Goods in transit, and 'in the possession of a carrier or other bailee'
(U.C.C. § 2-705(1)), invariably are consigned under a document of title, such as a bill
of lading. There was evidence in this case that the steel was consigned under nonnegotiable straight bills of lading.
114. 49 U.S.C. § 119 (1976) provides that
Where an order bill has been issued for goods no seller's lien or right of stoppage
in transi'u shall defeat the rights of any purchaser for value in good faith to whom
such bill has been negotiated, whether such negotiation be prior or subsequent to the
notification to the carrier who issued such bill of the seller's claim to a lien or right of
stoppage in transitu. Nor shall the carrier be obliged to deliver or justified in delivering the goods to an unpaid seller unless such bill is first surrendered for cancellation.
49 U.S.C. § 109 (1976) provides that
A bill may be transferred by the holder-by-delivery, accompanied with an agreement, express or implied, to transfer the title to the bill or to the goods represented
thereby. A straight bill can not be negotiated free from existing equities, and the
indorsement of such a bill gives the transferee no additional right.
Thus, even if the government were a transferee of the straight bills of lading covering the steel, it
would be subject to Ramco's right of stoppage. 620 F.2d at 775.
115. 620 F.2d at 775. See, e.g., Branan v. Atlanta & W.P.R. Co., 108 Ga. 70, 33 S.E. 836
(1899); Pattison v. Culton, 33 Ind. 240 (1870).
116. 620 F.2d at 775.
117. 601 F.2d 1385 (10th Cir. 1979).
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1978, the district court entered a stay order. In October of 1977, a subsidiary
of Rifle had entered into a maritime contract for a vessel and also contracted
to have its oil supplied by Cibro. Cibro delivered the fuel oil but was never
paid. On June 16, 1978, Cibro, having received notice of the bankruptcy
stay order, filed, as a listed creditor of the estate, a complaint in rem in a
New Jersey court to enforce its maritime lien for furnishing bunker oil to
Rifle's vessel. The ship was seized on june i7, i978, but the cargo remained
on the ship. Cibro did not apply to the bankruptcy court in Oklahoma for a
modification of the stay order, but Rifle knew of the seizure. A New Jersey
judge ruled that the seizure did not violate the bankruptcy stay order. The
cargo was eventually released when the exporter, Shell Curaqao, paid the
Cibro bill, taking in return an assignment of Cibro's claim.
The Oklahoma judge held Cibro and its attorneys in contempt of court
for violating'the stay order; it levied various penalties against them and ordered Cibro's officers and other attorneys to show cause for their failure to
follow the court's orders. The Tenth Circuit granted a stay of the contempt
judgment until the final disposition of the case.
Conflicts exist between admiralty and bankruptcy law.' 18 A bankruptcy stay order enjoins action against property owned or in possession of
the debtor.' 19 However, the parties in Ri# Petroleum entered into a time
charter agreement, which "is a contract for a special service to be rendered
by the owners of the vessel" who agree to carry goods in a ship in which the
charterer has no interest.1 20 This is distinguishable from a contract to lease
the vessel 12 ' in which the lessee, the charterer, in effect becomes the owner
122
of the ship for the length of the charter.
A maritime lien allows a ship to keep moving in commerce but prevents
it from sailing away to escape its debts.' 2 3 The Maritime Lien Act' 24 grants
a lien on a vessel for necessaries supplied, including fuel oil; the lien arises
automatically upon the furnishing of necessaries and has priority over mortgages or purchasers without notice. 125 The vessel is a distinct entity responsible for its own debts, 126 and a suit brought to enforce a maritime lien is
27
brought as an in rem proceeding in the district where the vessel is located. 1
28
Thus, the New Jersey proceeding was strictly against the ship. '
The Tenth Circuit noted that Rifle's subsidiary was a time charterer
and not the vessel's owner; had this not been the situation, the stay order
118. 601 F.2d at 1389. Set, e.g., Bide, MarimnetliensArisng Out of Collirin, 51 TUL. L. REV.
1134, 1151-52 (1977); Landers, The Shipowner Becomes a Bankrupt, 39 U. CHi. L. REV. 490 (1972).
119. Under the Bankruptcy Code the applicable provision is 11 U.S.C. § 362 (Supp. III
1979).
120. 601 F.2d at 1389 (quoting Leary v. United States, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 607, 610 (1871)).
See Bergan v. International Freighting Corp., 254 F.2d 231 (2d Cir. 1958).
121. 601 F.2d at 1389.
122. Marr Enterprises, Inc. v. Lewis Refrigeration Co., 556 F.2d 951, 957-58 (9th Cir. 1977).
123. 601 F.2d at 1389.
124. 46 U.S.C. § 971 (1976).
125. Piedmont & Georges Creek Coal Co. v. Seaboard Fisheries Co., 254 U.S. 1, 12 (1920).
126. 601 F.2d at 1389.
127. Platoro Ltd. v. Unidentified Remains of a Vessel, 508 F.2d 1113, 1115 (5th Cir. 1975).
128. 601 F.2d at 1389.
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would probably have been enforceable.' 29 While the bankruptcy court has
30
exclusive jurisdiction over the debtor and its property, wherever located,'
the debtor must have title or possession for the property to be within the
court's jurisdiction.' 3 1 Rifle's subsidiary operated under a time charter
agreement and had neither title to nor possession of the vessel. Ownership of
the cargo was of no importance because the shipowner, not Cibro, prevented
the unloading of the cargo. 132 "Congress did not give the bankruptcy court
exclusive jurisdiction over all controversies that in some way affect the
debtor's estate,"'1 33 for a debtor's property may be affected by admiralty proceedings, which do not constitute a claim against the property. 134 Furthermore, although the court did not mention it in the opinion, a court of
admiralty has exclusive jurisdiction of an action to enforce a maritime
36
lien.' 35 Absent a claim, the contempt proceedings could not continue.
Finally, the court of appeals dispelled the argument that Cibro had obtained a preference. There was no proof that Cibro had filed a claim, and
Shell Curaqao had paid Cibro's bill in return for an assignment of Cibro's
claim against Riffe. 137 Thus, the court concluded that the stay order had
not been violated, and it dismissed the case.
B.

Abuse of Discretion in the Bankruptcy Court

In Security National Bank v. Turner' 38 the bank held a security interest in
the property of the bankrupts, the Ocobocks, and received $34,000 from the
sale of their business. Two nonths later the Ocobocks filed for bankruptcy,
and two claims were submitted against the estate. The bank was listed as a
creditor, but it made no claim. The trustee, upon receiving the bankruptcy
court's permission to act as his own attorney, sued the bank, asserting that it
had obtained a preference by receiving funds two months prior to the filing
of the bankruptcy petition.
After negotiations with the trustee, the bank sent to him a check for
$8,000 and a "Release and Settlement Agreement" in which the bank relinquished any right it might have to file a claim against the estate. Shortly
thereafter, the trustee objected to the two claims that had been filed and
presented to the bankruptcy court an application for approval of the settlement with the bank, an application for his attorney's fees, and a final report
showing a positive balance of $8,436.84. Notice of a meeting of creditors was
sent to the bank, but not to the bank's counsel.
Less than one month later, the bankruptcy judge sustained the trustee's
objections to the two claims, approved both the attorney's fees and the re129.
130.
1978).
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

See id.at 1390.
Under the Bankruptcy Code the applicable provision is 28 U.S.C. § 1471(e) (Supp. II
Thompson v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 309 U.S. 478, 481 (1940).
601 F.2d at 1390.
Id. (quoting Callaway v. Benton, 336 U.S. 132, 142 (1949)).
601 F.2d at 1390.
Hercules Co. v. The Brigadier General Absolom Baird, 214 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1954).
Id.
601 F.2d at 1390-91.
608 F.2d 1358 (10th Cir. 1979).
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port of the trustee, and awarded the surplus to the bankrupts. The court
subsequently approved the settlement agreement with the bank. One week
later the bank learned that the objections had been sustained, and it appealed the bankruptcy court's decision. The district court affirmed, citing
no proof of error in the bankruptcy court.
Thc bank claimed a lega error because it was the sole creditor of the
estate.139 The court of appeals said that compromises achieving unjust results amount to abuses of discretion and should be set aside.' 4 A bankruptcy court is a court of equity, 14 1 and equitable principles govern its
jurisdiction. 142 In Turner the results were unjust because the bank had settled with the understanding that other allowable claims existed. 143 Since
the bankruptcy court and the trustee knew there would be no other allowable claims and the settlement would create a surplus, 144 the Tenth Circuit
found that the bankruptcy court had abused its discretion by allowing the
bankrupts to receive a windfall of over $6,000. 45 Therefore, it reversed the
orders of the bankruptcy court.
C.

Proofof Personal Ownership in Bankruptcy Proceedings

Despite a lower court's finding that a corporate officer lacked credibility, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held, in In re Whi'le House Decorating
Co. ,146 that documentary evidence which the officer presented established
the title to personal property found on the bankrupt's premises in the officer
personally and not in the bankrupt corporation. Therefore, the personal
property was not subject to the bankruptcy proceedings.
The court gave "great weight" to the bankruptcy court's conclusion
that the testimony of the company's president lacked credibility.' 47 The
president had presented uncontradicted documentary evidence, however, establishing that he himself owned the personal property in question, which
consisted of three boats.148 Although owners sometimes abuse the closelyheld corporation,' 49 unless a contention is made that the corporate form
should be disregarded so that creditors can reach personal assets or that a
fraud was perpetrated on the creditors, once a claimant establishes ownership, it becomes the trustee's burden to prove the asset should remain in the
bankrupt's estate. 150 In While House, the trustee failed to produce evidence
contradicting the officer's documents. 151 The court noted that the boats had
139. Id. at 1360.
140. Id. (quoting Albert-Harris, Inc. v. Woodward, 313 F.2d 447, 449 (6th Cir. 1963)).
141. American Employers Ins. Co. v. King Resources Co., 556 F.2d 471 (10th Cir. 1977).
142. Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966).
143. 608 F.2d at 1360.
144. Id. at 1361.
145. Id.
146. 607 F.2d 907 (10th Cir. 1979).
147. Id. at 909.
148. Id. at 911.
149. Id. at 910.
150. Id. at 911.
151. Id. at 910.
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been purchased more than ten years before the litigation,' 5 2 making it difficult to account for all pertinent documents; but, it disregarded the trustee's
handicap in having incomplete corporate records at his disposal 153 because
of the considerable weight it gave to the documentary evidence. Thus, the
boats remained in the personal possession of the corporate president, immune from bankruptcy proceedings.
D.

Securit Interests in Insurance Proceeds

In Brown . First National Bank' 54 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
considered the question of whether proceeds of insurance carried on collateral are proceeds of collateral within the meaning of section 9-306(1) of the
Oklahoma Uniform Commercial Code.' 55 In 1974, the Browns, owners of a
paint and gift store, gave the bank a security interest in all of the goods and
merchandise belonging to the business, including additions to and substitutions for collateral. The bank took the interest as security for a note that the
Browns executed in its favor for over $36,000 and for future advances. The
security interest was perfected.
In the agreement the Browns covenanted to insure the collateral with
policies written for the benefit of the debtor and the bank. They obtained
insurance to cover a loss of inventory by fire, but only the Browns were
named insureds;' 56 no clause designated the bank as payee.
The business was later' destroyed by fire, and the Browns received
$25,000 from the insurance company. The bank went to court and recovered this amount in October 1976. On December 1, 1976, the Browns were
adjudicated bankrupts. The trustee sued the bank, claiming that its acquisition of the insurance check was a transfer by the insolvent Browns to an
unsecured creditor within four months of filing the voluntary petition in
bankruptcy and was, therefore, a voidable preference.' 57 The district court
reversed the bankruptcy court and held that the bank had a continuously
perfected security interest in the insurance proceeds, which satisfied the requirements of the U.C.C. The Tenth Circuit affirmed that finding.
Section 9-306(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code, as adopted in
Oklahoma, provides that "proceeds" includes "whatever is received when
152.

Id.

153. Id. at 911. Under the Bankruptcy Act the failure to keep and turn over records could
be a bar to a discharge in bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 32(c)(2)(1976). Further, failure to maintain
records can work against the bankrupt when the trustee has the burden of proof. 607 F.2d at
911. The Bankruptcy Code provides that the court will not grant a discharge if
the debtor has concealed, destroyed, mutilated, falsified, or failed to keep or preserve
any recorded information, including books, documents, records, and papers, from
which the debtor's financial condition or business transactions might be ascertained,
unless such act or failure to act was justified under all of the circumstances of the case.
11 U.S.C. § 727(a)(3) (Supp. III 1979).
154. 617 F.2d 581 (10th Cir. 1980).
155. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.12A, § 9-306 (West 1963). For a discussion of insurance on
collateral as proceeds within the U.C.C., see Henson, Inzsuram. Awreds at "roceeds," 18 CATH.
U.L. REV. 453 (1969).
156. 617 F.2d at 582.
157. 11 U.S.C. § 107 (1976). Ninety days is the time limit for establishing a voidable preference under the Code. 11 U.S.C. § 547(f) (Supp. III 1979).
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collateral or proceeds is sold, exchanged, collected or otherwise disposed
of."1 5 Oklahoma's courts had not considered the question of whether proceeds of insurance on collateral are proceeds within the meaning of the
Code, and other courts were divided on the issue.1 59 Therefore, the Tenth
Circuit had to decide how the Oklahoma Supreme Court would decide the
question.
The trustee argued first that insurance proceeds arising from the destruction of collateral are outside the U.C.C. because section 9-10 4 (g) indicates that article 9 precludes treatment of proceeds of insurance on collateral
as proceeds of collateral under section 9-306.160 Next, he maintained that
Oklahoma accepted the personal contract theory of insurance, which establishes that insurance payments arise from a personal contract and not from a
contract running with the property.'61 Finally, the trustee urged that a literal reading of the section establishes that proceeds arise only from the voluntary disposition of property and not from the involuntary disposition of
162
property, such as loss to fire.
Cognizant of the revision of the Uniform Commercial Code, making
insurance on collateral proceeds within the meaning of section 9-306(1),163
the Tenth Circuit rejected the plausible arguments presented by the trustee.
First, the court stated that section 9-10 4 (g) applies only to the creation of
security interests in the insurance policy itself.' 64 In Brown the bank was
asserting an interest in the moneys already paid, not in the policy. Second,
the court noted that an exception to the personal contract of insurance theory arises if the mortgagor promises to insure the property for the mortga158. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-306 (West 1963).
159. See, e.g., Quigley v. Caron, 247 A.2d 94 (Me. 1968); Universal C.I.T. Credit Corp. v.
Prudential Inv. Corp., 101 R.I. 287, 22 A.2d 571 (1966) (insurance proceeds paid for a loss are
not proceeds within the term proceeds under § 9-306(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code).
In 1972, however, the U.C.C. was revised to include the following provision: "proceeds
includes whatever is received upon the sale, exchange, collection or other disposition of collateral or proceeds. Insurance payable by reason of loss of damage to the collateral is proceeds,
except to the extent that it is payable to a person other than a party to the security agreement."
The addition was intended to overrule cases holding that proceeds of insurance on collateral are
not proceeds of the collateral. Now insurance payable by reason of loss to the collateral is
proceeds if payable to the party to the security agreement. See U.C.C. § 9-306, Comment I
(1972) which provides that the purpose of the new sentence is to make clear that insurance
proceeds from a casualty loss are proceeds within the meaning of this section. See, e.g., PPG
Indus., Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 531 F.2d 58 (2d Cir. 1976); Insurance Management Corp.
v. Cable Services of Fla., Inc., 359 So.2d 572 (Fla. Ct. App. 1978); First Nat'l Bank v.
Merchant's Mut. Ins. Co., 89 Misc. 2d 771, 392 N.Y.S.2d 836 (1977), affd, 65 App. Div. 2d 59,
410 N.Y.S.2d 679 (1978).
At the time of this decision, Oklahoma had not revised its U.C.C. to reflect this change.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-306 (West 1963). Of the other states in the Tenth Circuit, only
New Mexico has not made the change in its commercial code. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 55-9-306
(1978). All other states in the Tenth Circuit have amended their commercial codes to reflect
this important change. See CoLO. REV. STAT. § 4-9-306 (Supp. 1979), KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9306 (Supp. 1979), UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-9-306 (Supp. 1979), and Wyo. STAT. § 34-21-935
(1977).
160. 617 F.2d at 583.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 584.
163. See note 159 supra.
164. See Paskow v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 579 F.2d 949 (5th Cir. 1978).
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gee's benefit. Even if the insurance proceeds are not made payable to the
mortgagee, the mortgagee acquires an equitable lien on the proceeds to the
extent of indebtedness.1 65 Under this exception the lien is superior to the
interests of the mortgagor's other creditors. Since the Browns had insured
the property for the bank's benefit, the court of appeals believed the
Oklahoma courts would not utilize the contract theory of insurance to deny
the bank its protection. Finally, the court, liberally construing the U.C.C.,
felt that a literal reading of section 9-306 did not distinguish between voluntary and involuntary dispositions of collateral.166 Therefore, it affirmed the
district court's decision that insurance proceeds from the fire loss of collateral
were proceeds payable to the bank.
E.

Improper Use of Credit Reports

In Heath v. Credit Bureau of Sheridan, InC. 167 the plaintiff, Charles Heath,
brought suit against the Credit Bureau of Sheridan, Inc. for allegedly preparing and delivering a "consumer report" to Heath's union. Heath claimed
that the credit bureau should have known that the union was requesting the
report to embarrass, humiliate, and discredit him, all of which are improper
purposes under the Fair Credit Reporting Act.168 The Tenth Circuit held
that the plaintiff had stated a claim for relief against the credit bureau because it appeared that the bureau might have known, when it delivered the
report, that the union had requested it for an impermissible purpose.' 6 9 The
credit bureau was not necessarily liable to Heath, however, for it could reasonably assume that the agency requesting the information would use the
report for the represented, proper purpose.17 0 Thus, the court found necessary a further inquiry into the credit bureau's knowledge of the purpose for
7
the request.' '
The Tenth Circuit did reverse the trial court's ruling on the credit bureau's failure to open its files to Heath. 1 72 According to the appeals court,
the lower court had dismissed Heath's claim because it believed jurisdiction
depended upon the existence of a consumer report.' 73 The Fair Credit Reporting Act, however, requires consumer reporting agencies to disclose, at a
consumer's request, the information in its files and the names of recipients of
that information. Nowhere does the statute limit the request to consumer
reports. 174 Thus, Heath had properly invoked the jurisdiction of the trial
court, and this issue was remanded for a determination whether the bureau
had in fact failed to open its files to Heath. Finally, the appellate court
165. Frensley Bros. Lumber Co. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 104 Okla. 8, 229 P. 598 (1924);
Smith & Furbush Mach. Co. v. Huycke, 72 Okla. 30, 177 P. 919 (1919).
166. 617 F.2d at 584.

167. 618 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1980).
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1693 (1976).
618 F.2d at 697.
Id. at 696.
Id. at 697.
Id.
Id.
See 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (1976).
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dismissed Heath's claim against all union defendants except the credit bureau because Heath failed to establish the only statutorily supportable claim,
which was that they had obtained the information from the credit bureau
175
under false pretenses.
Warren NathanielEckloff,Jr.

175.

618 F.2d at 697.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND FEDERAL
STATUTORY RIGHTS
OVERVIEW

In the area of constitutional law, a majority of the cases decided by the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stemmed from civil rights actions, under
either Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 or section 1983 of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871. Other constitutional issues presented to the appellate
court this past year included Indian rights, laetrile availability, the commerce clause, and abortion funding.
I.

TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided a number of cases during
the 1979-80 term involving allegations of violations of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.' The court used this opportunity to clarify and refine its
position in several areas unique to Title VII. Due to a multiplicity of issues
in a number of the cases, the decisions are discussed under headings corresponding to the relevant issue of the case.
A.

The Prima Facie Case

The central issue in each of the cases discussed in this subsection was
whether the claimant had established a prima facie case under the test enunciated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green.2 Each Title
VII case decided by the Tenth Circuit during the recent year which included
a major discussion of the McDonnell Douglas test was included in the survey to
assist the Tenth Circuit practitioner in understanding the court's application
of the prima facie standards to a variety of fact situations.
In Romero v. Union Pacif Railroad,3 the Tenth Circuit court reversed a
decision of a district court which had ruled that the plaintiff, a MexicanAmerican, had not established a prima facie violation of Title VII. Upon
motion for summary judgment, the trial court had dismissed the plaintiff's
discrimination charge because the court found that the plaintiff was not
qualified for the job.4 The Tenth Circuit court, in an opinion written by
Judge Seymour, held that there was sufficient contradictory evidence in the
record to warrant a further inquiry. Evidence was offered to show that Ro1. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (1976).
2. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).

The Court, in the McDonnell Douglas decision, held that a plaintiff

establishes a prima facie claim of a Title VII violation by showing: (i) that he belongs to a
racial minority; (ii) that he applied for and was qualified for a job for which the employer was
seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his
rejection, the position remained open, and the employer continued to seek applications from
persons of complainant's qualifications. Id. at 802.
3. 615 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir. 1980).
4. The trial court found that Romero was not qualified for reinstatement to his former
position because he had not participated satisfactorily in a drug and alcohol rehabilitation program sponsored by the employer. Id. at 1306.
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mero was qualified for the job and that Romero had been the subject of
discrimination by his employer. 5 The appellate court reasoned, therefore,
that the motion for summary judgment should have been denied. The
Tenth Circuit agreed with the district court in declaring that the McDonnell
Douglas standards apply both to an accusation of discrimination on the basis
of national origin and to a charge of employer retaliation against an employee for filing a discrimination suit. Additionally, the court of appeals
held that a plaintiffs triumph in a discrimination suit is not a prerequisite to
the successful prosecution of the charge of illegal retaliation. 6 The Tenth
Circuit accordingly refused to uphold the lower court's grant of summary
judgment on the issue of retaliation, finding that because the issue was primarily one of intent and motive, 7 it was not an issue properly disposed of
upon motion for summary judgment.
In Ray v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,8 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals agreed
with the district court's finding that the complainant, a black man, had established a prima facie case under the McDonnell Douglas standards. The
trial court, in adopting the findings of an appointed master, concluded, however, that the employer had articulated a valid business purpose for Ray's
discharge. 9 The trial court reasoned that Safeway, therefore, had countered
the prima facie test established by Ray. 10 Judge Seymour, writing for the
court of appeals, decreed that whereas the plaintiff had failed to introduce
any evidence to show that the business reason articulated by the employer
was a mere pretext for discrimination,"1 the discrimination charge filed by
12
Ray should be dismissed.
In Thornton v. Coey,13 the plaintiff had established a prima facie claim
of racial discrimination by the Oklahoma National Guard because of the
Guard's refusal to hire Thornton, a black, for a position with the State's
Equal Employment Office (EEO). The Guard contended that Thornton
5. Although there was evidence that Romero had participated satisfactorily in the employer's rehabilitation program, it had taken 15 months to reinstate Romero to his former position. In contrast, a white employee who had participated in the employer's program had been
reinstated in 120 days. Id. at 1309.
6. 615 F.2d at 1307 (citing Rutherford v. American Bank of Commerce, 565 F.2d 1162
(10th Cir. 1977)).
7. Id. at 1309 (citing Jeffries v. Harris County Community Action Ass'n, 425 F. Supp.
1208 (S.D. Tex. 1977) and Kornbluh v. Stearns & Foster Co., 73 F.R.D. 307 (S.D. Ohio 1976)).
8. 614 F.2d 729 (10th Cir. 1980).
9. Safeway alleged that Ray had been discharged for insubordination. Ray had refused
to accept a job assignment change which was necessitated by a personality conflict between Ray
and another employee. Id. at 730.
10. The McDonnell Douglas Court held that once a prima facie claim of discrimination has
been established, the burden shifts to the employer to "articulate some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." 411 U.S. at 802.
I1. Under the McDonnell Douglas test, if a court is satisfied that the employer has countered
the prima facie claim by articulating a valid business reason for the employee's rejection, the
burden shifts to the plaintiff to prove that the business reason offered by the employer is merely
a pretext for discrimination. Id.
12. The appellate court suggested that the plaintiff could have established that the business excuse was a mere pretext for discrimination by showing that white employees, in substantially similar circumstances, were treated differently than Ray, or by showing that the employer
had a general policy and practice of treating black employees differently than white employees.
614 F.2d at 731.
13. 618 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1980).
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was not qualified for the position, and, in the alternative, the Guard asserted
that the person hired for the job outranked Thornton. The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals, in an opinion written by Judge Seymour, rejected the employer's contention that Thornton was unqualified for the position. 4 The
court also rejected the business purpose excuse articulated by the Guardthat the appointment was based on a ranking system. The Guard had used
a rating procedure which the court found, under the Griggs test, 15 to be in
violation of Title VII.
In EEOC v. FruehaufCorp., 16 the court of appeals upheld the decision of
the district court which had determined that the EEOC failed to establish a
prima facie case against the employer. The employer had alleged, and the
trial court agreed, that the aggrieved employees were not qualified for the
disputed position of shop foreman. Judge McWilliams, writing for the
Tenth Circuit court, conceded that the EEOC had established a prima facie
case under the McDonnell Douglas standards. Because Judge McWilliams
found that the applicants were not qualified for the position of shop foreman,' 7 he affirmed the decision of the trial court.
The plaintiff in Hernandez v. Alexander'" had established a prima facie
case of national origin discrimination, but because the employer had articulated a valid business reason for the denial of Hernandez' promotion, the
trial court granted judgment for the employer. The employer, the United
States Army, stated that Hernandez had been denied the promotion because
the person promoted had "broader" qualifications than Hernandez. Chief
Judge Seth, writing for the appellate court, declared that the trial court had
applied the correct standard in requiring the employer merely to articulate a
reason for the promotion denial. The court .of appeals stressed the importance of the statements made by the Supreme Court in Trustees of Keene State
College o. Sweeney 9 because of the Court's emphasis on the articulationof business reasons as compared with proof of the absence of a discriminatory motive. 20 The Tenth Circuit opinion contained no discussion of whether
Hernandez attempted to establish that the reason articulated by the employer was a mere pretext for discrimination.
In Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc.,2t the plaintiff had established a
prima facie case of sex discrimination. The employer argued that the trial
court erred in its finding of a prima facie case because the plaintiff had failed
22
to establish that a vacancy existed or that she was qualified for a position.
14. The evidence in the record demonstrated that Thornton had received favorable officer
efficiency ratings while he was in the Army, Thornton's academic record showed that he had
specialized in areas particularly well-suited as background for the EEO position, and Thornton's application for the EEO position listed impressive credentials for the job. 618 F.2d at 690.
15. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971); see note 28 infra.
16. 609 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1979).
17. The appellate court's analysis is confusing. The court assumed that a prima facie case
was established. The court subsequently found, however, that one of the requisite elements of a
prima facie case, under the McDonnet Douglas test, was not satisfied. 609 F.2d at 435-36.
18. 607 F.2d 920 (10th Cir. 1979).
19. 439 U.S. 24 (1979).
20. 607 F.2d at 923.
21. 624 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980).
22. The employer argued that there was no position open for the female employee because
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The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion written by Judge Doyle,
rejected both of the employer's arguments. The appellate court noted that
there had been numerous occasions when the employer had asked the plaintiff to perform responsible duties. Nevertheless, the employer continually refused to promote the plaintiff to positions commensurate with her duties
when ajob opening occurred. Although the court was reluctant to conclude
that the employer had instituted a pattern and practice of discrimination
against women, 23 Judge Doyle was convinced that there had been numerous
specific acts of discrimination by the employer against the individual plaintiff.
In Wttenbrrnk v. Western Electrc Co. ,24 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's ruling which held that the plaintiff had not
been discriminated against by her employer on the basis of sex. The trial
court found that the discrimination charge was based on the plaintiffs sense
of frustration with the lack of upward mobility in her job and that the em25
Relying on an
ployer had not denied her a promotion because of her sex.
26
the plaintiff
that
earlier Tenth Circuit decision, Judge Barrett determined
had not established a prima facie case of a Title VII violation merely because a qualified male employee was promoted rather than plaintiff. Absent
any evidence of discriminatory intent by an employer to deny a female employee a promotion, the fact that a qualified man is promoted over a qualified woman is not sufficient grounds to sustain a claim of sexual
discrimination.
B.

Policies Which Perpetuate Pre-Act Discrimination

In Thornton v. Coffy, 2 7 the Tenth Circuit court ruled that a rating procedure used by the Oklahoma National Guard, when measured under the
Grzggs test,2 8 violated the requirements of Title VII. The Guard had argued
that Thornton was denied the EEO job position because the person who was
hired outranked him. The rating procedure used by the Guard favored applicants who were full time civilian employees. As no black officer had ever
been a full time civilian employee of the Guard, and since the person hired
for the position had been a full time Guard employee since 1956, the court of
appeals found that the rating procedure used by the Guard fell squarely
within the Griggs prohibition. The court concluded that the procedure perpetuated the discriminatory impact of the prior legal segregation of the
29
Guard.
there had been a lateral transfer of another worker into the vacancy. The employer also argued
that the plaintiff was not as well qualified as the person who had filled the position. Id. at 954.
23. See notes 38-40 znhfa and accompanying text.
24. No. 78-1737 (10th Cir. June 7, 1979) (not for routine publication).
25. M., slip op. at 6.
26. Olson v. Philco-Ford, 531 F.2d 474 (10th Cir. 1976).
27. 618 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1980); see notes 13-15 supra and accompanying text.
28. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Gr'ggs held that employment practices, procedures, or tests which are neutral on their face cannot be maintained if they operate to
freeze the status quo of prior discrimination. Id. at 430.
29. The Oklahoma National Guard was segregated by law until 1958.
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In United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. ,30 the Tenth Circuit court
held that, under the Griggs test, 3 ' an employer's no-transfer rule violated
Title VII. The employer's no-transfer policy forbade city drivers from transferring to a line or over-the-road driver position. 3 2 Finding that the employer had engaged in a pattern and practice of discrimination against
blacks who had requested an over-the-road position, 33 the court of appeals
held that the no-transfer policy impermissably locked blacks into city driver
positions. The appellate court concluded, therefore, that the no-transfer policy of the employer perpetuated pre-Act discrimination in violation of the
Grzggs mandate.
The employer argued that the Grzgs test was inapplicable in light of
the two recent Supreme Court pronouncements in United Air Lines, Inc. v.
Evans 34 and InternationalBrotherhood of Teamsters v. United States.35 The employer contended that the Supreme Court in these cases carved out two exceptions to the holding in Gr'ggs and that the no-transfer policy of the
trucking firm fell within the exceptions. The Tenth Circuit court rejected
the argument, stating that "[t]here is not the slightest indication in Evans
that the Supreme Court intended to overrule or disassociate itself from the
decision in Grzggs. '' 36 The court of appeals further noted that the Supreme
Court had limited the application of its Teamsters decision to bona fide seniority systems. The court of appeals concluded that the no-transfer policy of
37
the employer fell outside the scope of this limited exception.
C.

A Pattern and Practce of Discrimination

In United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. ,38 the government introduced considerable evidence of the employer's company-wide discrimination
against blacks. The government attempted to establish "a pattern and practice of discrimination" in order to set up the evidentiary presumption enunciated in the Teamsters case. 39 In the Teamsters decision, the Supreme Court
explained that once a pattern and practice of discrimination is established,
the rejection of an applicant of the class discriminated against creates the
inference that an employer is pursuing a discriminatory hiring policy. The
burden then shifts to the employer to establish that the individual applicant
40
was denied employment for lawful reasons.
The Tenth Circuit, agreeing with the district court, held that the gov30. 625 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1979).
31. See note 28 supra.
32. There was testimony indicating that the over-the-road drivers were paid more than the
city drivers.
33. See notes 38-40 tnfra
and accompanying text.
34. 431 U.S. 553 (1977). The Evans Court held that a discrimination charge which is not
timely filed with the EEOC is considered to be equivalent to a pre-1964 act of discrimination,
and, therefore, the charge has no legal effect.
35. 431 U.S. 324 (1977). The Teansters Court held that bona fide seniority systems are

protected from Title VII application under § 703(h) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h).
36. 625 F.2d at 928.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. at 359 n.45.
40. Id. at 364.
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ernment had established the Teamsters evidertiary presumption. The court
reasoned that since there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the
trial court's finding, the employer was rightly found to have established a
pattern and practice of discrimination against blacks. The appeals court
ruled that the trial court had not erred in granting relief to the claimants
without first requiring the government to prove instances of specific acts of
4
discrimination. 1
D.

Dscrmination Charges Against Unions

In Romero v. Union Pacifw Railroad,42 the Tenth Circuit court remanded
the case to the trial court for an evidentiary determination of whether the
employees' union was involved in the alleged national origin discrimination
and retaliation practices of the employer. Considering the fact that union
members had made retaliatory statements against Romero and the fact that
the union worked closely with the employer in the employer's drug and alcohol rehabilitation program, the court of appeals held that there was sufficient contradictory evidence in the record to warrant reversal of the trial
court's grant of the union's motion for summary judgment. In so doing, the
appellate court relied on precedential decisions from other circuits wherein
the courts of appeals have recognized the important role that labor organiza43
tions play in the enforcement of Title VII.
E.

Title VII and the Equal Pay Act

In Fitzgeraldv.Sirloin Stockade, Inc.,44 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
refused to apply the standards of the Equal Pay Act. 45 Although the trial
judge had made a mistaken reference to the Equal Pay Act in his findings,
the appellate court dismissed the employer's attempt to assert the Act on
appeal. Application of the Equal Pay Act would have allowed the employer
to request a jury trial. A right to a jury trial does not exist in cases brought
exclusively under Title VII. Adjudication under the Equal Pay Act also
would have allowed the employer to raise certain standards not available in
Title VII cases.46 The court rejected the employer's attempt to raise the
Equal Pay Act because the trial court had proceeded consistently under Title VII.
In Lemons v. City and County of Denver,47 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion written by Chief Judge Seth, rejected an attempt by
41. 625 F.2d at 930.
42. 615 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir. 1980).
43. See Donnell v. General Motors Corp., 576 F.2d.1292 (8th Cir. 1978) (labor organizations have an affirmative duty to insure employer compliance with Title VII); Gray v. Greyhound Lines, 545 F.2d 169 (D.C. Cir. 1976); Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257
(4th Cir. 1976); Macklin v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 478 F.2d 979 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (a union
may be held responsible for the discriminatory practices of the employer if the union takes no
action to prevent those practices),
44. 624 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980).
45. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1976).
46. The Equal Pay Act standards, however, are applied in Title VII actions when the issue
of discriminatory compensation arises.
47. 620 F.2d 228 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 244 (1980).
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several nurses to restructure Denver's classification and pay plan. The
nurses sought to adjust their wages so that their benefits would no longer be
linked to the salaries of other nurses in the metropolitan community. 48 The
nurses alleged that since most nurses are women, the prevailing low wages of
nurses in the community reflected an historic pattern of discrimination
against women. Furthermore, the Denver nurses argued that whereas the
classification and pay plan of the city reflected the low community wages for
nurses, the city's plan discriminated against them. The court of appeals rejected the nurses' claim, stating that the wage disparity articulated by the
nurses was not the type of employment disparity contemplated by Congress
in enacting Title VII and the Equal Pay Act. 49 The court declared that an
employee can prevail under these acts only upon showing a differential in
pay between persons doing equal work. The employee must further demonstrate that the differential is based on an unlawful reason. This is the "equal
pay/equal work" concept. As the nurses were attempting to link their job
classifications to employment categories requiring entirely different skills, 50
the court found that they merited no relief under either Title VII or the
Equal Pay Act.
F.

Afjirmatzwe Action Plans

In United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 5 ' the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals overturned a discretionary ruling of the trial court which had
held that the facts of the case did not warrant the imposition of an affirmative action plan. Recognizing the broad discretion granted to the district
courts under Title VII, the appellate court nonetheless ruled that the employer's history of racial discrimination mandated institution of affirmative
action. The court enunciated five factors to be considered in determining
whether affirmative relief should be granted. A trial court should consider:
1) whether there has been a long history of racial discrimination by the employer or the union; 2) whether the history of the employer's attempts to end
racial discrimination by increasing minority hiring and promotion is relatively short; 3) whether there was any significant change in the employer's
policies before the government filed suit; 4) whether the employer was recalcitrant in voluntarily taking action to correct the imbalances created by past
discrimination; and 5) whether there was any significant improvement in the
employer's practices. 5 2 Given the concentration of blacks in low paying, less
desirable jobs at Lee Way Motor Freight, and given the reluctance of the
employer to alter his employment practices despite two major lawsuits, 53 the
48. The nursing classification and pay plan of Denver placed city nurses on a parity with
other nurses in the community. Id. at 229.
49. As a result of the Bennett Amendment, Title VII mirrors certain provisions of the

Equal Pay Act with respect to discriminatory pay differentials. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(b) (1976).
50. The nurses wanted their job classification to be linked to a city classification described
as "General Administrative Series". 620 F.2d at 229.
51. 625 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1979).
52. Id. at 944.
53. These two major lawsuits were the instant case, 625 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1979), and
Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954
(1971).
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appellate court believed that affirmative relief was warranted.
G.

Subject MatterJurisdicton

In Romero v. Union Paciqftc Railroad,54 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
ruled that the omission of a defendant's name from an EEOC charge does
not require automatic dismissal of a subsequent Title VII action. 55 Recognizing that the timely filing of a charge of discrimination with the EEOC is a
jurisdictional prerequisite to the institution of a lawsuit, 56 the court of appeals stated that "complaints to the EEOC must be liberally construed in
order to accomplish the purposes of the Act."' 5 7 As the Tenth Circuit was
confronted with this issue for the first time, the court of appeals referred to
four factors listed in the Third Circuit case of Glus v. C C Murphy Co. 58 as
pertinent to an evaluation of a complainant's failure to name a party before
the EEOC. The Tenth Circuit court instructed the trial court to consider:
1) whether the role of the unnamed party could be ascertained through reasonable efforts by the complainant at the time that the EEOC complaint is
filed; 2) whether, under the circumstances, the interests of a named party are
so similar to the interests of the unnamed party that, for the purposes of
obtaining voluntary conciliation and compliance, it would be unnecessary to
include the unnamed party in the proceedings; 3) whether the party's absence from the EEOC proceedings resulted in actual prejudice to the interest
of the party; and 4) whether the unnamed party has in some way represented to the complainant that the party's relationship with the complainant
is to be through the named party. 59 As this jurisdictional question was one
of first impression, the case was remanded to the trial court for a reconsideration of the case in light of the Glus criteria.
H.

Tmely Filhng of Discrimination Charges

In Trujillo v. General Electric Co. ,6 the Tenth Circuit court recognized
that an EEOC district director has the implicit authority to rescind a notice
of right to sue. 6 1 The court thereby preserved the plaintiff's discrimination
charge, which charge would not have been considered as timely filed with
the EEOC had this implicit authority not been acknowledged.
The defendant employer filed a motion to dismiss the Title VII claim
because Trujillo's suit had not been filed within ninety days of the initial
notice of right to sue. 6 2 The EEOC district director had notified Trujillo of
54. 615 F.2d 1303 (10th Cir. 1980).
55. The issue on appeal was whether the failure of the complainant to name the individual
defendants in the charge brought to the EEOC precluded the district court from exercising
jurisdiction as to the individual defendants. Id. at 1311,
56. Id. See Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974).
57. 615 F.2d at 1311.
58. 562 F.2d 880, 888 (3d Cir. 1977).
59. 615 F.2d at 1311-12.
60. Nos. 79-1071 & 79-1072 (10th Cir. May 29, 1980).
61. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1976) provides that the EEOC or the Attorney General shall
notify a Title VII claimant of his right to sue where the Commission or the Attorney General
decides that there is no cause to press a claim on the individual's behalf.
62. A Title VII claimant who has been notified of his right to sue by the EEOC or by the
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his right to sue, but subsequently revoked this notice because of efforts to
attempt a conciliation of the parties. When conciliation failed, the district
director issued a second notice of right to sue. Trujillo had filed his claim
within ninety days of the second EEOC notice, but not within ninety days of
the original notice of the right to sue. The employer claimed that it was
error to allow Trujillo to bring his Title VII claim after the initial ninety
days had lapsed. General Electric argued that the district director is not
authorized by statute to rescind a notice of right to sue and, subsequently, to
issue a second notice.
In reliance upon a recent decision of the Fifth Circuit, 63 Judge
McWilliams, writing for the court, reasoned that a district director has an
implied authority to issue a second notice of right to sue. The judge declared
that because the district director is authorized to reconsider a determination
of "no cause",64 the director has the analogous authority to rescind a notice
of right to sue. To require the EEOC to conciliate within the limitations of
the initial ninety day period would severely restrict the conciliation efforts.
Judge McWilliams concluded, therefore, that the statutory ninety day time
limit should be calculated from the date of the EEOC's second notice of
right to sue.
In Wilkerson v. Siegied Insurance Agency, Inc. ,65 the Tenth Circuit court
ruled that the plaintiff had not timely filed her discrimination charges because she had not filed within the statutory period. The court of appeals
held that the event which triggers the statutory period is the last day that the
employee works. The date on which the employee ceased receiving severance pay or other extended benefits was deemed to have no legal significance. 6 6 The court of appeals relied upon a case decided by the Third
Circuit, Bonham v. Dresser Industries, Inc. 6 7 The tribunal was persuaded by the
Bonham court, which noted that if the statutory period during which a Title
VII claimant must bring a claim were allowed to begin to run at the time
the employee is taken off the payroll, rather than at the date when the employment relationship actually terminates, the employer would be penalized
68
for granting severance pay and other extended benefits.
I.

Discovey

The court of appeals remanded the case of Weahkee v. Norton69 to the
district court to permit discovery which the trial court had denied the plaintiff. In a most unusual turn of events, the plaintiff sued his employer, the
EEOC, alleging discrimination on the basis of the employee's national oriAttorney General must file his claim within 90 days of receipt of such notice. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e-5(0(1) (1976).
63. Gonzalez v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 610 F.2d 241 (5th Cir. 1980).
64. 29 C.F.R. § 1601.21(b) (1979).
65. 621 F.2d 1042 (10th Cir. 1980).
66. The employee argued that her charge was timely filed because it was filed within 90
days of her removal from the company's payroll. Id. at 1044.
67. 569 F.2d 187 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 821 (1978).
68. 621 F.2d at 1044.
69. 621 F.2d 1080 (10th Cir. 1980).
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gin. The EEOC had invoked a privilege defense in the trial court, claiming
that provisions in the Privacy Act 7° and in the Freedom of Information
Act 7 ' precluded claimant's requested discovery. Claimant had sought to obtain certain personnel files of EEOC employees. In denying the privilege
claims of the Commission, the appellate court reaffirmed the extensive scope
72
of discovery in a Title VII action.
J.

Remedies

In Thornton v. Coffey, 7 3 the Tenth Circuit court overturned the district
court's order which required that the Oklahoma National Guard reinstate
the plaintiff and retroactively promote him to the military rank of major.
While recognizing the wide variety of discretionary powers afforded trial
courts in fashioning appropriate relief, 74 the appellate court cautioned that
courts must strike a balance between their authority to grant remedies and
the judicial policy of nonintervention in internal military matters. 75 The
court of appeals concluded that the remedial powers of the district courts do
not extend to the ordering of military promotions. The court noted that the
remedy was particularly inappropriate because the claimant failed to exhaust the administrative remedies available to him.
In Fitzgerald v. Sirloin Stockade, Inc. ,76 the court of appeals upheld the
decision of the trial court which granted an award of "front pay" rather than
reinstatement. The Tenth Circuit determined that where the evidence in
the record establishes an atmosphere of hostility towards the plaintiff, reinstatement is not a precondition to the award of front pay. Because the evidence indicated that a working relationship between the employee and the
employer would be impossible, the appellate court upheld the remedy of the
77
trial court.
In UnitedStates v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. ,78 an issue analogous to the
issue raised in the Fitzgeraldcase was considered by the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals. The court, concurring with the report of an appointed master,
held that a probationary period is not a prerequisite to an award of back pay
where the claimant has a valid reason for refusing an offer of employment by
the defendant employer. The appellate court reasoned that a mandatory
probationary period could invite harassment by the employer, harassment
designed to encourage the claimant to leave before the probationary period
552a(b)(l 1) (1976) requires that a court order be obtained prior to the repersonnel files.
552(b)(6) (1976) exempts disclosure of personnel and medical files which
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy."
72. 621 F.2d at 1082 (citing Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1975)
and EEOC v. University of New Mexico, 504 F.2d 1296 (10th Cir. 1974)).
70.
lease of
71.
"would

5 U.S.C. §
government
5 U.S.C. §
constitute a

73. 618 F.2d 686 (10th Cir, 1980).
74. Id. at 691. See Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 421 (1975).
75. 618 F.2d at 691. See Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93-94 (1953).
76. 624 F.2d 945 (10th Cir. 1980).
77. The court relied upon evidence which showed that the employer had questioned the
loyalty of the plaintiff, had reduced the plaintiff's work responsibilities, and had inserted memoranda concerning her poor attitude in her personnel file. Id. at 957.
78. 625 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1979).
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concluded. The court was concerned that employers could thereby induce
79
claimants to forego the conditional back pay award.
The court, in the Lee Way decision, aligned itself with other federal judicial circuits which have ruled that a Title VII claimant is entitled to a back
pay award calculated from the date of injury until the time when remedial
relief is actually realized.80 The Tenth Circuit court rejected the argument
of the employer who claimed that this test would penalize the employer
where lengthy court proceedings are involved. The court countered that because the purpose of Title VII is to make whole aggrieved claimants, any
hardship which may result from lengthy court proceedings should fall upon
the "wrongdoing employer.""' The appellate court added, however, that
the two-year statute of limitations governing the award of back pay should
commence to run on the date when the discrimination charge is filed with
the EEOC under section 706(g) of the Act a 2 rather than from the date of the
government's suit. If the statute began to run on the date of the government's suit, it could work a hardship on claimants because the government
may file charges only upon a showing of a pattern and practice of discrimi8 3
nation by an employer.
K.

Miligaton of Damages

In United States v. Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. ,84 the Tenth Circuit court
indicated a preference for the individual approach rather than the "best
man" or "average man" approaches to the mitigation of damages question.8 5 Under the latter approaches, the group of employees is held to the
standard of the most successful claimant ("best man") or the average claimant ("average man") in determining whether the individual claimant exercised reasonable diligence to mitigate damages as required by the Act.8 6 Lee
Way Motor Freight argued that it had satisfied the employer's burden of
showing lack of reasonable diligence by the individual claimants who did
not satisfy the standards of either the "best man" or "average man" approach. The appellate court rejected the employer's attempt to apply these
standards, preferring to analyze the good faith mitigation efforts of the
87
claimants on an individual basis.
79. Id. at 938.
80. Id. at 933. (citing EEOC v. Enterprise Ass'n. Steamfitters Local 638, 542 F.2d 579 (2d
Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 911 (1977); Patterson v. American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257
(4th Cir.), cert. dented, 429 U.S. 920 (1976); James v. Stockham Valves & Fittings, 559 F.2d 310
(5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978)).
81. Id. at 931.
82. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976).
83. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-6(e) (1976).
84. 625 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1979).
85. The individual approach recognizes the efforts of an individual to mitigate damages
rather than the actions of a similarly situated group. The "best man" approach imputes the
interim earnings of the most successful claimant to other claimants similarly situated. The
"average man" approach imputes the average of the interim earnings to those claimants whose
interim earnings are below average. Id. at 937.
86. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g) (1976).
87. 625 F.2d at 938 (quoting NLRB v. Madison Courier, Inc., 472 F.2d 1307 (D.C. Cir.
1972)).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL
L.

[Vol. 58:2

Interest on Back Pay Awards

In Weaver v. United States,88 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed
the judgment of the district court, which had ordered the federal government, as the defendant employer, to pay interest on a back pay award. The
reviewing court ruled that because there was no express language in the 1972
amendment-- to Title VII authorizing the award of back pay interest to
federal employees, the lower court was mistaken in awarding interest to
claimants. The appeals court reasoned that absent express congressional
consent to the award of interest to claimants, the award was precluded,
based on the theory of sovereign immunity.
M.

Attorneys Fees

In EEOCv. FruehaufCorp.,90 the Tenth Circuit court overturned the trial
9
court's award of attorneys fees to the successful defendant. ' The appeals
court ruled that the trial court had abused its discretion by awarding attorneys fees to the defendant. The appellate tribunal emphasized that there
was insufficient evidence to warrant a finding that the action was frivolous,
92
unreasonable, or without foundation in its inception.
In Booker v. Brown,9 3 the court of appeals held that a claimant, who had
prevailed on the merits in his discrimination charge before the Civil Service
Commission, but who was denied compensation for attorneys fees in the administrative proceeding, had standing, as an aggrieved person under Title
VII, 94 to bring an action in the district court to enforce his right to attorneys
fees. The appellate court relied upon a number of cases, decided in other
circuits, which have recognized that the award of attorneys fees is appropriate for services rendered by a claimant's attorney before an administrative
95
agency.
II.

SECTION

1983

OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF

1871

During the past term the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was presented
with a number of cases wherein there was a claimed violation of section 1983
of the Civil Rights Act of 1871.96 The claimants alleged violations of constitutional rights by individuals acting under color of law. A significant issue
concerned the availability of good faith as a defense to unconstitutional action of a local governmental body. 97 Other questions arising under section
88. 618 F.2d 685 (10th Cir. 1980).
89. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16 (1976). This 1972 addition to the statute brought federal employees within the coverage of Title VII.
90. 609 F.2d 434 (10th Cir. 1979).
91. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1976) provides that reasonable attorneys fees may be awarded
to the prevailing party in a Title VII action.
92. 609 F.2d at 436 (citing Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U.S. 412 (1978)). A
prevailing defendant in a Title VII proceeding is to be awarded attorneys fees only when the
court finds that the plaintiff's action was frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation. Id.
93. 619 F.2d 57 (10th Cir. 1980).
94. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c) (1976).
95. 619 F.2d at 60.
96. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
97. Bertot v. School District No. 1, 613 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1979).
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1983 included the definition of "acts under color of law", the substantive
basis for section 1983 liability, and the interrelationship between state common law remedies and the federal statutory remedies provided by the Civil
Rights Act.
The Effect of the Presence of Good Faith

A.

In Bertot v. School District No. 1,98 the most significant section 1983 decision of the term, the Tenth Circuit court delineated the scope of municipal
liability following the Supreme Court decision of Monell v. Departmentof Social
Services. 99 In the Monell decision, the Supreme Court held that municipalities are not entitled to an absolute immunity when sued under section
1983.1°'° The Supreme Court, however, left the task of defining the scope of
any remaining immunity to the lower federal courts.
In its Bertot opinion, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals declared that
good faith was not available to the school district 0 1 as a defense in an action
for back pay under section 1983.102 Judge McKay, writing for the majority,
analyzed the history of the Civil Rights Act and the common law immunities, noting that the common law did not provide the same qualified good
faith immunity for public bodies as it did for public officials. 10 3 The judge
explained that the personal immunity doctrine for public individuals, acting
in good faith, is based on two concerns. If an individual in public office fears
personal financial liability bbcause of a mistake in judgment, even though
made in good faith, he or she will be deterred from exercising independent,
forceful judgment. The chilling effect on the decision making process is considered a detriment to the long term public interest.' 0 4 Furthermore, there is
fear that qualified persons will hesitate to seek public office if there is the risk
of personal liability. 10 5 The Tenth Circuit court found that these concerns
06
were not equally applicable when liability is placed on a school board.'
Judge McKay implied that the imposition of section 1983 liability will not
hinder the decision process of the school board members because no board
members will suffer personal financial loss as a result of mistaken judgment.
As a governmental entity, the school board's damage awards will be assessed
against the school board's treasury. The court of appeals evidently considered that the risk of depleting the board funds would not adversely affect the
independent judgments of school board members to the same degree as
would the threat of personal financial loss. The court of appeals emphasized
98. Id.
99. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
Id. at 701, 713-14.

100.

101. In the Monelt decision, the Supreme Court noted that there was no distinction between
municipalities and school boards for purposes of suit under section 1983. Id. at 696.
102. The court of appeals explained that an award of back pay is an element of equitable
relief. The presence of good faith cannot preclude the grant of an equitable remedy. 613 F.2d
at 250. Judge Barrett in his dissent, however, questioned the majority's labeling of back pay as
a form of equitable relief instead of as compensatory damages. Id. at 255.
103. Id. at 248.
104. Id. at 249.
105. Id.
106. Id.
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that when rights as important as those guaranteed by the first amendment
are violated by the government, it is preferrable to have the costs of the
violation spread among the taxpayers rather than to have the injured victim
0 7
bear the total burden of the unconstitutional action.1
Chief Judge Seth and Judge Barrett, dissenting, expressed concern
,
.fl
ri f the mainritv's decision. Chief Judge Seth reasoned that as the school board was merely a group of individual officials
acting collectively, any immunities available to the board members as individuals should be available to them as a unit.108 Because the majority's decision required the board to correctly predict judicial interpretation of
constitutional rights, Chief Judge Seth argued that board members should
not have been held to a standard higher than that of good faith in making
such difficult predictions. 109 Judge Barrett expressed concern for the potential financial repercussions of the imposition of section 1983 liability on municipalities which have acted in good faith."1 0

about the ram ;*ft

The majority's reasoning in the Bertot decision was subsequently affirmed by the Supreme Court's opinion in Owen v. City of Independence.' Il In
the Owen case, the Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit 1 2 and held,
as did the Tenth Circuit, that good faith is not available to municipalities as
a defense in suits claiming constitutional violations under the Civil Rights
Act of 1871.
In another case involving the good faith of the defendant, Love v. Mayor
of Cheenne,1 '3 the Tenth Circuit court held that the prevailing party in a
civil rights action is entitled to an award of attorneys fees under section 1988
of the Civil Rights Act" 4 unless there is a showing of special circumstance
which would render the award unjust. The plaintiffs had successfully challenged the constitutionality of a city ordinance," 5s but they were denied attorneys fees. The trial court found that because the defendants had acted in
good faith, an award of attorneys fees would be unjust." 6 The court of appeals reversed, holding that attorneys fees under section 1988 are not contingent upon a showing of good or bad faith. The reviewing court concluded
that the presence of good faith is not a special circumstance rendering unjust
7
an award of attorneys fees.' '
107. Id. at 252.
108. Id. at 253 (Seth, C.J., dissenting).
109.
110.

Id.
Id. at 254-56 (Barrett, J., dissenting).

111.

445 U.S. 622 (1980).

112. Owen v. City of Independence, 589 F.2d 335 (8th Cir. 1978). In its Berlot opinion, the
Tenth Circuit court specifically rejected the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit's Owen decision.
613 F.2d at 250.
113. 620 F.2d 235 (10th Cir. 1980).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
115. The ordinance required that persons obtain a permit prior to distributing religious
material from door to door. The permits were issued by the sheriff who had unbridled discretion in approving or disapproving the applications. 620 F.2d at 236.
116. Ad.
117. Id. See also Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
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Acting Under Color of Law

In Brown v. Chafe,"18 the plaintiff brought a civil rights action against
several attorneys who had defended him in a prior lawsuit and against Sheriff Chaffee, the plaintiff's co-defendant in the prior lawsuit. Brown and
Chaffee, who was Brown's supervising officer, had been defendants in a civil
rights action in which Brown was found liable for actual and punitive damages. Chaffee had been exonerated. Brown brought the subsequent action,
claiming that he had received inadequate representation of counsel at the
previous trial. Brown alleged that although his interests had conflicted with
Chaffee's, the two police officers were represented by the same attorneys until three months before trial. 1 9 Brown alleged that he was not informed of
the conflict, that evidence favorable to his defense was suppressed, and that
120
the attorneys and Chaffee had conspired to deprive him of a fair trial.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's dismissal
of the defendants, holding that attorneys do not act under color of law
merely by representing public officials in private litigation. The appellate
court also ruled that Sheriff Chaffee's defense of his personal lawsuit did not
constitute state action. Brown, therefore, had no cause of action against defendants under section 1983.121
In Norton v. Liddel,' 22 the court of appeals considered whether a private
individual had acted under color of law in conspiring with a state official
who was immune from section 1983 liability. Sheriff Liddel and an assistant
district attorney filed an information charging that the plaintiffs had unlawfully incited to riot.1 23 Plaintiffs alleged that Sheriff Liddel and the assistant
district attorney had conspired to bring the charges in retaliation for plaintiff's lawful exercise of constitutional rights.
In an opinion written by Judge Barrett, the Tenth Circuit court held
that an assistant district attorney is absolutely immune from lawsuits challenging the exercise of his prosecutorial discretion, even if his official actions
were "undertaken maliciously, intentionally, and in bad faith."' 24 The
court of appeals found that Sheriff Liddel, although a public official, had
acted in his capacity as a private citizen when he provided the district attorney's office with facts to support the charges filed against the plaintiffs.
Judge Barrett determined, however, that Sheriff Liddel's status as a private
citizen did not put an end to the section 1983 inquiry. A private citizen who
conspires with a government official to violate another citizen's constitutional rights may be deemed to be acting under color of law so as to make
him liable under section 1983.'25 The conspiracy may implicate the private
citizen even if the official coconspirator is immune from suit under section
118. 612 F.2d 497 (10th Cir. 1979).
119. Id. at 500.
120. Id. at 500-01.
121. Id. at 501.
122. 620 F.2d 1375 (10th Cir. 1980).
123. Id. at 1377.
124. Id. at 1379 (citing Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) and Atkins v. Lanning, 556
F.2d 485 (10th Cir. 1977)).
125. Id. at 1381.
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1983.126 A sufficient nexus between the immune state official and the private citizen must be established, however, by an examination of their concerted action in the advancement of the conspiracy. 127 Applying this test,
the appellate court ruled that the plaintiffs had established a sufficient nexus
between Sheriff Liddel and the assistant district attorney so as to warrant a
conclusion that Sheriff Liddel acted under color of law in advising the district attorney about plaintiffs' activities. Judge Barrett concluded, therefore,
that the trial court's grant of defendant's motion for summary judgment was

incorrect. 128
C.

Baszs for Liabity

In actions under section 1983, public officials cannot be held liable, on
the basis of respondeat superior, for the constitutional torts of inferiors. They
can, however, be held liable for the failure to properly train and supervise
their subordinates when such failure results in constitutional violations. In
McClelland v. Facteau,'29 the plaintiff brought suit under section 1983, claiming to be the victim of an illegal arrest. The defendants included the chief of
the New Mexico State Police and the police chief of Farmington, New Mexico. The trial court granted summary judgment as to the two police chiefs,
0
and the plaintiff appealed.13
McClelland claimed that the police chiefs had breached their duty to
adequately train and supervise the officers within their control. In an opinion written by Judge Logan, the Tenth Circuit court recognized that a
breach of duty could form the basis of a section 1983 action provided that
there is an affirmative link between the omission or act of the official charged
and the misconduct of subordinates which precipitated the complaint. The
appellate court noted that, at trial, there had been no disputed issues of fact
13 1
but there were isregarding the training of the offending police officers,
sues of fact concerning the performance of the defendant police chiefs in
supervising their subordinates.' 32 The judgment of the district court was
reversed, and the case was remanded to the trial court for further proceed33
ings on the issue of supervision.'
In Serna v. Manzano,' 34 two deputy sheriffs filed a section 1983 civil
rights action against their employer, the sheriff, claiming that he had discharged them in retaliation for the exercise of their first and fourteenth
126. Id. at 1380.
127.

Id.

128. Id. at 1380-82.
129. 610 F.2d 693 (10th Cir. 1979).

130. Id. at 695. The three other defendants, the arresting officers, reached a settlement with
the plaintiff.
131. Both defendant police chiefs presented evidence demonstrating that the training afforded the arresting officers was proper. This evidence was not contested by the plaintiff. Id. at
697.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 698.
134. 616 F.2d 1165 (10th Cir. 1980).

1981]

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

amendment rights to engage in political activities.'3 5 The Tenth Circuit
court affirmed the district court's finding that the discharge was proper. The
court of appeals reasoned that the dismissal was not based on the political
behavior of the deputies, but rather it was grounded upon the fact that the
accompanying activities 136 had disrupted the efficient operation of the sher13 7
iff's office.
D.

Eaffct of State Law on Section 1983 Actions

A Wyoming school teacher, seeking an award of damages under section
1983, was barred by Wyoming's two year statute of limitations.1 38 In Spiegel
v. School District No. . ,139 the plaintiff alleged that the statute of limitations
was inapplicable because: 1) his claim was for a penalty, and the statute
created an express exception for penalty or forfeiture actions; 2) his action
was not based on a federal statute; and 3) the two year period had not run
because his action was originally commenced in state court within the two
0
year period, which tolled the running of the state statute of limitations.14
In an opinion written by Judge McKay, the Tenth Circuit court briefly
considered and then dismissed the plaintiffs first two assertions. The appeals court found that the action was indeed based on a federal statute, section 1983. Judge McKay further explained that a claim for punitive
damages does not transform a civil suit into a penalty claim. The court of
appeals also rejected plaintiffs claim that his action in state court tolled the
running of the statute. The plaintiff had argued that the statute should toll
because he was required by law to exhaust state remedies prior to bringing
the section 1983 action.
Relying on two Supreme Court decisions, McNeese v. Board of Education' 4 1 and Monroe v. Pape,'4 2 the Tenth Circuit court reasoned that because
section 1983 actions supplement the remedies available under state law, a
plaintiff is not required to exhaust all possible state remedies prior to bring135. Deputy Sturdevant had decided to challenge Sheriff Manzano in the next election, and
Deputy Serna was acting as Sturdevant's campaign manager. Id. at 1166.
136. Id. The deputies had taped conversations which occurred in the sherifs office for use
in the political campaign. Other employees were aware of the taping which created an atmosphere of tension and distrust in the office.
137. The Tenth Circuit court applied the balancing test enunciated by the Supreme Court
in Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). The appeals court weighed the right of a
public employee to freedom of expression in matters of public concern against the right of the
state to supervise its employees so as to provide efficient public service.
138. 2 Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-3-115 (1977) provides that "laill actions upon a liability created by a federal statute, other than a forfeiture or penalty, for which no period of limitations is
provided in such statute, shall be commenced within two (2) years after the cause of action has
accrued."
139. 600 F.2d 264 (10th Cir. 1979).
140. Spiegel had successfully challenged his discharge in a state administrative proceeding
which was affirmed by the Wyoming Supreme Court. The plaintiff was reinstated to his former
position and he was in federal court only to seek damages under 40 U.S.C. § 1983 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (a). Id. at 265.
141. 373 U.S. 668 (1963).
142. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled on other grounds, Monell v. Department of Social Servs.,
436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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ing the federal action.143 The court of appeals recognized that the McNeese
and Monroe decisions were limited to some extent by Huffnan v. Pursue,
Ltd ,144 a case wherein the Supreme Court expressed concern for the comity
principle. Judge McKay stated, however, that in this case the court need not
determine the applicability of the Huffinan rule because Spiegel did not bring
145
his federal action until after the state proceedings were terminated.
Hufman bars a federal 1983 action only where there is a pending state proceeding which concerns the same matter that is the subject of the federal
action.
The reasoning of the court avoided the issue presented. Spiegel argued
that if he had brought his section 1983 action while the state proceedings
were pending, his action would have been barred by Hujlman. Yet, by waiting until the state proceedings terminated, Spiegel's suit was barred by the
statute of limitations. The court refused to decide the hypothetical situation,
stating that Spiegel should have attempted to bring the federal action earlier
which would have allowed the court to decide the applicability of the
14 6
Huffinan rule.
1 47
the district court awarded the plaintiff damages
In Clappier o. F4'nn,
under two theories of liability, one theory based upon common law negligence, the other theory based upon a deprivation of rights under section
1983. The Tenth Circuit court disallowed the double recovery because the
legal theories alleged were merely alternative theories providing for identical
relief. 148

The plaintiff in the Clappier case had been arrested and placed in the
Laramie County jail in Wyoming, where he was mistreated by the other
prisoners. 1 49 Clappier brought suit against the local sheriff, alleging common law negligence for the sheriff's failure to operate the jail in accordance
150
Plaintiff's second claim,
with the Wyoming Constitution and statutes.
was
guilty of cruel and unsheriff
the
based on section 1983, alleged that
15
The trial court
usual treatment in violation of the eighth amendment.
on each of the
recovery
authorizing
submitted two verdict forms to the jury,
claims.
143. 600 F.2d at 266.
144. 420 U.S. 592 (1975). The Hunan Court required claimants to exhaust previously initiated state proceedings prior to bringing a section 1983 action. Seealro Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S.
327 (1977); Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
145. 600 F.2d at 267.
146. Id. at 267 n.7.
147. 605 F.2d 519 (10th Cir. 1979).
148. Id. at 529. Se also Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (10th Cir. 1963).
149. Clappier was arrested on the evening of May 13, 1975, and it was not until May 16,
1975, that he was brought from his cell for photographing and fingerprinting. During the period between May 13 and May 16, he suffered repeated beatings and rapes inflicted by other
prisoners. Clappier was released on May 16, after the suspension of his $25.00 fine for breach of
the peace. He was taken to Fitzsimmons Army Hospital in Denver where he remained for over
four weeks receiving treatment for his injuries, which included a broken jaw. 605 F.2d at 52224.
150. Id. at 524. Since Clappier was a resident of Minnesota, federal jurisdiction was based
on diversity of citizenship. His claim for relief was $75,000.
151. Id at 524-25.
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While the Tenth Circuit had previously decided,' 52 and reaffirmed,
that double recovery, for both negligence and constitutional torts, could not
be permitted, the more difficult problem presented by this case was how the
appellate court should amend the trial court's jury instructions. Wyoming
follows the comparative negligence doctrine 53 in determining the amount
of a defendant's liability whereas comparative negligence is not to be considered in section 1983 actions. The Tenth Circuit court recommended that
special interrogatories be submitted to the jury. If the jury should find the
defendant liable solely on the negligence claim, then the award should be
reduced in proportion to the plaintiffs contributory negligence. If the liability should be based solely on the section 1983 claim, then the full amount of
the assessed damages should be awarded to the plaintiff regardless of the
plaintiff's contributory negligence. Finally, if liability was found to be based
on both theories, the section 1983 action would prevail, and the plaintiff
54
would receive the total award of damages.'
The court of appeals reversed the district court's decision concerning
the degree of proof required to establish a section 1983 violation. The trial
court had instructed the jury that the test of whether the plaintiff suffered
cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the eighth amendment was
"whether the assault, as determined by you, is sufficiently severe in the circumstances to shock the conscience of a reasonable person."' 155 The Tenth
Circuit court held that the proper instruction for a jury considering a claim
of cruel and unusual punishment, where there is an act of omission, is that
there must be a showing of "exceptional circumstances and conduct so
grossly incompetent, inadequate or excessive as to shock the conscience or to
156
be intolerable to basic fairness."'
III.
A.

INDIAN RIGHTS

Preferential Treatment Is Not Reverse Discrimination

In Livingston v. Ewtng,' 57 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a
New Mexico policy which permitted Indians to display and sell arts and
crafts on the grounds of designated public buildings, but which prohibited
non-Indians from doing the same, was constitutionally valid. The plaintiffs,
non-Indians seeking to sell jewelry in the restricted area, challenged a policy
of the Board of Regents of the New Mexicok Museum at Sante Fe' 58 and a
resolution of the city of Sante Fe t59 which authorized the exclusionary practices.
152. Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (10th Cir. 1963).
153. Defendant had charged that Clappier was negligent for failing to report his beatings to
the authorities at the jail. 605 F.2d at 524.
154. Id. at 530.
155. Id. at 533.
156. Id. See alsoDewell v. Lawson, 489 F.2d 877 (10th Cir. 1974).

157. 601 F.2d 1110 (10th Cir. 1979).
158. Id. at 11 11. The state policy allowed the area under the museum portal to be used for
merchandise display for arts and crafts handmade by Indians.
159. Id. at 1111-12. The city resolution prohibited sales by persons other than Indians
within 50 feet of any established business which sold Indian handcrafted jewelry.
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The aggrieved merchants' claim was based on the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The New Mexico officials, and the
intervening Indians, responded that there was a rational basis for the preferential treatment. Defendants noted that the state and city officials knew of
the unique historical and cultural aspects of the city and of the Indian heritage. In affirming the district court, the Tenth Circuit court found that the
classification was permissible under the preferential treatment of indians section of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.160 The court of appeals concluded that
because the business area was "on or near an Indian reservation" within the
meaning of the statute, the state action giving preferential treatment to Indi16 1
ans was lawful.
B.

Tribal Sovere'gnty

In Joe v. Marcum, 162 the Tenth Circuit court held that the Navajo Indian
Tribe is a sovereign entity possessing the right of self-government, including
the right to prohibit garnishment of Indians who live and work on reservations. The wages of Tom Joe, a Navajo living and working on a reservation
in New Mexico, were garnished because of Joe's failure to repay a loan from
63
the United States Life Credit Corporation.1 A writ of garnishment, seeking twenty-five percent of Joe's weekly salary, was served on Joe's employer.
Joe sought declaratory and injunctive relief in the United States District
Court for the District of New Mexico claiming that the local court lacked the
jurisdictional authority to garnish Indian wages and that the garnishment
164
Writing for the
was a deprivation of property without due process of law.
Tenth Circuit court, Judge McWilliams noted that the Navajo Tribe has an
extensive system of self-government, including a judicial system consisting of
65
district courts, a court of appeals, and a supreme court.1 The judge recognized that the tribal code provides a means for enforcing judgments, a means
other than garnishment. As garnishment is a statutory remedy permitted in
some jurisdictions and prohibited in others, the appeals court reasoned that
the Navajo Tribe, like any other independent state, had the right to accept
or reject garnishment as a post-judgment remedy.66
160. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(i) (1976) provides that nothing in the 1964 Civil Rights Act should
be seen as applying to any business or enterprise on or near an Indian reservation because of
preferential treatment given to a person because he or she is an Indian living on or near a
reservation.
161. 601 F.2d at 1115-16. The appeals court also found that claimants had failed to establish reverse discrimination within the meaning of Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Id.
162. 621 F.2d 358 (10th Cir. 1980).
163. Id. at 360.
164. On appeal, the defendant claimed that the federal court did not have jurisdiction, but
the Tenth Circuit court disagreed, finding that Joe had several bases for invoking federal jurisdiction, including 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-1326, 28 U.S.C. § 1343, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the commerce
clause and the treaty clause. Id. at 361.
165. Id.
166. Id. at 361-62.
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IV.

A.

CASE DIGESTS

Laetrile Availabih'ty

167
appeared, for the third time, 168
The case of Rutherfordv. United States
before the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals this term, after a reversal and
remand by the Supreme Court.' 6 9 The final issues before the Tenth Circuit
court were: 1) whether terminally ill cancer patients have a constitutional
right to privacy which allows them to take whatever treatment they desire,
regardless of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) classification; 2)
whether the proponents of laetrile had met the necessary premarketing procedures of the FDA; and 3) whether laetrile'comes under the grandfather
provisions of the FDA legislation. 1 70 Chief Judge Seth, writing for the appeals court, answered each of these questions in the negative, apparently
finalizing the protracted litigation.'71

B.

The Commerce Clause

The State of Oklahoma, in its second attempt,' 71 2 failed to convince the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to uphold a section of the Oklahoma Waste
Disposal Act' 7 3 in Hardage v. Alkins. 174 The Oklahoma law prohibited the
shipment of controlled industrial waste into Oklahoma unless the state of
origin had standards for the disposal of industrial waste which were substantially similar to those of Oklahoma. A further requirement was that the
state of origin must have entered into a reciprocity agreement with
Oklahoma.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals previously had held that the
75
mandatory reciprocity clause of the statute violated the commerce clause. 1
On subsequent appeal, Oklahoma argued that the provision requiring the
state of origin to have standards similar to those of Oklahoma differed from
the mandatory reciprocity requirement and should, therefore, be held constitutional. Judge Doyle, writing for the court, disagreed. Reasoning that
167. 616 F.2d 455 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 336 (1980).
168. See Rutherford v. United States, 582 F.2d 1234 (10th Cir. 1978); Rutherford v. United
States, 542 F.2d 1137 (10th Cir. 1976).
169. United States v. Rutherford, 442 U.S. 544 (1979). For a discussion of the Supreme
Court decision see United States Supreme Court Review of Tenth Circuit Decisions, Sixth Annual Tenth
Circuit Survey, 57 DEN. L.J. 337, 341-43 (1980).

170. 21 U.S.C. §

32

1(p)(1) (1976).

171. 616 F.2d at 457. The case was remanded to the district court without directions or any
indication as to what issues remained to be decided.
172. Oklahoma originally sought to have the statute validated in Hardage v. Atkins, 582
F.2d 1264 (10th Cir. 1978).
173. OKLA. STAT. tit. 63, § 2764 (Supp. 1978) states:
The [Controlled Industrial Waste Management Section] shall disapprove any plan
which entails the shipping of controlled industrial waste into the State of Oklahoma,
unless the state of origin has enacted substantially similar standards for controlled
industrial waste disposal as, and has entered into a reciprocity agreement with, the
State of Oklahoma. The determination as to whether or not the state of origin has
substantially similar standards for controlled industrial waste disposal is to be made by
the Director of the [Controlled Industrial Waste Management Section], and all reciprocity agreements must be approved and signed by the Governor of Oklahoma.
174. 619 F.2d 871 (10th Cir. 1980).
175. Hardage v. Atkins, 582 F.2d 1264 (10th Cir. 1978).
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Oklahoma may not force other states to enact legislation as a means of
avoiding economic isolation, the judge found that both statutory provisions
176
imposed a mandatory scheme in violation of the commerce clause.
C.

Abortion Fundtng

A Utah statute, 177 which permitted public assistance funds to be used
for abortions only if the life of the mother was endangered, was ruled unconstitutional in D.R. v. Mtchell.178 The trial court found that the Utah statute
was constitutional, reasoning that the law merely articulated the standard
79
for determining whether an abortion was therapeutic or nontherapeutic.'
The trial court noted that such classifications had been upheld in several
Supreme Court cases.' 80 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion
written by Chief Judge Seth, disagreed with the district court, stating that
"therapeutic" must be equated with "medically necessary" and that there
may be any number of circumstances which, although not life endangering,
18
may be medically necessary to preserve the health of the mother. '
18 2
In view of the recent Supreme Court decision of Harris v. McCrae,
however, the Mitchell decision is of questionable precedential value. In the
Harrs decision, the Supreme Court upheld the federal Hyde Amendment,i 8 3 which is similar in language to the Utah statute, except that the
Hyde Amendment permits federal funds to be used for abortions in cases of
rape as well as when the life of the mother is endangered. The Supreme
Court held also that states are not required by the constitution to provide
84
public funding for abortions.'
Maty H Hurley
Charles E Stuart

176. 619 F.2d at 873.
177. UTAH CODE ANN. § 55-15a-3 (Supp. 1979) provides:
The department shall not provide any public assistance for medical, hospital or other
medical expenditures or medical services to otherwise eligible persons where the purpose of such assistance is for the performance of an abortion, unless the life of the
mother would be endangered if an abortion is not performed.
178. 617 F.2d 203 (10th Cir. 1980).
179. 456 F. Supp. 609 (D. Utah 1978).
180. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Doe v. Bolton,
410 U.S. 179 (1973); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
181. 617 F.2d at 205.
182. 100 S. Ct. 2671 (1980).
183. Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 926 (1979). See also Pub. L. No. 96-86, § 118, 93
Stat. 662 (1979).
184.

100 S. Ct. at 2685.
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OVERVIEW

During the period covered by this survey, the usual host of cases in the
field of criminal law and procedure was decided by the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals.' The discussion which follows is a sampling of the more significant and interesting cases, but, even then, only a brief review will be possible. It is the goal of this survey to furnish the practitioner with introductory
1. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reviewed over 225 cases on criminal law and
procedure. Over ninety of the opinions were published.
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material in significant areas of the criminal field, thereby providing the
reader with guidance for further research.
I.

A.

FOURTH AMENDMENT

Standng

In United States v. Ri'os,2 one of the issues confronting the Tenth Circuit
was whether the defendant Rios had standing to object to an allegedly illegal search and seizure. Rios was charged with conspiracy to commit various
federal drug offenses, possession of heroin with intent to distribute, and the
actual distribution of heroin. He sought to suppress the seized heroin on the
basis that the search warrant's supporting affidavit contained significant
misrepresentations. Rios asserted that the search warrant was thereby defi3
cient for lack of probable cause.
In an opinion written by Judge Holloway, the Tenth Circuit court
noted that the proponent of a motion to suppress has the burden of establishing standing to assert a fourth amendment claim. 4 Initially, Rios had
claimed standing as the legal owner of the mobile home where the questioned search took place. He actually had sold the home and was no longer
in possession thereof, but he had retained legal title pursuant to the purchase
agreement. 5 The Tenth Circuit observed that "bare legal ownership" did
not support Rios' standing claim. 6 While intricate analysis of legal and equitable ownership may be important in the area of property law, a distinction between legal and equitable ownership becomes meaningless in fourth
amendment claims, unless viewed in terms of a legitimate expectation of
privacy. 7 The court of appeals found that no privacy interest was created by
Rios' use of the mobile home nor by any pendent legal rights which he may
have possessed in the home. 8
Rios successfully contended that he had standing to object to the search
because of the "automatic standing rule," which purportedly confers standing on a defendant to assert a fourth amendment claim when the criminal
charge involves a possessory offense. 9 Since Rios was charged with possession of heroin, the Tenth Circuit turned to the merits of his claim. The court
addressed the issue of whether the search warrant was defective.
Although the warrant had authorized the search of four closely situated
2. 611 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1979). Also decided within this survey period was United
States v. Montgomery, 620 F.2d 753 (10th Cir. 1980) (similar facts).
3. 611 F.2d at 1343.
4. Id. at 1344 (quoting Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 130-31 n.l (1978)).
5. Rios had sold the home to a co-defendant. Thereafter, Rios neither lived there, nor
kept any personal effects there, nor had a key. Legal title was to be transferred only after all
payments were made.
6. 611 F.2d at 1345.
7. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978) (fourth amendment does not recognize "arcane distinctions developed in property and tort law"); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 266
(1960) (fourth amendment analysis should not be guided by subtle property law distinctions).
8. 611 F.2d at 1345.
9. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960). But see Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128
(1978) (government may be able to contest defendant's standing in possessory offense).
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structures,' 0 it did not specify independent probable cause justifying a
search of each structure. While one affidavit and one warrant may sanction
the search of several places, probable cause must be shown for each location
to be searched.'' In the present case, however, the court of appeals considered that the buildings identified in the affidavit were but a single place,
because they were all used for one individual's residence or business. The
court concluded, therefore, that separate probable cause would not be re12
quired for each structure.
Rios was more successful in challenging the affidavit by claiming that
the affiant had made material and intentional misrepresentations. At trial,
the defendant offered to prove that the alleged criminal activity, which
formed the basis of probable cause, had not occurred at either the place
searched or at any of the other structures listed in the warrant. The district
court had found no reason to proceed beyond the face of the affidavit and
had refused to hold an evidentiary hearing on the matter.' 3 The Tenth Circuit reversed on this point, holding that, in view of the substantial offer of
proof made and the significant questions raised, a hearing should have been
conducted to decide the issue.14
The Tenth Circuit ruling in Rios is undeniably correct in all of its aspects. It should be noted, however, that the automatic standing rule, which
allowed Rios to object to the search, has been limited by the Supreme
Court's decision in UnitedStates v. Sa/vucci.' 5 In Sa/vucci, the Court held that
"defendants charged with crimes of possession may only claim the benefits of
the exclusionary rule if their own Fourth Amendment rights have in fact
been violated."' 6 As a result, the current standing test permits a defendant
to assert a fourth amendment violation only when he can demonstrate a
legitimate expectation of privacy in the place where the allegedly illegal
search or seizure occurred.' 7 If the Salvucci standard had been applied in
Rios, the defendant likely would have lacked standing since the court had
determined that the challenged search was neither at his home nor in a
structure in which Rios had a privacy interest.' 8
10. The buildings were a warehouse, a garage, a camping trailer, and a mobile home.
11. United States v. Olt, 492 F.2d 910 (6th Cir. 1974). See State v. Ferrari, 80 N.M. 714,
460 P.2d 244 (1969).
12. 611 F.2d at 1347 (dictum). Seegeneratly Williams v. State, 95 Okla. Crim. 134, 240 P.2d
1132 (1952).
13. 611 F.2d at 1348.
14. Id. (citing Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978)). See Comment, Franks v. Delaware: Granting the Right to Challenge theVeracity ofSearch Warrant Affdavrts, 45 BROOKLYN L. REV.

391 (1979).
The Tenth Circuit reversed on two additional grounds, finding 1) that it was error by the
trial court not to give a limiting instruction concerning the admissibility of a co-conspirator's
statements, 611 F.2d at 1339-4 1, and 2) that an improper closing argument had been made by
the prosecution, id. at 1341-43.
15. 100 S. Ct. 2547 (1980). See alsoUnited States v. Montgomery, 621 F.2d 753 (10th Cir.
1980) (critiquing the automatic standing rule).
16. 100 S.Ct. at 2549. St Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969).
17. 100 S.Ct. at 2551 n.4. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140-48 (1978).
18. See also Rawlings v. Kentucky, 100 S.Ct. 2559 (1980) (defendant did not have reasonable expectation of privacy in a companion's purse); United States v. Salvucci, 100 S. Ct. at
2555 (remanding for a determination of whether defendant had privacy expectation in mother's
home). But stee United States v. Wilson, 536 F.2d 883 (9th Cir. 1976) (defendant had fourth
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Probable Cause

In United States v. Diltz, 19 the Tenth Circuit was faced with the factual
determination of whether there was probable cause to justify making the
defendant a "target" of a wiretap. 20 The supporting affidavit declared that
the main purpose of the wiretap was the acquisition of incriminating evid.cc or a uspect inamed Bremson. The defendant, Diltz, was mentioned
only as one person with whom Bremson had been in contact over the phone.
Based in part on the evidence obtained from the wiretap, the defendant,
Diltz, was indicted and convicted of illegal drug distribution. Diltz argued
that he had always been a putative target and, since he had not been named
21
as such, no probable cause was shown to justify the wiretap involving him.
The Tenth Circuit court confined itself to the government's sixty-one
page affidavit to determine if there was probable cause to believe that the
defendant was engaged in illegal activities. The court concluded, in a rather
confusing opinion, that the evidence was "inconsequential and inconclusive
in establishing anything more than suspicions" that Diltz was engaged in
criminal activity. 22 The court stated that the present standard for probable
cause is
the test which is set forth in Brthegar [v. United States] requiring that
the facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge based on
reasonably trustworthy information be sufficient to warrant a man
of reasonable caution to believe that an offense has been or is being
committed, .....
Sometimes it is said that it is a reasonable
ground for belief of guilt, although less than evidence to justify
23
conviction.
The Tenth Circuit observed that hearsay may support the finding of
amendment rights in suitcase left in a friend's apartment); United States v. Harwood, 470 F.2d
322 (10th Cir. 1972) (defendant had fourth amendment rights in containers left in a friend's
attic).
19. 622 F.2d 476 (10th Cir. 1980).
20. The wiretap was instigated pursuant to Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and
Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510-2520 (1976).
21. 622 F.2d at 476-78. A person who has been the subject of a wiretap has four basic
rights under the Act: 1) the right to refuse to answer questions by the grand jury which are
based on illegally seized evidence; 2) the limited right to inspect intercepted communications;
3) the right to move to suppress illegally obtained evidence; and 4) the right to recover civil
damages for violation of title III. 18 U.S.C. §§ 2515, 2518(8), 2518(10)(a), 2520 (1976).
Defendant also claimed that the warrant was defective because of mistaken name identification. Throughout the affidavit, the government had referred to the defendant as Robert
Diamos. Only later was it discovered that Robert Diltz was the same man. The court of appeals dismissed defendant's contention that this name confusion rendered the wiretap illegal. It
found that the government had no reason to believe that Diltz and Diamos were the same man,
and that the name confusion had no effect on the determination of probable cause under the
affidavit. 622 F.2d at 479, 483.
22. 622 F.2d at 480. The majority opinion curiously dismissed United States v. Donovan,
429 U.S. 413 (1977), as irrelevant. Donovan had held that a failure to name all persons required
by statute was not an automatic constitutional violation requiring suppression of evidence. 429
U.S. at 436-40 (construing 18 U.S.C. § 2518(l)(b)(iv) (1976)).
23. 622 F.2d at 481. See Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949). With respect to
search warrants, it has been said that "probable cause for a search warrant is nothing more than
a reasonable belief that the evidence sought is located at the place indicated by the law enforcement officer's affidavit." United States v. Williams, 605 F.2d 495, 497 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
444 U.S. 932 (1979).
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probable cause but emphasized that "[w]hat is needed are facts that speak
out as to the existence of probable cause. Whether the evidence is hearsay is
not significant, but if it is hearsay, it should be factual, relevant and also
trustworthy." 24 Since the government's supporting affidavit was based on
25
insufficient factual material, it failed to meet the test for probable cause.
In United States v. Matthews,26 two of the many fourth amendment issues
present also involved the determination of probable cause. Military police
became suspicious of the defendant, Matthews, when they noticed his car on
the military base. The car had military license plates, yet it was not painted
like a military car. During questioning, the police specifically asked for the
customary military "log book" which should have matched the license
plates. Matthews could not produce such a book. He did produce car registration, but the registration was for a Chevrolet, and the car in question was
a Ford. The defendant then was taken, with the car, to the military police
27
station for additional questioning.
The Tenth Circuit noted that police custodial detentions must be based
on probable cause, regardless of whether they technically constitute an arrest. 28 The court found that there were sufficient grounds to justify the military police in reasonably believing that an offense was being, or had been,
committed. 29 The court of appeals found that probable cause was present in
that Matthews' civilian car bore military plates, a military log book corresponding to the plates was absent, and the registration which Matthews pro30
duced was for a different make of car.
In Matthews, the Tenth Circuit court also addressed the question of
whether probable cause existed so as to justify a search of the car. Matthews'
car was searched for evidence of ownership at the time of his custodial interrogation at the military police station. The court of appeals noted that for a
warrantless search to be proper, there must be both probable cause and exi3
gent circumstances. 1
The appellate court observed that the probable cause requirement was
satisfied "when the officers conducting the search have 'reasonable or probable cause' to believe that they will find an instrumentality of a crime or
'32
evidence pertaining to a crime before they begin their warrantless search."
The court found probable cause for a search in the same facts which supported the probable cause for arrest. The court also found an exigent circumstance in the fact that the car was in a relatively public area, a military
base, where it was vulnerable to being taken. The search was further justi24. 622 F.2d at 483. See, e.g., People v. Quintana, 183 Colo. 81, 514 P.2d 1325 (1973);
People v. Leahy, 173 Colo. 339, 484 P.2d 778 (1970).

25. 622 F.2d at 483.
26. 615 F.2d 1279 (10th Cir. 1980).
27. Id. at 1281, 1283.
28. Id. at 1284. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 215 (1979) (probable cause is
needed whenever the magnitude of an intrusion reaches a "crucial" level, regardless of the intrusion's label under state law). See also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
29. 615 F.2d at 1284. See text accompanying note 23 supra.
30. 615 F.2d at 1284.
31. Id. at 1287.
32. Id. (citing Dyke v. Taylor Implement Co., 391 U.S. 216, 221-22 (1968)).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:2

fled in that it preserved evidence and safeguarded the car's contents for the
true owner. 33 Consequently, all evidence used by the government in the
defendant's trial was deemed to have been obtained legally and was therefore not suppressible.
In United States v. Coker,34 the defendanti, Coker, was arrested and indcted for unlawfully possessing marijuana with the intent to distribute. The
Tenth Circuit was presented with the task of determining whether Goker's
warrantless arrest was supported by probable cause.
Police had discovered marijuana growing in a federal game reserve.
The police were told by informants that defendant was planning to harvest
the marijuana the following day. While both informants were considered
reliable, neither had personal knowledge of this information, but instead
were relying on the reports of others. The police watched the marijuana
patch and observed Coker in the general vicinity. Although freshly cut marijuana was found the next day, Coker was never seen at the patch. The
police subsequently spotted Coker's truck, being driven by Coker's wife, with
the defendant as a passenger. When Coker saw the police, he ducked down
in the seat in an attempt to avoid being seen. The police stopped the truck
and found that Coker was wet from the waist down and covered by plants,
stickers, and seeds. While the plant debris was not characteristic of any specific area of the wildlife refuge, there was a river running through the refuge
35
near the marijuana patch. The police placed Coker under arrest.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's finding that the government had not met its burden of showing probable cause for the warrantless
arrest. 3 6 The government failed to present sufficient evidence to support the
informants' rumor. 37 There was also no direct evidence linking the defendant to the cut marijuana or even to the marijuana patch. 38 Since a prudent
person would not be warranted in believing that Coker was committing an
offense, the court held that there was no probable cause to support the arrest.
33. Id. at 1287-88.
34. 599 F.2d 950 (10th Cir. 1979).
35. Id. at 951-53.
36. See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976) (warrantless felony arrest may be
made on probable cause alone); Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307 (1959) (lawfulness of
arrest depends on probable cause).
37. Informant information can form the basis of probable cause only if both the informant
and his source are shown to be reliable. Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); Aguilar
v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964). See United States v. Williams, 605 F.2d 495 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 932 (1979); Livermore, The Draper-Spinelli ,Problem, 21 ARIZ. L. REv. 945
(1979). Since, in this case, the informants themselves received only hearsay information about
Coker, the government did not meet the second prong of the test.
38. The opinion summarized the important facts in this manner:
Defendant was stopped because he ducked down in the car; he was arrested because he
had been seen in the general area of the marijuana patch, because the condition of his
person indicated he had been in the general area of the marijuana patch, and because
rumor had linked him to the patch.
599 F.2d at 952. But see id. at 953-54 (McWilliams, J., dissenting) (asserting that the facts did
support a finding of probable cause).
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WarrantlessSearches
1.

Personal Container Searches

In Un'tedStatesv. Meier,39 the defendant, Meier, was arrested for driving
while intoxicated. Meier was taken to jail, and his car was towed to a storage warehouse. Later, the car was searched and a backpack was found. The
police, without first obtaining a search warrant, searched the backpack and
discovered marijuana inside. The defendant was charged with unlawful posOn appeal, Meier asserted that his
session of a controlled substance.4
by the warrantless search of his
rights
were
violated
fourth amendment
backpack.
The inherent mobility of cars has been 'Considered an exigent circumstance, permitting a warrantless search. 41 When a suitcase or a backpack is
seized, however, the exigency of mobility is not present since the police exercise exclusive control and dominion over the item. 42 In such a case, the
courts, in determining whether there has been a fourth amendment violation, will look at the degree of the defendant's expectation of privacy in the
container seized. 4 3 The Tenth Circuit, per Judge McWilliams, saw this case
as the factual equivalent of Arkansas v. Sanders,44 where a warrantless search
of a suitcase was held to be in violation of the Constitution. The Tenth
Circuit explained that the definitive mark of containers with a high expectation of privacy are those which function "as a repository for personal items
when one wishes to transport them. ' ' 45 A backpack was found not significantly dissimilar to a suitcase, and, therefore, the warrantless search was
deemed to have violated the fourth amendment.
In United States v. Krazk, 46 the Tenth Circuit, per Judge Breitenstein,
decided the issue of whether a search warrant is required for the search of a
closed container located within another closed container. In this case, the
police had obtained a search warrant based upon probable cause that there
was a shotgun in the trunk of a car owned and used by a convicted felon.
The police opened the car's trunk but found no gun. They did, however,
find a closed suitcase. When the police opened the suitcase, they discovered
the shotgun underneath some clothing. The defendant argued that although
there was a search warrant for the car, there were no exigent circumstances
excusing the police from obtaining another warrant for a search of the suit47
case.
39.
40.
41.

602 F.2d 253 (10th Cir. 1979).
Se 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) (1976).
Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42, 51 (1970) (warrantless search of an automobile

justified because of inherent mobility of the car and possibility that evidence within the car may
disappear); United States v. Roberts, 583 F.2d 1173, 1178 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. dented, 439 U.S.
1080 (1979) (warrantless search of automobile justified by its inherent mobility when suspect
observed placing package of drugs inside). See Colorado v. Bannister, 101 S. Ct. 42 (1980).
42. 602 F.2d at 255.
43. See United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977) (higher degree of privacy expected in contents of double-locked footlocker taken from trunk of car than in car itself).
44. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
45. 602 F.2d at 255 (citing Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 762 (1979)).
46. 611 F.2d 343 (10th Cir. 1979), cer. dented, 445 U.S. 953 (1980).
47. Id. at 345.
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The Tenth Circuit held that only one warrant was needed for both the
48
car and the suitcase. The court distinguished Arkansas v. Sanders and United
49
States v. Chadwick by noting that the searches challenged in those cases
were conducted without any search warrant at all. In the instant case, there
was a valid warrant authorizing the search of the car. The court of appeals
also rejected defendant's contention that a warrant, to withstand judicial
scrutiny, must precisely identify all things to be searcsed, that is, both a car
and a suitcase when such items are to be searched. An additional warrant
was declared not to be necessary "for each container within a larger
container when the warrant covers the search of the larger for a specified
item."50
In United States v. Rengifo-Castro,51 the defendant's vehicle was stopped
by the border patrol at some distance from the Mexican border. Neither the
defendant, who initially claimed Panamanian citizenship, nor a passenger,
had a passport. Later, both individuals claimed to be from Columbia. They
were taken to a nearby office for further questioning. In the office, each
'5 2
suspect was "directed to identify his suitcase, open it, and sit back down."
A search of the defendant's open suitcase uncovered cocaine, and subsequently, he was convicted of unlawful possession with intent to distribute.
The Tenth Circuit court found that the warrantless search of the suitcases violated the defendant's fourth amendment rights. The court noted
that a person has a reasonable expectation of privacy in his personal luggage. 53 The appellate court reasoned that since the border agents had complete control over the suitcases, there were no exigent circumstances
54
justifying the warrantless search, even if there had been probable cause.
55
The defendant's conviction was reversed.
2.

Airplane Searches

The defendant in Untied States v. Gooch 56 contended that his conviction
for unlawful possession of marijuana was based upon illegally seized evi48. 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
49. 433 U.S. 1 (1977). See note 43 supra.
50. 611 F.2d at 345. See W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 4.10(b) (1978) (warrant
sufficiently describing premises need not particularly describe receptacles therein where personal effects may be found).
51. 620 F.2d 230 (10th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
52. Id. at 232.
53. Id. at 233. Defendant had a legitimate expectation of privacy because he had not been
stopped at the border checkpoint. Cf Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973)
(border searches of vehicles without probable cause or consent invalid anywhere but at the
border or its functional equivalent). Of course, if this had been a border search, the border
patrol would have had the authority to search the defendant's luggage on less than probable
cause. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(c) (1976). See alsoTorres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 472-73 (1979)
(dictum) (searches of personal baggage required to determine if belongings are entitled to enter
the country).
54. 620 F.2d at 232. But see United States v. Nevarez-Alcantar, 495 F.2d 678 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 878 (1974) (border patrol agent, not at the border, permitted to conduct a
warrantless search of a suitcase on probable cause). While Nearez-Alcantar apparently is inconsistent with the present case, the probable explanation for the holding is that it was decided
before Chadwick and Sanders. See notes 42-44 supra and accompanying text.
55. 620 F.2d at 233.
56. 603 F.2d 122 (10th Cir. 1979).

1981]

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

dence. Defendant's airplane had been detected by radar and tracked by
United States Customs officials. When the plane landed, the defendant
jumped out and began running away, as the plane turned to take off. The
plane was stopped, and the defendant and the pilot were arrested. The subsequent warrantless search of the plane resulted in the discovery of over
1,100 pounds of marijuana.
In its opinion, the Tenth Circuit noted that it was the government's
burden to justify a warrantless search. 57 The police had claimed that they
observed, through an open door, "several large bags and smelled marijuana
coming from the interior of the airplane. ' 58 The government argued that
this was sufficient probable cause to justify a search under the Chambers v.
59
Maroney rule.
The Tenth Circuit agreed. The Chambers decision held that the inherent mobility of automobiles constitutes an exigent circumstance which permits a warrantless search, if the search is based on probable cause. 6° The
Tenth Circuit had previously held that the exigent circumstances exception
is equally applicable to airplanes, because of the lesser expectation of privacy
6
and extreme mobility associated with an airplane. 1
The court of appeals also addressed the search of the bags found in the
plane. The court observed "that the sacks which contained the marijuana
were mere cargo rather than personal luggage."' 62 Since no affirmative steps
were taken to isolate the cargo, the court assumed that there was a lesser
degree of privacy expected in the bags containing marijuana than in a briefcase, which also had been searched. 63 The Tenth Circuit, therefore, upheld
this warrantless search and affirmed its findings in a short opinion issued
64
after rehearing.
3.

Controlled Delivery Searches

United States v. Andrews 65 was a significant opinion with regard to "controlled delivery" searches and seizures. The facts indicated that a man
presented a package to an airline cargo service in Miami and requested that
it be shipped to Denver. The airline employee, suspicious of the manner in
which it was wrapped, opened the package. 66 He found cocaine inside and
57. Id. at 124 (citing Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762 (1969)); United States v.
Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48, 51 (1951).
58. 603 F.2d at 123.
59. 399 U.S. 42 (1970). See United States v. Soto, 591 F.2d 1091, 1099 (5th Cir.), cert.
dented, 442 U.S. 930 (1979) (probable cause existed to justify search of a heavily-loaded van
stopped near area of smuggling activities when odor of inarijuana was detected).
60. 399 U.S. at 51. But see Judge McKay's comment: "To the extent that mobility rather
than privacy is the key in this area, it is troubling that inherent as opposed to actual mobility is
determinative." 603 F.2d at 125 n.3. See also Colorado v. Bannister, 101 S. Ct. 42 (1980).
61. United States v. Sigal, 500 F.2d 1118 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 954 (1974).
62. 603 F.2d at 125. See Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979).
63. 603 F.2d at 126. The Tenth Circuit invalidated the briefcase search. Id. at 125-26.
64. id. at 126.
65. 618 F.2d 646 (10th Cir.), cert. dented, 101 S. Ct. 84 (1980). Set also United States v.
Gibbons, 607 F.2d 1320 (10th Cir. 1979) (similar facts).
66. The airline employee was suspicious because packages sent by corporations normally
were packed in cardboard boxes, personalized with a printed corporation trademark. This
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notified the police. The police called a Denver agent of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), and it was decided that the Miami police
would remove a small quantity of cocaine, reseal the package, and send it to
Denver. When the package arrived in Denver, the DEA agent took custody
of it. The next morning, defendant Andrews presented himself to claim the
package. The DEA agent, posing as nn -irlin, employee, took A-dr-aside, and told him that he knew that drugs were inside the package and
that he wanted money in return for not telling the police. Andrews paid,
took the package, and was arrested when he left the airport building. The
agent retrieved the package and removed the cocaine.
Andrews was charged with possession of a controlled substance. 67 He
moved to suppress the evidence on the grounds that the package was opened
without a search warrant, in violation of his fourth amendment rights. The
trial court suppressed the evidence, and the government took an interlocutory appeal. Since the initial search was purely private, not subject to fourth
amendment protection, 68 the basic issue was whether the reopening of the
package after Andrews' arrest was a continuation of the first legal search or a
new, second search. 69 Andrews argued that the latter was the case, claiming
that he had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the package after it was
delivered to him.
The Tenth Circuit, in a well reasoned opinion by Judge Barrett, held
that the series of actions constituted a single search, legal at its inception. 70
UniledStates v. Ford,7 ' a case with similar facts, 72 was cited in support of the
majority opinion. The Ford court had held that an authorization to ship
contraband was an initial act of police dominion and control, dominion
which was maintained continuously by close surveillance until physical possession was reasserted after the arrest. 73 The Andrews majority found the
same official dominion and control to be present. 74 The court of appeals
also discounted the existence of any privacy expectation after the DEA agent
package identified the sender as a corporation but was wrapped in brown paper with all designations handwritten. 618 F.2d at 648.
67. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (1976).
68. The fourth amendment protects against unreasonable governmental intrusions, not
against the acts of private individuals, unless they are working as government agents. Burdeau
v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 474 (1921). Therefore, a search made by a common carrier, on its
own initiative, does not come within the ambit of the fourth amendment. United States v.
Gibbons, 607 F.2d 1320 (10th Cir. 1979) (search by airline employee not governmental action);
United States v. Ford, 525 F.2d 1308 (10th Cir. 1975); United States v. Pryba, 502 F.2d 391
(D.C. Cir. 1974), cert dented, 419 U.S. 1127 (1975); People v. Benson, 176 Colo. 421, 490 P.2d
1287 (1971) (seizures by non-governmental personnel not suppressible).
69. 618 F.2d at 651.
70. Id. at 654.
71. 525 F.2d 1308 (10th Cir. 1975).
72. An airline employee, in California, discovered heroin in a package addressed to
Oklahoma City. Police in both jurisdictions cooperated in tracing the package and arresting
the defendant when he claimed it. Id. at 1311.
73. The Ford court emphasized that the airline officials could not have shipped the contraband without government authorization. Id.
74. A different situation would have arisen if the government had lost control of the pack-

age. Instead of simply retrieving the package when Andrews was arrested, the government
agents would have had to have made a new intrusion into Andrews' privacy. Such an intrusion
would have required a warrant or an exception to the warrant requirement.
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informed the defendant that he knew the package contained drugs. 75 Since
the whole transaction was but one search, the district court's grant of the
76
motion to suppress was reversed.
In an equally thoughtful opinion, Judge Seymour dissented from the
majority's analysis and from the previous holding in Ford. The judge reasoned that it was incongruous for the majority to hold that the cocaine was
in the "dominion and control" of the police when Andrews was charged with
a crime of possession. 77 Furthermore, Judge Seymour disagreed with the
proposition that a search conducted "by different police in a different state
at a different time" could be a continuation of a previous search. 78 Finally,
Judge Seymour noted that "certainly an individual's expectation of privacy
in a sealed package is as legitimate as his expectation of privacy in an unlocked suitcase."' 79 She argued that this privacy expectation was evident
from the fact that Andrews actually paid money to the DEA agent to keep
the information private. 80 Judge Seymour concluded that the motion to
suppress should have been upheld.
4.

Open Field--Curtilege

United States v. Carra8a arose from a situation where a state narcotics
agent had information that land leased by the defendant, Carra, contained a
substantial crop of marijuana. The agent observed that the marijuana was
growing within a fenced area behind the defendant's home. One of the
questions confronting the Tenth Circuit court on appeal was whether there
was an illegal search and seizure when the agent picked and left with a marijuana leaf.8 2 The agent testified that the leaf was protruding through the
fence at the time it was seized. The court, per Judge McKay, held that the
75. 618 F.2d at 652. It is questionable whether a stranger's knowledge of the contents of an
otherwise personal container would destroy one's reasonable expectation of privacy. A better
analysis, producing the same result in this case, might be that Andrews had a lesser expectation
of privacy by using a public carrier to transport his package. Cf Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S.
583, 590 (1974) (use of motor vehicles on public thoroughfares creates an expectation of privacy
which is less than the privacy expected in homes).
76. 618 F.2d at 654.
77. Id See note 57 supra and accompanying text.
Compare Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 263-64 (1960) (government may not assert
that defendant possessed illegal goods for conviction and simultaneously deny such possession
for fourth amendment protections) with United States v. Salvucci, 100 S.Ct. 2547, 2552 (1980)
(prosecution may charge defendant with criminal possession and nevertheless deny that defendant has standing to claim fourth amendment violation). See also United States v. Jackson, 588
F.2d 1046 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 941 (1979) (constructive possession of a controlled
substance need not be exclusive; government must prove defendant's dominion and control over
the drug); United States v. Martinez, 588 F.2d 495 (5th Cir. 1979) (constructive possession may
be joint or exclusive).
78. 618 F.2d at 655. But setUnited States v. DeBerrey, 487 F.2d 448, 451 n.4 (2d Cir.
1973).
79. 618 F.2d at 655 (citing Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979)). See Walter v. United
States, 100 S. Ct. 2395 (1980) (sealed package in mail); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1,
16 (1977) (foot locker); United States v. Gooch, 603 F.2d 122, 125-26 (10th Cir. 1979) (briefcase).
80. 618 F.2d at 648, 655-56.
81. 604 F.2d 1271 (10th Cir.), cert. deneid, 444 U.S. 994 (1979).
82. On the basis of the plucked marijuana leaf, a warrant was obtained for a more thorough search of the house and yard. Firearms were found, and the defendant was convicted of
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the leaf was in an "open field," outside of the
search was not illegal because
"curtilege" of the house.8 3
84
The Tenth Circuit did not cite any authority for its holding, and the
analysis in Carra disregards the Supreme Court's observation that the
85
While the open fields"fourth amendment protects persons, not places."
curtilege. dichotomy and the reasonable expectation of privacy standard may
produce similar results, this is not always true. For example., if a person
allows marijuana to grow on his front porch, certainly the marijuana is
within the curtilege of his house, but he could not have the reasonable expec86
Conversely, if maritation that a passerby would not observe his plants.
juana were growing in an open field, hundreds of yards from the nearest
farmhouse, with fences prohibiting one's view and "No Trespassing" signs
posted, a search warrant would be needed since the occupants of the land
87
had taken all reasonable precautions to protect their privacy in that area.
It is apparent, therefore, that the terms "curtilege" and "open field" cannot
88
be used "in some talismanic sense or as a substitute for reasoned analysis."

Unfortunately, the Tenth Circuit did not make a specific determination
of whether Carra had a reasonable expectation of privacy that was violated
by the picking of the marijuana leaf. Such an analysis would have required
resolving such issues as whether the marijuana could have been seen from
adjoining lands and whether the landlord's permission justified the agent's
entry on property leased by the defendant.
illegal possession of firearms and for making false statements in the acquisition of a firearm. See
18 U.S.C. §§ 922(h)(1), 924(a) (1976).
83. 604 F.2d at 1272-73.
84. Cf Hester v. United States, 265 U.S. 57 (1924) (fourth amendment protection does not
extend to open fields); Care v. United States, 231 F.2d 22 (10th Cir. 1955) (fourth amendment
applies to buildings within the curtilege, but not to open fields).
85. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). See United States v. Salvucci, 100 S.
Ct. 2547, 2552-53 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143 (1978); Jones v. United States, 362
U.S. 257, 266 (1960).
86. United States v. Miller, 589 F.2d 1117 (1st Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 958 (1979).
87. See W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.4(a) (1978) (citing Commonwealth v.
Janek, 242 Pa. Super. 380, 363 A.2d 1299 (1976)).
88. United States v. Gooch, 603 F.2d 122, 126 (10th Cir. 1979). See note 7 supra and accompanying text. See generally W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.3(d) (1978) where it is
stated that:
One of the virtues of Katz v. United States is that it makes it apparent that the
curtilege concept should not be employed to arbitrarily limit the reach of the Fourth
Amendment's protections. Under Katz, it is a search to violate "the privacy upon
which [one] justifiably relied," and unquestionably a person can have such an expectation of privacy as to garages and barns and the like even when they are not in "close
proximity" to his dwelling.
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II.

A.

FIFTH AMENDMENT

CustodialInterrogationof aJuvenile8 9

In UnitedStates v. Palmer,9° defendant Palmer, a seventeen-year old juvenile was convicted, under the Juvenile Delinquency Act, 9 ' of aiding and
abetting an assault on a car and its occupants. Palmer and his friends had
attacked a car by smashing the windows and headlights, slashing the tires,
and beating the car body with pipes. The car's driver was stabbed to death
92
while several other occupants were seriously injured.
The following day, a policeman appeared at Palmer's home and told his
mother that Palmer would be picked up after school for questioning. According to Palmer's mother, the policeman also said that she could not be
present at the questioning. The policeman testified that the mother gave
permission to the police to question her son. Later that same day, the policeman tried again to contact the mother but was unsuccessful. The mother
did not try to reach her son. During the questioning of the defendant, the
mother was not present. Defendant Palmer refused to sign a waiver of his
93
Miranda rights, but he did make a statement.
The general issue confronting the Tenth Circuit concerned the competency of a minor to make, without the guidance of a parent or attorney, an
intelligent and voluntary waiver of his constitutional rights. The Tenth Circuit, per Judge Breitenstein, observed that "admissibility of statements obtained during custodial interrogation requires 'inquiry into the totality of the
circumstances surrounding the interrogation.' -94 The court concluded that
Palmer's waiver was made knowingly and voluntarily, and it upheld the admissibility of the policeman's testimony regarding Palmer's statement. 95
The Tenth Circuit was swayed by the fact that Miranda rights were read to
Palmer, that he understood them, and that he did not request a lawyer or his
mother's presence at the questioning.
Judge McKay dissented. He noted that for a waiver of constitutional
89. Within this survey period, the Tenth Circuit enumerated the basic factors it will look
to when analyzing whether "interrogation" took place in a custodial or non-custodial setting.
"These factors are 1) whether there is probable cause to arrest, 2) the subjective intent of the
police, 3) the subjective belief of the defendant, and 4) the focus of the investigation." United
States v. Clay, No. 77-2009, slip op. at 35 (10th Cir. June 9, 1979).

90. 604 F.2d 64 (10th Cir. 1979).
91. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031-5042 (1976).
92. 604 F.2d at 65.

93. Id. at 66. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
94. 604 F.2d at 67 (citing Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979)). The Supreme Court
has listed the many factors to be considered in determining the voluntariness of a juvenile's
waiver, including the age, education, background, and intelligence of the minor, the juvenile's

capacity to understand the warning given, and his appreciation of the consequences of waiving
constitutional rights. 442 U.S. at 725. See also
West v. United States, 399 F.2d 467 (5th Cir.
1968); State v. Hinkle, 206 Kan. 472, 479 P.2d 869 (1971).
95. 604 F.2d at 67. The Supreme Court, in Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979), held
that although a juvenile's request to see his probation officer did not invoke his fifth amendment
rights, a request for an attorney did call forth such rights. 442 U.S. at 718-22. The Tenth
Circuit did not mention whether a request for a parent is comparable to a request for a probation officer or to a request for an attorney. But see,e.g., CoLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-102(3)(c)(I)
(1973) (requiring parent's or attorney's presence during police questioning ofjuvenile). Seegenerally People v. Patrick Steven W., 104 Cal. App. 3d 615, 163 Cal. Rptr. 848 (1980).

DENVER LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 58:2

safeguards to be valid, a defendant must have the capacity to execute a
knowing and intelligent waiver, 96 and he argued that "incapacity should be
presumed in the case of a minor."' 97 Judge McKay thought that the government had failed to meet its burden of showing the requisite mental capacity,
thus rendering defendant's statement inadmissible. 98
B.

Due Process
1.

Pre-Indictment Delay

In United States v.Comosona,99 the Tenth Circuit had to decide whether
the due process clause of the fifth amendment was violated considering the
fact that the defendant was indicted 435 days after the crime was committed. 60 The Tenth Circuit held that it was appropriate to apply a balancing
test in cases of pre-indictment delay. In balancing the rights of the defendant against the tardy actions of the state, the following elements must be
evaluated:
First, there must be demonstration of actual prejudice to the
defendant resulting from the delay. Generally, such prejudice will
take the form of either a loss of witnesses and/or physical evidence
or the impairment of their effective use at trial. Second, the length
of delay must be considered. Finally, the Government's reason for
the delay must be carefully considered.101
The court also set out the method of proof:
Upon a prirnafacieshowing of fact by a defendant that the delay
in charging him has actually prejudiced his ability to defend, and
that this delay was intentionally or purposefully designed and pursued by the Government to gain some tactical advantage over or to
harrass him, the burden of going forward with the evidence shifts
to the Government. Once the Government presents evidence
showing that the delay was not improperly motivated or unjustified, the defendant then bears the ultimate burden of establishing
the Government's due process violation by a preponderance of the
0 2
evidence. 1
Since Comosona failed to show any prejudice to his ability to defend as a
96. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 475-76 (1966) (defendant needs to know his
legal rights and understand the consequences of waiver for the waiver to be knowing and voluntary).
97. 604 F.2d at 68.
98. See Commonwealth v. Webster, 466 Pa. 314, 353 A.2d 372 (1975) (the younger the age
of the minor, the greater is the government's responsibility to provide counseling by a parent or
an attorney).

99. 614 F.2d 695 (10th Cir. 1980). Also decided within this survey period was United
States v. McManaman, 606 F.2d 919 (10th Cir. 1979) (five month delay, during which witness
died, not prejudicial).
100. The sixth amendment right to a speedy trial does not vest until a person has been
arrested or indicted. United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (1977); United States v. Marion,
404 U.S. 307 (1971). Therefore, protection against pre-indictment delay is governed by statutes
of limitations and by the due process clause of the fifth amendment. Id. at 322-24.
101. 614 F.2d at 696. It has been stated that a defendant must show actual and substantial
prejudice to establish a due process violation. See, e.g., United States v. Blevins, 593 F.2d 646
(5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Ramos, 586 F.2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1978).
102. 614 F.2d at 696-97.
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result of the pre-indictment delay, his efforts to make a prima facie showing
of a due process deprivation were unavailing. 10 3 His conviction was affirmed.
2.

Deprivation of Life and Liberty

The due process claims which arose in Yanez v. Romero 104 stemmed from
a confrontation between defendant and police officers. Upon observing defendant, Yanez, enter a service station restroom, the police burst into the
restroom and found a used hypodermic needle and fresh needle marks on the
arm of Yanez. Yanez was arrested and transported to a hospital, where he
refused a police request to give a urine sample until threatened with catheterization. Based on evidence obtained from the urine sample, Yanez was
convicted of unlawful possession of morphine. After challenging his conviction through all possible state forums, Yanez sought a writ of habeas corpus
in federal court.
Defendant's first contention was that he had been criminally punished
because of his status as a drug addict, in violation of the Supreme Court's
ruling in Robinson v. Caifornia.105 The Robinson Court held that while possession of narcotics was punishable, drug addiction was a disease and, as such,
could not be made a crime. 10 6 Judge Doyle, writing for the Tenth Circuit,
compared the Robinson ruling with the Supreme Court's decision in Powell v.
Texas, 10 7 in which the Court upheld a conviction based on a public
drunkenness statute. Judge Doyle concluded that the conviction in this case
was more similar to Powell than to Robinson, and, therefore, valid.' 018
Defendant's second contention was that the production of the urine
sample violated his fifth amendment rights under the rule of Rochtn v. Californ'a. 10 9 In the Rochi case, evidence of narcotics was obtained by the forcible
pumping of the defendant's stomach. The Tenth Circuit characterized
Rochi'n as an extraordinary case, restricted to its set of facts.I 10 Instead, the
court of appeals found this case more akin to Schmerber v. Californa, "I where
103. Id. at 697. For examples of other unsuccessful attempts to show prejudice as a result of
pre-indictment delay see United States v. Radmall, 591 F.2d 548 (10th Cir. 1978) (loss or "dimming" of memory); United States v. Francisco, 575 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1978) (unavailability of
witnesses); Arnold v. McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1978) (death of victim); United States
v. Smyth, 556 F.2d 1179 (5th Cir.), cert. dented, 434 U.S. 862 (1977) (loss of evidence).
The length of pre-indictment delay seems to have little effect on the grant or denial of a
due process claim. Courts have denied claims when the delay has been one year, Arnold v.
McCarthy, 566 F.2d 1377 (9th Cir. 1978), three years, United States v. Bursten, 560 F.2d 779
(7th Cir. 1977), and four years, United States v. Radmall, 591 F.2d 548 (10th Cir. 1979). A due
process claim has been dismissed in a case where the government had waited to file charges until
only a few hours before a five year statute of limitations would have run, United States v.
Parker, 586 F.2d 422 (5th Cir. 1978).
104. 619 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1980).
105. 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
106. Id. at 666.
107. 392 U.S. 514 (1968).
108. 619 F.2d at 852. Based on evidence from the urine sample, Yanez was convicted, not
for the status of addiction, but for possession of morphine. Id. at 85 1.
109. 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
110. 619 F.2d at 854.
111. 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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the Supreme Court upheld the unconsented withdrawal of blood on the basis of the existence of probable cause to arrest. In distinguishing Rochin, the
Tenth Circuit noted that the urine sample demand and the arrest in the
present case were based on the solid ground of probable cause., 12 Since
there was probable cause to arrest and since there was no actual use of cathe3
terization, the admissibility of the evidence was sustained."
Judge McKay, in a vigorous dissent,
zation violated all canons of decency and
astound me if our law approved official
condemned in Rochin, while disapproving
' 14
threatened indignities." "

found that the threat of catheterifairness. He stated that "it would
threats of the type of indecencies
only actual consummation of the

Yanez exemplifies the inherent conflict between Rochin and Schmerber. In
all three cases, there had been probable cause to search. The police in Rochin
had observed pills being swallowed, in Schmerber they had observed drunkenness, and in Yanez the police had observed a used hypodermic needle and
fresh needle marks. In all three cases, the police had obtained evidence of a
crime by using intrusive medical procedures without the truly voluntary
consent of the defendant.
The factors distinguishing Rochin from Schmerber may be found in Justice Frankfurter's statement that the facts in Rochin represented "conduct
that shocked one's conscience."' '5 The totality of the shocking circumstances in Rochin included the police entrance into the defendant's home
without a warrant, the forcible entrance into the defendant's bedroom while
he and his wife were in bed, and the pumping of his stomach to retrieve pills
wanted as evidence. Although the police may have had probable cause to
arrest the defendant and an exigent circumstance in the need to preserve
evidence, this probable cause had arisen from a violation of basic constitutional rights.' 16
In contrast, the totality of the circumstances in Schmerber were not as
offensive or shocking. There was no violation of a highly held privacy right,
for defendant was in the hospital immediately after, and as a result of, his
car accident. The police arrested defendant shortly after he committed the
crime of driving while intoxicated. The medical procedure for withdrawing
blood is significantly less offensive than pumping one's stomach.
Yanez lies somewhere between Rochin and Schmerber. In Yanez, the police
burst into a public restroom and, like the situation in Rochin, probably violated defendant's justifiable expectation of privacy." 17 Unlike the case in
112.

619 F.2d at 854.

113. Id. at 855-56.
114. Id. at 856 (McKay, J., dissenting).
115. 342 U.S. at 172.
116. Perhaps the result in Rochtn also can be reached by applying the later developed "fruit
of the poisonous tree" analysis. Any evidence obtained by the "shocking" conduct of pumping
Rochin's stomach might also have been suppressible because it was acquired as a direct result of
a patently illegal entry into Rochin's home. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 48487 (1963). See also Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (warrant needed to enter a suspect's home to make felony arrest).
117. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); People v. Triggs, 8 Cal. 3rd 884, 506
P.2d 232, 106 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1973), ovemruledon othergrounds,People v. Lilienthal, 22 Cal. 3d 891,
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Roche'n, however, the privacy expected in a public restroom is not the same as
that expected in one's own bedroom. And while catheterization is as offensive as stomach pumping, unlike the Rochin situation, in Yanez there was only
a threat to use a catheter.'l 8 Truly then, this case is a hybrid of the RochtnSchmerber fact pattern and perhaps the only resolution available in such a
case is each judge's determination of what "shocks" his legal and personal
conscience.
III.

A.

SIXTH AMENDMENT

Eaffct'e Assistance of Counsel

In Dyer v. Crisp,119 the Tenth Circuit, in an en bane decision, held that
effective assistance of counsel is accomplished when a criminal "defense
counsel exercises the skill, judgment and diligence of a reasonably competent
defense attorney." '1 20 Judge Doyle, writing for the court, noted that all of
the circuits, save the Secondt12 and Tenth,122 had abandoned the "sham,
12 4
23
for the stricter "reasonably competent" test.
farce, and mockery" test'
The Tenth Circuit in this case decided that the more stringent standard
would better fulfill the sixth amendment's guarantee of effective assistance of
counsel.
While the new test is stated clearly in this opinion, its proper procedural
application in the Tenth Circuit remains an open question. Some circuits
have ruled that once the defendant presents a prima facie case showing attorney ineffectiveness, prejudice to the defendant is presumed, and the bur587 P.2d 232, 150 Cal. Rptr. 910 (1978); State v. Bryant, 287 Minn. 205, 177 N.W.2d 800
(1970); W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 2.4(c) (1978) (surveillance of a closed restroom
constitutes a fourth amendment search).
118. The majority opinion stated that catheterization "is nevertheless an undesirable practice which ultimately is likely to produce a fact situation which will be ruled shocking and
unlawful." 619 F.2d at 854.
denied, 445 U.S. 945 (1980). The sixth amendment's
119. 613 F.2d 275 (10th Cir.), cert.
guarantee of right to assistance of counsel means right to effective assistance. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 770-71 (1970).
Also during this survey period, the Tenth Circuit decided Brown v. Shi
0 9,which held that,
for the purpose of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, court-appointed attorneys do not
act under the color of state law as required in section 1983 actions. 614 F.2d 237 (10th Cir.
1980). See 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). In addition, the Tenth Circuit ruled that a Kansas recoupment statute, which provided that criminal defendant's were liable for the fees of court-appointed counsel, was unconstitutional. Olson v. James, 603 F.2d 150 (10th Cir. 1979). See also
ia'. at 155 (guidelines for reviewing recoupment statutes).
120. 613 F.2d at 278. See, e.g., Erickson, Standards of CorpeiencyforDefense Counsel ina Criminal
Case, 17 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 233 (1979); Finer, Ineciive Assisiace of Counsel, 58 CORNELL L.
REV. 1077 (1973); Gard, Inadequate Assistance of Counsel-Siandards and Remedies, 41 Mo. L. REV.
483 (1976); Note, Identifing and Remedying Inejkcie Assistance of Criminal Defense Counsel- A New
Look After United States v. DeCoster, 93 HARV. L. REV. 752 (1980); Note, Current Standardsfor
a Sham, Farce or Mocker?, 1979 So. ILL. UNIV. L.J.
DeterminingInective Assistance of Counsel; Still
132. See also, Dear, Adversagy Review.- An Expernent in Performance Evaluation, 57 DEN. L.J. 401
(1980).
121. E.g., Rickenbacker v. Warden, 550 F.2d 62, 65 (2d Cir. 1976), cer. denied, 434 U.S. 826
(1977). See Brinkley v. Lefevre, 621 F.2d 45, 47-48 (2d Cir. 1980) (Weinstein, J., dissenting and
advocating reversal of the farce and mockery standard).
122. E.g., Gillihan v. Rodriguez, 551 F.2d 1182 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 845 (1977).
123. See, e.g., Diggs v. Welch, 148 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir.), cer. denied, 325 U.S. 889 (1945).
124. 613 F.2d at 276-78.
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den shifts to the government to show the lack of prejudice.' 25 Other circuits
require that the defendant prove both incompetence of counsel and resulting
prejudice. ' 2 6 The procedures applicable to the new test in the Tenth Circuit
27
will have to await future opinions.'
B.

-;/"r

JRght
'
t..... Trial by Jury
to

In UnitedStates v. Dubozse, 128 the Tenth Circuit held that a juvenile is not
entitled to a jury trial under the Juvenile Delinquency Act.' 2 9 The defendant, Duboise, an Indian boy of sixteen, was charged with the murder of a
teenage acquaintance. Although the defendant did not request to be tried as
an adult, he did make a motion for a jury trial. The motion was denied, and
the federal district court judge found Duboise to be delinquent. On appeal,
the defendant claimed that his right to a jury trial could not be waived by
his simply electing to be tried in accordance with the Juvenile Delinquency
Act. 130
As originally enacted, the Act contained an express provision precluding jury trial; the current Act merely says that a juvenile will be tried as such
unless the youth requests to be tried as an adult.13 ' In McKever v. Pennsylvanza,13 2 the United States Supreme Court held that due process did not
require a jury trial in state juvenile delinquency proceedings.1 33 The Court,
however, has never decided specifically whether the federal government
could preclude jury trial in Delinquency Act proceedings.
The Tenth Circuit ruled that McKeiver, nevertheless, controlled the outcome of the case. 1 3 4 The McKeiver opinion indicated that a jury was not a
prerequisite to accurate factfinding, and that the informal nature ofjuvenile
proceedings might be better suited to protecting and rehabilitating youthful
offenders. 135 In addition to agreeing with the Supreme Court's rationale,
125. United States v. DeCoster, 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 944 (1979);
Marzullo v. Maryland, 561 F.2d 540 (4th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 435 U.S. 1011 (1978).
126. Cooper v. Fitzharris, 586 F.2d 1325 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 974 (1979);
United States v. Bad Cob, 560 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1977); United States v. Johnson, 531 F.2d 169
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976); Beasley v. United States, 491 F.2d 687 (6th Cir. 1974).
127. For a helpful and specific delineation of the various standards of conduct, which give
structure and meaning to the "reasonably effective assistance" test, seeABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND

THE DEFENSE FUNCTION (approved draft 1970).
128. 604 F.2d 648 (10th Cir. 1979).
129. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5042 (1976).
130. 604 F.2d at 648-50.
131. Federal Youth Corrections Act, ch. 645, 62 Stat. 857 (1948) (current version at 18
U.S.C. § 5032 (1976)). Section 5032 also provides that the Attorney General may, by motion,
transfer the juvenile's case to state court for criminal prosecution, provided that the case involves a juvenile, over sixteen, who has committed a major felony.
132. 403 U.S. 528 (1971).
133. The decision in AcKtever did not change statutory or case law providing jury trials in
juvenile proceedings. Most states in the Tenth Circuit do furnish juveniles with the possibility
of a jury trial. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-1-106(4) (1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-808(a)
(Supp. 1979); OKLA. STAT. tit. 10, § I110 (Supp. 1979); Wyo. STAT. § 14-6-223(c) (1977). See
also Peyton v. Nord, 78 N.M. 717, 437 P.2d 716 (1968). But see UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3a-33
(1953) (jury not provided).
134. 604 F.2d at 652.
135. 403 U.S. at 543-48.
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the Tenth Circuit noted that the Act left defendant the option of being tried
as an adult, with a jury.' 36 The court held that there was therefore no right
137
to a jury trial under the Juvenile Delinquency Act.
C.

Juo, Prejudtce

In United States v. Greer,' 38 the Tenth Circuit held that juror contact
with a United States Marshal required reversal of a defendant's conviction.
At a recess during defendant Greer's trial, a juror asked a marshal a question
on sentencing in an unrelated case. During another recess, the juror and the
marshal continued the conversation and discussed sentencing under the Federal Youth Corrections Act (FYCA) in general. 139 Apparently, upon overhearing this dialogue, a second juror asked a general question as to the
applicability of the FYCA to yet another unrelated case, to which the marshal responded that the FYCA did apply. 14
These conversations were reported by another juror to the trial judge,
who immediately held an evidentiary hearing on the matter. 14 ' It was determined that six of the jurors did not know of the conversation, three jurors
remembered hearing some generalized comments on the FYCA but not in
reference to defendant Greer, and the remaining three jurors had participated in the conversation with the marshal. 142 The trial court found that
the conversations did not prejudice Greer in any manner, but the judge gave
cautionary instructions to the jury.1 43 The defendant was later convicted of
federal drug violations.
The Tenth Circuit, per Judge McKay, reversed the trial court and remanded for a new trial. Judge McKay noted the fundamental importance
of an impartial jury. He cited the Supreme Court case of Remmer v. United
States' 44 to the effect that "[a]ny private contact with jurors during trial
about the matter pending before them is 'presumptively prejudicial.' ",t45
Under the Remmer ruling, the government has the burden of showing
that third party contact with a juror was harmless to the defendant.146 This
procedure is difficult to apply when considered with Federal Rule of Evi136. 604 F.2d at 651-52.
137. Accord, United States v. Hill, 538 F.2d 1072 (4th Cir. 1976); United States v. Torres,
500 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1974); United States v. Salcido-Medina, 483 F.2d 162 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 1070 (1973); United States v. King, 482 F.2d 454 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1076 (1973); Cotton v. United States, 446 F.2d 107 (8th Cir. 1971).
138. 620 F.2d 1383 (10th Cir. 1980). This case may have limited precedential value in light
of the fact that each judge on the panel wrote a separate opinion.
139. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-5042 (1976).
140. 620 F.2d at 1384.
141. The failure to question a jury when there is a reasonable belief of the presence of
prejudice may be a denial of the sixth amendment right to trial by an impartial jury. See Aston
v. Warden, 574 F.2d 1169 (4th Cir. 1978). Seegenerally United States v. Wood, 299 U.S. 123,
145-146 (1936).
142. 620 F.2d at 1389-90 (Holloway, J., dissenting).
143. Id. at 1390.
144. 347 U.S. 227 (1954).
145. 620 F.2d at 1385 (citing Remmer v. United States, 347 U.S. at 229). Seealso United
States v. Gigax, 605 F.2d 507 (10th Cir. 1979).
146. 347 U.S. at 229.
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dence 606(b).1 4 7 Rule 606(b) essentially states that jurors are not allowed to
testify to any matter, statement, or component of their deliberation process. 14 8 This prohibition of juror testimony as to the juror's state of mind
when combined with the analysis used in Remmer, prompted Judge McKay
to conclude that the "presumption of prejudice cannot be overcome once a
' 49
jury has reached its verdict."'
Judge Doyle concurred with the result in Greer but he felt that the presumption of prejudice was a rebuttable presumption, not a conclusive
one. 150 The judge found that the trial court in this case had violated rule
606(b).'15 Judge Doyle read this rule as allowing only juror testimony as to
whether there had been prejudicial information, and not, as the trial judge
permitted, evidence as to its effect on the jury.' 52 This type of testimony
required reversal.
Judge Barrett dissented. He emphasized that the trial judge was in the
best position to determine what is prejudicial to the jury, and his findings in
these matters should be given great weight and deference.1 53 Judge Barrett
felt that the trial judge's findings were supported in this case. In his discussions with the jurors, the marshal had never referred to the defendant or to
the possible sentence Greer might receive if found guilty. In addition, the
jurors were specifically instructed and admonished that sentencing was exclusively the court's function and was not to be considered in arriving at
their verdict. 1'5 4 Judge Barrett argued that the majority decision discarded
ninety years of Supreme Court precedent.' 55 The dissenting judge pointed
147. Once an extrinsic influence on the jury has been reporied, it is proper for the judge to
presume that it is prejudicial and to conduct a hearing. See Krause v. Rhodes, 570 F.2d 563
(6th Cir. 1977), cert. denid, 435 U.S. 924 (1978) (hearing should be held immediately upon
learning of an intrusion). Since rule 606(b) prohibits inquiry into the actual eet of the influence, the judge must evaluate the irregularity and determine whether it would probably have a
prejudicial effect sufficient to require requiring a mistrial. Miller v. United States, 403 F.2d 77,
83 n. 11 (2d Cir. 1968). See note 148 itnfra. A trial judge cannot examine the mental processes of
the jurors, but he can receive evidence on the existence of conditions or events which may show
prejudice. Maddox v. United States, 146 U.S. 140, 149 (1892) (juror may testify as to the existence of any extraneous influence although not as to how that influence operated on his mind).
148. FED. R. EvID. 606(b) states:
Upon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify as
to any matter or statement occurring during the course of the jury's deliberations or to
the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions as influencing
him to assent to or dissent from the verdict or indictment or concerning his mental
processes in connection therewith, except that a juror may testify on the question
whether extraneous prejudicial information was improperly brought to the jury's attention or whether any outside influence was improperly brought to bear upon any
juror. Nor may his affidavit or evidence of any statement by him concerning a matter
about which he would be precluded from testifying be received for these purposes.
149. 620 F.2d at 1385.
150. Id. at 1386.
151. See note 148 supra and accompanying text.
152. 620 F.2d at 1387 (Doyle, J., concurring).
153. Id. at 1388.
154. Id. at 1389. See United States v. Jones, 554 F.2d 251, 252 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 866 (1977) (trial judge's repeated instructions to the jury not to talk about the case, among
themselves or with others, negated any prejudice which may have arisen when juror attempted
to question marshal).
155. Id. at 1391. See Maddox v. United States, 147 U.S. 140, 150 (1892) (communications
between jurors and third persons are forbidden, "unless their harmlessness is made to appear").
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out that if the conclusive presumption of prejudice standard were the court's
holding, the Tenth Circuit would be the only federal circuit so holding.' 56
IV.
A.

PRISONERS' RIGHTS

Right to Parole

In Shirley v. Chestnut,'5 7 the Tenth Circuit considered the claims of a
group of inmates from various Oklahoma prisons. The inmates asserted that
due process was ignored when they were denied parole. Specifically, the inmates sought declaratory and injunctive relief to the effect that due process
"requires published criteria for parole release, access to adverse material in
inmate files, [the] right to subpoena witnesses at the [parole] hearing, and
written reasons for the denial of parole."' 58 The Tenth Circuit found that
these claims were comparable to those presented in Greenholtz v. Inmates of the
Nebraska Penaland CorrectionalComplex 159 and, therefore, the court of appeals
applied the principles articulated in that case.
In Greenholtz, the Supreme Court found that the Nebraska law outlining
60
parole standards codified a liberty interest protectable by due process.1
The Nebraska statutes entitle each inmate to a parole review every year. At
the hearing, the inmate may present any oral or written evidence and may
be represented by counsel. The parole board interviews the inmate and reviews his record. Thereafter, the Nebraska parole board must release an eligible prisoner unless it finds at least one of four statutory reasons for denying
parole. If denied parole, the prisoner is given a written explanation. 161
Although this statutory scheme created a legitimate expectation of parole, entitled to due process protection, 62 the Supreme Court emphasized
that the Nebraska system of parole was unique. "Whether any other state
statute provides a protectible entitlement must be decided on a case-by-case
basis."' 63 The important issue, therefore, in Shirley v. Chestnut was the evaluation of the rights and procedures provided in the Oklahoma parole system.
The Oklahoma statutes provide for automatic review of each inmate on
or before the expiration of one-third of his term. 164 At the parole hearing,
the inmate may present evidence and be represented by counsel. Unlike the
Nebraska system, however, the Oklahoma statutes do not provide that the
parole board "shall" release a prisoner "unless" a statutorily designated reason is found; nor does the Oklahoma parole system require specific criteria to
be considered.' 6 5 "The Board's only statutory guidance in the exercise of its
156. See, e.g., Llewellyn v. Stynchcombe, 609 F.2d 194 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v.
Winkle, 587 F.2d 705 (5th Cir.), cert. dented, 444 U.S. 827 (1979).
157. 603 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1979) (per curiam).
158. Id. at 806.
159. 442 U.S. 1 (1979).
160. Id. The Supreme Court, however, held that the Nebraska statutes provided, of themselves, sufficient due process protections. Id. at 13-16.
161. Id. at 4-5; NEB. REV. STAT. § 83-1-114(1) (1971).
162. Cf Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974) (prisoner with cognizable liberty interest
entitled to procedural due process).
163. 442 U.S. at 12.
164. OKLA. STAT. tit. 52, § 332 (1971).
165. Id See generally Dye v. United States Parole Comm'n, 558 F.2d 1376 (10th Cir. 1977)
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discretion is that it act as the public interest requires, and the sole existing
statutory criteria dictate only the time of parole consideration.' 166 Because
of these distinctions, the Tenth Circuit found that, unlike Greenholtz, the
Oklahoma parole statute did not create a constitutionally cognizable liberty
interest, protected by due process, and the court of appeals denied the relief
16 7
sought by the inmates.
B.

Access to the Courts

In the case of Battle v. Anderson, 16' the Tenth Circuit reviewed the question of whether furnishing prisoners with a law library but denying them
69
access to civilian legal advisors violated the mandates of Bounds v. Smit'h.'
The Supreme Court, in Bounds, held that a prison system must provide prisoners with reasonable access to a law library or to persons trained in the
law. 170 Such access was deemed necessary to fulfill the due process requirement that persons have adequate, effective, and meaningful representation
in the courts.' 7 '
Since prison riots in 1973, the federal district court has supervised the
resolution of such issues as over-crowding, sanitation, fire-safety, water, ventilation, and sewage systems within the Oklahoma penal system. This appeal was a product of a district court finding, pursuant to Bounds, that
prisoners' constitutional right of access to the courts is a desirable and necessary goal; a goal usually neglected in the state's penal system. 172 The district
court had ordered that both an adequate library system and competent civilian advisors were necessary "to insure inmates the means to frame and present legal issues effectively for judicial consideration."' 173 The petitioner
contended on appeal that while the law libraries were adequate, a system of
civilian legal advisors had not been provided. As a result, the illiterate or
legally ignorant prisoners had to rely on "jailhouse lawyers," who may prac74
tice chicanery in one form or another.'
The Tenth Circuit, per Judge Barrett, was unable to resolve the issue
because the requirement of civilian legal assistants was apparently abandoned, or at least modified, by a later order of the trial judge.' 75 Because
this order was unclear, the Tenth Circuit remanded the case for additional
76
findings of fact.1
(parole commission can consider factors which would be unconstitutional if considered by a
court of law). But cf.Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972) (due process protection applies to
parole revocation).
166. 603 F.2d at 807.
167. Id.
168. 614 F.2d 251 (10th Cir. 1980). See alsoBattle v. Anderson, 594 F.2d 786 (10th Cir.

1979).
169. 430 U.S. 817 (1977).
170. Id. at 828. See Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969) (access of prisoners to the
court system must not be obstructed).
171. See Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
172. Battle v. Anderson, 457 F. Supp. 719, 739 (E.D. Okla. 1978).

173. Id.
174. 614 F.2d at 255.
175.
176.

Id. at 256.

Id.
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Both Judges McKay and Doyle concurred, offering possible guidelines
for the district court. They indicated that consideration should be given to
the dangers inherent in affording jailhouse "writ writers" unreasonable control over their fellow inmates and suggested the use of volunteer assistants
from the legal community as an alternative.L77
In Harrellv. Keohane,' 78 the Tenth Circuit was confronted with the issue
of whether a prisoner is denied access to the courts when denied access to
free photocopying. The Oklahoma Bureau of Prisons had promulgated
three procedural options for inmate copying. Harrell claimed that he could
not comply with any of the options: he could not afford to pay the ten cents
per copy that the prison charged; he could not have friends or family do the
copying because they were also poor; and he could not adequately reproduce
179
the needed complex documents with a typewriter and carbon paper.
The Tenth Circuit, following the mandate of Bounds v. Smith, 180 found
that "[r]easonable regulations are necessary to balance the legitimate interests of inmate litigants with budgetary considerations and to prevent
abuse."' 8' 1 The appellate court's ruling, denying free access to a photocopying machine, was in accordance with a previous holding which held that
prison inmates do not have an unrestricted right to free postage or use of a
typewriter. 182
The court of appeals also summarily dismissed appellant's contention
that the limited seating capacity of the prison law library denied court access. Appellant did not claim deprivation of a legal right because of the lack
of space, nor did he assert that there were insufficient legal materials in the
crowded library.183 Since appellant was deemed not to be prejudiced in any
manner, the Tenth Circuit court dismissed his claim.
C.

Availabtlity of Federal Habeas Corpus Relif

In Sanders v. Oli'ver,'184 the Tenth Circuit considered the question of what
constitutes an "opportunity for full and fair litigation" of fourth amendment
claims in state court. When an unconstitutional search or seizure is claimed,
a federal court may grant habeas corpus relief to a state prisoner only if he
has been denied the opportunity to fully and fairly litigate his claim in the
185
state forum.
177. Id. at 259.
178. 621 F.2d 1059 (10th Cir. 1980) (per curiam).
179. Id. at 1060.
180. 430 U.S. 817 (1977) (one month wait for use of library deemed not to be a violation of
prisoner's right of access to the courts).
181. 621 F.2d at 1061.
182. Twyman v. Crisp, 584 F.2d 352, 359 (10th Cir. 1978). But see Jones v. Diamond, 594
F.2d 997, 1024 (5th Cir. 1979) (when only prison procedure available to inmates is ordering
books from county law library, prisoners are denied free access to courts); Williams v. Leeke, 584
F.2d 1336, 1340 (4th Cir. 1978) (forty-five minute limitation on use of law library restricts
meaningful access).
183. 621 F.2d at 1061.
184. 611 F.2d 804 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 90 (1980).
185. This standard was first articulated in Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976). The
holding in Stone essentially stated that federal courts will not entertain claims involving a denial
of fourth amendment rights "where the state has provided an opportunity for full and fair
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Defendant Sanders was convicted by the State of Kansas for possessing
marijuana with the intent to sell. 18 6 Before trial he sought to suppress the
marijuana, which was seized in his house pursuant to a search warrant. At
the preliminary hearing, Sanders proved that the warrant's supporting affidavit was riddled with false statements. Despite these findings, the magistrate court held that the affidavit was still sufficient to support the probable
cause needed for the warrant. A further evidentiary hearing on the matter
87
was denied by the trial court.'
After his conviction in state court, Sanders exhausted all of the possible
state procedural remedies, going so far as to seek a rehearing of his certiorari
petition by the United States Supreme Court.' 88 Sanders then filed the present habeas corpus action in federal district court, asserting again that the
affidavit was inaccurate and insufficient to support the search warrant. The
federal district court held that Sanders had already received the opportunity
for full and fair litigation of his fourth amendment claim and therefore denied his petition for federal habeas corpus relief.' 8 9 Sanders appealed the
decision to the Tenth Circuit, arguing that "the refusal by the trial court to
hear testimony concerning factual assertions in the affidavit denied him an
190
opportunity for full and fair litigation."'
Chief Judge Seth, writing for the court, first noted that both the state
district and supreme courts had held that the affidavit information was sufficient to support the search warrant, even after the inaccuracies were removed.' 9 ' The Tenth Circuit agreed, however, with the federal district
court that the governing issue was whether the petition for federal habeas
corpus relief was barred by Stone v. Powell.192 The Tenth Circuit split its
consideration of this issue by dividing the standard into two parts: first, the
"oppportunity," and second, "full and fair" litigation.
The definition for the requisite "opportunity" to litigate fourth amendment claims was an issue left open by the Supreme Court decision of Stone v.
Powell. In this case, the Tenth Circuit interpreted "opportunity" as meanlitigation" of the claim. Id. at 494. For recent commentaries on the meaning of this standard,
see Note, Habeas Corpus After Stone v. Powell: The "Opportuniy For Full And Fair Litigation" Standard, 13 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 521 (1978); Note, The 'Opportunz'y' Test of Stone v. Powell:
Towarda Predefimition ofFederal HabeasCorpus, 23 VILL. L. REv. 1095 (1978); Note, Applying Stone
v. Powell: Full and Fair Litiationfor Fourth Amendment Habeas Corpus Claims, 35 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 319 (1978).
186. State v. Sanders, 222 Kan. 189, 563 P.2d 461 (1977).
187. 611 F.2d at 806.
188. The complete and orderly procedure Sanders followed was: 1) he filed a motion to
suppress the seized evidence at the preliminary hearing in the magistrate court; 2) he filed a pretrial motion to suppress; 3) he submitted a motion for new trial in the state district court; 4) he
took an appeal to the Kansas Supreme Court; 5) he filed a motion for rehearing by the Kansas
Supreme Court; 6) he submitted a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States Supreme
Court; 7) he petitioned for rehearing to the United States Supreme Court; 8) he filed a petition
for habeas corpus relief in federal district court; 9) he sought a rehearing by the federal district
court; and 10) he submitted a certificate of probable cause for appeal to the Tenth Circuit. Id.
at 806-07.
189. Id. at 807.
190. Id. at 808 (emphasis in original). See text accompanying note 187 supra.
191. Id. at 807.
192. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). See note 185 supra and accompanying text.
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ing the "procedural opportunities to raise a claim, and it includes a full and
fair hearing." ' 93 This definition indicates that the Stone standard is basically
a procedural adequacy one, requiring the opportunity for an actual hearing,
in some form, on the claim.' 94 The Tenth Circuit ruled that the evidentiary
95
hearing in the state magistrate court provided this "opportunity."'
The court also decided that the evidentiary hearing constituted a "full
and fair" hearing under the requirement of Stone. 196 The opinion noted that
the defendant's examination of the affiant took up some sixty pages of the
evidentiary hearing transcript, and that the warrant was the principal issue
at trial. 197 The Tenth Circuit concluded that "one complete and unrestricted evidentiary hearing with subsequent review by the state courts of
the issue and the facts so developed would seem sufficient under Stone.' ' 98
V.

A.

CRIMINAL LAW AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION

False Statements and the "Exculpatoov No" Defense

In United States v. Fitzgibbon,' 99 defendant Fitzgibbon was convicted of
violating the federal false statement statute. 2° ° Fitzgibbon had traveled
from Canada to Denver by airplane and, upon arrival, he was greeted by
customs officials with various forms which needed to be filled out. One form
question inquires as to whether the traveler is entering the United States
with more than $5,000. Fitzgibbon checked the "no" box and also gave a
negative response when questioned by a customs official about importing
money. When the official observed him to be hesitant and nervous, Fitzgibbon was searched, and over $10,000 was found in his boots. After being
convicted for willfully making a false statement to a government agency, the
defendant filed a habeas corpus petition, arguing that he was denied effective assistance of counsel because an "exculpatory no" defense was not raised
20
at trial. '
The "exculpatory no" defense provides that a negative response, of it193. 611 F.2d at 808.
194. See Johnson v. Meachem, 570 F.2d 918 (10th Cir. 1978) (defendant's waiver of hearing
opportunity barred habeas corpus review).
195. 611 F.2d at 808.
196. Id. See Gamble v. Oklahoma, 583 F.2d 1161 (10th Cir. 1978) (evidentiary hearing and
at least a colorable application of correct fourth amendment constitutional standards required);
O'Berry v. Wainwright, 546 F.2d 1204 (5th Cir. 1977) (consideration of disputed facts by factfinding court and th4 availability of appeal required).
197. 611 F.2d at 808.
198. Id. Judge McKay concurred in the result. He felt that the court should have simply
affirmed the state court finding that the remaining truthful allegations in the affidavit supported probable cause. Under this analysis, the Stone question would need not have been addressed. Ild.
199. 619 F.2d 874 (10th Cir. 1980).
200. 18 U.S.C. § 1001 (1976). The section provides:
Whoever, in any manner within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of
the United States knowingly and willfully falsifies, conceals or covers up by any trick,
scheme, or device a material fact, or makes any false, fictitious or fraudulent statements or representations, or makes or uses any false writing or document knowing the
same to contain any false, fictitious or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be fined not
more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than five years, or both.
201. 619 F.2d at 875.
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self, cannot serve as proof of the intent needed to convict under the federal
false statement statute. 20 2 The federal statute was designed to prevent the
perpetration of intentional frauds which hinder government agencies in fulfilling their administrative duties. 20 3 In cases similar to Fitzgibbon's, courts
have upheld the "exculpatory no" defense on the ground that defendant's
negative response may only indicate an intention to enter the country with
4
Without specifically informing
more than $5000, which is not a crime.,2
defendants of the statutory requirements, it is almost impossible to prove
that false statements are intended to frustrate government functioning. For
example, an immigrant may make untruthful customs statements only because of the mistaken belief that currency over $5000 would be confis20 5
cated.
In this case, the Tenth Circuit found thai Fitzgibbon completely understood that completion of the form was required prior to entry into the
United States, and that "the false statements he made were designed to con20 6
The court noted
ceal information relevant to the administrative process."
that prominent posters advised incoming travelers of the obligation to report
currency over $5000, and that the custom's form clearly stated that false
20 7
In addition, the Tenth Circuit held
statements were punishable by law.
that the reporting requirement did not violate Fitzgibbon's fifth amendment
20 8
If defendant had reported correctly the
right against self-incrimination.
currency amount, he would not have committed any crime. His habeas
corpus petition was therefore denied.
B.

Weapons Used in Bank Robbeg

In Unted States v. Lucas,20 9 the defendant, Lucas, was convicted of bank
robbery. On appeal, Lucas asserted that there was insufficient evidence to
support the finding that the robbery was committed by "force and violence,
or by intimidation." 2 10 Upon entering the bank, Lucas brandished a toy
gun and demanded money. Every teller followed standard bank instructions
not to take any action or to respond in any way to a bank robber's directions.
While all of the tellers eventually noticed that the pistol was a toy, a few
202. Id. at 876. See Note, Fatrness In Cnmnal Investigations Under the Federal False Statement
Statute, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 316 (1977).
203. 619 F.2d at 877-78. See Bryson v. United States, 396 U.S. 64 (1969); United States v.
Bramblett, 348 U.S. 503 (1955).
204. United States v. Schnaiderman, 568 F.2d 1208 (5th Cir. 1978); United States v. Granada, 565 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1978).
205. See United States v. Granada, 565 F.2d at 926..
206. 619 F.2d at 880.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 881.
209. 619 F.2d 870 (10th Cir. 1980).
210. 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1976). The section reads in part:
Whoever, by force and violence, or by intimidation, takes, or attempts to take,
from the person or presence of another any property or money or any other thing of
value belonging to, or in the care, custody, control, management, or possession of, any
bank, credit union, or any savings and loan association. ...
Shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or
both.

19811

CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE

testified that they were frightened, shaken, or quite concerned about the obviously stressful situation. 2 1' The Tenth Circuit court found that this testimony constituted "objectively intimidating facts," facts which were
sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that the "intimidation" element
2 12
was satisfied.
In United States v. Shannahan,2 13 the defendant was charged under the
same bank robbery statute applied in Lucas. 2 14 Defendant, Shannahan, had
given a bank drive-up teller a bag which contained what appeared to be
dynamite, together with a note demanding money. Believing that the defendant did have dynamite, the teller gave him several hundred dollars.
Shannahan later was convicted of bank robbery by force. The issue on appeal was whether the elements of "a dangerous weapon or device" which
"puts in jeopardy the life of any person" during a bank robbery were satis2 15
fied by the use of the two fake sticks of dynamite.
Shannahan asserted that since the dynamite was not real, it was not
capable of putting the life of a person in jeopardy, and the prosecution,
therefore, failed in establishing its burden of proof. The Tenth Circuit, per
Judge Pickett, noted that some jurisdictions have held that the prosecution
must show that the weapon had an actual capability to cause death or physical harm. 2 16 Other jurisdictions, including 'the Tenth Circuit, have held
that it is sufficient if the weapon or device appeared dangerous, putting the
robbery victim in reasonable apprehension of death or serious bodily injury. 2 1 7 In Shannahan, the court reaffirmed this latter construction, stating
that the test was one of a subjective state of danger, that is, what the reasonable victim believes the danger to be, rather than what is the actual capabil218
ity of the weapon used.
C.

Interstate Transportationof a ForgedSecurity

In United States v. Sparrow,2 19 defendant Sparrow was convicted on two
220
counts of interstate transportation of a falsely made or forged security.
The security involved in the first count was an original Oregon certificate of
619 F.2d at 870-71.
Id. at 871.
605 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1979).
18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) (1976). For the text of the statute, see note 210 supra.
605 F.2d at 540. See 18 U.S.C. § 2113(d):
Whoever, in committing, or in attempting to commit, any offense defined in subsections (a) and (b) of this section, assaults any person, or puts in jeopardy the life of
any person by the use of a dangerous weapon or device, shall be fined not more than
$10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty-five years, or both.
216. See, e.g., United States v. Cobb, 558 F.2d 486 (8th Cir. 1977); Bradley v. United States,
447 F.2d 264 (8th Cir. 1971), vacatedon other grounds, 404 U.S. 567 (1972).
217. See, e.g., United States v. Waters, 461 F.2d 248 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 880
(1972); United States v. Beasley, 438 F.2d 1279 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971).
218. 605 F.2d at 542.
219. 614 F.2d 229 (10th Cir. 1980).
220. 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (1976) states, in pertinent part:
Whoever, with unlawful or fraudulent intent, transports in interstate or foreign
commerce any falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited securities or tax stamps,
knowing the same to have been falsely made, forged, altered, or counterfeited ....
211.
212.
213.
214.
215.

Shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
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title for an automobile which defendant had transported from Utah to
Idaho. The security in the second count was a duplicate certificate which
was sent from Oregon to Utah.
The facts were somewhat complicated. Sparrow bought a used Cadillac
in Utah with a bank loan. The bank recorded its lien on the back of the
orignal certficate nf title, which had been issued in Oregon. Sparrow then
went to Idaho, where he obtained a clear title to the car by submitting a
different version of the Oregon certificate, on which Sparrow was listed as
both owner and lienholder. Sparrow returned to Utah and exchanged the
Cadillac for a compact car and cash. He reported the Cadillac as stolen and
filed a claim with his insurance company. Sparrow proceeded to apply for a
duplicate Oregon certificate of title and transfer, which was issued in his
22
name and sent to the Utah bank as lienholder. 1
The defendant challenged the first count of his conviction, contending
that the government did not present evidence demonstrating the interstate
transportation element of the crime. Although there was a strong indication
that defendant had presented an altered certificate of title in Idaho, there
was no showing that the alteration had taken place in Utah. In fact, defendant argued that there was a legal presumption that a forged instrument was
222
forged in the location where it was first found in its changed state.
The Tenth Circuit, per Judge Barrett, rejected defendant's argument.
Instead, the court of appeals found that the essence of the statutory offense
was the fraudulent scheme, and that the interstate transportation element
was included "solely to afford federal jurisdiction. 2 2 3 The appellate court
noted that Sparrow's continued possession of the altered title was not questioned and that the document was the focus of his interstate scheme to defraud. 2 24 The interstate transportation element was satisfied because the
fraudulent scheme "had both its origin and consummation" in another state
and the "interstate movement of the certificates of title was, at all times, the
'2 25
central means of accomplishing the criminal design."
The second count charged that Sparrow had caused a duplicate title
certificate to be sent from Oregon to the bank in Utah, "knowing the same
to have been falsely made, forged and altered. ' 226 Sparrow contended that
at all times, including its travel between states, the duplicate title was genuine, and not a forgery. The Tenth Circuit noted that the words "forged"
and "falsely made" had been interpreted to include "spurious or fictitious"
The defendant was also convicted of submitting a filse bank statement. 18 U.S.C. § 1014
(1976). This count was not appealed.
221. 614 F.2d at 230.
222. See, e.g., United States v. Owens, 460 F.2d 467, 469 (5th Cir. 1972).
223. 614 F.2d at 232. See United States v. Roselli, 432 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1970), ceri. dented,
401 U.S. 924 (1971).
224. 614 F.2d at 232-33.
225. 614 F.2d at 233. But see td. at 235-36 (McKay, J., dissenting) (criminal statutes must be

strictly construed and interstate transportation must be proved as an essential element of the
crime).
226. Id. at 230.
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execution of documents genuine on their face. 227 The court found that
Sparrow knew that the duplicate title, purporting to show that he was the
owner of the Cadillac, "could not be genuine inasmuch as he no longer owned
the vehicle and had not owned it for several months." 228 The court of ap229
peals affirmed Sparrow's conviction.
D.

Theft From Interstate Commerce

In United States v. Luman,2 3 0 the defendant, Luman, was charged with
and convicted of stealing goods which were in interstate commerce. 23 ' The
goods consisted of a truckload of automobile tires, shipped from Wisconsin
to Tulsa, Oklahoma. The consignee did not sign the delivery receipt because
there was not enough time to unload all of the tires and verify the contents.
The consignee's employees, however, broke the seal of the trailer, removed
the packing slip, and padlocked the trailer, retaining the key. The trailer
232
was taken by the defendant during the night.
The main issue confronting the Tenth Circuit was whether the tires
were still in interstate commerce at the time of the theft. The Tenth Circuit
said that "no single event can be isolated as the point at which chattels lose
their character as an interstate shipment and become an intrastate shipment
2 34
or inventory." 233 The court reviewed the decisions of other jurisdictions,
noting that a consignee's acceptance and exercise of custody over goods renders them intrastate in character. 235 In this case, however, both factors
were not present: while the consignee had taken custody of the tires, he had
not accepted delivery.
In reviewing the facts, the Tenth Circuit noted that the testimony of
both the carrier and the consignee demonstrated that neither regarded the
delivery as completed nor the goods as under the control or care of the consignee. 236 The appellate court also observed that, at the time of the theft,
the tires remained on the trailer, separated from the consignee's inventory.
Furthermore, the court noted that the employees had not signed the delivery
receipt. The Tenth Circuit concluded that this was a sufficient factual basis
227. Id. at 234 (quoting United States v. Crim, 527 F.2d 289 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. dented,
425 U.S. 905 (1976); and United States v. Williams, 498 F.2d 547 (10th Cir. 1974)).
228. Id. (emphasis in original).
229. Id.
230. 622 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1980).
231. See 18 U.S.C. § 659 (1976) which states, in pertinent part:
Whoever embezzles, steals, or unlawfully takes, carries away, or conceals, or by
fraud or deception obtains from any. . . motor truck, or other vehicle. . . with intent
to convert to his own use any goods or chattels moving as or which are a part of or
which constitute an interstate or foreign shipment of freight, express or other prop-

erty

. ...

Shall in each case be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than ten
years, or both.
232. 622 F.2d at 491.
233. Id. at 492.
234. E.g., United States v. Cousins, 427 F.2d 383 (9th Cir. 1970); Chapman v. United
States, 151 F.2d 740 (8th Cir. 1945); O'Kelley v. United States, 116 F.2d 966 (8th Cir. 1941).
235. 622 F.2d at 493.
236. Id. at 493-94.
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for the jury to find that the goods were in interstate commerce at the time of
23 7
the theft.
Judge Holloway dissented, remarking that the federal government
should have allowed this crime to be prosecuted in state court. Judge Holloway concluded, from the pertinent facts, that "effective possession and control of the tires" was in the consignee. 238 The judge rejected any notion that
uncompleted paperwork could be considered a salient factor in the distinction between interstate and intrastate commerce. He asserted, instead, that
the sole factor to be considered was who had actual dominion and control
239
over the property.
E.

Lesser Included Offnses

In United States v. Pino,240 the defendant Pino, an Indian, was convicted
of involuntary vehicular manslaughter while on an Indian reservation. The
evidence showed that Pino was driving home after drinking with a few
friends. He collided with a disabled car, killing the driver who had been
making repairs under the hood. 24 1 Pino argued on appeal that he was
wrongfully denied a jury instruction on the lesser included offense of careless
driving.
The Tenth Circuit, per Judge Holloway, first noted that the Supreme
Court decision in Keeble v. United States242 declared that a defendant is entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense if the evidence is such as to
permit a jury to rationally find him guilty of the lesser offense and to acquit
him of the greater offense. 243 The prosecution contended that in the Tenth
Circuit, the applicable standard provides that an instruction is proper only
when a lesser included offense is such that " 'it is impossible to commit the
greater without having first committed the lesser.' "244 Since involuntary
manslaughter may be committed independently of the careless driving of an
automobile, the government argued that the instruction request was properly denied by the trial court.
The Tenth Circuit court impliedly rejected its former test. The court of
appeals held that a defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense instruction when evidence which is necessary and offered to prove the greater offense establishes the lesser offense.2 45 This standard was viewed as a
practical one; its application is to be determined by the offense charged and
by the evidence developed at trial. 246 The court concluded that the prosecution's case in PAno had established all of the elements of a careless driving
237. Id. at 493.
238. Id. at 494 (Holloway, J., dissenting).
239. Id. at 494-95.
240. 606 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1979).
241. 606 F.2d at 910-14.
242. 412 U.S. 205 (1973) (an Indian prosecuted under the Major Crimes Act of 1885 is
entitled to a lesser included offense instruction). See also FED. R. CRIM. P. 31(c).
243. 412 U.S. at 212-14.
244. 606 F.2d at 915 (relying on Larson v. United States, 296 F.2d 80, 81 (10th Cir. 1961)).
245. 606 F.2d at 916 (citing with approval United States v. Whitaker, 447 F.2d 314 (D.C.
Cir. 1971)).
246. Id.
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to a jury instruction on the
charge, and therefore, the defendant was entitled
247
lesser included offense of careless driving.
In United States v. Chapman,248 the Tenth Circuit ruled that a defendant
is only entitled to an instruction on a lesser included offense when the evidence reasonably supports such a theory. The defendant, Chapman, was
convicted of premeditated murder.2 49 Witnesses testified that Chapman had
driven his truck to a house where the victim was located, that Chapman had
called the victim over to the truck, and that after a short discussion, Chapman shot the victim with a sawed-off shotgun. 250 Chapman claimed that
the shooting was an accident and his attorney tendered an instruction for the
lesser included offense of voluntary manslaughter. The trial court refused
the request because it felt that the evidence did not justify a lesser included
2
offense instruction. 51
The Tenth Circuit court ruled that the trial court did not commit error.
The court of appeals stated that the decision whether to give an instruction
252
on a lesser included offense is within the sound discretion of a trial court.
The court cited Keeble v. United Stales253 for the proposition that an instruction need not be given when the evidence does not rationally support defendant's theory. 254 Chapman's own testimony indicated that the shooting
was an accident, that he was happy at the time of the shooting, and that he
had only wanted to scare the victim. The majority of the court felt that this
testimony dispelled the notion that the shooting was done in the heat of
255
passion, an element required in the crime of voluntary manslaughter.
Judge Holloway dissented. Chapman had also testified about previous
disputes with the victim and about being drunk and being taunted immediately prior to the shooting. Judge Holloway felt that this was evidence to
support a voluntary manslaughter instruction. 256 He argued that a trial
court has no discretion to refuse an instruction if there is some evidence to
support a lesser included offense, even when the evidence is weak or contra257
dicted by other testimony.
247. Id. at 916-17.
248. 615 F.2d 1294 (10th Cir. 1980).
249. See 18 U.S.C. § 1111 (1976) (murder); id. § 1153 (offenses committed within Indian
country).
250. 615 F.2d at 1295-96.
251. Id. at 1298.
252. Id.
253. 412 U.S. 205 (1973). See note 242 supra and accompanying text.
254. 615 F.2d at 1299. See United States v. Thompson, 492 F.2d 359, 362 (8th Cir. 1974)
(listing the dispositive factors of a lesser included offense).
255. 615 F.2d at 1300. The court commented that if the defendant had not testified, he
might have persuaded the trial court to give a voluntary manslaughter instruction. Id.
256. Id. at 1302-03 (Holloway, J., dissenting).
257. Id. at 1301 (citing United States v. Swallow, 511 F.2d 514, 523 (10th Cir.), cert. dened,
423 U.S. 845 (1972)).
The main distinction between the majority and the dissenting opinions seems to be the
individual judge's opinions as to the quantum of factual proof necessary to support a lesser
included offense instruction. Simply stated, the majority felt that the trial judge may deny, as a
matter of law, a lesser included offense instruction when there is not enough evidence for the
jury to rationally conclude that the lesser offense was committed. Alternatively, the dissenting
judge believed that if there is some evidence to support the defendant's claim, the jury, not the
trial judge, should decide whether a lesser included offense is merited by the facts.
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TRIAL MATTERS

Discovery

In UnitedStates v. Bump, 258 the defendant, Bump, requested discoverable
information under rule 16(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. In
*

.se,,o

the govcrr ncr's ,ci..Lpuat

rcquest unuerulc 16(U),29 DUIp S

attorney disclosed that he intended to introduce a charge card receipt for an
airplane ticket and hotel registration records showing that the defendant was
out of town during the time of the alleged conspiracy. 26° These documents
were never produced. At trial, Bump testified as to his alibi but did not
mention any supporting evidence. During cross-examination, the prosecutor
used the attorney's earlier representation of documentary evidence, and its
apparent nonexistence, for impeachment purposes. Bump contended, on appeal, that this line of questioning was an impermissible intrusion into confidential statements made between attorney and client, that it deprived him of
the effective assistance of counsel, and that it made him a witness against
26
himself in violation of the fifth amendment. '
The Tenth Circuit, per Judge Logan, quickly dismissed the attorneyclient privilege contention. The court observed that even when a privilege
exists with regard to a statement made between a client and his attorney, the
privilege is waived once the statement is revealed to a third party. 262 Since
Bump failed to demonstrate that the disclosures made by his attorney were
without his consent, he did not uphold his burden of proving that the com2 63
munication was privileged.
The Tenth Circuit examined Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(b)
for a disposition of defendant's other claims. The court of appeals had diffi258. 605 F.2d 548 (10th Cir. 1979). Also within this survey period the Tenth Circuit decided United States v. Gallagher, 620 F.2d 797 (10th Cir. 1980) (Federal Rule of Criminal
Procedure 17(b) does not require a trial court to grant a defendant's motion for the subpoena of
a witness where the witness would only provide cumulative testimony).
259. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b) provides, in part:
(1) Information Subject to Disclosure.
(A) Documents and Tangible Objects. If the defendant requests disclosure under
subdivision (a)(l)(C) or (D) of this rule, upon compliance with such request by the
government, the defendant, on request of the government, shall permit the government to inspect and copy or photograph books, papers, documents, photographs, tangible objects, or copies or portions thereof, which are within the possession, custody, or
control of the defendant and which the defendant intends to introduce as evidence in
chief at the trial.
(2) Information Not Subject to Disclosure.
Except as to scientific or medical reports, this subdivision does not authorize the discovery or inspection of reports, memoranda, or other internal defense documents
made by the defendant, or his attorneys or agents in connection with the investigation
or defense of the case, or of statements made by the defendant, or by government or
defense witnesses, or by prospective government or defense witnesses, to the defendant,
his agents or attorneys.
260. 605 F.2d at 550.
261. Id.
262. See Wilcoxon v. United States, 231 F.2d 384, 386 (10th Cir.), cert. dented, 351 U.S. 943
(1956) (client's statement made to attorney, with intent that it be communicated to others, is
not privileged).
263. 605 F.2d at 551. See, e.g., United States v. Ponder, 475 F.2d 37, 39 (5th Cir. 1973)
(defendant failed to carry burden of proving that evidence was privileged).
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culty in determining whether the representations of Bump's attorney were
nondiscoverable statements under rule 16(b)(2) or whether they were discoverable documents under rule 16(b)(1)(A). 264 The appellate court skirted this
issue by assuming that the discovery rule required Bump's attorney to disclose his client's statements concerning what the documents purported to
266
the court of
prove. 265 Relying on analogous Supreme Court precedents,
be
appeals held that the forced disclosure did not violate Bump's rights to 26
7
protected against self-incrimination and to effective assistance of counsel.
The Tenth Circuit also found that the government's use of the represen268
The repretations of defendant's attorney was not prejudicially unfair.
the stand.
took
defendant
when
sentations were used only for impeachment
evidence,
discovered
involving
this
situation,
The court of appeals compared
are
rights
of
constitutional
in
violation
obtained
statements
where
to that
v.
New
in
Harris
Court,
Supreme
The
purposes.
used for impeachment
York, 269 held that evidence suppressed because of a fifth amendment violation may be used to impeach a defendant's exculpatory testimony. Similarly, the Tenth Circuit has held that discovered evidence could be used for
impeachment purposes even if the defendant has not specifically utilized it
270
in his defense.
As mentioned earlier, 27 1 the Tenth Circuit did not decide whether rule
16(b) requires disclosure of a defendant's statements concerning document
relevancy as well as the documents themselves. Under rule 16(b), a defendant, after requesting discovery under rule 16(a), must permit inspection of
272
In this case, however,
documents which he intends to introduce at trial.
the defendant apparently had no exculpatory document within his "posses27 3
If and
sion, custody or control" at the time of the rule 16(b) request.
have
would
the
defendant
found,
were
documents
when these exculpatory
2 74
Until the time when the
been required to disclose them immediately.
actual documents are in the attorney's hands, any attorney-client communications as to their existence and potential use at trial should be nondiscoverable. 2 75 In view of the Bump decision, defense attorneys would be wise not to
264. See note 259 supra for text of FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b).
265. 605 F.2d at 551.
266. United States v. Nobles, 422 U.S. 225, 235 (1975) (forced pre-trial disclosure applies
only to evidence that defendant intends to introduce at trial and applies only when defendant
makes discovery request); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (state rule, which required
defendant to disclose intention to rely upon alibi defense, declared to be constitutional).
267. 605 F.2d at 552.
268. Id.
269. 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
270. 605 F.2d at 552. &e also United States v. Havens, 100 S. Ct. 1912 (1980) (evidence
suppressed as fruit of unlawful search and seizure may be used to impeach false testimony offered on cross-examination); United States v. McManaman, 606 F.2d 919 (10th Cir. 1979) (evidence suppressed, because obtained in violation of right to counsel, may be used to impeach
false testimony).
271. See text accompanying notes 264-65 supra.
272. See note 259 supra for the text of FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b).
273. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(A). See note 259 supra.
274. FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(c).
275. See id. 16(b)(2). See note 259 supra.
Clearly, the purported evidence showing that Bump was in St. Louis at the time of the
conspiracy constituted an alibi. Although this evidence was revealed pursuant to rule 16(b),
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voluntarily disclose the existence of exculpatory documents unless certain
that they will be used at trial. If the documents are not found, or, when
found, are not used as evidence, the representations of their existence may
prejudice the client by providing the prosecution with impeachment ammunition.
B.

Judge Recusal

In United States v. Gzgax, 276 one of the issues before the Tenth Circuit
court was whether the district court judge should have recused himself because of personal prejudice against the defendant. The defendant, Gigax,
was convicted of willfully making false statements on the Internal Revenue
Service's W-4 form, where he claimed twenty-one allowances and exemptions. The defendant alleged that the judge had made statements, at the
post-conviction hearings, which displayed personal prejudice against the de277
fendant and against tax protesters in general.
The Tenth Circuit, per Judge Barrett, began its analysis by comparing
the two federal statutes pertaining to judge recusal. 278 Section 144 essentially states that, ten days before trial, an affidavit may be filed relating facts
which demonstrate a personal prejudice, by the judge, for or against one of
the parties in the case. 279 When a trial judge is presented with an affidavit
under section 144, he must accept as true the facts alleging personal
prejudice. 280 It is the challenged judge who then determines whether the
factual allegations are legally sufficient to justify recusal. 28 1 Section 455, on
the other hand, states that a judge, on his own initiative, must recuse himself
when a reasonable man may question his impartiality.28 2 The Tenth Circuit
rather than as an alibi under rule 12.1, an argument could be made that a reasonable interpretation would apply provision () of rule 12.1 in either case. Rule 12.1(f0 states that "evidence of
an intention to rely upon alibi defense, later withdrawn; or of statements made in connection
with such intention, is not admissible in any civil or criminal proceedings against a person who
gave notice of the intention." FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.1(l). The Tenth Circuit, however, found
similar statements admissible in this case on the grounds that although rule 16 was amended at
the same time as rule 12.1, the "inadmissible" language was not included in the former. 605
F.2d at 552. Bump's statements, however, could not have been protected under rule 12.1()
since he retained his alibi defense when testifying.
276. 605 F.2d 507 (10th Cir. 1979).
277. Id. at 513.
278. Id. at 510-12. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 144, 455 (1976 & Supp. 11 1978).
279. Apparently, this remedy was not used by the defendant, for the alleged personal
prejudice did not become apparent until the post-conviction hearings.
The Tenth Circuit has enforced strict compliance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 144.
Scott v. Beams, 122 F.2d 777 (10th Cir. 1941), cert. denied, 315 U.S. 809 (1942); Freed v. Inland
Empire Ins. Co., 174 F. Supp. 458 (D. Utah 1959).
280. See Mitchell v. United States, 126 F.2d 550, 552 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 316 U.S. 702

(1942).
281. United States v. Ritter, 540 F.2d 459 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 951 (1976). See
Note, Disqua/ifwation ofa FederalThstrtJudgefor Bias-The StandardunderSection 144, 57 MINN. L.
REV. 749 (1973).
282. See Note, Duquaificationfor Interest of Lower Federal Court Judges: 28 US C § 455, 71
MICH. L. REV. 538 (1973).
The judge must determine whether a reasonable person would believe that a personal, as
opposed to a judicial bias, existed. Judicial bias is simply an opinion on the law or facts developed during trial and is not sufficient to require disqualification of a judge. In contrast, personal bias stems from an extrajudicial source, such as a racial prejudice, and results in a decision
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concluded that, under both statutes, the appropriate standard to be used is
"whether a reasonable person would have questioned the district judge's impartiality," for the appearance of impartiality is virtually as important as the
283
fact of impartiality.
The alleged prejudicial conduct arose after the trial, at sentencing and
bond hearings. The Tenth Circuit observed that a trial court judge has wide
and almost unrestricted discretion during post-conviction hearings. 284 The
judge may consider all of the pertinent circumstances relating to the defendant's background and the nature of the crime. 285 The Tenth Circuit believed that the trial judge in GCiax was only exercising this broad discretion,
albeit in an aggressive manner. The court of appeals concluded that " '[a]
judge cannot be disqualified because he believes in upholding the law, even
though he says so with vehemence.' "286
C.

Trial Court Discretion

In United States v. Taylor,28 7 the Tenth Circuit was asked to review a
discretionary order of the trial court. The district court had refused to grant
a mistrial after a police officer testified, in front of the jury, that he had
previously "worked a case on" defendant Taylor. The judge found it sufficient to exclude the evidence and to instruct the jury to disregard the testibased on irrelevancies. See United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563 (1966); United States
v. Hall, 424 F. Supp. 508 (W.D. Okla. 1975), affd, 536 F.2d 313 (10th Cir. 1976). See alsoDavis
v. Cities Service Oil Co., 420 F.2d 1278 (10th Cir. 1970).
283. 605 F.2d at 512. See Webbe v. McGhie Land Title Co., 549 F.2d 1358, 1361 (10th Cir.
1977); United States v. Hall, 424 F. Supp. 508 (W.D. Okla. 1975). If the allegations of bias and
prejudice are merely the selfish and subjective opinions of a few, the judge has a duty not to
disqualify himself. See generally Laird v. Tatum, 409 U.S. 824, 837 (1972); United States v. Bray,
546 F.2d 851 (10th Cir. 1976); United States v. Cowden, 545 F.2d 257, 265 (1st Cir. 1976), cert.
dented, 430 U.S. 909 (1977); Antonello v. Wunsch, 500 F.2d 1260 (10th Cir. 1974). When a
judge's conduct might reasonably be questioned as motivated by bias or prejudice, it is
mandatory that the judge recuse himself even if he holds a good faith belief that he could
conduct an impartial proceeding. Blizard v. Fielding, 454 F. Supp. 318 (D. Mass. 1978), affdsub
noma., Blizard v. Frechette, 601 F.2d 1217 (1st Cir. 1979).
284. 605 F.2d at 512. See 18 U.S.C. § 3577 (1976) (no limitation on information concerning
"background, character, and conduct" for sentencing convicted defendant); United States v.
Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 446-47 (1972) (no limitation on either the source or kind of information
which can be considered by a sentencing judge). But see United States v. Thompson, 483 F.2d
527, 529 (3d Cir. 1973) ("[u]nder § 144 a defendant is entitled to trial before a judge who is not
biased against him at any point of the trial and, indeed, most importantly, at sentencing."). See
also Williams v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 246-52 (1949) (discussion of different evidentiary rules
governing trial and sentencing procedures).
Judicial prejudice exhibited during trial is treated differently. In Hayes v. National Football
League, the court stated that "when a trial judge makes hostile remarks in the presence of ajury
the courts use entirely different criteria to determine their prejudicial effect, reversal being premised upon the prejudicial effect upon the jury, rather than the personal bias or prejudice
possessed by the judge." 463 F. Supp. 1174, 1182 (C.D. Cal. 1979).
285. 605 F.2d at 513-14. See United States v. Ochs, 595 F.2d 1247, 1262 (2d Cir. 1979)
(sentencing judge's consideration of defendant's general character and prior record is permissible); United States v. Hayes, 589 F.2d 811, 827 (5th Cir. 1979) (consideration of defendant's
background is within the judge's discretion).
denied, 352 U.S.
286. 605 F.2d at 514 (quoting Knapp v. Kinsey, 232 F.2d 458 (6th Cir.), cert.
892 (1956)). See also Montgomery v. United States, 344 F.2d 955 (10th Cir. 1965) (sentencing
judge may use forceful and emphatic language).
287. 605 F.2d 1177 (10th Cir. 1979).
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mony. 288 The Tenth Circuit, per Judge Logan, noted that great deference is
accorded to such a determination since the trial judge is in the best position
to measure the impact of improper evidence on the jury. 289 The court of
appeals enumerated the major factors to be considered in determining the
necessity of a mistrial after impermissible remarks upon a defendant's criminal record:
Mistrial is most likely to becousie necessary when the evidence ts
admitted, indicates on its face that defendant has been guilty of a
prior crime, and the evidence plays a prominent part in the conduct of the trial. Conversely, prejudicial error is least likely to occur when the evidence is excluded, the jury is instructed to
disregard it, and the reference is both vague and passing in na290
ture.
The court concluded that, in light of the fact that there was no further reference to the prior case involving Taylor, the short and insignificant nature of
the remark, the cautionary instruction given to the jury, and the more than
adequate evidence to sustain the conviction, there was no error.291
D.

Guilty Pleas

In Sena v. Romero, 292 the defendant Sena petitioned for federal habeas
corpus relief on the basis that his guilty plea in state court was uninformed,
involuntary, and lacking a factual basis; all in violation of the Supreme
Court decision in BoyX-h v. Alabama.293 The Boykin Court held that due process requires that a plea of guilty be voluntary and intelligent since the plea
involves the waiver of several constitutional rights. 294 While a fixed procedure need not be followed, the trial judge does have the affirmative duty to
make an on the record examination of the accused to insure that he com2 95
pletely comprehends the consequences of his guilty plea.
In Sena, the federal district court had ordered that an evidentiary hearing be held before a magistrate since the state court transcript was deficient,
if not totally silent, on the guilty plea issue. 296 Although there was conflict288. Id. at 1178.
289. Id. at 1179. See Lakeside v. Oregon, 435 U.S. 333, 341-42 (1978) (trial judge responsible for conducting fair trial); United States v. Evans, 542 F.2d 805 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1101 (1977) (mistrial order is within sound discretion of trial court).
290. 605 F.2d at 1179.
291. Id. See United States v. Cline, 570 F.2d 731, 736-37 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v.
Dorn, 561 F.2d 1252, 1257 (7th Cir. 1977).
292. 617 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1980).
Also within this survey period, the Tenth Circuit held that a defendant's motion, made
before sentencing, to withdraw his plea of guilty must be examined carefully and liberally. The
court of appeals reversed a trial court's denial of the motion since there was no hearing on the
plea withdrawal, and no reasons for denying the request were stated. United States v. Hancock,
607 F.2d 337 (10th Cir. 1979). Set FED. R. GRIM. P. 32(d). See also Dorton v. United States, 447
F.2d 401, 411-12 (10th Cir. 1971).

293. 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
294. Id. at 242.
295. Id. at 243 (a waiver of constitutional rights cannot be presumed from a silent record);
Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506 (1962). See a/so McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459
(1969). But cf. United States v. Eaton, 579 F.2d 1181 (10th Cir. 1978) (defendant need not be
informed of collateral consequences of a guilty plea).
296. 617 F.2d at 580.
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ing evidence as to the adequacy of the trial court's inquiry into Sena's desire
to plead guilty, the magistrate concluded that the defendant had failed to
meet his burden of proof and that the preponderance of the evidence demonstrated that defendant's plea was voluntarily and knowingly made. The federal district court adopted these findings and denied the habeas corpus
297
petition.
The Tenth Circuit, per Judge Logan, reversed on the issue of burden of
proof. The court of appeals held that, where there is a silent record, the
burden is on the government to make "an affirmative showing" that the
guilty plea and waiver of the defendant's constitutional rights were "know'298
ingly, voluntarily and intelligently made.
E.

Sentencing

In United States v. Klusman,299 the main issue presented was whether a
judge's recollection of a defendant's earlier conviction is an improper consideration in sentencing. The trial judge remembered placing Klusman on probation for a previous drug offense. Before pronouncing sentence, the judge
told the defendant that he was unsure of "what it is going to take to convince
300
you that the drug business isn't a profitable business."
The defendant's first conviction was as a juvenile and was subsequently
set aside pursuant to the Federal Youth Corrections Act (FYCA). 3 0i Klusman argued that any subsequent consideration of this "expunged" conviction violated the statute. The government contended that the FYCA was
intended to facilitate rehabilitation of youthful offenders and not to interfere
with judicial discretion in subsequent sentencing matters.
The Tenth Circuit, per Judge Doyle, found it unnecessary to decide the
issue of expungement. The court of appeals expressed doubt as to whether
setting aside a conviction under the FYCA is the equivalent of expungement, 30 2 but Judge Doyle asserted that even if it is, there is no right to ex297. Id. at 581.
298. Id. See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 US. 238, 242 (1969); United States v. Pricepaul, 540
F.2d 417, 423-24 (9th Cir. 1976) (nothing more than a silent record is needed to shift the burden
of proof to the government). But cf. Stinson v. Turner, 473 F.2d 913, 915-16 (10th Cir. 1973)
(record indicating a voluntary and intelligent plea need not show express waiver of each constitutional right).
299. 607 F.2d 1331 (10th Cir. 1979). Within this survey period, the Tenth Circuit also
decided United States v. Haney, 615 F.2d 907 (10th Cir. 1980) (judge may not commit defendant convicted under the Federal Youth Corrections Act, 18 U.S.C. § 5010(b) (1976), and also
impose a special parole term provided in 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (l) (A) (1976)), and United States v.
Sisneros, 599 F.2d 946 (10th Cir. 1979) (failure to advise the defendant of special parole term is

only a technical violation when the total sentence imposed is less than the maximum sentence
which the court had told defendant he might receive).
300. 607 F.2d at 1333.
301. 18 U.S.C. § 5021 (1976). See United States v. Arrington, 618 F.2d 1119 (5th Cir. 1980);
United States v. Purgason, 565 F.2d 1279 (4th Cir. 1977); United States v. Fryer, 545 F.2d II
(6th Cir. 1976).
302. 607 F.2d at 1334. Set United States v. Doe, 556 F.2d 391 (6th Cir. 1977) (FYCA provides a "unique shield" from prejudicial effects of conviction, but does not provide for expungement); United States v. McMains, 540 F.2d 387 (8th Cir. 1976). See also cases cited in note 301
.npra.
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punge a judge's memory. 30 3 The broad sentencing discretion vested in a
trial judge permits consideration of relevant facts within his personal knowledge. 30 4 The court of appeals concluded that the judge "could be mindful of
' 30 5
the prior conviction in the present circumstances.
Todd L. Vriesman

303. 607 F.2d at 1334.
304. Judge Doyle also noted that the less than maximum sentence imposed reflected no
prejudicial effect from the previous conviction. Id. at 1333. See generally United States v. Eaton,
579 F.2d 1181, 1183 (10th Cir. 1978); United States v. Green, 483 F.2d 469 (10th Cir.), cert.
dented, 414 U.S. 1071 (1973).
305. 607 F.2d at 1334. Cf Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552 (1980) (no limitations,
including consideration of defendant's lack of cooperation with the government, should be
placed on sentencing considerations). But cf. United States v. Tucker, 404 U.S. 443, 447-49
(1972) (due process forbids trial court reliance on unconstitutional convictions in sentencing
decisions).

EVIDENCE
THE SPOUSAL TESTIMONIAL PRIVILEGE AFTER
TRAMMEL v

UNITED STA TES

INTRODUCTION

On March 10, 1976, Otis Trammel, Jr., was indicted, along with two
others, in the Federal District Court for the District of Colorado for importing heroin into the United States from Thailand and the Philippine Islands,I
and for conspiracy to import heroin.' The indictment also named six persons as unindicted coconspirators, including the defendant's wife, Elizabeth
Ann Trammel. When Elizabeth Trammel was granted "use" immunity in
exchange for her testimony, 3 Otis Trammel moved to sever his case from the
other two defendants. 4 He claimed that he would be prejudiced in a joint
trial as the government was planning to call his wife as a witness. Otis
Trammel asserted that he had not waived his privilege to bar adverse
spousal testimony. 5 The trial court denied Trammel's motion to sever, stating that since the wife's testimony did not concern confidential communica6
tions, the spousal testimonial privilege was not available.
Elizabeth Trammel testified extensively at the trial and, based exclusively on this testimony, Otis Trammel was convicted as charged.7 The
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in a split decision, upheld the ruling of the
trial court, concluding that the spousal testimonial privilege did not preclude "the voluntary testimony of a spouse who appears as an unindicted
coconspirator under a grant of immunity from the Government." 8
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 9 to reconsider Hawkihs v. United
States,10 a case in which the High Court's pronouncement on the spousal
testimonial privilege conflicted with the Tenth Circuit's holding in Trammel.
The Court affirmed Trammel's conviction, not on the grounds espoused by
the court of appeals, but on the same rationale that it had rejected twentytwo years earlier in Hawkins. The Court in Trammel modified the spousal
testimonial privilege so that today the witness spouse alone has the privilege
1. 21 U.S.C. § 952(a) (1976) and 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1976).
2. 18 U.S.C. § 371 (1976).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1976). Use immunity precludes the use of testimony or other
compelled information, or the use of any information derived from such testimony or other
compelled information, in a criminal prosecution of the witness. Kastigar v. United States, 406
U.S. 441, 453 (1972). Transactional immunity, in contrast, accords full immunity to the
witness from prosecution for the offense to which the compelled testimony relates. Id.
4. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980).

5.

Id.

6. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 28, Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980)
(Hearing on Motion to Sever).
7. Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 43 (1980).
8. United States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166, 1168 (10th Cir. 1978).
9. Trammel v. United States, 440 U.S. 934 (1979).
10. 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
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to refuse to give adverse testimony." In so doing, the Court completed a
400-year evolution of the privilege. It brought the privilege into conformance with other testimonial privileges and struck a better balance between
the social value of preserving marital harmony and the public's right to
every person's evidence.
This comment will examine the evolution of the spousal testimonial
privilege and its modification by the Court in Trammel. An analysis and
critique of the factors relied upon by the Court in striking the new balance
between the competing interests will follow. The comment will conclude
with an examination of a major problem tlie courts will encounter in attempting to apply the Trammel version of the spousal testimonial privilege.
I.

A.

EVOLUTION OF THE MARITAL PRIVILEGE

Origins ofthe Privmlege

The history of the spousal testimonial privilege is shrouded in "tantalizing obscurity."' 2 There is no certain record as to the precise time of its
origin or as to the thought process by which it evolved.' 3 The earliest reported case in which the privilege was explicitly stated is Bent v. Allot,' 4 an
1580 decision wherein the accused was allowed to prevent his spouse from
testifying against him. The court, however, held that this privilege would be
waived if the defendant permitted his spouse to take the stand to testify favorably.'

5

By the time of Coke's Commentarie Upon Littleton, ' 6 in 1628, the testimonial privilege had evolved into two complementary rules. The English
courts were holding that a witness was both incompetent to testify in favor of
a spouse and was privileged not to testify adversely. ' 7 The spousal incompetency rule was based upon the rationale that favorable spousal testimony
was not trustworthy due to the common interests of a husband and wife who
were considered but "two souls in one flesh."' 18
During the mid-1800's,19 the spousal incompetency rule was statutorily
abolished in most states when common interest was no longer considered a
basis for disqualification. 20 These statutes, however, either expressly, or by
judicial interpretation, retained a privilege for confidential communications. 2 ' Unlike the broad spousal testimonial privilege, this testimonial privilege extends only to confidential communicatzons between husband and wife
11. 445 U.S. at 53.
12. 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 2227, at 211 (McNaughton
rev. 1961).
13. Id.
14. 21 Eng. Rep. 50 (Ch. 1580).
15. Id.
16. L. COKE, A COMMENTARIE UPON LrrTLETON 6b (1628).
17. Note, Marital Testimony and Communication Pnvileges. Improvements and Uncertainttes in the

Courts, 9 U. CAL. D. L. REV. 569, 570 (1976).
18. L. COKE, supra note 16, quoted in J. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2227, at 212.
19. This abolition did not occur in the federal courts until Funk v. United States, 290 U.S.
371 (1933).
20. J. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2333, at 645.
21. Id.
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during the marriage and can be invoked even after death 22 or divorce. 23 The
policy behind the confidential communications privilege is to promote the
free interchange of confidences necessary for mutual understanding and
trust. 24 There had been no need for a separate confidential communications
privilege until this time because such information had been adequately protected by the all-encompassing spousal incompetency or testimonial privi25
lege rules.
There are two major justifications proffered for the spousal testimonial
privilege. 26 The first justification is that the privilege fosters family harmony
and avoids the marital dissension which would allegedly result from the admission of adverse testimony. 2 7 This rationale was originated by Lord Coke
in 1628 and has become the leading modern day justification for the privilege. 28 The second reason advanced is that there is a natural repugnancy in
29
compelling a husband or wife to be the means of the other's condemnation.
These justifications have been criticized on the premise that the privilege
extends to marriages beyond salvation, 30 while at the same time, it does not
extend to other family members whose testimony will be equally repugnant.3

1

Although the spousal testimonial privilege has been severely criticized, 32 it has survived, virtually intact, throughout the years. 33 It has been
22. Merlin v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 180 F. Supp. 90, 91 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
23. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 6 (1954).
24. See Wolfle v. United States, 291 U.S. 7, 14 (1934).
25. Id. See discussion in Note, The Husband-Wife Testimoial Privilege in the Federal Courts, 59
B.U.L. REV. 894, 896 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Testimonial Pr vlege].
26. Every current argument for the privilege had appeared in England by the early 1800's.
Unfortunately, these reasons usually confused the spousal testimonial privilege with the confidential communications privilege or the spousal incompetency rule. Only the two reasons discussed in the text have any arguable merit. J. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2228, at 214-16.
27. Id.
28. In Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77 (1958), the Court stated that "such a
policy was necessary to foster family peace ....
" This-rationale was also the basis for Judge
McKay's dissent in United States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166, 1173 (10th Cir. 1978).
29. Wyatt v. United States, 362 U.S. 525, 535 (1960) (Warren, C.J., dissenting); J. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2228, at 217; Brief for Respondent at 15 n. 10, Trammel v. United States,
445 U.S. 40 (1980).
30. See, e.g., United States v. Walker, 176 F.2d 564 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 891
(1949).
31. J. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2228, at 217 n.2. Forcing a child to testify against his
parents would be equally undesirable, yet the common law privilege does not extend, and never
has extended to any family members other than the spouse. Id.
32. Professor McCormick claims that the privilege is "an archaic survival of mystical religious dogma." C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 66, at 145 (2d ed.
1972). Dean Wigmore claimed that the privilege was "the merest anachronism in legal theory
and an indefensible obstruction to truth." J. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2228, at 221.
One of the earliest critics of the privilege was Jeremy Bentham who stated:
Let us . . . grant to every man a license to commit all sorts of wickedness, in the
presence and with the assistance of his wife: let us secure to every man in the bosom of
his family . . . a safe accomplice: let us make every man's house his castle; and . . .
let us convert that castle into a den of thieves.
5 J. BENTHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE 332, 340 (1827), quoted in J. WIGMORE,
supra note 12, § 2228, at 218.
33. The spousal testimonial privilege is not absolute and has long been subject to exceptions. The privilege will not apply when the witness spouse is the victim of the crime, Wyatt v.
United States, 362 U.S. 525 (1960); or if the crime is against the spouse's property, Herman v.
United States, 220 F.2d 219, 226 (4th Cir. 1955); or if the crime is committed against the child
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retained in some form by a majority of the jurisdictions in the United States
today. 34 The first indication that the privilege was not inviolable appeared
in the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which declared that the application of all privileges should be governed by common law principles "in
light of reason and experience. ' 35 Some federal courts began to question the
continuing viability of the privilege and used the "reason and experience"
guideline as a basis for its modification. 36 Other courts felt inclined to await
38
37
explicit guidance from the Supreme Court, or Congress.
B.

The Hawkins Preceden

In 1958, the Supreme Court appeared to settle the controversy in Hawkins v. United States.39 In Hawkins, the Court unequivocally reaffirmed the
applicability of the spousal testimonial privilege in federal courts. The
Court asserted that there was no reason why the privilege "based on the
persistent instincts of several centuries should now be abandoned. '40 The
Court in Hawkt)s stated that the value of the privilege in promoting marital
harmony "has never been unreasonable and is not now."'' 4 The Court, however, made no attempt to determine if this policy would be advanced by the
application of the privilege in the Hawkins case. Such a conclusion would
have been unlikely as it was questionable whether there was any harmony in
42
the Hawkins marriage to preserve.
The government, in Hawkins, did not argue for the abolition of the testimonial privilege, but simply urged its modification in light of "reason and
experience." The government maintained that the privilege should belong
solely to the witness spouse. 43 This revision would permit the witness spouse
to waive the privilege and testify if he or she should so choose. The Court
explicitly rejected this argument, claiming that there was no valid distinction between "voluntary" and "compelled" testimony in this context. "The
basic reason the law has refused to pit wife against husband or husband
against wife in a trial . . . was a belief that such a policy was necessary to
of either spouse, United States v. Allery, 526 F.2d 1362 (8th Cir. 1975); or if the marriage is
fraudulent, Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953).
34. See listing as to how each state treats the spousal testimonial privilege in Trammel v.
United States, 445 U.S. 40, 48-49 n.9 (1980).
35. FED. R. CRIM. P. 26, Pub. L. No. 76-675, ch. 445, 54 Stat. 688 (1940). This provision
was deleted when the Federal Rules of Evidence became effective on July 1, 1975. See FED. R.
GRIM. P. 26 and Amendment Notes, 18 U.S.C.A. (West 1975).
36. See, e.g., United States v. Yoder, 80 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1935).
37. Brunner v. United States, 168 F.2d 281, 283 (6th Cir. 1948).
38. United States v. Walker, 176 F.2d 564 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 891 (1949). See
discussion in Tesimonial Awitbege, supra note 25, at 898-99.
39. 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
40. Id. at 79. Justice Stewart, in his concurrence, was more skeptical. He stated that
"[s]urely 'reason and experience' require that we do more than indulge in mere assumptions,
perhaps naive assumptions, as to the importance of this ancient rule to the interests of domestic
tranquility." Id. at 81-82 (Stewart, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 77.
42. The defendant's wife, a prostitute, had been living apart from the accused for several
years, under an assumed name. At one point in his testimony, the defendant referred to Mrs.
Hawkins as his "ex-wife." Id. at 82 n.4 (Stewart, J., concurring).
43. Brief for Respondents, Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
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foster family peace . . . ."44 and family peace would be disturbed as much,
if not more so, by voluntary testimony. 45 The Court conceded that if one
spouse were willing to testify against the other, there was a strong indication
that the marriage was in disrepair. The Court went on to state, however,
that many broken homes could be salvaged "provided no unforgivable act
[was] done by either party."' 46 In the Court's opinion, adverse testimony,
either voluntary or compelled, would constitute such an "unforgivable act."
While the Court acknowledged that the rule was open to modification under
the "reason and experience" guideline, that guideline, in the Court's opin47
ion, did not justify granting the privilege solely to the testifying spouse.
C.

CongressionalResponse

Fifteen years after Hawkins, Congress attempted to legislate a compromise on the spousal testimonial privilege dispute in the proposed Federal
Rules of Evidence.48 Proposed rule 505 provided that the accused in a criminal proceeding would have a privilege to prevent his spouse from testifying
against him, subject to certain exceptions. 49 - The Advisory Committee rejected the suggestion from the Department of Justice and Senator McClellan
that the testifying spouse be made the sole holder of the privilege. In the
Committee's judgment, "[t]he willingness of the testifying spouse is not . . .
complete support for the conclusion that the marriage is past saving since
50
there may be temporary pressures brought to bear."
Unaccountably, the proposed rules did not provide for a confidential
communications privilege. This absence caused a tremendous furor among
legal scholars because the confidential communications privilege, unlike the
spousal testimonial privilege, was generally accepted. One writer, criticizing
the proposed rules, claimed that Congress had "adopted the wrong form of
the wrong privilege, and [gave] it to the wrong spouse. "51
Rather than jeopardize the passage of the rest of the rules, Congress
substituted the current rule 501 which simply states that all testimonial privileges are to be "governed by the principles of the common law as they may
44. 358 U.S. at 77.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 78.
47. While Justice Stewart was more inclined to believe that "reason and experience" warranted the requested change in the privilege, he felt that Hawkts was not the proper case for the
modification. There was a question as to the voluntariness of the wife's testimony. Id. at 82-83
(Stewart, J., concurring). See discussion in text accompanying notes 99-108, in/Ja.
48. 56 F.R.D. 183 (1973).
49. Proposed Fed. R. Evid. 505, 56 F.R.D. 183, 244-47 (1973). The proposed privilege did
not apply to (1) crimes against the spouse or the children of either spouse, (2) matters occurring
prior to the marriage, or (3) proceedings in which the spouse is charged with importing aliens
for prostitution purposes in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1328 (1976), or with violation of the Mann
Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2421-2424 (1976).
50. 2 WEINSTEIN's EVIDENCE
505 [01], at 505-6 to 505-7 (1980). This was the principal
reason, given in a memorandum by Edward W. Cleary, Reporter for the Advisory Committee
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, for rejecting this suggestion. Rules of Evidence: Hearings on
ProposedRules of Evidence Before the Special Subcomm. on Reform of FederalCriminal Laws of the House
Comm. on theJudiiag,93d Cong., 1st Sess. 57-58 (1973).
5 1. M. Reutlinger, Poliey, Privac,and Prerogatives: A CriicalExamination ofthe Proposed Federal
Rules of Evide ce as They Affect MaritalPnvilege, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 1353, 1381 (1973).
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52
be interpreted by the courts . . . in the light of reason and experience."
The spousal testimonial privilege was thus left just where Congress had
found it-governed by "reason and experience" as defined on a case-by-case
53
basis.
The purpose of the proposed rules was to provide uniformity among the
federal courts. Rule 501, however, just as its predecessor in the federal criminal procedure rules, resulted in conflicting decisions. Courts utilized the reason and experience guideline of rule 501 to carve out exceptions to the
54
privilege when both spouses jointly participated in a crime, or when the
55
marriage at issue appeared to be fraudulent or beyond preservation.
These exceptions evidenced the reluctance of. the courts to impede the factfinding process by applying a testimonial privilege of questionable validity.

II.
A.

TRAMMEL V UNITED STATES

ProceduralHisto.y

Trammel v. United States56 is a prime example of the creativity employed
by the courts to rationalize the admission of adverse spousal testimony over a
defendant's objection. In the Trammel case, the district court, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, and the United States Supreme Court all allowed
admission of the spouse's hostile testimony. Significantly, each court found
its own justification for so doing.
The district court apparently confused the spousal testimonial privilege
with the confidential communications privilege. The court adjudged that
the defendant Trammel could not prevent his wife from testifying about his
criminal activities because the information was deemed not to be confidential. 57 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court and
held that the spouse's testimony was admissable, but for reasons other than
58
The Tenth Circuit court held that
those advanced by the district court.
there is an exception to the spousal testimonial privilege when the witness
spouse is an unindicted coconspirator testifying under a grant of immunity. 59 The court of appeals further stated that the defendant's privilege did
not "override" his spouse's grant of immunity and, therefore, in light of reason
52. FED. R. EVID. 501.
53. See S. REP. No. 1277, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 11, reprinted in [1974] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 7051, 7059; H.R. REP. No. 650, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 8, reprhiedth [1974] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 7075, 7082; 120 CONG. REC. 40891 (1974) (remarks of Rep. Hungate).
54. United States v. Van Drunen, 501 F.2d 1393 "(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1091
(1974).
55. United States v. Cameron, 556 F.2d 752 (5th Cir. 1977); United States v. Fisher, 518
F.2d 836 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1033 (1975).
56. 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
"57. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 28, Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980)
(transcript of hearing on defendant's motion for severence before Chief Judge Winner of the
Federal District Court for the District of Colorado).
58. 583 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1978). The court made it clear that the marital relationship
spawns two distinct privileges-the spousal testimonial privilege and the confidential communications privilege-and that only the former was involved in the instant case. Id. at 1171
(McKay, J., dissenting). For a further analysis of the Tenth Circuit's reasoning, see Overview,
CriminalLaw and Procedure, Sixth Annual Tenth Circuit Suwey, 57 DEN. L.J. 229, 260 (1980).
59. 583 F.2d at 1168.
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6
and experience, her adverse testimony could properly be admitted. 0

The Supreme Court granted certiorari 6 l to reconsider its decision in
Hawkins v. United States. 62 The differing rationales of the district court and
of the court of appeals were indicative of the confusion and doubts which all
of the courts were experiencing in applying the spousal testimonial privilege.
Congress' attempt to legislate the privilege had failed 63 and the courts' application of the "reason and experience" guideline was producing inconsistent results. 64 The time was ripe for the Supreme Court to provide further
guidance.
B.

The Government's Position

The government advanced two arguments in support of its position.
The United States urged the Court to affirm the decision of the court of
appeals and hold that the spousal testimonial privilege does not apply when
the husband and wife are joint participants in crime. 65 The government
claimed that the rehabilitating aspect of the marriage is lost when both wife
and husband are involved in a crime. The application of the privilege therefore would abuse the relationship it was designed to protect. 66 The United
States asserted that an exception in this case was necessary in order to bring
the spousal testimonial privilege into conformance with other testimonial
67
privileges.
The second argument espoused by the government was the bold assertion that the time had come to reconsider the Hawkins decision and award
the testimonial privilege solely to the witness spouse. 68 This contention apparently surprised both the petitioner and the amicus curiae.69 While both of
these parties presented very cogent arguments as to why the exception relied
upon by the court of appeals should not be upheld, neither addressed the
government's second argument. This omission proved to be a crucial mistake.
60. Id. (emphasis added). Judge McKay severely criticized this rationale in his dissent,
stating that the immunity statutes are irrelevant and afford no basis for fashioning a new exception to the privilege. Id. at 1172 (McKay, J., dissenting).
61. 440 U.S. 934 (1979).

62. 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
63. See text accompanying notes 48-55, supra.
64. Compare United States v. Trammel, 583 F.2d 1166 (10th Cir. 1978) with United States
v. Lilley, 581 F.2d 182 (8th Cir. 1978).
65. Brief for Respondents at 25-29, Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980). The
government did not argue that a grant of immunity had to be involved. The government felt
that the married couple's joint participation in a crime was sufficient to justify an exception to
the spousal testimonial privilege.
66. Id. at 26.
67. Joint participation in a crime creates an exception to the confidential communications
privilege, United States v. Mendoza, 574 F.2d 1373 (5th Cir.), cert. demnid, 439 U.S. 988 (1978);
and to the attorney-client privilege, Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 15 (1933) (dictum); In re
Doe, 551 F.2d 899, 901 (2d Cir. 1977); Hyde Constr. Co. v. Koehring Co., 455 F.2d 337, 342
(5th Cir. 1972); United States v. Friedman, 445 F.2d 1076, 1086 (9th Cir.), cert. dnied, 404 U.S.
958 (1971); United States v. Hoffa, 349 F.2d 20, 37 (6th Cir. 1965).
68. Brief for Respondents at 16-25, Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
69. The Michigan Bar Association Standing Committee on Civil Procedure was granted
leave to file a brief as amicur cuniae. Trammel v. United States, 442 U.S. 939 (1979).
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The Holdng i Trammel

The Supreme Court recognized that the government's supplemental argument, that the spousal testimonial privilege should belong to the testifying
spouse, had been expressly rejected in Hawkins. The Court, nevertheless,
claimed that the caveat in Hawkins, 70 coupled with the language and the
71
congressional intent behind rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, confirmed its authority to reconsider the continucd vitality of the Hawkins rule
72
in light of "reason and experience."
As further justification for a reconsideration of Hawkins, the Court
pointed out that the trend in state law is toward divesting the accused of the
privilege to bar adverse spousal testimony. The number of jurisdictions that
recognize the privilege has decreased from thirty-one in 1958 to twenty-four
in 1980. 7 3 A conclusion regarding the trend in state law, however, would not
be accurate without an examination of the states' confidential communicain scope than the fedtion statutes as well. These statutes are often broader
7 4
eral definition of "confidential communication."
Having found sufficient cause to reconsider Hawkins, the Court went on
to hold that
"reason and experience" no longer justify so sweeping a rule as that
found acceptable by the Court in Hawkins. Accordingly . . . the
existing rule should be modified so that the witness spouse alone
be
has a privilege to refuse to testify adversely; the witness 7may
5
neither compelled to testify nor foreclosed from testifying.
III.
A.

ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S RATIONALE

Reason and Experience Re-examined

The Trammel Court modified the spousal testimonial privilege on the
pretext that it was no longer tenable in light of "reason and experience."
Specifically, the Court claimed that the spousal testimonial privilege was
broader in scope than the other testimonial privileges, that the ancient foundations for the privilege had long since disappeared, and that the willingness
of one spouse to testify against the other was a reliable indication that the
marital relationship was in disrepair. As Justice Stewart cogently pointed
70. In Hawkins, the Court stated that "this decision does not foreclose whatever changes in
the rule [as] may eventually be dictated by 'reason and experience.'" 358 U.S. at 79.
71. Congress intended that Fed. R. Evid. 501 was to "provide the courts with the flexibility
to develop rules of privilege on a case-by-case basis." 120 CONG. REc. 40891 (1974) (statement
of Rep. Hungate), quoted in Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40, 47 (1980).
72. The petitioner claimed that the Court was without authority to reconsider Hawkins, as
28 U.S.C. § 2076 (1976) states that no rule "creating, abolishing, or modifying a privilege shall
have . . . force or effect unless . . . approved by act of Congress." The Court dismissed this
contention as inconsistent with the congressional intent behind Fed. R. Evid. 501. 445 U.S. at
47 n.8.
73. 445 U.S. at 48.

74. Many of the states' statutes regarding confidential communications are broad enough
in scope to allow the accused to exclude adverse spousal testimony which would not fall within
the federal definition of "confidential communication." See discussion in Testimonal nudWegr,
supra note 25, at 914-15.

75. 445 U.S. at 53.
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out in his concurrence, reason and experience had not changed since Hawkrns. The Court simply accepted the argument it had rejected in 1958.76 An
examination of the majority's reasoning demonstrates the accuracy of Justice
Stewart's perception.
The Court claimed that the spousal testimonial privilege is in marked
contrast to all other testimonial privileges as it is not limited to confidential
communications. Instead, the spousal testimonial privilege permits the accused to exclude all adverse testimony. 77 While true, this distinction had not
developed since Hawkins was decided. 78 Furthermore, it is invalid to compare the spousal testimonial privilege with testimonial privileges designed to
promote confidence and trust between the parties. The cultivation of confidence and trust is not the primary purpose of the spousal testimonial privilege, nor was it ever purported to be. The principal purpose of the spousal
testimonial privilege is to foster family harmony and to avoid the marital
dissension which would result from "pitting" one spouse against the other in
a trial. 79 To limit the spousal privilege to confidential communications
would not further the goal of family harmony, and would moreover render
the spousal privilege superfluous since confidential communications are independently privileged.8 0 Apparently, the Court was aware of the infirmity
of this comparison for, even after the Trammel modification, the privilege
extends to all adverse spousal testimony. The post- Trammel spousal testimonial privilege encompasses adverse testimony relating to both actions and
confidential communications. The significant difference after Trammel is who
may invoke or waive the privilege.
The Court stated that the "ancient foundations for so sweeping a privilege have long since disappeared."8' As Justice Stewart pointed out in his
concurrence, however, these foundations disappeared long before 1958 and
"this disappearance certainly did not occur in the few years that have
elapsed between the Hawkins decision and this one."'8 2 It is also questionable
whether the "ancient foundations" referred to by the Court ever pertained to
8 3
this particular privilege.The Court's final basis for modifying Hawkins was its conclusion that, if
one spouse is willing to testify against the other, there is a clear indication
that the relationship is in disrepair. The Court reasoned that there is thus
76. Id. (Stewart, J., concurring).
77. Id. at 51.
78. This distinction has existed since the privilege was created some 400 years ago. To
state that this distinction makes a difference in light of "reason and experience" in 1980, but not
in 1958, overestimates the credulousness of the American public.
79. Hawkins v. United States, 358 U.S. 74, 77 (1958). See discussion in text accompanying
notes 26-31, supra.
80. The confidential communications privilege already excludes this information. The
Court made it clear that the confidential communications privilege was not at issue in the instant case. 445 U.S. at 45 n.5.
81. Id. at 52.
82. Id. at 54 (Stewart, J., concurring).
83. The Court was referring to Lord Coke's statement that the husband and wife were but
two souls in one flesh." See text accompanying notes 16-18, supra. This early rationale, however, supported the spousal disqualification for incompetency rule, not the privilege of the accused to prevent adverse spousal testimony.
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very little marital harmony to be preserved by the privilege. 84 In Hawkins v.
United States, the Court had stated that:
the Government argues that the fact a husband or wife testifies
against the other voluntarily is strong indication that the marriage
is already gone. Doubtless this is often true. But not all marital
flareups . . . are permanent. . . . [S]ome apparently broken
homes can be saved provided no unforgivable act is done by either
party. Adverse testimony given in criminal proceedings would, we
think, be likely to destroy almost any marriage. 8 5
It is noteworthy that the Trammel Court repudiated this reasoning without
citation to the Hawkins decision.
A proper analysis of Trammel cannot be based upon the changing circumstances between 1958 and 1980. Any attempt to justify the Trammel decision on the ground that "reason and experience" has evolved since the
Hawkins opinion was handed down will falter. The Trammel opinion is a de
novo analysis by the Supreme Court and the Court's rationale must be examined independently of Hawkins. As Justice Stewart stated, any attempt to
reconcile the Hawkins and Trammel opinions would be of "greater interest to
86
students of human psychology than to students of law."
B.

Balancing of Interests

The Court in Trammel re-examined the balance between society's interest in preserving marital harmony and the public's right to every man's evidence. The Court prefaced this discussion by stating that every privilege
impedes the pursuit of justice and will be recognized only to the extent that
it promotes "a public good transcending the normally predominant princi' 87
ple of utilizing all rational means for ascertaining the truth.
The importance of preserving marital harmony is generally accepted. 8
The criticism of the rule has usually centered on whether the spousal testimonial privilege, as it existed prior to Trammel, sufficiently promoted that
goal. 89 Permitting the accused to invoke the privilege fostered abuse because
the privilege was often claimed when there was, in fact, no marital harmony
to preserve. Too often the privilege was claimed to protect the defendant
rather than the marriage. 9° Ironically, a prime example of this abuse was
demonstrated in Hawkins v. United States.9 1 In Hawkins, the Court upheld the
right of the accused to invoke the privilege even though the defendant's wife,
a prostitute, had been living apart from him for several years under an as84. 445 U.S. at 52.
85. 358 U.S. at 77-78.
86. 445 U.S. at 54 (Stewart, J., concurring). Justice Stewart was paraphrasing a similar
sentiment of Justice Jackson, as stated in Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 325 (1951).
87. 445 U.S. at 50 (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 234 (1960)).
88. Wigmore, however, claimed that the defendant's marital harmony should not be
placed above society's need for the truth. J. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2228, at 216-18.
89. See, e.g., Testimonial Pr vilege, supra note 25, at 912-15.
90. When Elizabeth Trammel was questioned whether divorce was contemplated, she testified that her husband had said that "I would go my way and he would go his." 445 U.S. at 42
n. 1. This does not comport with the theory that Otis Trammel was concerned with his marital
harmony.
91. 358 U.S. 74 (1958).
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sumed name. At one point in his testimony, the defendant had referred to
' 92
her as his "ex-wife."
Aware of the privilege's abuses, the Supreme Court concluded that the
privilege, in its present form, did not sufficiently promote the goal of preserving marital harmony so as to justify its burden on society's need for probative evidence. 9 3 Concluding that the spousal testimonial privilege was
inappropriate, the Court was presented with the problem of modifying the
privilege so as to allow more testimony into evidence while, at the same time,
still fostering family peace. There were three alternatives. The Court could
have: 1) abolished the privilege; 2) requested the courts to balance, in each
case, the need for the evidence against the possible adverse impact on the
94
marriage; or 3) awarded the privilege to the witness spouse alone.
Abolition of the privilege would involve the type of policy decision that
is properly left to the legislature. This approach was the one taken by all the
states which have modified or abolished the privilege. 95 The individual balancing approach would be too difficult to apply and conducive to the generation of conflicting results. 96 In addition, this approach would put the
defendant in the objectionable position of having to establish the "worth" of
his marriage before the privilege could be invoked.
The most viable alternative was to grant the testimonial privilege to the
witness spouse alone. This modification will enhance the opportunity for the
introduction of probative evidence into testimony, will avoid the onerous
judicial inquiry into the "worth" of a marriage, and will promote a uniform
application of the spousal testimonial privilege throughout the federal judicial system. The advantages of this rule are substantial. Moreover, there is
no reason to suspect that family peace will be jeopardized by the Court's
empowering the witness spouse to decide whether he or she will testify. As
one commentator has stated,
if the rationale for the privilege is one of avoiding marital dissension, then the only spouse able to make a decision to testify on the
basis of whether the marriage is worth saving is the witness spouse;
the accused is understandably unlikely to be able to put aside his or
her strong personal interest in suppressing adverse testimony, and
would be likely to invoke the privilege regardless of marital consid97
erations.
The witness spouse is in a better position than either the accused or the court
to decide whether the marriage is worth saving and what effect, if any, adverse testimony will have on the relationship. The Trammel modification also
minimizes society's "natural repugnancy" in witnessing the condemnation of
one spouse by the other. Society is less likely to be offended if the witness
92.

Id. at 82 n.4 (Stewart, J., concurring).

93. 445 U.S. at 53.
94. See Testirwnia/ Pnivjlge, supra note 25, at 913-19, for a further discussion of the possible
alternatives.
95. Id. at 915.
96. Id. at 917. "Because the harm that might be caused to the marriage would be difficult
to show, while the need for evidence easy to show, any balancing would be illusory at best." Id.
97. M. Reutlinger, supra note 51, at 1384 (emphasis in original).
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spouse has voluntarily chosen to testify. 98 A trial court should respect, therefore, any decision by the witness spouse to voluntarily testify. The key determination, however, is whether the testimony is indeed voluntary.
C.

Delermznrng Voluntariness

The Court's reasoning in Trammel is based upon the assumption that the
witness spouse's testimony will be voluntary. If this is indeed the situation in
every case, the grant of the privilege solely to the witness spouse will result in
an ideal balance of the competing interests. If, however, a witness spouse is
pressured into testifying, the privilege will become an absurdity, as the marital relationship will be subject to the whim of the prosecutor. This possibility was recognized by Justice Stewart in Hawkins, wherein he stated that
such a rule [the witness spouse privilege] would be difficult to administer and easy to abuse. Seldom would it be a simple matter to
determine whether the spouse's testimony were really voluntary,
since there would often be ways to compel such testimony more
subtle than the simple issuance of a subpoena, but just as cogent. 99
In Hawkins, the witness spouse had been imprisoned and was released under
a three thousand dollar bond. The bond, however, was conditioned upon
her appearance in court as a witness for the government. As Justice Stewart
observed, "these circumstances are hardly consistent with the theory that
[the witness'] testimony was voluntary."'0
The situation in the Trammel case was strikingly similar. Elizabeth
Trammel was given immunity on the condition that she testify against her
husband. 0 1 The government conceded that she would be in danger of los2
When the witness spouse is
ing her freedom if she refused to testify. 10
placed in a position where he or she must choose between the marriage and
freedom, it would be difficult for any trial court to conclude that the testimony is voluntary. 10 3 The Court in Trammel summarily dismissed the voluntariness issue with the conclusory statement that the witness spouse's
testimony was not rendered involuntary by the fact that she chose to testify
only after a grant of immunity and assurances of lenient treatment.' 0 4 In
light of the circumstances, the voluntariness of Elizabeth Trammel's testimony is highly suspect. The voluntariness issue certainly deserved a more
thorough analysis by the Court.
Notwithstanding this imperfection, the Court's Trammel decision is to be
commended. It is imperative, however, that the federal district courts adopt
precautions to ensure that the witness spouse's testimony is, in fact, volunta98. Id. at 1385.
99. 358 U.S. at 83 (Stewart, J., concurring).
100. Id.
101. 445 U.S. at 42.
102. The government, in its brief, stated that the invocation of the privilege by the accused
could place the witness in danger of losing her freedom. Brief for Respondent at 20-21, Trammel v. United States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980).
103. This was the principle reason why the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
Evidence rejected the suggestion that the witness spouse be the sole holder of the privilege. See,
note 50 supra and accompanying text.
104. 445 U.S. at 53.
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rily given. An examination of the jurisdictions which have adopted the witness spouse privilege indicates that the states have been able to effectively
deal with this problem.10 5 The precautions generally followed by these jurisdictions include the requirement that the trial judge make an independent
determination that the witness spouse is aware of the privilege not to testify,
and that the witness spouse has knowingly and voluntarily waived that privilege. 1 0 6 This bench determination should be made outside of the presence of
the jury, 10 7 and neither party should be permitted to comment to the jury
8
regarding the invocation of the privilege. 10
Undoubtably, many occasions will arise where the witness spouse will
feel pressured to testify, for a variety of reasons. If the federal district courts
adopt precautions to ensure the voluntariness of testimony, both the marital
relationship and the rights of the accused should be adequately protected.
While the voluntariness of spousal testimony is a serious question, and deserves consideration more thorough than that afforded it by the Court in
Trammel, the voluntariness determination requirement is not a fatal flaw in
the Trammel modification of the spousal testimonial privilege.
CONCLUSION

The Court, in its Trammel decision, has completed a 400-year evolution
of the spousal testimonial privilege. By granting the privilege solely to the
witness spouse, the Court has struck a more equitable balance between society's interest in preserving marital harmony, on the one hand, and the public's right to every person's evidence, on the other. In addition, the Court
has silenced the major critics of the testimonial privilege who had argued
that a marriage in which one spouse is willing to testify against the other is
beyond salvation,' 0 9 and that the accused should not be "consulted in deter' 0
mining whether justice shall have its course against him." "1
As with most solutions, however, the Court has raised new problems.
Unless it can adequately be shown that the witness spouse's testimony is indeed voluntary, the spousal testimonial privilege will become a mere charade. The prosecutor, with his abilities to pressure a witness spouse, will be
in the position of deciding whether a particular marriage is "worthy" of the
privilege. The prosecutor's dominance is compounded when the husband
and wife have jointly participated in a crime. Through the use of
prosecutorial discretion and immunity, the government can put great pres105. See, e.g., Postom v. United States, 322 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S.
917 (1964); Taylor v. State, 25 Ala. App. 408, 147 So. 647 (1933); People v. Lankford, 55 Cal.
App. 3d 203, 127 Cal. Rptr. 408 (1976); People v. Marsh, 270 Cal. App. 2d 365, 75 Cal. Rptr.
814 (1969); Carroll v. State, 147 Ga. App. 332, 248 S.E.2d 702 (1978); Broome v. State, 141 Ga.
App. 538, 233 S.E.2d 883 (1977); Commonwealth v. Stokes, 374 N.E.2d 87 (Mass. 1978).
106. See, e.g., People v. Lankford, 55 Cal. App. 3d 203, 210, 127 Cal. Rptr. 408, 412 (1976);
Commonwealth v. Stokes, 374 N.E.2d 87, 96 n.9 (Mass. 1978).
107. Postom v. United States, 322 F.2d 432 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denid, 376 U.S. 917
(1964); Broome v. State, 141 Ga. App. 538, 233 S.E.2d 883 (1977); Commonwealth v. Stokes,
374 N.E.2d 87 (Mass. 1978).
dened, 365 So. 2d 112 (Ala. 1978).
108. Holyfield v. State, 365 So. 2d 108 (Ala. App.), cert.
109. C. MCCORMICK, supra note 32, § 66, at 145.
110. J. WIGMORE, supra note 12, § 2228, at 216-17.
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sure on one spouse to testify against the other. Although this problem raises
serious complications for trial courts, it can effectively be dealt with if the
courts take precautionary measures to ensure the voluntariness of testimony.
The courts have successfully dealt with the voluntariness determination in
other areas."' There is no reason to believe that the courts will have any
more difficulty in determining the voluntariness of spousal testimony.
Dennis C Keeler

111. Voluntariness requires an "intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known
right or privilege." Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
OVERVIEW

The recent decisions of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals should promote no major changes in the area of federal practice and procedure. In the
past term, the court interpreted several federal rules, made some clarifications in the area of jurisdiction, and demonstrated that it will closely supervise the discretionary actions of the federal district courts. This article
presents a survey of the court's most significant decisions in the field.
I.

TRIAL COURT SUPERVISION

The most important decisions of the Tenth Circuit in this area pertained to the appellate court's supervision of the activity of the district
courts. Specifically, the court addressed the appropriateness of a writ of
mandamus as a tool to supervise the district courts' discretion, the proper
scope of a pre-trial order, and the abdication of judicial responsibility
through verbatim adoption of one party's findings of fact or via an unwarranted reference to a special master.
A.

Review under Rule 21(a) of the FederalRules of Appellate Procedure

There are three method§ of obtaining appellate review. The most common approach is an appeal under 28 U.S.C. section 1291.1 This route, however, is restricted to "final orders" of the district court 2 and precludes appeal
which is "tentative, informal or incomplete."' 3 The purpose of this rule is to
4
avoid piecemeal review.
The second method of review is through an appeal under 28 U.S.C.
section 1292(b). 5 This method allows for the appeal of orders, not final for
purposes of section 1291, which the district court is willing to certify for ap6
peal.
The third, a seldom used procedure for appellate review, is through a
writ of mandamus under the All Writs Act.7 The Supreme Court has made
it clear that mandamus is not a substitute for the appeal procedure under
section 1291 or section 1292(b). 8 It is an extraordinary writ and will only be
1. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976).
2.

Id.

3. Cohen v. Beneficial Ind. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 546 (1949).
4. Id. Lack of jurisdiction is an exception to the "final order" rule. Daiflon, Inc. v. Bohanon, 612 F.2d 1249, 1253 (10th Cir. 1979), rev'don othergrounds, 49 U.S.L.W. 3368 (U.S. Nov. 17,
1980) (No. 79-1895).
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976). See FED. R. App. P. 21(a).
6. The district judge may certify an order for appeal if he is of the opinion that there is
substantial ground for difference of opinion and that an immediate appeal may materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1976). See FED. R. APP. P. 21(a).
8. Roche v. Evaporated Milk Ass'n, 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943). See also Daiflon, Inc. v. Bohanon, 49 U.S.L.W. 3368 (U.S. Nov. 17, 1980) (No. 79-1895).
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granted when the petitioner has established that his right to the writ is "clear
and indisputable" 9 and that the district court's action was so extraordinary
that it evidenced arbitrariness and clear abuse of discretion. 10
The Tenth Circuit was petitioned for a writ of mandamus in State Farm
Mutual Auto Insurance Co. v. Scho/es1 and in Dazfton, Inc. v. Bohanon. 12 In the
former case, the petition was denied; in the latter case it was granted in part.
In Scholes, State Farm Insurance Company appealed from the district
court's dismissal of its declaratory judgment action. State Farm was seeking
a judicial declaration relieving it of any further obligation to defend Scholes,
an insured of State Farm, on the grounds that Scholes had violated various
clauses in the insurance contract. 13 The district court ordered the action
dismissed without prejudice pending state proceedings which involved the
same parties, the same facts and identical issues. 14 For purposes of review,
the court of appeals treated the dismissal without prejudice as the equivalent
15
of a stay of proceedings.
As a preliminary matter, the court of appeals stated that an appeal
under section 1291 was not the proper procedure for review in this case.
While certain appellate courts have held otherwise, 16 the Tenth Circuit
stated that the district court's decision to stay the proceedings was not a
"final order" for purposes of appellate jurisdiction and that mandamus
would be the appropriate remedy.17 Despite this procedural defect, the circuit court was willing to treat State Farm's "appeal" as an "application for
leave to file a petition for writ of mandamus pursuant to the All Writs
Act." 8 This act of benevolence proved to be illusory, however, as the court
went on to deny State Farm's application, stating that "the district court was
clearly justified in staying proceedings before it pending final determination
. . .in state court." 19
9. Will v. Calvert Fire Ins. Co., 437 U.S. 655, 662 (1978); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v.
Holland, 346 U.S. 379 (1953).
10. Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383 (1953).
11. 601 F.2d 1151 (10th Cir. 1979).
12. 612 F.2d 1249 (10th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 49 U.S.L.W. 3368 (U.S. Nov. 17, 1980) (No. 791895).
13. 601 F.2d at 1153.
14. Id.
15. The district court stated that "[tlhe practical effect of such a stay [of proceedings]
would be indistinguishable from a dismissal without prejudice in this case." Id at 1155 (quoting the district court's opinion). The majority did not address this distinction because it was not
raised by the parties. Id at 1156 n.3. judge Logan, in his concurrence, disagreed. A dismissal
without prejudice is different from a stay of proceedings; a stay eliminates any statute of limitations problem and "leaves the judge free to reconsider his decision to defer or to take other
action." Id at 1156 (Logan, J., concurring).
16. See Rancho Palos Verdes Corp. v. City of Laguna Beach, 547 F.2d 1092 (9th Cir.
1976); Drexler v. Southwest Dubois School Corp., 504 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1974) (en banc);
Druker v. Sullivan, 458 F.2d 1272 (lst Cir. 1972).
17. 601 F.2d at 1154 (citing Pet Milk Co. v. Ritter, 323 F.2d 586, 588 (10th Cir. 1963)). It
is questionable whether this classification had any effect on the outcome of the case. Judge
Logan believed that an appeal was the proper procedure since he treated the dismissal without
prejudice as a "final order", yet he still agreed with the result reached by the majority. Id.at
1156 (Logan, J., concurring).
18. 601 F.2d at 1154.
19. Id at 1155.
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The circuit court relied on W1/I v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co.,20 wherein the
United States Supreme Court stated that "[i]t is . . . well settled that a district court is 'under no compulsion to exercise [its] jurisdiction' ",21 and that
the decision to stay proceedings is "largely committed to the 'carefully considered judgment' . . . of the district court."' 22 Based on this authority,
Judge Barrett, writing for the circuit court's majority, went on to hold that
State Farm's right to have its declaratory judgment action heard was not
"clear and indisputable. '2 3 On the contrary, the district court was clearly
justified in its actions because simultaneous prosecution of the case in state
and federal court would result in wasteful duplication of counsel, courts, liti24
gants and witnesses.
Da/ion,Inc. v. Bohanon25 was an antitrust action in the District Court for
the Western District of Oklahoma. The jury returned a verdict of $2.5 million in favor of the plaintiff Daiflon. The trial judge denied the defendant's
motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict. Instead, the judge vacated the jury verdict and granted a new trial on all issues.2 6 The trial judge
appeared to have based his ruling on the excessive award of damages and on
the wrongful admission of unidentified exhibits into evidence. 27 Daiflon petitioned the circuit court to issue a writ of mandamus 28 to prohibit any fur29
ther proceedings except as necessary to enter judgment on the verdict.
The Tenth Circuit, through Judge Doyle, acknowledged that there are
only three circuit court cases in which mandamus has been invoked to review a lower court's order for a new trial. 30 Despite this sparse precedent,
Judge Doyle held that mandamus would be proper when
there is a disregard for proper procedure, or misuse of judicial
power in the trial [court constituting] a clear abuse of discretion. If
it is found that there was a plain or clear error in the judge's evaluation of the facts and that the granting of the new trial was gross or
excessive to the extent that it is extraordinary, it would seem that
20. 437 U.S. 655 (1978).
21. Id at 662 (quoting Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co., 316 U.S. 491, 494 (1942)).
22. Id at 663 (quoting Colorado River Water Conserv. Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.

800, 818 (1976)).
23. 601 F.2d at 1155.
24. Id.

The stay was further justified because the state court obtained jurisdiction long

before the federal court did, no issue of federal law was involved, and the state action would
resolve all of the issues arising out of the transaction. Id.
25. 612 F.2d 1249 (10th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 49 U.S.L.W. 3368 (U.S. Nov. 17, 1980) (No. 791895).
26. Daiflon, Inc. v. Allied Chem. Corp., No. 72-483-B (W.D. Okla. 1979) (attached as Exhibit A to Daiflon, Inc. v. Bohanon, 612 F.2d at 1261). Although the district court did not
formally vacate the judgment, the court of appeals felt that this was a mere "oversight".
Daiflon, Inc. v. Bohanon, 612 F.2d at 1252.
27. 612 F.2d at 1252.
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1976); FED. R. App. P. 21(a).
29. 612 F.2d at 1251. An order granting a new trial is not a "final order" for § 1291
purposes. Kanatser v. Chrysler Corp., 199 F.2d 610, 615 (10th Cir. 1952), cet. dened, 344 U.S.
921 (1953).
30. 612 F.2d at 1257. See Peterman v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific R.R., 493 F.2d 88
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 947 (1974); Grace Lines, Inc. v. Motley, 439 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir.
1971); Kanatser v. Chrysler Corp., 199 F.2d 610 (10th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 921
(1953).
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31
vacating the order granting the new trial would be permissible.
Using this standard, the circuit court went on to grant supervisory mandamus on the issue of liability but declined to vacate the trial court's order as
to damages. 32 The circuit court's reason for granting mandamus on the issue of liability was that the trial judge offered no "rational basis" for vacat33
Ordering a new trial on
ing the verdict as to liability of respondent.
liability invaded the province of the jury and denied the piainti1s seventh
34
amendment rights.

On the issue of damages, however, the court of appeals was less willing
to interfere. Since the trial court heard the evidence in its entirety, it was in
a better position to judge this issue. "[S]ubject only to the limitation of the
Seventh Amendment the trial court's discretion is most full and complete
35
Thus,
when the court is considering a factual question such as damages."
even though the court of appeals was not necessarily in agreement with the
trial court's determination, 36 the appeals court was unwilling to vacate that
section of the trial court's order granting a new trial on the issue of damages.
Daifon is notable because it is only the fourth case wherein a federal
appeals court agreed to issue a writ of mandamus to review a lower court's
order granting a new trial. The case is also important for sharpening the
distinction between liability and damages with regard to the scope of the
trial court's discretion. The court implied that mandamus will seldom, if
ever, be issued in the latter case. On the issue of liability, however, the court
of appeals will be less inclined to defer to the trial court's discretion. In
summary, the Tenth Circuit has indicated that it will supervise the lower
courts, by extraordinary writs if necessary, to ensure against any abuse of
discretion.
B.

Adherence to .Pre- Trial Orders

In Truj'llo v. Uniroyal Corp.,37 the district court rejected tendered evidence and jury instructions on the grounds that they deviated from the pretrial order. 38 The action was a strict liability claim against Uniroyal for the
manufacture and sale of a tire which caused injury to the plaintiff when it
exploded during mounting. The defendant claimed that the plaintiff's injury was caused by his own misuse in attempting to mount a 16-inch tire on
a 16.5-inch rim. 39 The pre-trial order which set out the plaintiffs claim
stated that the tire was defective and that Uniroyal was liable under the rule
of strict liability. 4° Shortly before trial the defendant learned that the plain31.
32.
33.
34.

612 F.2d at 1255.
Id at 1260.
Id
Id

35. Id at 1259.
36. Id at 1260. The circuit court referred to possible misconceptions by the trial judge of
some of the facts related to damages.

37.
38.
39.
40.
of Torts

608 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1979).
Id at 816.
The plaintiff testified that he thought he was working with a 16-inch rim. Id at 817.
New Mexico has adopted the rule of strict liability as set out in Restatement (Second)
§ 402A (1965). Se Fabian v. E.W. Bliss Co., 582 F.2d 1257, 1260-61 (10th Cir. 1978).

1981]

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

tiff planned to base liability on a "failure to warn" theory. The defendant
claimed that the plaintiff was trying to change the theory of the case and
deviate from the pre-trial order. 41 The trial court agreed and excluded the
proffered evidence on that issue. The jury found for the defendant.
The Tenth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge McKay, stated that if parties deviate from a properly drawn pre-trial order, the trial court may exclude the evidence. 42 A proper pre-trial order is one that sharpens and.
simplifies the issues and represents a complete statement of the parties'
claims. 43 If, however, "an adverse party is content with a boilerplate pretrial
order, it cannot later demand that the trial court enforce it as though it were
a specific and meaningful narrowing of the issues." ' 44 Since the "rule of strict
liability" in New Mexico includes the lack of adequate warning, the court of
appeals correctly found that the evidence relating to that issue could not be
45
excluded.
The case is important in two respects. First, the court announced a
judicial policy that procedural devices are to be liberally construed in order
to avoid dismissing otherwise meritorious lawsuits on technicalities. 46 This
rule of construction is to apply to all pretrial procedural tools and not just to
the pleadings. 47 Second, the case is yet another example of the Tenth Circuit's willingness and determination to supervise its district courts.
C.

Findings of Fact

The mechanical adoption of one litigant's proposed findings of fact
without adequate evidentiary support is an abdication of the judicial function. This was the holding of the Tenth Circuit in Ramey Construction Co. o.
Apache Tribe.48 The trial court in Ramey adopted verbatim the defendant's
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law without citation to any legal
49
authority.
Rule 52 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires the trial judge
to make findings of fact and conclusions of law. This rule has two purposes.
First, the procedure fosters care on the part of the trial judge "in considering
41. 608 F.2d at 817. Strict liability in New Mexico includes liability for failure to warn.
See Skyhook Corp. v. Jasper, 90 N.M. 143, 560 P.2d 934 (1977). Therefore, it is unclear why the
defendant felt that this was a change of theory unless prior communications between the parties
had led defendants to believe that the plaintiffs were limiting their claim to the manufacturing
or design aspects of strict liability. The court of appeals opinion sheds no light on this issue.
42. 608 F.2d at 817, citing Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Nielson, 448 F.2d 121, 125 (10th
Cir. 1971).
43. See Christenson, The Pre-Trial Order, 29 F.R.D. 362 (1960).
44. 608 F.2d at 818. The court easily distinguished two cases cited by the defendant
wherein the pre-trial orders were specific and narrowly drawn. See Rigby v. Beech Aircraft Co.,
548 F.2d 288 (10th Cir. 1977); Rodrigues v. Ripley Indus., Inc., 507 F.2d 782 (1st Cir. 1974).
45. Had the pre-trial order limited the claim to manufacturing or design defects, the district court would have been correct in excluding the evidence related to the failure to warn.
Southern Pac. Transp. Co. v. Nielson, 448 F.2d 121 (10th Cir. 1971).
46. 608 F.2d 815, 818 (10th Cir. 1979).
47. Id
48. 616 F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1980).
49. The only changes by the trial court were in grammar, in the wording (but not substance) of one conclusion of law, and in a citation to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. In
addition, the last proposed conclusion of law was dropped as unnecessary. Id at 466.
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and adjudicating the facts in the dispute."50° Second, it allows for meaningful review in that the appellate court can determine the trial court's "dis5
cerning line for decision." '
The court of appeals stated that the trial court may have performed its
judicial functions; the court could not tell from the record. The trial court
dismissed complex factual allegations and legal theories in a conclusory
manner without citation to authority. 52 Certain issues did not receive even
summary treatment by the trial court. Without explicit reference in the record, the court of appeals was unable to determine if the trial court had con53
sidered the issues.
The most glaring example of the inadequacy of verbatim adoption was
evidenced by the trial court's rejection of the plaintiff's theory of damages.
The trial court adopted a conclusion of law consisting of five reasons for
rejecting the proposed theory; each reason was separated by the phrase
"and/or. ' 54 Presumably, the defense intended the trial court to accept some
or all of the suggested reasons and then delete the appropriate conjunction.
However, the deletion was not made. "While a court may properly phrase
its conclusions in the alternative, this conclusion as adopted [was] merely
55
tentative."
The court of appeals acknowledged that the trial court should have the
aid of the parties in its decision-making. Reliance on one party's proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law would have been permissible if the
trial court had taken some steps to ensure that it had fulfilled its function.
Specifically, the trial court could have 1) had the parties exchange proposals
and object to the counterproposals with appropriate fact and law references, 56 2) annotated the proposals with references to documentary evidence
and testimony, 5 7 or 3) heard oral arguments following submission of the proposals to ensure judicial scrutiny. 58 None of these safeguards were employed.
While the circuit court noted that the trial court did not act in a judicially irresponsible manner, 59 it made clear that the verbatim adoption of
50. Id at 466-67 (quoting Featherstone v. Barash, 345 F.2d 246, 249 (10th Cir. 1965)).
This procedure also defines what is being decided for purposes of estoppel and res judicata for
future cases. 345 F.2d at 249.
51. Id at 466 (quoting G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 514 F.2d 935, 940 (10th Cir.
1975), modifwd on other grounds, 429 U.S. 338, cert. ded,
435 U.S. 923 (1977)).
52. Id at 467.
53. There was no reference in the record to Ramey's claim for interest on money which
was admittedly due but improperly retained or to the Tribe's claim of sovereign immunity. Id
at 467-68.
54. Id at 467.
55. Id

56. Id at 468 (citing Heterochemical Corp. v. United States Rubber Co., 368 F.2d 169
(7th Cir. 1966)).
57. Id (citing Schnell v. Allbright-Nell Co., 348 F.2d 444 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383
U.S. 934 (1966)).
58. Id (citing Halliburton Co. v. Dow Chem. Co., 514 F.2d 377 (10th Cir. 1975)).
59. The court of appeals denied plaintiff's request to remand the case to another judge.
Comments by the trial court which the plaintiff felt were indicative of inadequacy were merely
"self-deprecating modesty and, given the volume of evidence, simple realism." Id at 469, 469
n. 7.
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the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law did not fulfill the judicial function. The case was remanded and the trial court was ordered to
make new and significantly more detailed findings to give the court of appeals and the parties a fuller explanation of the basis for the decision. 60
D.

Reference to Special Master

The Tenth Circuit addressed the propriety of a reference to a Special
Master pursuant to rule 53(b) 6 ' in Pohln v.Dun &Bradstreet, Inc. 62 The trial
court issued two orders of reference which bestowed extraordinary powers on
the Special Master. The Special Master was empowered to hear evidence,
make findings of fact which would be final, conduct a trial, and recommend
judgment which the trial court promised to follow. 63 The result of these
orders was "to confer upon the Special Master all of the power that the trial
court enjoyed and perhaps more." 64 Following a pre-trial conference, the
Special Master granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment.
This judgment was confirmed that same day by the trial judge in a one65
sentence ruling.
The circuit court, per Judge Doyle, reversed the judgment, stating that
this was a complete abdication of the judicial function. 66 Approval of this
action would "fly in the face of Rule 53(b)" 6 7 which states that reference
"shall be the exception and not the rule." 6 References to a Special Master
will only be approved where exceptional circumstances are shown. 6 9 The
Supreme Court has stated that neither congestion of the docket nor c6mplexity nor length of trial will suffice to warrant a reference. 70 In the instant
case, there were no circumstances that would warrant a reference to a Spe71
cial Master.
In those cases where exceptional circumstances warrant a reference to a
Special Master, the Master's report is merely evidence which the jury can
disregard. 72 In the instant case, even though a jury trial was contemplated,
Id at 469.
Rule 53(b) provides:
A reference to a master shall be the exception and not the rule. In actions to be
tried to a jury, a reference shall be made only when the issues are complicated; in
actions to be tried without a jury, save in matters of account and of difficult computation of damages, a reference shall be made only upon a showing that some exceptional
condition requires it.
FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b).
62. No. 78-1648 (10th Cir. Feb. 25, 1980).
63. Id., slip op. at 2-3.
64. Id, slip op. at 3 n.2.
65. Id, slip op. at 1-2.
66. Id, slip op. at 10.
67. Id
68. FED. R. Civ. P. 53(b), supra note 61.
69. Bartlett Collins Co. v. Surinam Navig. Co., 381 F.2d 546, 550-51 (10th Cir. 1967).
70. LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249, 259 (1967). The Court, in LaBuy, did
concede that a complex accounting was an element that might permissibly be referred to a
Special Master. Id
71. The appellate court recognized that Judge Barrow, the trial judge, was in failing
health at the time of reference. The proper procedure, however, would have been to transfer
the case to another district judge. No. 78-1648, slip op. at 10.
72. Some commentators suggest that a reference to a Special Master would rarely be ap60.
61.
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the Special Master was empowered to make final findings of fact and to
enter a binding judgment. Such an order was not only an abdication of the
judicial function but it also invaded the province of the jury and denied to
the plaintiff his seventh amendment rights.
Through these decisions, the Tenth Circuit has emphasized that it is
going to take the time and effort to supervise the district courts. The court of
appeals will not hesitate to intervene to protect the interests of the parties if
it finds that the trial court abused its discretion.
II.
A.

FEDERAL JURISDICTION

Subject MatterJurisdiction

The Tenth Circuit, in Naisbiti v. United States,73 ruled that the federal
courts do not have jurisdiction under the Federal Tort Claims Act for claims
arising out of intentional torts committed by government employees. The
plaintiffs, victims of intentional torts committed by two off-duty airmen,
sued the government under the Act and claimed in their suit that the government had been negligent in its supervision of the airmen. The district
74
court granted the government's motion to dismiss based on section 2680(h)
of the Act. Under this section, the government retains its immunity when
the liability claim arises from intentional torts. Immunity is waived in the
Act, however, for negligence claims.
The Tenth Circuit, in an opinion written by Judge Doyle, upheld the
district court's dismissal of the claim. 75 The appellate court gave support to
the lower court's interpretation of section 2680(h) which allows a negligence
claim against the government when an intentional tort has been committed
by a non-employee, such as an inmate in a federal prison, whom the government has a duty to supervise. This interpretation bars a negligence claim
when the tort has been committed by a government employee. This employee/non-employee distinction, Judge Doyle noted, was first articulated
by the Second Circuit in Panel/a v. United States76 and has been adopted in
most subsequent decisions.
It is believed that [this distinction] stems from the proposition that
where the employee has committed a tortious intentional act, even
though it is not with the approval of his employer, the government,
nevertheless, he is so closely connected with the government that
the intentional act is imputed to the government. Since the govpropriate in a non-jury trial as the Special Master and not the court would in fact decide the
case. See, e.g., 9 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2605
(1971).
73. 611 F.2d 1350 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 240 (1980).
74. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1976) provides that the waiver of immunity shall not apply to
"[alny claim arising out of assault, battery, false imprisonment, false arrest, malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract
rights ..
"
75. The trial court reasoned that, although based on negligence, the plaintiffs' claims were,
by their character, intentional torts. Where the government is sued for failure to supervise nonemployees, the sole basis of the government's liability is negligent supervision. Here, negligence
was an alternate theory, not the sole basis of the liability claim.
76. 216 F.2d 622 (2d Cir. 1954).
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ernment has waived liability only in negligence cases in accordance
with § 2680(h), an attempt to establish liability on a negligence
basis is indeed an effort
to circumvent the retention of immunity
77
provided in § 2680(h).
A strong thread running through a number of cases, Judge Doyle summarized, is a recognition of this governmental immunity when the tortfeasor is a
government employee. The two airmen were government employees; application of section 2680(h) therefore barred the plaintiff's claims. 7 8
The Tenth Circuit found that federal jurisdiction was present in a declaratory judgment action concerning an insurance policy with a $10,000
limit in FarmersInsurance Co. v. McClain.79 The defendants had asserted that,
under 28 U.S.C. section 1332, district courts only have jurisdiction when
"the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000, exclusive of
interest or costs." 80 Because the insurance policy was limited to $10,000,
Farmers claimed that the plaintiff had not met the statutory requirement for
federal court jurisdiction.
Judge McWilliams, writing for the Tenth Circuit, reasoned that the
costs and interest excluded from the jurisdictional amount by the statute
were only those which might be allowed in connection with the federal action. Farmers' potential liability, however, would include both the costs of
defending the claim in the state court proceeding and the costs which might
be assessed against the insured. These additional obligations would be considered part of the maximum limit of Farmers' liability and therefore would
cause the amount in controversy to exceed $10,000. The opinion cited numerous cases which have held that costs incurred or incurrable in state proceedings could be considered as a part of the amount in controversy for
federal jurisdictional limits. 8 ' Farmers' obligations under the policy might
cause the company to incur some expenses in connection with the pending
state court proceeding; thus, the jurisdictional limit was met.
The Tenth Circuit made law out of dictum by holding in Hackney o.
Newman Memonal Hospital,Inc.82 that the appointment of a fiduciary who has
a substantial beneficial interest in existing litigation is immune from a challenge for diversity jurisdiction purposes. The plaintiff, a resident of Colorado, was appointed the successor administratrix of her deceased mother's
estate. In this capacity she commenced a wrongful death action in the District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma. Shortly afterwards, the
plaintiff moved to Oklahoma. The trial court dismissed the wrongful death
action on the grounds that the plaintiff had been appointed administratrix
in violation of 28 U.S.C. section 1359. This "anti-collusion" statute denies
jurisdiction when a party has been "improperly or collusively made or joined
to invoke the jurisdiction of such court."'8 3 The trial court's holding was
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.

611 F.2d at 1355.
Id.at 1356.
603 F.2d 821 (10th Cir. 1979).
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1976) (emphasis added).
603 F.2d at 823.
621 F.2d 1069 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 397 (1980).

83. "A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a civil action in which any party, by
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based on a finding that the primary purpose of the plaintiff's appointment
was to invoke federal jurisdiction.
In reversing the trial court's dismissal, Judge Logan cited the leading
case of McSparran v. We'st8 4 wherein the Third Circuit had construed the
words "improperly or collusively" to prohibit the joinder of "a nominal
party designated simply for the purpose of creating diversity of citizenship,
who has no real or substantial interest in the dispute or controversy."85' The
courts, following the McSparran interpretation of section 1359, have found
the appointment of "straw parties" as fiduciaries solely for the purpose of
gaining diversity jurisdiction to be collusive but have implied in dictum that
collusion would not be present if the appointee had a substantial relationship to the litigation.
Declaring that the "instant case tests the dictum," 8 6 Judge Logan, writing for the appellate court, reasoned that the plaintiff, a beneficiary entitled
to a portion of the proceeds from the wrongful death action, had a real,
substantial stake in the litigation. Thus, she was not a straw party collusively and improperly appointed. The challe*nge to her appointment failed
and the district court was deemed to have jurisdiction to hear the suit that
the plaintiff had commenced. Chief Judge Seth, in concurrence, noted that
the "primary purpose" test used by the trial court does not apply the "improper and collusive" statutory standard. While motive and intent are elements to be considered in a determination of the collusive and improper
standard, "[a] motive or intent to secure federal jurisdiction does not of itself
87
defeat jurisdiction.
B.

PersonalJursdicton

The minimum contacts standard of InternationalShoe Co. v. Washingtona
was cited in two Tenth Circuit cases involving personal jurisdiction.
Schreiber v. Alhs-Chalmers Corp.8 9 involved the transfer of a products liability action from a Mississippi to a Kansas federal district court. The plaintiff, a citizen of Kansas, had been injured in Kansas while working on a rotobaler manufactured by the defendant. Plaintiff brought suit in Mississippi,
basing federal jurisdiction on diversity of citizenship. The defendant, a
Delaware corporation headquartered in Wisconsin and qualified to do business in Mississippi for many years, sought a change of venue to Kansas. The
case was transferred to the Kansas federal district court which was bound, as
the transferee court, to apply the state law of the transferor court. 90 The
assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court." 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (1976).
84. 402 F.2d 867 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. dented, 395 U.S. 903 (1969).
85. 402 F.2d at 873.
86. 621 F.2d at 1071.
87. Id.
88. "It is evident that these operations establish sufficient contacts or ties with the state of
the forum to make it reasonable and just, according to our traditional conception of fair play
and substantial justice, to permit the state to enforce the obligations which appellant has incurred there." 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
89. 611 F.2d 790 (10th Cir. 1979).
90. Van Dusen v. Barrack, 371 U.S. 612, 639 (1964).
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Kansas district court granted summary judgment to the defendant on alternate theories. The trial court first held that the Mississippi court did not
have jurisdiction to hear the case because the Mississippi statute violated
federal due process. The statute provided that a foreign corporation doing
business in Mississippi is subject to suit regardless of where the cause of action accrued. 9 1 In the alternative, the trial court asserted that if the Mississippi court did have jurisdiction, the action was barred by Kansas' two-year
statute of limitations for tort and warranty claims.
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit, per Judge McWilliams, reversed the
summary judgment order, finding that the assumption of jurisdiction by the
Mississippi court did not offend federal due process. The court of appeals
cited a Ninth Circuit decision 92 which had reviewed the authorities on the
minimum contacts requirement and had concluded that if a foreign corporation's activities in the forum state are "continuous and systematic," it could
be served in causes of action unconnected to forum activities. In answer to
the trial court's contention that jurisdiction was prohibited due to the recent
Supreme Court ruling in Shaffer v. Henner,93 the court of appeals distinguished the quasi-in-rem action in that case from the personal jurisdiction
question of the instant case, noting that the Court in Shaffer had held that
jurisdiction could be maintained in a state court proceeding if the minimum
contacts standard of International Shoe had been met. 94 Allis-Chalmers had
been conducting continuous and systematic, although limited, parts of its
general business in Mississippi. Therefore, the state statute authorizing jurisdiction over such a foreign corporation when the cause of action had accrued
in another state did not violate federal due process standards. Furthermore,
the court held that Mississippi's six-year statute of limitations for tort and
warranty claims would control because the Kansas federal court was obli95
gated to follow Mississippi law as it presently existed.
Minimum contacts with the forum state sufficient to establish personal
jurisdiction were found lacking in Burke v. Tom McCall & Associates.96 The
plaintiff, a resident of New Mexico, brought suit in New Mexico federal district court against California and Texas employment agencies, alleging age
discrimination under a provision of the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act of 1967. 9 7 The defendants, both of whom had been contacted by the
plaintiff by mail, filed motions to dismiss claiming a lack of personal jurisdiction. Neither firm conducted business in New Mexico nor contacted any
potential employers in the state on the plaintiffs behalf. The trial court
granted the defendants' motion to dismiss.
On appeal, Judge Doyle, writing for the Tenth Circuit, affirmed the
91. MIss. CODE ANN. § 79-1-27 (1972). The trial court felt that Shaffer v. Heitner, 433
U.S. 186 (1977), prohibited a state from opening its courts to a proceeding against a foreign
corporation when the cause of action accrued from events arising in another state.
92. Wells Fargo & Co. v. Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1977).
93. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
94. 611 F.2d at 794.

95. Id
96. No. 79-1145 (10th Cir. Aug. 21, 1979).
97. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1976).
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trial court's finding of a lack of personal jurisdiction. Because the cause of
action arose under a federal law, the federal standard for jurisdiction set out
in InternationalShoe Co. was applicable. "Under InternationalShoe Co. it is necessary for the plaintiff to demonstrate that the defendant had substantial
contact with the state."9 8 Because there had been no transaction of business
by either defendant in New Mexico, neither fairness nor due process would
permit personal jurisdiction to attach by tie unere receipt of a i ttr.
C.

Appellate Jurzsdiction

The Tenth Circuit restricted appellate jurisdiction in class action suits
in Bowe v. First of Denver Mortgage Investors99 by holding that dismissal of a
complaint for failure to prosecute does not permit appellate review of a trial
court's order denying certification of the class action. The plaintiff in Bowe
filed a class action suit alleging violations of the Securities and Exchange
Act, 10 0 the Colorado Securities Act' 0 ' and fraud. The district court denied
the motion for certification of the class action and the plaintiff appealed. In
dismissing the appeal, the Tenth Circuit determined that the order denying
certification did not constitute a final judgment subject to review nor did it
satisfy the "death knell"' 0 2 or collateral order 10 3 exceptions to 28 U.S.C.
section 1291,104 the final judgment rule. On remand, the plaintiff again
sought, but failed, to obtain class certification. The trial court dismissed the
plaintiff's individual complaint for failure to prosecute. The plaintiff once
again appealed to the Tenth Circuit, alleging that the dismissal of her complaint constituted a final judgment, making the lower court's order denying
05
certification reviewable on appeal.'
Judge Doyle, writing for the court, agreed that the dismissal for failure
to prosecute was a final judgment. However, the matter to be reviewed on
appeal was the trial court's dismissal of the complaint and not the order denying class certification.' 0 6 Judge Doyle asserted that review of a decertification order, which is interlocutory in nature, would conflict with the Livesay
doctrine. In Livesay,'0 7 the Supreme Court held that a district court's pre98. No. 79-1145, slip op. at 5.
99. 613 F.2d 798 (10th Cir. 1980).
100. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. 78jij(c) (Supp. III 1979).
101. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 11-51-123 (1973).
102. The "death knell" exception to the final judgment rule allowed the appeal of an order
denying class certification if such order was likely to sound the "death knell" of the litigation.
This would occur when a plaintiff seeking representative status would find it economically difficult, without the incentive of a potential group recovery, to pursue his complaint to final judgment; such a plaintiff could seek appellate review of the denial of class certification. See Eisen v.
Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119 (2d Cir. 1966), cerl. dented, 386 U.S. 1035 (1967).
103. In order to qualify for the collateral order exception, enunciated in Cohen v. Benefrt7t
Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949), an interlocutory order must determine conclusively the
disputed question, it must resolve an issue which is separate from the merits of the claim, and it
must be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment.
104. "The court of appeals shall have jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the
district courts of the United States . . . except where. a direct review may be had in the
Supreme Court." 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1976).
105. 613 F.2d at 799.

106. Id
107.

Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463 (1978).
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judgment order denying certification of a class action was not appealable
under the final judgment rule of section 1291. The Supreme Court opinion
ended the circuit courts' use of the "death knell" exception, by which parties
denied class certification could obtain appellate review if the order was likely
to sound the "death knell" for the litigation. The Supreme Court opposed
further use of the exception because the "death knell" doctrine authorized
indiscriminate interlocutory review of decisions made by the trial judge and
"defeat[ed] one vital purpose of the final-judgment rule-'that of maintaining the appropriate relationship between the respective courts.' "108
The claim of the class representative in the Bowe case, Judge Doyle concluded, was not distinguishable from the claim in Livesay. To permit appellate review of the order denying certification merely because the plaintiff's
individual complaint had been dismissed for failure to prosecute would circumvent the clear mandate of Livesay. Judge Doyle reasoned that any plaintiff desirous of appellate review could simply allow dismissal of his claim for
class representation on the grounds of failure to prosecute. If review of the
dismissal included review of the order denying certification, an intolerable
loophole to Liwesay would be created.
Judge Doyle noted that the Ninth Circuit had reached a similar conclusion in Huey v. Teledyne, Inc. 109 He recognized the hardship which strict application of this rule would place on plaintiffs for whom denial of class action
review terminated the litigation. Nonetheless, the Livesay doctrine, which
represents further difficulties for plaintiffs seeking class action representation,i 1o compelled the Tenth Circuit court to conclude that they were without authority to review "the class issue .... at this preliminary stage . . .
notwithstanding that the individual case of the class representative stands
dismissed." I II
An appeal cannot be taken from a federal magistrate's order for entry of
a final judgment, the Tenth Circuit held in the per curam decision of Harding
v. Kurco, Inc. 112 The district court had ordered consolidated actions brought
under the Fair Labor Standards Act and referred them to the United States
Magistrate for trial. The parties, pursuant to the district court's local rule
17(a), which required that stipulations for trial to a magistrate include review procedures, stipulated that the magistrate's judgment would be final
and directly appealable to the court of appeals. Following the trial, the defendants appealed from the judgment which was entered for the plaintiffs on
the magistrate's direction and order.
In dismissing the appeal, the Tenth Circuit court cited the Federal
Magistrates Act, which authorizes the assignment to a magistrate of only
those additional duties that are not inconsistent with the Constitution and
laws of the United States. The district judge retains supervisory power over
the magistrate's decisions and is ultimately responsible for that decision.
108. Id. at 476.
109. 608 F.2d 1234 (9th Cir. 1979).
110. See also Comment, FederalJurisdzction--Cass Action---Orders Relating to Class Certifratiwn
Not Appealable Under 28 USC § 1291 Prorto Fialfjudgment, 49 Miss. L.J. 973 (1978).
111. 613 F.2d at 802.
112. 603 F.2d 813 (10th Cir. 1979).
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Thus, the court of appeals concluded that "the discretionary authority to
direct entry of a final judgment is a fundamental and exclusive power of an
Article III judge." ' " 3 The magistrate's order was vacated and the appeal
dismissed without prejudice so that district court review would be facilitated.
An appeal from a district court judgment interpreting oil and gas pricing regulations promulgated by the Federal Energy Administration (FEA)
was dismissed by the Tenth Circuit for iack ofjuridiction, in ahL,,ana Asso4
ciation of Energy Consumers & Producers v.FEA. 11
The plaintiff association
asserted that the issue before the trial court was FEA adherence to proper
procedures in the promulgation of regulations, thus giving the circuit court
jurisdiction over the appeal. The government moved to dismiss the appeal,
contending that the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals (TECA) had
exclusive appellate jurisdiction in this matter.
In dismissing the appeal, the Tenth Circuit established that the district
court's jurisdiction was based on the provisions of the Economic Stabilization Act. The Supreme Court, in Bray v. Uniied States," 5 held that all appeals arising under this Act were within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
TECA. The trial court's determination dealt with "exactly the types of regulations on oil and gas pricing . . .that the TECA was established to handle."' 16 The court of appeals rejected a Second Circuit opinion"t 7 allowing
a bifurcated appeal to both a circuit court and to the TECA, declaring that
"[t]here is little to be gained. . . other than mass confusion, by the promot' 8
ing of simultaneous circuit-court-TECA appeals." "
As the question of ripeness affects subject matter jurisdiction, the court
may raise the issue sua sponte at any time, the Tenth Circuit ruled in their
denial of jurisdiction in In re GrandJug, Apri, 1979.119 A federal grand jury
had issued subpoenas duces tecum to the defendant. While motions to
quash the subpoenas were being heard, the grand jury indicted the defendant. The government then applied for issuance of pre-trial subpoenas, requesting the same documents sought by the grand jury. The district court
had not ruled upon the government's application for pre-trial subpoenas at
the time of this government appeal from a lower court ruling which partly
sustained and partly overruled the motions to quash the grand jury subpoenas.
The defendant argued, on appeal, that the grand jury's indictment,
which came without the grand jury first obtaining the requested documents,
mooted the subpoena issue. The government, however, contended that it
had applied for issuance of pre-trial subpoenas and believed that the defendants would raise the same defenses to their subpoenas as were raised to the
enforcement of the grand jury subpoenas. Thus, the government asserted
113.
114.
115.
116.

117.
Aug. 1,
118.
119.

Id.at 814.
No. 79-1847 (10th Cir., Oct. 23, 1979).
423 U.S. 73, 74 (1975).
No. 79-1847, slip op. at 4.
Coastal States Marketing, Inc. v. New England Petroleum Corp., No. 79-7330 (2d Cir.,
1979).
No. 79-1847, slip op. at 5.
604 F.2d 69 (10th Cir. 1979).
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that the issues presented were "capable of repetition, yet evading review."

120

Judge Barrett's Tenth Circuit opinion rejected both of these arguments,
but he dismissed the appeal for want of ripeness, an issue which the court
of appeals may raise voluntarily because it affects the court's subject matter jurisdiction. The court declined to issue an advisory opinion on the
propriety of the government's subpoena applications, declaring that "it is
preferable to defer decision of the constitutional issues raised until there is an
actual, concrete need to decide them."' 12 1 Although the appellate court recognized that the defendants were likely to raise the same defenses to the
government's subpoenas when issued, the court decided to delay resolution
of the question until a time closer to the disputed event.
D.

Removal Jurisdiction

Parties who seek removal to federal court are not estopped from challenging that court's jurisdiction on appeal, the Tenth Circuit ruled in Hudson
v. Smith.' 2 2 The district court, however, had the authority to remand a separate and independent claim while retaining a non-removable cause of action.
In Hudson, the plaintiff, assignee of a third party's interest in a corporation, brought suit in Oklahoma state court. The first claim sought damages
for breach of contract; the second claim sought dissolution of the corporation
formed by the contract under an Oklahoma statute which provided for dissolution when there was a deadlock in corporate ownership. The state court
granted the defendant's petition for removal to federal district court; the
plaintiff then moved to remand the action to the state court. The federal
district court remanded the claim for dissolution to state court but retained
the breach of contract claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. section 1441.123 This
statute gives the district court the discretion either to try or to remand separate and independent causes of action which have been joined with nonremovable claims. Trial on the breach of contract claim resulted in a jury
verdict for the plaintiffs. Defendants appealed, claiming that the federal district court to which they sought removal now lacked jurisdiction. Defendants charged that both causes of action should have been remanded to the
state court.
Judge McWilliams' opinion rejected the argument that a party who petitions for removal to a federal court and then loses his case in that court is
estopped from seeking remand to a state court. The decision rested on the
authority of American Fire &Casualty Co. v. Finn.'2 4 Instead, the judge looked
to the provisions of section 1441 (c) to determine if the plaintiff's two causes
120. Id. at 72.
121. Id.
122. 618 F.2d 642 (10th Cir. 1980).
123. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 states:
Whenever a separate and independent claim or cause of action, which would be removable if sued upon alone, is joined with one or more otherwise non-removable
claims or causes of action, the entire case may be removed and the district court may
determine all issues therein, or, in its discretion, may remand all matters not otherwise
within its original jurisdiction.
124. 341 U.S. 6 (1951).
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of action were separate and independent, thus giving the district court discretionary authority to remand the dissolution claim but retain the breach of
contract action. In determining that the two claims were indeed separate
and independent, the appellate court reasoned that the outcome of the
breach of contract claim would not affect the question of whether the corporation's ownership was deadlocked. Because the dissolution action would be
pursued regardless of who prevailed in the contract claim, the trial court
properly held that the two claims were separate and independent and properly retained the contract claim.
III.
A.

FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE

Rule 15(b)-Amendments to Conform to the Evidence

In In re Santa Fe Downs, Inc.,125 the Tenth Circuit declared that under
the minimum procedural requirements of rule 15(b), a plaintiWs suit may be
dismissed from court when the pleadings contain an incorrect statutory citation. 126 This is particularly true when the plaintiff's legal theory is reliant
27
upon the statute miscited.'
In the original complaint, the trustee of the bankrupt, Santa Fe Downs,
claimed that defendants' mortgages were void under a section of the Bankruptcy Act unrelated to consensual liens.' 28 Therefore a showing of the
lienholders' knowledge of the insolvency was not required. The court,
through Judge McKay, declared that defendant mortgagees properly objected when Santa Fe Downs' trustee sought to introduce evidence of the
129
mortgagees' knowledge of insolvency.
The deficiencies in the trustee's complaint were repeatedly noted. Because the trustee failed to amend the pleadings, and because rule 15(b)
makes no provision for automatic amendment when proper objections are
made to the admission of evidence,' 30 the Tenth Circuit determined that the
bankruptcy court committed reversible error in refusing the mortgagees' motion for dismissal on the grounds that the plaintiffs presentation of evidence
failed to show a right to relief.13 1 Underlying the appellate court's determination in the case was its recognition that while the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure may have abolished full fact pleading, the rules must accommo125. 611 F.2d 815 (10th Cir. 1980).
126. Id at 816.
127. Id
128. The trustee's complaint stated that the suit was brought to declare liens null and void
pursuant to § 67(a)(1) of the Bankruptcy Act, I I U.S.C. § 107(a)(1) (1976), (current version at
I I U.S.C. §§ 349(b), 457(b), (d), 551 (Supp. III 1979)), which is directed at liens obtained by
attachment, judgment, levy, or other equitable process or proceedings. 611 F.2d at 816.
129. 611 F.2d at 816.
130. FED. R. Civ. P. 15(b), in relevant part, reads:
If evidence is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues made
by the pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so
freely when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and
the objecting partyofails to satisfy the court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him
in maintaininghis action or defense upon the ments.
(emphasis added).
131. FED. R. Civ. P. 41(b).

1981]

FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE

date a defendant by requiring that he be given some notice of the case
against him. 132 Therefore, plaintiff's error in citation of a statute essential to
the claim for relief was more than a mere technical error. Dismissal of the
suit during the trial would not have constituted the tyranny of formalism
133
which rule 15(b) seeks to prevent.
B.

Rule 56--Summay Judgment

St. Loui's Baptist Temple, Inc. v. FDIC134 provided the Tenth Circuit with
an opportunity to reiterate that, in considering a motion for summary judgment, a district court may take judicial notice sua sponte of its own records
and the records of other courts-if called to the court's attention by the parties-to determine the existence of a genuine issue of material fact. 135 The
appeal arose from the Colorado District Court's entry of summary judgment
for the defendant FDIC in an action brought by St. Louis Baptist Temple,
Inc. (Temple). Temple challenged the validity of a sheriff's sale in satisfaction of a judgment debt. The judgment had been rendered against Soldiers
of the Cross, Inc. (Soldiers) and Goff Memorial Library (Goff), which Temple alleged to be its predecessors in title. The suit, originally brought in the
district court of Jefferson County, Colorado, was removed to the federal district court by the FDIC. It challenged the validity of the sale for insufficiency of publication and inadequacy of the sale price. Temple, on appeal,
contended that the district cou-rt erred in granting summary judgment based
on judicial notice of records from an earlier litigation and appeal involving
the same tract of land.
The Tenth Circuit, through Judge Barrett, reasoned that court records
are verifiable with certainty and may be judicially noticed when brought to
the attention of the court by the parties. 136 The records of the earlier case
and appeal were properly considered by the district court because they were
directly relevant to the determination of the existence of a genuine issue of a
material fact. The prior litigation and affirmance by the Tenth Circuit established that Soldiers and Goff were estopped collaterally from attacking
both the judgment and the sheriffs deed, and the related doctrines of res
judicata and collateral estoppel applied against the plaintiff, Temple. Since
the plaintiff was attempting to litigate the same issues "the second time
around, ' ' t 37 utilization of judicial notice, whether requested or not, 138 was
considered especially appropriate.
132. 611 F.2d at 816.
133. Id. at 817.
134. 605 F.2d 1169 (10th Cir. 1980).
135. See Ginsberg v. Thomas, 170 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1948).
136. 605 F.2d at 1172.
137. In its memorandum opinion in civil action no. C-4227, the district court noted that
Soldiers, Goff, and the president of Temple, Reverend Bill Beeny, were closely connected in
identity. The court stated that "this is the second time around for defendant's counsel and for
Rev. Bill Beeny who quarterbacked the case for defendants." Id at 1174.
138. Id at 1174-77.
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Rule 60(a)-Reef from Judgment or Order-ClericalMistakes

C.

A district court's inadvertent mistake in ordering a party guilty of civil
contempt to pay $1200 compensatory damages, when evidence indicated
that the figure should have been $12,000, properly fell under the scope of
rule 60(a)'s provision allowing sua sponte correction of errors arising from
ovcrsight or oifiiSS10h, "3 so the Tenth Circuit held in AlliedMaterials Corp. v.
Superior Products Co. 140 The appellant, Superior Products, was found to have
violated a consent decree by making false and misleading representations
about joint sealant which Allied had contracted to provide for construction
of an addition to Stapleton Airport in Denver. Superior Products contended
on appeal that the trial court could not amend its findings on its own motion. 141
In rejecting Superior Products' contention that the district court's mistake triggered the application of rule 52(b), which rule would have required
that the court's amendment be preceded by the parties motion for amendment, the Tenth Circuit court defined the following boundary between the
rules under discussion: rule 52(b) will apply if the court intended to say, write,
or record the words which are the subject of the amendment and later finds
them to be wrong; rule 60(a) will apply if the error in speech, writing, or
recordation was not what the court intended.' 4 2 The mistake involved in
Allied Materials, which the court described as an inadvertent removal of one
zero in the judgment order, was clearly of the rule 60(a) variety. Therefore,
the district court was found to have made no error in correcting the omission
on its own initiative. 143 While the appellee, Allied Materials, prevailed on
the procedural issues involving the federal rules, the court of appeals accepted Superior Products' contention that the $12,000 compensatory damages award was not supported by the evidence. The court of appeals offered
Allied the choice of an award of $7,000, as the amount of damages supported
44
by the evidence, or a retrial of the case on the issue of damages.1
Rule 60(b) -Rehef from FinalJudgment Due to Mistake, Inadvertence,
Excusable Neglect, or Newly DiscoveredEvidence

D.

tion'

In a decision upholding a district court's denial of a rule 60(b) mo45
IT Corp. v. Allen, 146 the Tenth
for relief from a default judgment, CI

139. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(a) reads, in relevant part:
Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors therein
arising from oversight or omission may be corrected by the court at any time of its own
initiative or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if any, as the court
orders.
140. 620 F.2d 224 (10th Cir. 1980).
141. Superior argued on appeal that rule 52(b), not rule 60(a), applied. Id.at 225-27. FED.
R.

Civ. P. 52(b) states: "Upon motion ofa par

made not later than ten days after entry of

judgment the court may amend its findings or make additional findings and may amend the
judgment accordingly." (emphasis added).
142. The court of appeals repeated this distinction as it was set forth in Kelley v. Bank Bldg.
& Equip. Corp., 453 F.2d 774, 778 (10th Cir. 1972).
143. 620 F.2d at 226.
144. Id. at 226-28.
145. The rule states, in part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or his legal
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Circuit extensively quoted prior decisions to emphasize that the grant of a
motion to set aside a judgment is within the sound discretion of the trial
court. The trial court's determination will not be disturbed in the absence of
a showing of abuse.
Defendant Allen had defaulted on two promissory notes secured by using heavy construction equipment as collateral. Upon Allen's default, the
balance had been accelerated, the equipment had been repossessed by
C.I.T., and, following public sales of the equipment, C.I.T. obtained, by default, a deficiency judgment against the defendant. Over six weeks after being served, and some twenty days after the district court's entry of the
default judgment in favor of C.I.T., Allen filed his original answer. Seven
days later, he filed a motion to set aside the default judgment alleging that
his failure to respond was the result of excusable neglect. He also stated that
he had a meritorious defense because the construction equipment was sold
below its fair market value. Subsequently, Allen submitted additional memoranda alleging that C.I.T. had allowed a third party to use the repossessed
equipment prior to sale, that the third party had damaged the equipment,
and that the equipment was sold in damaged condition. Relying on its 1978
decision in In re Stone, 14 7 the Tenth Circuit stated that for a successful motion to set aside a default judgment under rule 60(b), not only must the
movant demonstrate justifiable grounds such as mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect, but the movant must also show the existence of a
meritorious defense.148 White Allen may have made out a case for excusable
neglect, the Tenth Circuit held that he failed to elaborate the facts as sufficiently as required by In re Stone 149 to permit the trial court to judge whether
the defense would have been meritorious. The court of appeals noted that
Allen's later assertions about third-party da mage to the equipment were
"predicated on rank hearsay." ' S° Furthermore, he never asserted that he
was not in default, that C.I.T. repossessed the equipment in an improper
manner, or that C.I.T. acted in excess of its rights conferred under the notes
and security agreements. 15!
representative from a final judgment, order or proceeding for the following reasons: 1)
mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; 2) newly discovered evidence
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial
under rule 59(b); 3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct of an adverse party; 4) the judgment is void; 5) the
judgment has been satisfied, released or discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it
is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that the
judgment should have prospective application; or 6) any other reason justifying relief
from the operation of the judgment.
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b). For another case dealing with rule 60(b), see notes 163-79 in)faand
accompanying text.
146. No. 79-1637 (10th Cir., Dec. 10, 1979).
147. 588 F.2d 1316 (10th Cir. 1978). This case details the law controlling the granting of
motions for relief from default judgments.
148. No. 79-1637, slip op. at 5.
149. 588 F.2d at 1319.
150. No. 79-1637, slip op. at 6-7.
151. Id at 7.
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Rule 60(b)-Modiftcation of Consent Decree

In EEOC v. Safeway Stores, Inc.,152 seventeen individual union members
intervened in an unfair employment practices action to seek modification of
the original parties' consent decree. The Tenth Circuit prescribed two channels through which such a consent decree may be modified. First, rule 60(b)
may be applied to grant reiief when a final judgment is shown to be void,
when it is shown that prospective application would no longer be equitable,
or when there is any other reason justifying relief. Second, the continuing
jurisdiction of equity empowers a court to modify a decree upon a showing
53
of changed circumstances. 1
The consent decree agreed upon by the EEOC, various labor unions,
and Safeway altered the seniority system for all of Safeway's employees. The
intervenors argued that the decree did not comport with the purpose of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196415 4 because it discriminated against em155
ployees who had transferred positions before the decree became effective.
In dismissing these contentions and affirming the district court's denial of
intervenors' motion for modification, the Tenth Circuit stated that, absent a
showing of abuse of discretion, a trial court's ruling on a rule 60(b) motion
will not be disturbed, that a consent decree may vary from the statutory
confines of the original action in order to encourage voluntary settlements,
and that rule 60(b) is not designed "to allow Modification of a consent decree
merely because it reaches a result which could not have been forced on the
parties through litigation."' 156 While the appellate court admitted that a
consent decree may be altered upon a showing of changed circumstances
which produce hardship so extreme and unexpected as to make the decree
oppressive, it found no abuse of discretion in the district court's determination; there was no evidence of substantial change in the facts underlying the
decree and the interpretation of the order.
Finally, in response to the intervenors' assertion that modification of the
decree was compelled by the Supreme Court case of InternationalBrotherhoodof
Teamsters v. United States,' 57 decided after the decree was entered, the Tenth
Circuit cited its 1958 decision of Collins v. City of Wichita' 58 and the Third
Circuit's decision of Maybery v. Maroney.' 59 In Collins, a change in the judicial view of an established rule of law was not deemed to be an extraordinary
circumstance justifying relief under rule 60(b). 1" According to the Third
Circuit in Maybery, the power to alter decrees may not be based merely on
"precedential evolution."' 6 1 Finally, the court in the instant case held that
152. 611 F.2d 795 (10th Cir. 1979).
153. Id at 799. See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b), supra note 145.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1976).
155. In the court's words: "[Intervenors'] seniority status was adversely affected by the enhanced seniority of post-decree transferees, many of whom had no more claim to Title VII
protection than intervenors." 611 F.2d at 798.
156. Id at 800.
157. 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
158. 254 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1958).
159. 558 F.2d 1159 (3d Cir. 1977).
160. 254 F.2d at 839.
161. 558 F.2d at 1164.
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although there may be some situations where a change in the law would
warrant modification of an injunctive decree, under no circumstances would
modification based on judicial clarification be allowed to undo the effects of
past enforcement or to jeopardize the seniority of employees who had trans162
ferred positions in reliance on the decree.

IV.

FEDERAL-STATE RELATIONS

The Tenth Circuit addressed the unusual situation of a federal court
enjoining a state court proceeding in Brown v. McCormick. 16 3 Three years
after the plaintiff obtained a default judgment in federal court, the defendants sought to relitigate the issues in state proceedings. The plaintiff unsuccessfully defended on the basis of resfud'cata. He then instituted this action
in the federal district court seeking to enjoin the state proceedings under 28
U.S.C. section 2283.'64 The defendants responded with a motion for relief
16 5
of judgment under rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The district court denied the rule 60(b) motion and enjoined the defendants
from proceeding with their action in the state court.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed. The opinion involved a two-part analysis.
The court had to determine if the earlier default judgment could withstand
a rule 60(b) attack and, if so, whether an injunction was permissible under
28 U.S.C. section 2283. Rule 60(b) is an extraordinary procedure which permits the court to grant relief from its judgment upon a showing of good
cause. ' 66 The rule is not a substitute for appeal but instead concerns matters
which were not raised and considered by the court in reaching its judg6 7
ment. 1
As a basis for the rule 60(b) motion, the defendants claimed 1) that the
federal court had lacked personal and subject matter jurisdiction; 2) that
they were denied due process by virtue of rule 37 sanctions; 16 3) that the
default judgment was obtained by fraud on the court; and 4) that the default
judgment was in excess of the pleadings.169
The court of appeals agreed with the district court that these contentions were without merit. The claims of lack of personal jurisdiction and
fraud on the court were summarily dismissed.170 The Tenth Circuit found
that subject matter and diversity were addressed and resolved by the trial
611 F.2d at 801.
163. 608 F.2d 410 (10th Cir. 1979).
164. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976) states that "a court of the United States may not grant an
injunction to stay proceedings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments."
165. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(4) permits a court to relieve a party from a final judgment if the
judgment is void.
166. See 6A J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE,
60.02 (2d ed. 1979); 7 id. 60.19.
167. See Daily Mirror, Inc. v. New York News, Inc., 533 F.2d 53 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 862 (1976).
168. FED. R. Civ. P. 37.
169. 608 F.2d at 413.
170. Id at 413, 414.
162.
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court prior to the entry of default judgment 17 and that the rule 37 sanctions
were appropriate in light of the defendant's "dilatory tactics."' 72 Finally,
the default judgment was deemed not to have exceeded the scope of the

complaint. 173
Having found the default judgment to be valid, the appellate court then
det...ed
that the injunction. against further state procedings was proper.
The anti-injunction statute1 74 provides that federal courts cannot normally
interfere with state court proceedings. However, an injunction by the federal court to "protect or effectuate its judgment" is an exception to this general rule. 75 The court of appeals, per Chief Judge Seth, found that the
exception applied in this case; resjuedicata and collateral estoppel operated to
preclude relitigation.' 76 The Younger-Buffiman1 77 doctrine of abstention
based on the principle of federalism did not apply as "[nieither Supreme
Court case involved resjuaidata principles or the situation where a party
armed with his valid federal judgment exhausted state appellate review.' 78
The injunction issued by the district court under 28 U.S.C. section 2283
extended to claims not actually litigated in the initial action. Chief Judge
Seth, however, held that this was valid. These claims arose from the same
underlying transaction and as a compulsory counterclaim, they too were
subject to the injunction.' 79 Once it was determined that the prior default
judgment obtained in federal courts was valid and that the state proceedings
sought to relitigate the same issues, the district court was obligated to issue
the injunction. The integrity of the federal judiciary would allow no less.
V.

A.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

Malpractice Actions: Statute Does Not Run Until Claim Accrues

In Zeidler v. UnitedStates,180 the conservator of the mentally incompetent
plaintiff brought a malpractice action in 1976 under the Federal Tort
Claims Act.' 8 ' Zeidler's conservator alleged that lobotomy operations per171. Id. at 413-14. Having been addressed by the district court, these issues were not considered proper grounds for a rule 60(b) motion.
172. Id at 414.
173. This controversy centered on whether certain grazing lands were part of the Z-Bar-T
Ranch. The district court found that they were because the evidence showed such was the
intent of the parties. Id. at 414-15.
174. 28 U.S.C. § 2283 (1976).
175. Id
176. 608 F.2d at 416.
177. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592
(1975).
178. 608 F.2d at 416. Younger concerned a state criminal prosecution. Harris claimed the
statute under which California was prosecuting him unconstitutionally abridged his freedom of
speech. The Supreme Court declared that the principles of federalism prohibited federal interference in the state proceeding, barring extraordinary circumstances. Hujinan applied this ra-

tionale in a civil case. However, it was a civil obscenity case with criminal ramifications.
Additionally, Pursue, Ltd. had not exhausted its state remedies, a necessary component under
Younger. Neither case dealt with a situation so clearly covered by the statute.
179. Id The "pending action" exception to this rule only applies when the counterclaim
was the subject of a pending state action when the federal suit was instigated.
180. 601 F.2d 527 (10th Cir. 1979).

181.

28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1976).
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formed in 1947 and 1948 by the government to control Zeidler's conduct
while he was a Veterans Administration Hospital patient rendered him incompetent and should not have been performed. The district court concluded that insanity was a disability for which the statute of limitations
could not be tolled;' 82 therefore, from the face of the complaint, any action
was barred by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to the section of
83
the Federal Tort Claims Act under which the action had been brought.1
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded on the
grounds that the trial court, in rendering a final disposition based on the
pleadings, made the improper assumption that Zeidler's complaint was
based on insanity leading to the automatic running of the statute. Instead,
the appellate tribunal contended, the main thrust of the plaintiff's action
84
was malpractice, under which claim the statute could have been tolled.'
In medical malpractice actions, the claim accrues when the claimant has a
reasonable opportunity to discover the essential elements of a possible cause
of action.' 85 The case was therefore remanded for a determination as to
whether Zeidler knew or should have known that he suffered injury.
Judge Logan, in his dissent, criticized the majority's conclusion based
on the insanity-malpractice dichotomy as a "distinction without a difference."' 8 6 If Zeidler had been mentally incapacitated before the operation
then the claim would have been barred by the statute of limitations; if the
alleged malpractice had caused the incompetency, then the result would have
been observable by family and friends following the operation and the statute would have commenced running. As Judge Logan intimated in his dissent, Zeidler is a difficult case contested in the realm of limitations of actions.
The plaintiff seemed to argue that it was a tort to perform the lobotomies,
not that they were negligently done, and that the defendant government
should be judged from hindsight after thirty years of advancements in medical science. The currency of the standard of judgment would be a logical
foundation supporting the running of the statute of limitations.
B.

Vhdicatihg Pub/ic and Private Rights Under Federal Statutes: State Statutes of
Limitlations Do Not Apply
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals determined in Marshall v. Intermoun-

182. See Casias v. United States, 532 F.2d 1339, 1342 (10th Cir. 1976).
183. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (1976), which, according to the trial court, contained the applicable statute of limitations reads:
A tort claim against the United States shall be forever barred unless it is presented in
writing to the appropriate Federal agency within two years after such claim accrues or
unless action is begun within six months after the date of mailing, by certified or
registered mail, of notice of final denial of the claim by the agency to which it was
presented.
The administrative claim, required by 28 U.S.C. § 2675(a), was filed and denied. 601 F.2d at
528.
184. The court extensively cited Exnicious v. United States, 563 F.2d 418 (10th Cir. 1977),
where plaintiff was able to bring a malpractice action thirteen years after an operation because
there was a material factual issue as to when the plaintiff had been able to discover the injury.
185. 601 F.2d at 529 n.l, 530 (citing Ciccarone v. United States, 486 F.2d 253, 256 (3d Cir.
1973)).
186. Id. at 533.
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tarn Electric Co. 187 that when an action is brought by the government to enforce private as well as public rights, state statutes of limitations will not bar
the action even though no period of limitations is provided in the operative
federal statute. The Secretary of Labor filed the complaint in this case almost twenty-six months after an Intermountain employee, Edward
Cavaliere, had been discharged for filing safety-related complaints with Intermountain. The Secretary's suit, in which the govermimieit sought an in-junction against future violations of section 11 (c) of the Occupational Safety
and Health Act (the Act) 188 and reinstatement and backpay for Cavaliere,
was dismissed by the district court on the ground that the action was barred
89
by Colorado's two-year statute of limitations for federal causes of action.1
In reversing the district court's dismissal of the action, the court of appeals noted that a state limitations period will not be applied to an action
brought by the federal government to vindicate pubic rights or pubhc interests
absent a clear showing of contrary congressional intent.'9° Furthermore, the
court stated that there is no suggestion of congressional intent to adopt state
statutes of limitations in the Act itself;' 9 1 and that section I I(c) of the Act is
designed to ensure reporting of violations rather than vindication of private
interests. 92 The court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Occidental
Life Insurance Co. v. EEOC'93 to find a new rule applicable to cases in which
the plaintiff seeks to vindicate a hybrid of private and public interests; in
Intermountain Electric the original action had been brought to vindicate public
rights but the primary immediate effect would be relief for private individuals. Under the new rule, state statutes of limitations are inapplicable even
though the federal statute provides no period of limitations. However, in
situations where the public and private interests are combined, the doctrine
of laches may be applied to protect the defendant against unreasonable de9 4
lay in the commencement of the action.1
The Intermountain Electric decision appears to reach a sympathetic conclusion in extending indefinitely the period within which the public interest
may be vindicated. However, it does not acknowledge that the equitable
and elastic doctrine of laches fails to protect, in as certain a manner as statutory periods of limitations, the ability of defendants to prepare for trial in the

187. 614 F.2d 260 (10th Cir. 1980).
188. 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1976). Subsection I provides that employees may not be discharged or in any way discriminated against for filing a complaint pursuant to the Act or for in
any way exercising rights afforded by the Act. Under subsection 2, provision is made for the
filing of complaints with the Secretary of Labor.
189. CoLO. RE v. STAT. § 13-80-106 (1973) reads:
Actions under federal statutes. All actions upon a liability created by a federal statute,
other than for a forfeiture or penalty for which actions no period of limitations is
provided in such statute, shall be commenced within two years or the period specified
for comparable actions arising under Colorado law, whichever is longer, after the
cause of action accrues.
190. 614 F.2d at 262.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. 432 U.S. 355 (1977). The Occidental decision is analyzed and applied by the Tenth
Circuit Court of Appeals as the principal support for the new rule. 614 F.2d at 262-63.
194. 614 F.2d at 263 n.8.
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increasing variety of hybrid situations, such as administrative cases, where
public and private interests are combined.
Madie Gustafson Hellman
Dennis C Kee/er
Frederic T Kutscher
Miles D. Madorin

LABOR LAW
OVERVIEW

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' opinions in the area of labor law
during the past year dealt with fairly standard issues. The court's decisions
were, generally, in conformity with settled principles of law. This survey will
examine the Tenth Circuit's labor law cases as an aid to the practitioner in
the field. Particularly noteworthy are the labor law decisions wherein the
Tenth Circuit court departs from the traditional analysis.
I.

NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT-LABOR MANAGEMENT
RELATIONS ACT'

A.

Protected Concerted Activity

In NLRB v. Modem Carpet Industries, Inc., 2 three maintenance employees
were discharged after refusing to work with lead which they believed to be
dangerous. The lead had been obtained from a hospital which used it to
store radioactive materials. When asked to check the lead for radioactivity,
the supervisor on the job replied that an unnamed person had assured him
that the material was safe. 3 The employees were unsuccessful in their repeated attempts to obtain the name of the person who reportedly had said
that this substance was safe. When these workers continued to refuse to
4
work with the material, they were fired.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the National
Labor Relations Board (Board), which had determined that the company
violated section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA)
(Act) 5 by firing the three employees. 6 The court found that the discharge of
the men was based solely upon their refusal to work with what they believed
to be dangerous material. Such action on the part of employees has been
held to be concerted activity for the purpose of mutual aid or protection,
activity explicitly allowed employees in section 7 of the Act. 7 Whether an
employee's good faith belief in the existence of dangerous working conditions
is enough to bring his refusal to work within the protection of section 8(a)(1)
of the Act depends upon the facts of each case.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-144, 151-169, 171-188 (1976).

2. 611 F.2d 811 (1Oth Cir. 1979).
3. Id. at 813.
4. Id.
5. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976) provides that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer
to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization
or any other protected activity.

6. 611 F.2d at 815.
7. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976) provides that employees have the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or aid labor organizations, to bargain collectively, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid and protection. See also

611 F.2d at 813.
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In Gateway Coal v. United Mine Workers,8 the United States Supreme
Court held that a good faith fear of the existence of abnormally dangerous
working conditions was not sufficient to allow workers to refuse to work.9 In
that case, however, the employees were members of a union and were working under a valid collective bargaining agreement.' 0 The Court held that
the employee's refusal to work was a violation of an implicit no-strike clause
in the agreement.-- Other cases involving similar activity by unorganized
2
workers have held differently.'
In the Modern Carpet opinion, there was no mention of whether the discharged employees were union members. The court discussed NLRB v.
Washington Aluminum Co.,' 3 another United States Supreme Court case, in
which unorganized employees who had walked off the job in protest of frigid
working conditions were held to be engaged in protected activity.' 4 In the
Modern Carpet decision, the Tenth Circuit emphasized the good faith belief of
the workers in determining whether their action was protected. In light of
the company's refusal to name its source of information about job safety, the
court felt justified in sustaining the Board's conclusion that the workers, in
refusing to work with the lead, acted out of a genuine fear for their health.' 5
B.

Dtscrtmt'nation Based Upon Union Membership

In NLRB v. Borg- Warner Corp., 16 the Tenth Circuit court upheld the
Board's finding that an employer violated section 8(a)(1) and (3) of the
NLRA 17 when he withdrew existing employment benefits because of union
activities on the part of employees.' 8 In this case, six test technicians had
8. 414 U.S. 368 (1974).
9. Id. at 386-87 (the fear must be based upon objective facts).
10. Id. at 374.
11. Id. at 387. Union members are not always denied such protection. See NLRB v. Belfry
Coal Corp., 331 F.2d 738 (6th Cir. 1964) (per curiam), enforcing 139 N.L.R.B. 1058 (1962) (two
miners refusing to work in area "dangered off" by state mine inspector); G.W. Murphy Indus.,
Inc., 183 N.L.R.B. 97 (1970) (employees walking off job because of excessive smoke and heat);
Associated Divers & Contractors, Inc., 180 N.L.R.B. 62 (1969) (workers refusing to work because of unsanitary conditions on barge); Atleson, Threats to Health and Safey: Employee Self-Help
Underthe NLRA, 59 MINN. L. REV. 647 (1975); 7 AKRON L. REv. 508 (1974); 86 HARV. L. REV.
447 (1972).
12. See generally NLRB v. Washington Aluminum Co., 370 U.S. 9 (1962) (section 7 of
NLRA protects employees with no bargaining representative); Trustees of Boston Univ. v.
NLRB, 548 F.2d 391 (1st Cir. 1977) (NLRA protection extends to unorganized employees);
Hugh H. Wilson Corp. v. NLRB, 414 F.2d 1345 (3d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 935 (1970)
(protection for concerted activities extends to non-union employees); Ashford & Katz, Unsafe
Working Conditions: Employee Rights Under the Labor Management Relations Act and the Occupational
Safety &Health Act, 52 NOTRE DAME LAW. 802 (1977); Johnson, Protected Concerted Activity in the
Non-Union Context.- Limitations on the Employers Rights to Discipline or Discharge Employees, 49 Miss.
L.J. 839 (1978).
13. 370 U.S. 9 (1962).
14. Id. at 14-15.
15. 611 F.2d at 814-15.
16. 608 F.2d 1344 (10th Cir. 1979).
17. 19 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) (1976). For an explanation of§ 158(a)(1), see note 5 supra.
Section 158(a)(3) provides that it will be an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in hiring or tenure of employment, or any term or condition of employment because of
union membership.
18. 608 F.2d at 1347.
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enjoyed an early-in, early-out option whereby they could come to work early
in the morning, and subsequently leave the job early that afternoon. 19 This
option was not a plant-wide practice. When it became known to management that four of these six technicians were active in a union organizing
campaign, their supervisor was told to keep a watch on them at all times and
to try to keep them from going into other areas of the plant to speak to other
workers. 20 As a result of this directive, the practice of early-in, early-out was
discontinued so as to prevent the possibility of the technicians being in the
2
plant at a time when the supervisor was not present. '
The court, in agreement with the Board, found that this change in practice was a direct result of the technicians' union activities. The NLRA
clearly states that it is an unfair labor practice for an employer to restrain
employees from exercising their right to self-organization. 22 Because the employer altered the conditions of employment in response to employees' union
activities, 23 a prima facie violation of the NLRA existed. 24 Finding substantial evidence in the record to support the Board's decision, the court ordered
25
reinstatement of the early-in, early-out practice.
In U.S Sozi Condzaonng v. NLRB, 26 the Tenth Circuit court was asked to
review, and to deny enforcement of, an order of the Board concerning reinstatement of an employee. The employer argued before the Board that the
employee was discharged because he took an unauthorized extra week of
vacation. 27 The Board, however, found that the reason for the employee's
28
discharge was his union activity.
On appeal, the court looked to the record as a whole. Recognizing the
Board's expertise in this area, 29 the court refused to prevent enforcement of
the Board's order because there was substantial evidence in the record to
support the Board's decision. 30 The court noted that the law requires the
judiciary to uphold an administrative decision where substantial evidence
supporting the administrative determination exists in the record. 3 ' Therefore, the court felt compelled to uphold the Board.
The issue involved in Cartwrght Hardware Co. o. NLRB 32 was whether
the actions of an employer resulted in a constructive discharge of three union
employees. Cartwright, the employer, notified the union involved that it
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.

Id. at 1346 n.4.
Id. at 1347 n.5.
Id. at 1347.
29 U.S.C. § 157 (1976). See note 7 supra.
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3) (1976).
608 F.2d at 1345 n.3.
Id. at 1349 n. 10.
606 F.2d 940 (10th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 942.
Id. at 948. See note 17 supra.

29. 606 F.2d at 948.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 943-45. 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) (1976) instructs a court to consider the Board's findings as conclusive if supported by substantial evidence in the record. See also Universal Camera
Corp. v. NLRB, 340 U.S. 474 (1951); NLRB v. Central Mach. &Tool Co., 429 F.2d 1127 (loth

Cir. 1970), cert. dented, 401 U.S. 909 (1971).
32. 600 F.2d 268 (10th Cir. 1979).
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would no longer operate a union shop. 33 Having received no response from
the union, Cartwright drafted wage and benefit proposals for the period following the expiration of the collective bargaining agreement then in existence. 34 The three union members on the job resigned, claiming constructive
discharge by Cartwright. The Board found that Cartwright had violated
section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the NLRA. 35 On appeal,
the Tenth Circuit
supported the Board's findings of several violations, 36 but reversed the Board
37
as to the verdict of constructive discharge.

The court stated that a constructive discharge occurs "when an employer makes working conditions so intolerable as to force an employee to
resign." 38 For such a discharge to be in violation of the Act, 39 the employer
must have been motivated by a desire to discourage union activity or membership and, in addition, the employee's resignation must have been caused
by intolerable conditions created by the employer. 40 Reviewing the record,
the court found no evidence to show an antiunion animus on the part of
Cartwright. Furthermore, the appellate court concluded that the employees
had resigned, not because of any intolerable conditions created by Cartwright, but because of a certain "secret" provision of the union's bylaws.
The employees and union leaders were convinced that this provision of the
41
union's bylaws precluded union members from working in an open shop.
The court found no evidence indicating that Cartwright knew of this secret
42
provision before notifying the union of his intention to run an open shop.
Having earlier decided that Cartwright had evidenced no antiunion animus, the court emphasized that the employees resigned not because of Cart43
wright's proposals, but because of a provision in their own union's bylaws.
As these bylaws were something over which Cartwright had no control, the
court ruled that it could find no constructive discharge of the union employees.
In NLRB v.Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co., 44 the Tenth Circuit was presented
with several issues. The labor dispute involved in this case arose when negotiations between employees and the predecessor employer reached an impasse, leading the employees to strike. The strike was later determined to be
33. Id. at 269.
34. Id.
35. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (3), (5) (1976). Section 158(a)(5) provides that it is an unfair
labor practice for an employer to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his
employees.
36. The court upheld the Board with respect to the Board's findings of Cartwright's "refusal to bargain with the Union, its direct bargaining with employees, its unilateral institution
of changed terms and conditions of employment, and its withdrawal of recognition from the
Union." 600 F.2d at 270 (footnotes omitted).
37. Id.
38. Id. at 270, 272 n.7.
39. The discharge of an employee because of his union activity or membership is violative
of 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3) (1976).
40. 600 F.2d at 270.
41. Md.at 271.
42. Id. at 273.
43. Id. at 272.
44. 613 F.2d 267 (10th Cir. 1980).
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an economic one, and therefore, not an unfair labor practice strike. 45 After
the strike, the employees filed for reinstatement but found that all of their
jobs had been filled. They were told by the predecessor employer to fill out
new applications. This employer then sold his business. The successor refused to bargain with the union, claiming doubt that the union represented
46
the majority of employees.
The union filed charges against the predecessor employer, alleging that
by requiring the employees to fill out new applications for reinstatement, the
predecessor employer had discriminated against the strikers. 47 The Board
found that this application requirement, in effect, treated the strikers as new
workers, denying them their rights as continuing employees. 48 On appeal,
the Tenth Circuit court reviewed the record but could not find sufficient
evidence to uphold the Board's ruling. 49 Rather, the court found that the
predecessor employer's request that the strikers make a formal application
for reinstatement to their jobs was not necessarily evidence that these work50
ers were being treated as new, rather than as continuing employees.
The union also filed charges against the successor employer,5 1 claiming
that the successor employer was guilty of both an unlawful refusal to bargain
and discrimination in hiring. As the union had been certified as the bargaining representative of employees only four months prior to the sale of the
business to the successor employer, the court upheld the Board's order to
bargain. The Tenth Circuit court restated the general principle that a certification should be honored for a reasonable time, usually for a term of one
year. 52 Though a certification may be challenged within the one year period
if there are unusual circumstances, the court asserted that the change in
ownership of a company is not sufficient grounds for a challenge to the certification, particularly when the successor employer hires a majority of his
predecessor's employees. 5 3 Therefore, since the successor employer in this
case carried forward a majority of his predecessor's workers, he did have a
duty to bargain with the union.
In respect to the discrimination in hiring charge against the successor
employer, though the Board held for the union, 54 the Tenth Circuit court
45. Id. at 270.
46. Ia.
47. Id. at 271. Treating returning strikers as new employees would be discrimination
against the employees in violation of 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1976).
48. 613 F.2d at 272.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 271. See also NLRB v. Fleetwood Trailer Co., 389 U.S. 375 (1967) (economic
strikers retain their status as employees unless and until they find other regular employment
that is substantially the same).
51. 613 F.2d at 270.
52.
d at 272; see Brooks v. NLRB, 348 U.S. 96 (1954) (recognizing the doctrine announced in Celanese Corp., 95 N.L.R.B. 664 (1951), that a union certified by the NLRB as a
bargaining representative enjoys an irrebuttable presumption of majority status for one year
after certification); Terrell Mach. Co., 173 N.L.R.B. 1480 (1969), enforced in 427 F.2d 1088 (4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 929 (1970); Morales, Presumptobn of Union's Maxoy Status in NLRB
Cases, 29 LAB. LJ. 309 (1978).
53. 613 F.2d at 270, 272.
54. Id. at 273.
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found that due process of law required a different result. 55 When the discrimination charge was considered at the Board hearing, the union's claims
56
centered upon the successor's refusal to reinstate unfair laborpractice strikers.
It was later determined, however, that the strikers were economic strikers. 57
The court felt, therefore, that the parties had not had the opportunity to
present appropriate evidence to either support or defend a charge of discrimination in hiring. 58 Since the Board had found for the union on this count,
the court denied the Board's order of enforcement against the successor employer on the grounds that due process was denied the employer on the dis59
crimination in hiring charge.
In Osteopathic Hospital Founders Association v. NLRB, 6° the Tenth Circuit
upheld the decision of the Board, finding that the hospital in question had
violated section 8(a)(1), (3), and (5) of the NLRA. 61 The hospital clearly
had violated section 8(a)(3) of the Act by refusing to promote one employee,
and by refusing to hire two other persons, based solely upon the individuals'
status as union members. 62 Other issues presented in the appeal included
the hospital's refusal to bargain with the union and the propriety of the bargaining unit represented by the union.
The hospital discharged all the members of the stationary engineers employee unit after an unlawful refusal by the union to perform work. 63 After
the discharge, the hospital replaced the members of this bargaining unit and
claimed that the hospital was no longer obligated to bargain with the union.
The hospital asserted that it had a good faith doubt as to whether the union
continued to represent a majority of the members of the stationary engineers
unit. 64 The Board reasoned, and the court affirmed, that even if a good
faith doubt existed, 65 the incumbent union had a presumption 66 of majority
status for the life of the collective bargaining agreement. 6 7 Since the agreement had two remaining months at the time the hospital withdrew its recognition, the hospital's refusal to bargain was illegal. 68
As for the hospital's challenge to the legitimacy of the bargaining unit,
the court agreed with the Board that the hospital failed to make its objec69
tions at the appropriate time. Though the unit was indeed a mixed unit,
the unit was determined by the Board more than two years before the con55.

Id. at 275.

56. Id. at 273.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 274.
59. Id. at 275. The court stated that the parties, especially the employer, lacked sufficient
notice to prepare for such a charge. Id.
60. 618 F.2d 633 (10th Cir. 1980).
61. 29 U.S.C. § 158 (a)(1), (3), (5) (1976).
62. 618 F.2d at 637-38.
63. Id. at 637 n.3.
64. Id at 638.
65. Here, there was no "good faith" doubt, since any loss in the union's majority status was
at least partly attributable to the unfair labor practices of the hospital. Id. at 638-39.
66. Id. at 638.
67. Id See aLro note 52 supra.
68. 618 F.2d at 638.
69. A mixed unit is one which contains both professionals and nonprofessionals.
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troversy arose. The court noted that the time of unit determination was the
70
Since the hosproper time for the hospital to challenge the unit's makeup.
pital did not pursue its challenge at that time, the court refused to allow a
protest at the later date. 7 I Thus, the unit was ruled appropriate.
C.

Duy to Bargain

In Newspaper Printing Corp. v. NLRB, 72 the Tenth Circuit upheld an order of the Board which required an employer to bargain with an employee's
union. The employer and the union had reached an impasse on the issue of
a collective bargaining agreement's definition of the bargaining unit represented by the union. 73 Since the employer had insisted upon his suggested
changes in the definition, to the point of impasse, both the Board and the
court of appeals found that the employer was in violation of section 8(a)(5)
74
of the Act.
The court decided that the employer's insistence in changing the scope
75
of the bargaining unit was a violation of the section 8(a)(5) requirement
that an employer bargain collectively with the representative of his employees. Section 9(a) 7 6 requires an employer to recognize the union as the bar77
The court pointed
gaining agent of all employees in the appropriate unit.
78
of bargaining
subjects
out that the union cannot bargain as to mandatory
79
The court further noted that
without knowing whom it is representing.
the definition of the bargaining unit is not one of those areas subject to
mandatory bargaining.80 The court concluded that an unyielding insistence
8
on a point of permissive bargaining is a violation of section 8(a)(5). ' The
court, therefore, upheld the Board's order directing the employer to bar82
gain.
An employer may be estopped from denying an association with a mul83
Recently,
tiemployer bargaining unit if his actions imply membership.
84
however, the Tenth Circuit, in NLRB v.JD. IndustrialInsulation Co., overturned a finding of the Board which held that an employer had "engaged in
70. 618 F.2d at 640.
71.

Id. at 641.

72. 625 F.2d 956 (10th Cir. 1980).
73.

Id. at 961.

74. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976). See note 35 supra.
75. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
76. Id. § 159(a).
77. 625 F.2d at 963.
78. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976) provides for mandatory bargaining with respect to rates of
pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment.
79. 625 F.2d at 963; see McQuay-Norris Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 116 F.2d 748 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 313 U.S. 565 (1940).
80. 625 F.2d at 963; see Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. NLRB, 602 F.2d
73 (4th Cir. 1979); National Fresh Fruit & Vegetable Co. v. NLRB, 565 F.2d 1331 (5th Cir.
1978).
81. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
82. 625 F.2d at 965; see NLRB v. Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342 (1958).
83. NLRB v. Southwestern Colo. Contractors Ass'n, 379 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1967); Vin
James Plastering Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 125 (1976).
84. 615 F.2d 1289 (10th Cir. 1980).
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a course of conduct consistent with membership" ' 5 in a multiemployer bargaining unit. The Board observed that the employer had attended meetings
of the association, had discussed proposed contract terms during negotiations, had paid dues to the association for three months, and had engaged in
other activities suggestive of membership. In light of these activities, the
Board found that the employer was "estopped from avoiding the responsibilities of association membership." ' 86 The employer was found to be in violation of section 8(a)(5) of the NLRA s 7 for refusing to bargain with the union
involved.
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the court reviewed the evidence
presented to the Board and found that the facts dictated a different result.
The court stressed that the employer had never applied for membership in
the association, had never paid its initiation fee, and had never given written
authority for the association to bargain with the union on his behalf.88 Consequently, the court reasoned that there could be no basis for finding that an
implied contract existed between the employer and the association.
Finding that no contract existed, the court turned to an examination of
the doctrine of estoppel. Estoppel being an equitable principle, the court
contended that equity warranted a determination that the employer should
not be held bound in a situation where both sides had acted in an ambiguous manner. In this case, neither the employers' association nor the union
ever attempted to have the employer clarify his position in regard to his
purported association membership. In addition, the court noted that detrimental reliance, a necessary element of equitable estoppel, was not present in
this situation because the union members who worked for the employer were
receiving the same benefits they would have received had they been working
under a negotiated collective bargaining agreement. 89 The court distinguished several of the cases relied upon by the Board, concluding that these
holdings were inapposite as concerning situations in which it had not been
necessary to rely upon the principles of estoppel. 9° In conclusion, the court
held that since section 8(a)(5) of the Act 91 applies only in a situation involving a valid collective bargaining agreement, the employer did not violate the
92
NLRA.
At issue in Western DistributingCo. v. NLRB 93 was whether an employer's
good faith doubt of a union's majority status is sufficient to allow a successor
85. Id. at 1291.
86. Id.
87. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
88. 615 F.2d at 1292.
89. Id. at 1293.
90. Id. The court stated that the Board had relied upon cases decided on the basis of
equitable estoppel principles, although the theory was never fully discussed in those opinions.
See NLRB v. R.O. Pyle Roofing Co., 560 F.2d 1370 (9th Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Associated
dentid,423 U.S. 893 (1975); NLRB v. SouthwestShower Door Co., 512 F.2d 230 (9th Cir.), cert.
ern Colo. Contractors Ass'n, 379 F.2d 360 (10th Cir. 1967); Rabouin v. NLRB, 195 F.2d 906 (2d
Cir. 1952); Vin James Plastering Co., 226 N.L.R.B. 125 (1976).

91. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1976).
92. 615 F.2d at 1294.
93. 608 F.2d 397 (10th Cir. 1979).
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employer 94 to refuse to bargain with the union. While, in general, a successor employer 95 does have a duty to bargain with the representative of the
employees, 96 a good faith doubt as to the union's majority status is a defense
to an unfair labor practice charge, 9 7 if that doubt is founded upon a rational
basis in fact. 98
After a hearing, the Board ruled that the employer was a successor employer and that he had a duty to bargain with the union from the date of the
merger.9 9 Reversing the Board, the Tenth Circuit court felt it unnecessary
to determine whether the employer was a successor employer. 10 Instead,
the court argued that even if the employer were a successor employer, no
duty to bargain would exist unless, and until, the union made a formal request to bargain. 1° ' In this case, no formal request to bargain was made
until more than four months after the merger.' 0 2 The court further asserted
that the employer's good faith doubt of the union's majority status should be
judged in relation to the timing of the formal request. Under the facts of this
case, the court held that, at the time the request to bargain was made, there
had been a sufficient change in the bargaining unit to support the em10 3
ployer's claims of good faith doubt.
In NLRB v. Roger's IG.A., Inc., 10 4 the Tenth Circuit, affirming a Board
decision, ruled that once an employer voluntarily recognizes a union as the
bargaining representative of employees, the union enjoys a presumption of
majority status unless, and until, the employer acquires a good faith, reasonable doubt of that status, which doubt is grounded upon a rational basis in
fact. Both the union and the employer involved in this case had agreed to
withdraw from their longstanding relationship105 with a multiemployer bargaining association. After this withdrawal, however, Roger's refused to bargain with the union, claiming a good faith doubt about the union's majority
status. The Board found that Roger's refusal to bargain was a violation-of
section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the Act, 106 thus ruling that the union's presumptive
majority status survived the employer's withdrawal from the bargaining as94. Whether Western Distributing Co. was in fact a successor employer was not decided
here. Id. at 399.
95. A successor employer is one which maintains a "substantial continuity of identity in
the business." John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543, 551 (1964). The successor
employer also has a "substantial continuity in the identity of the work force." Howard Johnson
Co. v. Detroit Local Joint Executive Bd., 417 U.S. 249, 263 (1974). See 608 F.2d at 399.
96. See NLRB v. Bums Int'l Security Servs., 406 U.S. 272 (1972) (new employer hiring
employees of predecessor employer has duty to bargain with union).
97. 608 F.2d at 399.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 398.
100. Id. at 399.
101. Id. See also NLRB v. Columbian Enameling & Stamping Co., 306 U.S. 292 (1939);
NLRB v. Eagle Material Handling, Inc., 558 F.2d 160 (3d Cir. 1977); NLRB v. Albuquerque
Phoenix Express, 368 F.2d 451 (10th Cir. 1966).
102. The NLRB decreed that a duty to bargain arose at the time of the merger. The court,

however, adjudged that a duty to bargain was imposed only upon the union's formal request to
bargain. 608 F.2d at 399.
103. Id. at 400.
104. 605 F.2d 1164 (10th Cir. 1979).
105. Id. at 1165.
106. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5) (1976).
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Upon appeal, the Tenth Circuit court agreed with the Board's reasoning and found that Roger's voluntary acceptance of the union as the bargaining representative of its employees created a presumption of the union's
majority status.' 08 The rationale for this presumption is based on the more
an ...
t
a.. in
fndamenta premise that emp!oyers will normally actd.
the law. Since recognition of a union with less than majority status is an
unfair labor practice, 10 9 it is presumed that any union recognized by an employer will have met the requisite majority status. The court then explained
that the Board favors continuation of bargaining relationships after a withdrawal from a bargaining association 110 so as to discourage employers from
quitting such associations."I I To rebut the presumption that the union's
majority status survived the withdrawal, the employer "must show a good
faith belief, sustained by objectivefacts, that majority status did not survive
....
,,2
Because Roger's failed to meet this standard of proof, the court
1t 3
decreed that the employer was obligated to bargain with the union.
A violation of section 8(a)(1) and (5) of the NLRA, 1 4 because of noncompliance with a collective bargaining agreement, was asserted in Arco Electric Co. v. NLRB. 15 Though Arco was never a member of a multiemployer
bargaining association, it did bind itself to contracts made between a bargaining association and an Arco employees' union.1 16 Arco also engaged in
conduct which, in the opinion of the Board, estopped the company from
repudiating its current employment contract with the employees' union.'" 7
The Tenth Circuit court, in upholding the Board's decision, reviewed
the various claims of Arco and found them devoid of merit. Arco had argued that financial hardships necessitated its noncompliance with certain of
the contract terms. The court, however, reasoned that "economic need does
not justify contract repudiation."' 1 8 Arco had also urged that the repudiation was justified because of the company's good faith doubt about the continued majority status of the union.' 1 9 Arco's voluntary recognition of the
union as the bargaining representative of its employees raised a presumption
of majority status.' 20 Though Arco may have been able to justify its refusal
to bargain as based upon a good faith doubt of majority status, backed by a
107. 605 F.2d at 1165.
108. Id.
109. Id. See also International Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB (Bernhard-Altmann), 366 U.S. 731 (1961).
110. 605 F.2d at 1165 (citing NLRB v. Tahoe Nugget, Inc., 584 F.2d 293 (9th Cir. 1978),
cert. denied, 442 U.S. 921 (1979)).
111. 605 F.2d at 1166. The court also noted that the employees' freedom of choice in representation is not disturbed as they may demand a decertification election.
112. Id. (emphasis added).
113. Id.
114. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), (5) (1976).
115. 618 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1980).
116. Arco had bound itself to these contracts for 15 years. d. at 698-99.
117. Id. at 699.
118. Id. at 700.
119. Id.
120. See NLRB v. Roger's I.G.A., Inc., 605 F.2d 1164 (10th Cir. 1979).
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rational basis for that belief, such reasoning does not justify repudiation of
a contract that had already been negotiated. 121 The court warned that
grave consequences would follow a decision which approved the unilateral
repudiation of an existing contract merely because of a good faith doubt as
to majority status.' 22 After dismissing several other Arco arguments, the
123
court ruled that Arco was bound by the contract to collectively bargain.
When one employer succeeds another in essentially the same business, 124 the successor employer has a duty to consult with the bargaining
representative of the retained employees. 125 In some cases, however, the determination of a duty to bargain must await a successor employer's hiring of
a "full complement"' 1 26 of employees so as to allow the employer to determine if the union actually represents a majority of the employees. 12 7 The
"full complement" question was placed before the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals in the case of NLRB v. Pre-Engtheered Buildng Products, Inc. 128 PreEngineered Building Products, Inc. (company) assumed control over a plant
two weeks after it had been closed down by the prior owner. When the
company's predecessor was in full operation, the work force consisted of
forty-one employees. Upon its acquisition of the plant, the company hired
four employees, all of whom had been employees of the predecessor. 129 The
company was summoned before the Board when it refused to bargain with
the union representing those employees. The Board found that the company
was a successor employer and that it thus had a duty to bargain with the
union. 130
On appeal of its case to the Tenth Circuit, the company argued that the
Board erroneously refused to consider evidence pertaining to the change in
the composition of the plant's work force. The company further averred
that at the time of the Board's hearing, the company had not yet hired a full
complement of workers. 3 ' The appellate court agreed with the company's
contention that the Board acted precipitously in finding a duty to bargain.
The major legal problem, according to the court, was determining at what
point in time the composition of the work force was to be examined so as to
ascertain the union's majority status. The court balanced the need to protect the employees' right to speedy representation against the need to insure
that the representation truly reflects the wishes of a majority of the employees. 1 32 The court asserted that it is also necessary to take into account the
employer's need to build up, to an efficient operating level, a business which
121.
122.

618 F.2d at 700.
Majority status did, however, exist here. Id.

123. Id.
124. See note 95 supra.
125. NLRB v. Burns Int'l Security Servs., 406 U.S. 272 (1972).
126. The duty to bargain with the union may not become apparent until after the new
employer has hired a full complement of workers. Id. at 295.
127. 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1976) requires that the bargaining agent must represent a majority
of the employees in the unit.
128. 603 F.2d 134 (10th Cir. 1979).
129. Id. at 136.
130. Id. at 135.
131. Id.
132. Pacific Hide & Fur Depot, Inc. v. NLRB, 553 F.2d 609, 612-13 (9th Cir. 1977).
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The court determined that the Board should have considered all factors
in deciding whether the company was a successor employer bound to bargain with the preexisting bargaining representative. Therefore, the order of
the Board was denied enforcement and the case was remanded to allow the
Board to hear further evidence on the issue of whether the company actually
had acquired a full complement of workers. The Board was further instructed to decide whether, at the time of the company's refusal to bargain,
134
the union represented a majority of that work force.
D.

Exhausting Union Remedies

When workers are represented by a collective bargaining agreement
which provides grievance procedures to channel employee complaints, the
employees are expected to follow the internal procedures before seeking the
aid of outside factfinders, such as the courts. 135 The requirement that internal procedures be exhausted may be excused, but only in certain extraordinary circumstances.' 36 In Varra v. Dillon COS., 13 7 the Tenth Circuit court was
asked to consider a case in which an employee sued both her union and her
employer without first complying with all of the internal union grievance
procedures. The employee had initially filed a grievance with the union.
After investigating the claim, the union decided not to carry the grievance to
arbitration, a procedure permitted by the collective bargaining agreement.
The employee, however, claimed that the union's decision was "arbitrary
and capricious."'' 3 8 She therefore brought suit against the union, alleging
that the union had breached its duty of fair representation. The employee
filed suit against the employer as well, charging breach of the collective bar39
gaining agreement. 1
The Tenth Circuit court ruled that the lawsuit was premature. The
court noted that the union's constitution provided a means by which an employee could appeal a union official's decision within the structure of the
union. 140 Although in certain circumstances an employee need not exhaust
internal union remedies, 14 1 the court found none of the exceptions to the
exhaustion requirement applicable. Thus, the court held that the employee
could not sue the union until those procedures provided in the union's constitution had been followed.'42
133. 603 F.2d at 136.
134. Id.
135. Imel v. Zohn Mfg. Co., 481 F.2d 181 (10th Cir. 1973), cert.
dnt-d, 415 U.S. 915 (1974).
136. The employee need not exhaust internal procedures if it would be futile to do so, id. at
183; if the union wrongfully prevented access, Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 185-86 (1%7); if the
union and the employer have engaged in racial discrimination, Glover v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 393 U.S. 324, 330-31 (1969); or if the remedies have not provided for redress of the
grievance involved, Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760 v. Morley, 378 F.2d 738, 745 (9th Cir.

1967).
137.
138.

615 F.2d 1315 (10th Cir. 1980).
Id. at 1316.

139.

Id.

140.
141.

Id.
See note 136 supra.

142. 615 F.2d at 1317.
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The court of appeals also examined the suit against the employer. The
employer had argued that the employee's failure to exhaust the union remedies was a defense to the employee's allegations against employer. Although
the court recognized that some jurisdictions do not permit an employer to
raise employee's failure to exhaust union remedies as a defense, 143 the Tenth
44
Circuit decided that such a defense should be available to the employer.'
Because the employee's suit against the employer was based upon its claims
against the union, 14 5 the court declared that proof of the union's breach was
a prerequisite to a judicial finding against the employer. 146 Thus, the employee could not succeed in its suit against either the union or the employer
until all of the union's internal remedies had been exhausted.147
E.

Arbitration

The courts have long recognized the federal policy favoring arbitration
as the primary method for the settlement of disputes arising under collective
bargaining agreements. 148 The preference for arbitration is evidenced by
the fact that the courts have held an employer bound to arbitrate an underlying dispute even when the union has breached a no-strike clause of an
0
agreement. 149 In Reid Burton Construction, Inc. v. Carpenters Distrct Council,15
however, the Tenth Circuit decided that an employer may legitimately refuse to arbitrate if the union's conduct is such as to establish an equitable
defense to an arbitration demand.
The court of appeals noted that the right to arbitration, like any other
contract right, may be waived. 15 ' Looking to the facts surrounding the
case,' 5 2 the court emphasized that the union had not asked for a stay of the
court proceeding nor had it sought an order for arbitration. The union
merely raised the arbitration clause as one of several defenses in its answer to
the charges.1 53 Furthermore, the union participated in pretrial hearings and
143. Compare Winter v. Local 639, Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 569 F.2d 146 (D.C. Cir. 1977);
Harrison v. Chrysler Corp., 558 F.2d 1273 (7th Cir. 1977); Orphan v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 466
F.2d 795 (7th Cir. 1972); Petersen v. Rath Packing Co., 461 F.2d 312 (8th Cir. 1972); Brady v.
TWA, Inc., 401 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1968), cer. denied, 393 U.S. 1048 (1969) with Aldridge v. Ludwig-Honold Mfg. Co., 385 F. Supp. 695 (E.D. Pa. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 937 (1975); Brookins v. Chrysler Corp., 381 F. Supp. 563 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Imbrunnone v. Chrysler Corp., 336
F. Supp. 1223 (E.D. Mich. 1971); Harrington v. Chrysler Corp., 303 F. Supp. 495 (E.D. Mich.
1969). See also Note, The Exhaustion ofInternal Union Remedies as a Prerequisite to Section 301 Actions
Against Labor Unions and Employers, 55 CHI.-KErtT L. REV. 259 (1979).
144. The national labor policy favors private resolution of disputes. The court felt that this
policy was advanced by its decision allowing employers to raise this defense. 615 F.2d at 1317-

18.
145. See Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).
146. 615 F.2d at 1318. See also Hines v. Anchor Motor Freight, Inc., 424 U.S. 554 (1976).
147. 615 F.2d at 1318.
148. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Textile Workers v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
149. See Packinghouse Workers v. Needham Packing Co., 376 U.S. 247 (1964).
150. 614 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1980).
151. Id. at 702.
152. This case had been heard at the trial court level, appealed, remanded, and appealed
again. d. at 700-01.
153. The employer charged the union with breach of a no-strike clause. Id. at 699-700.
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54
On appeal, the
discovery without seeking a stay or order for arbitration.
union claimed that its delay did not constitute a waiver of its right to arbitration because the employer suffered no prejudice as a result of its actions. 15 5 The court, through an examination of the facts, determined that
56
The court found that the emthe union's actions did result in a waiver.'
15 7
Based upon
ployer was prejudiced by the burdens of trial preparation.
these conclusions, the appellate court ruled that the employer was relieved of
his contractual obligation to arbitrate.
5
the Tenth
In Painters Local Union No. 171 v. Williams & Kelly, Inc.,'
of the
the
authority
within
as
clearly
Circuit upheld an arbitrator's award
and
an
employer
between
agreement
arbitrator. A collective bargaining
its
work
of
percent
hire
seventy-five
would
employer
union provided that the
force from the local labor pool. It was provided that the remainder of the
59
The senlaborers would come from employer's work force in California.'
emThis
not
hired.
was
job
the
on
to
work
entitled
ior local employee
an
before
a
hearing
Upon
the
employer.
against
ployee filed a grievance
agreement.
the
violated
had
the
employer
that
determined
was
it
arbitrator,
The local employee was awarded back pay and fringe benefits.'6°

On appeal to the Tenth Circuit court, the employer alleged that
whereas the arbitrator was limited to deciding whether there had been a
contract violation, the arbitrator exceeded his authority by awarding back
pay. 61 The court rejected this argument, noting that courts may not review
the merits of an arbitrator's award which is within the scope of a collective
bargaining agreement. 16 2 In addition, if an arbitrator's decision is within
the bounds of the contract, the courts will recognize a broad arbitral discre63
tion in fashioning an appropriate remedy. 1 As the employer attacked the
arbitrator's remedy but did not challenge the underlying finding that a violation of the agreement had occurred, the court deferred to the decision of
64
the arbitrator. 1
Conversely, in another arbitration case, Operating Engineers Local 670 v.
Kerr-McGee Refning Corp.,16 5 the Tenth Circuit court refused to enforce an
arbitrator's award on the basis that the arbitrator had overstepped his authority. The collective bargaining agreement involved in this case pronounced that the use of false statements to obtain sick leave benefits would
154.

Id. at 703 n.8.

155.

Id. at 702.

156. Id See also, Cornell & Co. v. Barber & Ross Co., 360 F.2d 512 (D.C. Cir. 1966), afg
242 F. Supp. 825 (D.D.C. 1965).
157. 614 F.2d at 703.
158. 605 F.2d 535 (10th Cir. 1979).
.159. Although the employer's home base was California, the agreement arose from a job to
be performed in Colorado. Id. at 536.

160. Id. at 537.
161. d. at 538.
162.

d. See also United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960).

163. 605 F.2d at 538; see Campo Machining Co. v. Local Lodge No. 1926, 536 F.2d 330, 333
(10th Cir. 1976).

164. 605 F.2d at 538.
165. 618 F.2d 657 (10th Cir. 1980).
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constitute grounds for discharge.' 66 An employee who took off from work,
claiming sick leave, presented the employer with a falsified doctor's note.
Soon thereafter, the employee was dismissed for "using false statements to
obtain sick leave, and a history of excessive absenteeism."'' 6 7 The employee's
union challenged the dismissal and the matter went to arbitration.
The arbitrator ruled that the employee should be reinstated. The arbitrator reasoned that as the employer had given two reasons for the discharge, 1 8 unless both charges were supported by evidence, the dismissal was
improper. Although there was sufficient evidence to support the charge that
the employee had made false statements, the company had presented no evidence to support its allegation of excessive absenteeism. Consequently, the
169
arbitrator found for the employee.
The employer argued, on appeal, that the arbitrator had exceeded his
authority.170 The court agreed. The reviewing court explained that an arbitrator's award may not be contrary to the express terms of the collective
bargaining agreement.' 7 ' The arbitrator recognized that the employee had
violated the sick leave provisions of the contract, yet he seemingly ignored
those terms in his decision. The provisions of the bargaining agreement
clearly provided for the discharge of an employee guilty of making false
statements. Finding that the arbitrator had no authority to "add to" the
172
terms of the contract by also requiring proof of the excessive absenteeism,
the court vacated the arbitrator's award.
II.

HYBRID JURISDICTION

In Richins v. Southern Pacifc Co., 173 the Tenth Circuit was presented with
a case involving dual jurisdiction. Railroad employees charged that their
employer was guilty of a violation of a collective bargaining agreement.
These employees filed an additional claim against their union, alleging
breach of the duty of fair representation. The federal district court dismissed
the action upon the ground that the employees had failed to exhaust their
administrative remedies before the National Railroad Adjustment Board
74
(Adjustment Board). 1
The Tenth Circuit court ruled that the district court could entertain the
case under a hybrid jurisdiction. This hybrid jurisdiction was made neces166. Id. at 658.
167. Id. (emphasis added).
168. The two reasons given to explain the discharge were the employee's use of false statements to obtain sick leave and the excessive absenteeism. Id.
169. Id. at 658-59.
170. Id.
171. See Fabricut, Inc. v. Tulsa Gen. Drivers, 597 F.2d 227, 229 (10th Cir. 1979); Mistletoe
Express Serv. v. Motor Expressmen's Union, 566 F.2d 692, 695 (10th Cir. 1977).
172. 618 F.2d at 659-60.
173. 620 F.2d 761 (10th Cir. 1980).
174. Id See also Union Pac. R.R. v. Sheehan, 439 U.S. 89, 94 (1978) (minor disputes go to
the Adjustment Board, not to the courts); Magnuson v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 576 F.2d
1367 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 930 (1978) (no suit permitted until the exhaustion of remedies through National Railway Adjustment Board); Note, Labor Law-Preemption Docrine and
Exhaustion of Adnistrative Remedies Under theRailway Labor Act-Magnuson v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 52 TEMP. L.Q. 198 (1979).
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sary by the fact that, although the Adjustment Board had jurisdiction over
the employees' charge against the railroad,1 75 it lacked jurisdiction over the
76
unfair representation claim against the union. 1 The court was unwilling to
split the two complaints. Hearings by both the Adjustment Board and the
district court would result in an undesirable duplication of effort, since the
77
contract in dispute applied to both claims.1
Although some courts havc argued that the Adjustment Board should
have the authority to hear hybrid cases,' 78 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that, absent express authorization from the Supreme Court or
79
Congress, the Adjustment Board should not be given such broad power.'
Because the appellate court felt that the federal courts should not relinquish
fair representation cases, the court declared that the district court should
take jurisdiction over both the case against the railroad and the case against
the union.
III.

FAIR LABOR STANDARDS ACT

180

The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) I8s applies to certain
"enterprises" defined by statute. 18 2 In United States v. El/edge,' 83 the Tenth
Circuit was asked to determine if a day care facility came under the coverage
of FLSA. FLSA explicitly states that preschools, elementary schools, and
secondary schools are covered by the Act. Although other enterprises are
defined, 18 4 the statute, unfortunately, does not give a definition of the term
"preschool.' 8 5 The business in question was described as a day care facility, providing toys, meals, outdoor play, and occasional field trips, mainly for
children of working mothers. The school had no certified teachers, and no
lesson plans or progress reports were prepared. 8 6 The operator of the business argued that the facility was simply a day care center, not a preschool.
The Secretary of Labor, however, asserted that the enterprise was a preschool subject to FLSA requirements.
The court looked to the legislative history of FLSA, but could find no
guidelines to aid in the determination of whether a given facility is a preschool. The court noted that the Ninth Circuit, in considering the same
question, held that operations "essentially custodial in nature"' 1 7 for the
175.
176.

620 F.2d at 762.
Id. at 762-63.

177. Id. at 763.
178. See, e.g., Goclowski v. Penn Central Transp. Co., 571 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1978).
179. 620 F.2d at 763.
180. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1976).
181. Id.
182. Id. § 203(s)(5) includes as enterprises: "a school for mentally or physically handicapped or gifted children, a preschool, elementary or secondary school, or an institution of
higher education . ... "
183. 614 F.2d 247 (10th Cir. 1980).
184. 29 U.S.C. § 203(v), (w) (1976).
185. The term "preschool" was added to the statute by amendment. Education Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, § 906(b)(2), (3), 86 Stat. 375 (codified in 29 U.S.C.
§ 203(s)(5) (1976)).
186. 614 F.2d at 249.
187. Marshall v. Rosemont, Inc., 584 F.2d 319, 321 (9th Cir. 1978).
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purpose of providing day care for children of working mothers were not
preschools regulated by FLSA. The Tenth Circuit, however, rejected the
Ninth Circuit precedent and instead looked to the common meaning of the
word "preschool."' 88 The court emphasized that expert testimony supported the contention that children can learn simply through exposure to
other children and adults.' 89 The appellate court considered the humanitarian and remedial purposes of the FLSA and decided that, in order to carry
out the purposes of the legislation, the term "preschool" must be given a
broad interpretation.1 9 0 Accordingly, the court held that an operation
which is open only for custodial purposes falls under the coverage of the
FLSA.
Linda B Burlington

188.
189.
190.

614 F.2d at 250.
Id.
Id. at 251.

LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES
OVERVIEW

As the United States enters the fuel-scarce 1980's, national attention
centers on the energy-rich West. Vast amounts of coal, oil, natural gas, uranium, and oil shale lie untapped in the region encompassed within the
Tenth Circuit's jurisdiction. Full-scale development of these minerals will
significantly strain existing environments. Many mineral deposits occur on
federal lands subject to numerous federal environmental and multi-use statutes. Preserving valuable park and wilderness areas while extracting a sufficient amount of energy fuels presents both a challenge and a dilemma. As
the pace of mineral development quickens, legal conflicts will develop between and among producers, distributors, carriers, environmental groups,
Indian tribes, private land owners, and federal, state, and local governments.
Increasingly, these disputes are being litigated in the federal courts.
During the past year, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided nineteen
cases involving natural resources issues. Several of the cases were of major
importance. Issues associated with the use and control of Indian lands were
addressed in six Tenth Circuit decisions. A Tenth Circuit case wherein the
court of appeals upheld the right of Indian tribes to place a severance tax on
minerals removed from reservation lands, if upheld by the United States
Supreme Court, will greatly increase tribal revenues for those tribes located
on mineral-rich lands. Attempts to alter the terms of existing natural gas
contracts also occupied the court's time. In a decision with potentially farreaching consequences, the Tenth Circuit cleared the way for coal slurry
pipeline companies to obtain rights of way across railroad lands.
This survey will examine the rationale employed by the Tenth Circuit
in deciding these natural resource issues. A more extended analysis will accompany the discussion of those decisions of major significance.
I.

INDIAN LANDS

A number of important issues relating to Indian lands and Indian rights
were presented to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals during the past term.
The right of executive-order reservation tribes to impose mineral severance
taxes upon non-Indians, state criminal jurisdiction over Indian hunting and
fishing activities on trust lands, the effect of anti-alienation statutes on allotted lands, the scope of responsibility of the Secretary of the Interior under
the Southern Paiute Judgment Distribution Act, the necessity of joining the
United States in municipal easement condemnations of reservation lands,
and the jurisdiction of state courts to determine Indian water rights were
among the plethora of legal issues addressed by the court during the past
year.

DENVER LAW JOURNAL
A.

Vahdit

[Vol. 58:2

of Indian Severance Taxation

Perhaps the most significant public lands decision of the Tenth Circuit
was Merrion v. Jicartlla Apache Tribe,' a case wherein the court upheld the
right of Indian tribes to impose a mineral severance tax on non-Indians producing oil and gas from leases on executive-order reservation lands. 2 This
holding will, in all probability, allow Indian tribes on mineral-rich reservations to vastly increase their revenues.
Merrion, under federal leases, produced oil and gas from wells located
on the Jicarilla Apache tribe's reservation in northern New Mexico. In 1976,
the Jicarilla Tribal Council passed an ordinance imposing a severance tax on
all oil and gas extracted and removed from the reservation. The ordinance
was passed pursuant to a revised tribal constitution adopted in 1968, 3 which,
in turn, was adopted under authority granted by the Indian Reorganization
Act of 1934 (1934 Act). 4 After the ordinance was approved by the Secretary,
Merrion and other federal oil and gas lessees with wells on the reservation
sought declaratory and injunctive relief in the United States District Court
for the District of New Mexico. These lessees brought the action in order to
prohibit enforcement of the tax.
After a hearing on the merits, the trial court issued a preliminary injunction prohibiting enforcement of the tax, declaring it illegal and unconstitutional. The lower court could find no express congressional authority
for the tax and determined that there was no inherent sovereign power in the
tribe to impose the tax. Furthermore, the trial court held that the tax was an
unconstitutional burden on interstate commerce and that the tribal tax had
been preempted by an express congressional grant of authority to New Mexico to impose severance taxes on oil and gas production within executiveorder reservations under provisions of section 398c of Title 25 of the United
States Code. 5
1. 617 F.2d 537 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3208 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1980) (No.

80-1 1).
2. The tax is imposed at the time of severance, is payable monthly, and is assessed per
million Btu of natural gas and per barrel of crude oil taken off the reservation. Oil and gas used
as royalty payment to the tribe is exempt from the tax. Id. at 539.
3. Article XI, section l(e) provides:
Taxes and Fees. The tribal council may levy and collect taxes and fees on tribal
members, and may enact ordinances, subject to approval by the Secretary of the
Interior, to impose taxes, and fees on non-members of the tribe doing business on
the reservation.
(quoted in 617 F.2d at 539).
4. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1976) provides, in part:
Any Indian tribe or tribes, residing on the same reservation, shall have the right to
organize for its common welfare, and may adopt an appropriate constitution and bylaws, which shall become effective when ratified by a majority vote of the adult members of the tribe, or of the adult members residing on such reservation, as the case may
be, at a special election authorized and called by the Secretary of the Interior under
such rules and regulations as he may prescribe,

5. 617 F.2d at 540. 25 U.S.C. § 398c (1976) provides:
Taxes may be levied and collected by the State or local authority upon improvements,
output of mines or oil and gas wells, or other rights, property, or assets of any lessee
upon lands within Executive order Indian reservations in the same manner as such
taxes are otherwise levied and collected, and such taxes may be levied against the
share obtained for the Indians as bonuses, rentals, and royalties, and the Secretary of
the Interior is authorized and directed to cause such taxes to be paid out of the tribal
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Upon the tribe's appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the court, per Judge Logan, addressed the following three issues: 1) whether sovereign immunity
precluded suit against the tribe;6 2) whether the tribe possessed inherent
power to impose the severance tax; 7 and 3) whether the tax violated the
commerce clause. 8
The preliminary jurisdictional issue was discussed first. Noting that
sovereign immunity generally prevented suit against the Indian tribes absent
their consent, 9 the court of appeals found that the Jicarilla Apache tribe had
expressly waived its immunity in a provision of a recently passed tribal ordinance. Under the 1934 Act, broad powers of self government were granted
to the tribes, powers broad enough to allow them to waive their immunity.
To deny the tribe this right of waiver would, the appellate court reasoned,
contradict both the terms and the intent of the 1934 Act. Moreover, the
court concluded that by approving the ordinance, the Secretary had ratified
the waiver provisions contained therein; therefore, the express waiver of immunity found in the tribal ordinance was valid.iO
After disposing of the jurisdictional question, the court of appeals addressed the crucial issue of the case-whether executive-order reservation
tribes possess z/hereni power to impose a mineral severance tax on non-Indians operating on reservation lands. The court stated that "the case . . .
presents the bald issue of an Indian tribe's taxing power without benefit of
reservations of authority in a treaty."' I
The Tenth Circuit court discussed the problems posed by the quasisovereign status of the Indian tribes. Certain powers are denied to the tribes
because exercise of these powers would in some way infringe on the superior
rights of the United States. Thus, the Indian tribes have no right to independently transfer land, 12 to deal with foreign nations,1 3 or to assert criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.i4 The court of appeals, however, found
that the tribe's enactment of the mineral severance tax did not interfere with
any federal right. The federal taxing power remained unscathed since the
United States could "tax non-Indians or Indians within the reservation
whether or not the Tribe levies this tax. ' ' i 5 Neither did the tax violate the
protection afforded by the fifth and fourteenth amendments, because, according to the court of appeals, the tax was not so severe as to constitute a
deprivation of property. 16
The remaining aspect of this issue, and the central one, was whether
funds in the Treasury: Providtd, That such taxes shall not become a lien or charge of
any kind against the land or other property of such Indians.
6. 617 F.2d at 540.
7. Id. at 541.
8. Id. at 544.
9. E.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978); United States v. United
States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940).
10. 617 F.2d at 540.
I1. Id. at 543.
12. Johnson and Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
13. The Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 9, 17-18 (1831).
14. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
15. 617 F.2d at 542.
16. Id.
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taxation is one of those inherent powers surrendered by Indian tribes when
they acquire their quasi-sovereign status. While recognizing that recent
Supreme Court decisions have limited the inherent powers of the tribes because of the current dependent status of Indians, t 7 the Tenth Circuit pointed
out that the test employed by the Supreme Court in making these determinations was not based upon the degree of a tribe's dependency, but rather
the Court examined whether the exercise of a certain power by the tribes
would interfere with the sovereignty of the United States. If dependency
were the test, the court of appeals reasoned, then consistency would dictate
that the tribes exercise no powers over either non-members or members, ultimately conditioning the very existence of the tribes upon congressional approval. This would reduce the tribes to private, voluntary associations, a
status expressly rejected by the Court in United States v. Mazurze.' 8
In finding that taxation is an inherent power retained by the Indian
tribes, the Tenth Circuit relied upon Supreme Court decisions which have
held that territoriality is one of the sovereign powers which the Indian tribes
have not surrendered. The court of appeals concluded that this fact justified
the imposition by the tribes of a tax on the extraction and removal of minerals by non-Indians from Indian territory.' 9
The court of appeals focused on section 16 of the 1934 Act, which section recognized generally the sovereign powers of the tribes. Noting that
Congress was aware of the holding in Buster v. Wright,20 wherein the Court
had affirmed the right of the Creek Nation to impose a tax on non-Indians
doing business on its reservation, the Tenth Circuit found implicit congressional approval of the Indian taxing power because no express provisions
limiting the taxing power had been included in the 1934 Act. 2t Further
support for this interpretation was found in an opinion by the Solicitor of the
Department of Interior, issued shortly after passage of the 1934 Act. Com17. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978); United States v.
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978).
18. 419 U.S. 544 (1975).
19. E.g., Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959); Johnson & Graham's Lessee v. M'Intosh, 21
U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823).
20. 135 F. 947 (8th Cir. 1905), appeal dismissed, 203 U.S. 599 (1906). The court of appeals
had held:
The authority of the Creek Nation to prescribe the terms upon which noncitizens may
transact business within its borders did not have its origin in act of Congress, treaty, or
agreement of the United States. It was one of the inherent and essential attributes of
its original sovereignty. It was a natural right of that people, indispensable to its autonomy as a distinct tribe or nation,. and it must remain an attribute of its government
until by the agreement of the nation itself or by the superior power of the republic it is
taken from it.
Id. at 950.
Other cases upholding the right of tribes to impose taxes on non-Indians doing business
within Indian reservations include Morris v. Hitchcock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904) (grazing tax);
Barta v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 259 F.2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied 358 U.S. 932 (1959) (nonIndian cattle grazing lessee cannot raise constitutional claims of deprivation of property without
due process of law because Indian tribes are not states or other political subdivisions of the
United States); Iron Crow v. Oglala Sioux Tribe, 231 F.2d 89, 99 (8th Cir. 1956) ("Inasmuch as
it has never been taken from it, the defendant Oglala Sioux Tribe possesses the power of taxation [on the privilege of grazing livestock] which is an inherent power incident of its sovereignty.").
21. 617 F.2d at 544.
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menting on section 16, the Solicitor stated that "chief among the powers of
sovereignty recognized as pertaining to an Indian tribe is the power of taxation."' 2 2 The court of appeals reasoned that this contemporaneous interpretation of the meaning of section 16, by the agency charged with its
23
enforcement, should be given great weight.
After finding that the tribe had an inherent power to tax mineral lessees
doing business on the tribe's reservation, the Tenth Circuit addressed the
trial court's finding that the tax violated the commerce clause. In rejecting
the trial court's conclusion that the tax was discriminatory because it did not
apply to oil and gas royalty production transferred to the tribe, the court of
appeals pointed out the purposeless and self-defeating nature of the imposition of a tribal tax on its own resources. 24 In addition, the court found that
no burden was imposed upon interstate commerce by the severance tax per
se. In support of this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit noted a line of cases
which have held that a tax on local activity, levied before a product enters
the stream of interstate commerce, is not categorically subject to commerce
25
clause restrictions.
It was more difficult for the court of appeals to justify the tax as not
imposing a multiple burden on interstate commerce, since the State of New
Mexico also taxes the oil and gas produced on the Jicarilla reservation. The
court divided this issue into two questions: 1) whether New Mexico's tax
interfered with the United States interest in allowing the tribe to enact its
tax, and 2) whether Congress had preempted the tribe's power to tax oil and
gas lessees by expressly granting to the states the power to tax lessees on
executive-order reservations under section 398 of Title 25.26 It is significant
that the court of appeals declined to consider the first issue. Moreover, the
manner in which the question was phrased indicates that, if the issue is
raised in subsequent litigation, the appellate court may find that state severance taxes on minerals extracted from Indian lands are an unconstitutional
27
intrusion into the federal government's power to regulate Indian affairs.
22.

55 Interior Dec. 14, 46 (1934).

See F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW

142 (1942), wherein the author states that "one of the powers essential to the maintenance of
any government is the power to levy taxes. That this power is an inherent attribute of tribal
sovereignty which continues unless withdrawn or limited by treaty or by act of Congress is a
proposition which has never been successfully disputed."
23. 617 F.2d at 544.
24. Id. at 545.
25. E.g., Oliver Iron Mining Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1923).
26. 617 F.2d at 546.
27. For a discussion which concludes that states do not have the power to preempt Indian
mineral taxation, see Comment, The Case for Excluste Tribal Power to Tax Mineral Lessees of Indan
Lands, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 491 (1975). The author argues that state taxation of Indian reservation mineral lessees is invalid because: 1)it reduces the income to the tribe, thereby impairing
its ability to function as a governmental entity; and 2) it interferes illegally with the tribe's
sovereign right to impose taxes. Id. at 507. But see Oklahoma Tax Comm'n v. Texas Co., 336
U.S. 342 (1949), wherein the Court held that states could tax oil company income derived from
mineral production activities on reservation leaseholds, even though it might interfere with tribal royalty payments. See also Agua Caliente Band of Mission Indians v. County of Riverside,
306 F. Supp. 279 (CD. Cal. 1969), affd442 F.2d 1184 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. detied, 405 U.S. 933
(1972), wherein a state possessory interest tax on non-Indians was upheld even though it imposed a burden on the tribe's only source of income.
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Though recognizing the express language in section 398 authorizing
state taxation, 28 the court of appeals reasoned that, by not specifically
prohibiting Indian taxation of the minerals, Congress did not preempt the
29
power of executive-order Indian reservation tribes to enact severance taxes.
In reaching this conclusion, the appellate court followed the well-settled
orinciole that statutes affecting Indians are to be construed so that ambigui30
ties are resolved in their favor.
The court of appeals inferred that because Congress failed either to explicitly permit or to prohibit the levying of Indian severance taxes, Congress
did not consider the issue at the time of the enactment of section 398. The
court also employed this reasoning to support its conclusion that the provision in section 398c, for royalty and bonus payments to Indians through the
leasing process, was not meant to preclude the enactment of a severance tax
by executive-order tribes. 3 ' The crucial part of the 1934 Act, according to
the majority, was the section allowing Indians to determine for themselves
what leasing regulations to enact. 32 The court noted that the Department of
the Interior had implemented this provision in its leasing regulations.
Two lengthy and vigorous dissents were filed by Chief Judge Seth and
Judge Barrett. Chief Judge Seth's analysis centered upon the particular history of the Jicarilla tribe and its nomadic nature. 33 Because of this, Chief
Judge Seth reasoned that the Jicarillas never exercised the territoriality
which he felt would have justified the imposition of the tax. 34 He noted that
the historical sovereign in this geographic area was Mexico, which ceded the
territory to the United States in the 1848 Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo.
Although the treaty provided for certain previously existing property rights,
the Jicarilla tribe was not mentioned among those with claims to the land.
Chief Judge Seth distinguished the nomadic Jicarilla tribe from the settled
Pueblo Indians and noted that the creation of the Jicarilla reservation by
executive order did not bestow any territorial rights upon the tribe. The
chief judge concluded that the tribe's property rights were no different from
28. See note 5 supra for the text of section 398c.
29. In British-American Oil Producing Co. v. Board of Equalization, 299 U.S. 159 (1936),
the Court held that section 398c applied to unallotted tribal trust lands and that "Congress
assents to taxation by the State of the production of oil and gas through a lease given under
[section 398c's] provisions." Id. at 166. The Court, however, had determined earlier in the
decision that the reservation was of congressional origin, rather than a creature of executive
order. Since section 398c pertains specifically to executive-order reservations, the Court may
have misapplied the statute. In addition, the Brtish-Amercan Court did not reach the issue of
the exclusivity of the state tax.
30. E.g., Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976) (citing Northern Cheyenne Tribe v.
Hollowbreast, 425 U.S. 649, 655 n.7 (1976) and Alaska Pacific Fisheries v. United States, 248
U.S. 78, 89 (1918)).
31. 617 F.2d at 547-48.
32. 25 U.S.C. § 396b (1976) provides, in part:
[Tihe foregoing provisions shall in no manner restrict the right of tribes organized and
incorporated under sections 476 and 477 of this title, to lease lands for miningpurposesas
therein provided and in accordance with the provisions of any constitution and charter adopted by any
Indian tribe ....
(emphasis added).
33. 617 F.2d at 551 (Seth, C.J., dissenting).
34. Id. But see the concurring opinion of Judge McKay, in which he states that the concept
of tribal sovereignty is not dependent on the exercise of territorial rights. Id.-at 549.
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those of any other socio-economic group 35 and, therefore, the 1934 Act did
not create a status in the tribe which had not existed previously. Although
conceding that the 1934 Act granted to the tribes power over the internal
and social relations of tribal members, such as criminal jurisdiction and inheritance distribution, Chief Judge Seth stated that these rights did not in36
clude the independent power to tax as a sovereign nation.
Judge Barrett, in his dissent, emphasized that the Jicarilla reservation
was created by executive order and that there were, therefore, no treaty
rights involved in the Jicarillas' attempt to exercise taxing powers. Judge
Barrett noted that past cases which upheld the power of the tribes to enact
taxes on non-Indian activities were based on specific grants in individual
treaties, statutes, or agreements. Since there had been no express grant of
taxation authority to the Jicarilla tribe, the judge argued that a "balancing
of interests" test had to be applied. 37 Judge Barrett then interpreted section
398c as demonstrating a clear congressional intent to reserve to state and
local governments the right to levy and collect taxes on production from oil
and gas wells within executive-order Indian reservations. 38
The Tenth Circuit decision in Merron v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe has the
potential of allowing any Indian tribe to enact severance taxes on mineral
production within reservations created by executive order or by treaty.
Since the Tenth Circuit court found sufficient legal justification for the imposition of a severance tax by tribal governments on executive-order reservations, despite express statutory provisions granting to the states the power to
tax mineral production on these lands, there is little doubt that similar taxes
enacted by tribes living on treaty-created reservations, which reservations do
not have corresponding statutory provisions permitting state severance taxes,
39
will be upheld.
35. This statement appears to be at odds with the Supreme Court decision in United States
v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975), wherein the Court stated that "Indian tribes are unique
aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both their members and their territory."
See also McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 173 (1973); United States v.
Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381-82 (1886) ("[Indian tribes are] a separate people, with the power of
regulating their internal and social relations"); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 (6 Pet.) 515, 557 (1832)
("[T~he several Indian nations fare] distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having a right to all the lands within those
boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guaranteed by the United States.").
36. 617 F.2d at 553-54.
37. Id. at 557-59 (Barrett, J., dissenting).
38. For a discussion of congressional history relative to section 398c, see Comment, The Case
for Exclusive Tribal Power to Tax Mineral Lessees ofIndan Lands, 124 U. PA. L. REV. 491, 520 n. 175
(1975). See also Comment, TribalPower to Tax Non-Indian Mineral Lessees, 19 NAT. RESOURCES J.
969, 989-90 (1979), which discusses the confusing congressional history of section 398. It is
interesting to note that the authors of these two comments come to completely opposite conclusions regarding congressional intent over executive-order Indian reservation tribal power to tax
mineral lessees.
39. There are several current federal district court cases on this issue. However, the tribe
involved in these cases is a treaty reservation tribe--the Navajos. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, No. 79-0153 (D. Utah, filed Mar. 15, 1979); Salt River Project
Agricultural Improvement and Power Dist. v. Navajo Tribe of Indians, No. 78-352 (D. Ariz.,
filed July 11, 1978).
See also Ames, Tribal Taxation of Non-Inditan Mineral Lessees.- An Undefmed Inherent Power, 6 J.
CONTEMP. L. 55 (1979). Ames argues that the power to tax mineral lessees on reservation land
is an inherent power of tribal sovereignty.
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The weakest part of the majority's opinion appears to be in its conclusion that the express congressional grant of -authority to the states to tax
mineral production on executive-order reservations did not preempt tribal
taxation of the same production. 40 The Merrion decision places oil and gas
and other mineral lessees operating on Indian reservations in the economically disadvantageous position of paying severance taxes on the same mineral production to both the state and Indian governmental bodies. This
double taxation may become so onerous as to constitute either an unconstitutional taking of property or an undue burden on interstate commerce.
A related, and as yet unanswered question, which will likely arise in
future litigation, is whether a stale severance tax on Indian reservation minerals is an unconstitutional intrusion on the powers of the federal government. In the Merrion case, the federal government had specifically granted
to the states the authority to tax oil and gas production from the Jicarillas'
executive-order reservation. If a state were to tax mineral production from
Indian reservations created by treaty, in which case section 398 would not
apply, the state might be guilty of unduly burdening interstate commerce.
A challenge to the state's taxation would arise if the double taxation provided a stumbling block to the continued mining or drilling on Indian
4
lands. '
B.

Munict;ial Easement Condemnation of Indian Lands

In United States v. City of McAlester,42 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the United States was not a necessary party to the city's 1903 watershed basin easement condemnation of Choctaw and Chickasaw reservation lands. The court, however, remanded the case to the federal district
court for reconsideration of whether the city's present use of the easement
43
was consistent with watershed basin purposeS.
The City of McAlester had condemned 2,535.8 acres of Indian lands in
The doctrine of Indian sovereignty means little if a tribe has no revenues to carry out
its plans. This is especially true with the Navajo, whose population is undereducated
and underemployed ....
If a tribe is to govern itself, it is essential that taxation be
one of the powers which is retained.
Id. at 64. This reasoning was adopted by Judge McKay in his concurring opinion. Judge McKay asserted that "it simply does not make sense to expect the tribes to carry out municipal
functions approved and mandated by Congress without being able to exercise at least minimal
taxing powers, whether they take the form of real estate taxes, leasehold taxes or severance
taxes." 617 F.2d at 550 (McKay, J., concurring).
40. See note 38 supra.
41. The Solicitor of the Department of Interior recently issued an opinion concerning New
Mexico's taxation of the royalties accruing to the Jicarilla tribe from oil and gas production on
reservation land. The opinion states that § 398 prescribes that executive-order reservation
tribes are to be treated the same as treaty reservation tribes. Furthermore, he asserted that,
pursuant to an earlier opinion explaining that tribal royalties from oil and gas production on
treaty reservations in Montana could not be taxed by the state, "taxation of production on
Jicarilla Apache tribal lands from leases made under the 1938 Leasing Act is not authorized by
§ 398c. . . . Thus, New Mexico may not tax royalties received by the Jicarilla Apache Tribe
from 1938 Act leases." [19791 6 INDIAN L. RPTR. H-4. This opinion, however, was specifically
limited to Indian royalties and did not address New Mexico's right to impose severance taxes on
the lessees themselves.

42. 604 F.2d 42 (10th Cir. 1979).
43.

Id. at 55.
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1903 for use as a "watershed and basin and [for] erecting, maintaining, and
using a waterworks system," without joining the United States in the condemnation proceeding.4 4 In 1950, the encumbered tribes filed a quiet title
suit against the city and moved to join the United States. The United States
45
The
was dismissed from the suit because it had not consented to be sued.
46
court,
district
the
by
valid
ruled
subsequently
was
easement condemnation
which held that the Tenth Circuit decision of Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations v.
7
Sez'Iz 4 was controlling. In 1975, the United States brought a second quiet
title action on behalf of itself and as the trustee of Indian lands. The government argued that because the United States was an indispensable party to
the original 1903 action, the city's failure to join the United States rendered
the 1903 condemnation decision invalid. The federal district court ruled
49
48
a three-judge Tenth Circuit panel reversed,
against the United States,
50
and, upon grant of a rehearing en banc, the panel decision was overturned.
The issues presented on appeal were: 1) whether the United States was
an indispensable party to the 1903 condemnation; 2) whether section 11 of
city had
the Curtis Act authorized the condemnation; and 3) whether the
5
1
purposes.
non-watershed
for
easement
the
of
use
made improper
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that the Non-Intercourse Act of
183452 prevented any conveyance of Indian land without the consent of the
United States.5 3 The court pointed out, however, that this restriction had
been significantly modified by subsequent legislation. Under provisions es4
tablished by the Dawes Commission of 1893,' the United States gave its
broad consent to the alienation of Indian lands without requiring specific
prior approval by the federal government. Furthermore, section 11 of the
Curtis Act allowed incorporated cities adjacent to reservation lands to condemn "lands actually necessary for public improvements, regardless of tribal
lines." ' 55 Also, the Atoka Agreement of 1897, between the Dawes Commission and the Choctaw and Chickasaw nations, which was incorporated as
section 29 of the Curtis Act, 56 gave United States consent for the tribes to
44. City of South McAlester v. Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations, No. 3293 (C.D. Ind.
Terr. 1903).
45. 604 F.2d at 58.
46. Choctaw and Chickasaw Nations v. City of McAlester, No. 2781-Civil (E.D. Okla.
Sept. 10, 1952).
47. 193 F.2d 456 (10th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 919 (1952).
48. United States v. City of McAlester, 410 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Okla. 1976).
49. The panel decision is reprinted at the conclusion of the en banc decision. 604 F.2d at 57.
Judges McWilliams and Doyle dissented from the majority opinion and continued to adhere to
the panel decision. See Overview, Lands and Natural Resources, Fifth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, 56
DEN. L.J. 517, 524-26 (1979).
50. 604 F.2d at 55.
51. Id. at 45.
52. 25 U.S.C. § 177 (1976) provides, in part:
No purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands, or of any title or claim
thereto, from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians, shall be of any validity in law or
equity, unless the same be made by treaty or convention entered into pursuant to the
Constitution.
53. 604 F.2d at 47.
54. 27 Stat. 612, 645 (1893).
55. Curtis Act of 1898, ch. 517, 30 Stat. 495, 498.
56. Id. at 505-13.
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alienate their lands.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on section 2 of the Curtis
Act to justify its conclusion that the United States was not a necessary party
to the 1903 condemnation. 57 The majority of the court inferred that the
legislature's failure to expressly mandate the inclusion of the United States
as a necessary party demonstrated a congressional belief that the federal government was not an indispensable party in an action affecting tribal property.5 8 The court concluded that the specific provisions of the Curtis Act,
permitting the alienation of Indian lands without joinder of the United
States, controlled over the more general provisions of the Non-Intercourse
Act.5 9
In rejecting the government's argument that the condemnation provisions of section 11 pertained only to allotted lands, the court focused on the
express language of the Curtis Act, which granted condemnation authority
to "all towns and cities ... [and] all lands, regardless of tribal lines . . .,6
The court was satisfied that this language demonstrated that municipal condemnation actions are not limited to allotted lands. Although the condemnation provisions of section 11 deal principally with allotted lands, the court
pointed out that some of the section's provisions also refer to certain types of
unallotted lands. 6 ' The court concluded that although the provision for
condemnation proceedings had been included within section 11, Congress
62
did not intend thereby to limit condemnation actions to allotted lands.
The United States claim that Congress had breached its fiduciary duty
as trustee of Indian lands, by allowing condemnation of unallotted lands
without the government's prior, specific consent, was also rejected. The
court found the 1953 decision of Choctaw and Chickasaw Natlzns v. Atoka, 63 in
which the court had allowed the condemnation of unallotted Indian lands,
to be controlling on this point. Further support for the court's reasoning was
found in provisions of section 11, which established certain procedural requirements for municipal condemnation actions, such as the guarantee of
the right to a jury trial and the designation of territorial federal district court
judges to preside over condemnation actions. These procedural safeguards
indicated, to the majority of the court, that the United States had not
breached its fiduciary duties. 64
Although the court of appeals affirmed the district court's decision, the
case was remanded for a further hearing on the issue of whether the city had
violated the purpose of the original easement. The city had leased some of
57. 604 F.2d at 49. Section 2 of the Curtis Act made Indian tribes necessary parties to any
action affecting tribal property. 30-Stat. 495 (1898).
58. 604 F.2d at 50.
59. Id. at 49.
60. 30 Stat. 498 (1898).
61. Id. at 497-498. Certain provisions of the Curtis Act reserved from allotment those
lands used for churches, schools, parsonages, charitable institutions, and burial grounds.
62. 604 F.2d at 50.
63. 207 F.2d 763 (10th Cir. 1953).
64. 604 F.2d at 51.
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the easement lands for private uses. 65 The court noted that whether these
non-municipal activities were a departure from the necessary or incidental
purposes of the watershed easement was a question to be decided under
66
Oklahoma law.
Judges McWilliams, Doyle, and McKay subscribed to the earlier panel
decision. 6 7 The unanimous three-judge panel had held that whereas the
condemnation provisions in the Curtis Act appeared in section 11, and
whereas this section dealt exclusively with allotted lands, unallotted lands
were not included in those Indian lands subject to condemnation.
C.

State Court Jurisdiction Over Indian Reserved Water Rights

The jurisdictional authority of state courts to determine the status of
Indian reserved water rights was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals in Jzcar'laApache Tribe v. United States.68 In addition, the court confirmed the propriety of United States representation of Indian federal reserved water rights interests in state water rights adjudications. The right of
a tribe to independently intervene to protect tribal water rights was also
advanced.

69

In an action filed in state district court, New Mexico sought a general
water rights adjudication of all the water rights and uses of the San Juan
River system.70 As the action involved the determination of federally reserved water rights, including Indian reserved water rights, the United
States was joined as a defendant. The United States attempted to remove
the case to federal district court. Furthermore, the federal government
sought to dismiss that part of the suit designating the United States as the
fiduciary representative of all Indian reserved rights, claiming conflicts of
interest. 7 ' The United States District Court for the District of New Mexico
remanded the case to the state district court for a determination of all water
rights claims, including the Indian claims. The federal district court man72
dated that the United States continue to represent Indian interests.
The Jicarilla Apache tribe subsequently filed suit in federal district
65. Id. at 52. These private uses included farming, hunting, fishing, grazing, and recreational uses.
66. Id. at 55. The court held that the test used by the trial court, i.e., whether the present
uses were inconsisient with the watershed easement, was improper. The appropriate test, under
Oklahoma law, was whether the uses were "incident or necessary to the reasonable and proper
enjoyment of the easement." Hudson v. Lee, 393 P.2d 515, 518-19 (Okla. 1964).
67. 604 F.2d at 57-64. The panel decision was authored by the honorable Howard T.
Markey, Chief Judge, United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, sitting by designation.
68. 601 F.2d 1116 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 530 (1979). The McCarran Amendment, 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1976), in which the United States consented to joinder in any state
proceeding involving the general adjudication of water rights, provided the statutory basis for
the court's holding.
69. 601 F.2d at 1127.
70. Reynolds v. United States, No. 75-184 (Dist. Ct. San Juan County, filed Mar. 13,
1975).
71. 601 F.2d at 1118. The United States implied that whereas the Apaches, the Navajos,
and the Utes all had reserved water rights claims involved in the litigation, it could not adequately represent each tribe's interest. Id. at 1120.
72. Id.
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court, seeking both a general adjudication of water rights on the Navajo
River system and injunctive relief against the United States to protect the
73
tribe from an alleged violation of the Upper Colorado River Compact.
The tribe asserted that the United States diversion of water from the
Chama-Rio Grande River system through the San Juan-Chama Project exceeded the amount of water that could beneficially be used by the appro74
priating parties.
The State of New Mexico argued that the adjudication of all federally
reserved water rights should be conducted in one forum. The state also asserted that the United States was the real party in interest in any litigation
involving Indian reserved water rights. The federal district court suggested
to the tribe that a bifurcation of the reserved rights issue and the interstate
compact issue would facilitate a hearing on the transmountain diversion aspects of the case. The tribe rejected the court's suggestion. 75 The federal
district court then dismissed the entire case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 76
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the central issue before the court was
whether the McCarran Amendment 77 had effectively repealed the jurisdictional disclaimer contained in the New Mexico Enabling Act 78 and in the
state constitution. 79 Through the language in section 2 of the New Mexico
Enabling Act, the people of New Mexico renounced the right to divest the
title to any property "held by any Indian or Indian tribes the right or title to
which shall have been acquired through or from the United States." 80 The
enabling act further provided that the disclaimer was irrevocable without
the consent of both the Congress and the people of New Mexico. 8t These
73. Id.at 1119.
74. Id. The appropriators had contracted with the Secretary of the Interior for said waters.
75. Id. at 1121.
76. Id. at 1123.
77. 43 U.S.C. § 666(a) (1976). The pertinent portion of the McCarran Amendment provides:
(a) Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1) for the
adjudication of rights to the use of water of a water system or other source. . . . The
United States, when a party to any such suit, shall (I) be deemed to have waived any
right to plead that the State laws are inapplicable or that the United States is not
amenable thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and (2) shall be subject to the judgments, orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may obtain review
thereof, in the same manner and to the same extent as a private individual under like
circumstances.
Id.
78. New Mexico Enabling Act of 1910, ch. 310, 36 Stat. 557, 558-559. Section 2 of the
New Mexico Enabling Act provides, in part:
[Tihe people inhabiting said proposed State do agree and declare that they forever
disclaim all right and title to the unappropriated and ungranted public lands lying
within the boundaries thereof and to all lands lying within said boundaries owned or
held by any Indian or Indian tribes the right or title to which shall have been acquired
through or from the United States.
Id.
79. N.M. CONST. art. 21, § 2. The wording is similar to the language of the Enabling Act,
see note 78 supra.
80. 36 Stat. 558-559 (1910).
81. Id. The state relinquishment of authority over the public domain contained in the
New Mexico Enabling Act is consistent with similar disclaimers found in the enabling acts of
other public land states. L. MALL, PUBLIC LAND AND MINING LAW at 3-6 (1979).
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provisions were codified in the state constitution. 82
The Tenth Circuit court recognized the express wording of the enabling
act and the state constitution, but nevertheless concluded that there presently exists no exclusive federal jurisdiction over Indian water rights disputes.8 3 The court of appeals relied upon the legislative history of the
McCarran Amendment, which the court felt demonstrated a congressional
determination that all federal water rights should be settled in one forum.
The Tenth Circuit court reasoned that the language of the McCarran
Amendment and the congressional rationale for its enactment pointed toward an implicit modification of the New Mexico Enabling Act. 84 In addition, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the decisions of New
4exico v. Aamodt85 and Colorado River Water Conservancy Di trct v. United
States86 were controlling. These earlier cases expressly held that state courts
have jurisdiction to determine Indian reserved water rights. The court also
found implicit support for its conclusion in United States v. District Court,8 7 a
case wherein the Supreme Court had spoken of non-Indian and Indian reserved rights without any suggestion of a distinction between the two for
purposes of McCarran Amendment jurisdiction.
Together with its McCarran Amendment reasoning, the Tenth Circuit
court adjudged that whereas the disclaimer provisions in the New Mexico
Enabling Act pertained only to proprietary tterests in Indian lands, the enabling act's limitations did not apply to general water rights adjudications.
The court of appeals analogized this New Mexico case to the situation which
confronted the Supreme Court in Kake Village v. Egan. 88 Kake Village arose
as the result of Alaska's attempt to regulate the fishing practices of Indians
residing in Alaskan incorporated communities. The Supreme Court ruled
that despite jurisdictional disclaimer provisions in the Alaska Enabling Act,
the state had authority to regulate Indian fishing activities.8 9 The Tenth
Circuit suggested, on the basis of Kake Village, that so long as state regulation
of Indian rights does not interfere with property rights granted to the Indians by the United States, or impair the ability of Indian tribes to govern
themselves, the state regulations will not constitute a breach of enabling act
restrictions. 9° As state adjudication of Indian reserved water rights was
deemed not to interfere with the Jicarilla Apache tribe's self-governance or
to impair a property right granted to the Indians by the United States, the
Tenth Circuit found that New Mexico jurisdiction attached. 9 1
82. N.M. CONsT. art. 21 § 2.
83. 601 F.2d at 1130.
84. Id. at 1131.
85. 537 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1121 (1977).
86. 424 U.S. 800 (1976). The Supreme Court declared that "the state court had jurisdiction over Indian water rights under the [McCarran] Amendment." Id. at 809.
87. 401 U.S. 520 (1971).
88. 369 U.S. 60 (1962).
89. Id.
90. 601 F.2d at 1135.
91. Id. A third foundation for the court's holding was the basic principle that Congress
may delegate its supervisory authority over the Indian tribes. United States v. New Mexico, 590
F.2d 323, 328 (10th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 63 (1979). The court of appeals found that
the McCarran Amendment served as a specific congressional delegation ofjurisdictional author-
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The court of appeals' distinction between Indian proprietary rights, to
which the enabling act restrictions purportedly apply, and other Indian
property rights, is a sound one. Because Indian reserved water rights, as
Alaskan native fishing rights, fall into the latter category, state jurisdiction
over the Indian water rights would be appropriate even if the enabling act
was not modified by the McCarran Amendment. Rather than limiting itself
to this analysis, however, the court emphasized the modification of the enabling act by subsequent congressional actions and Supreme Court decisions. The court never squarely addressed the tribe's contention that the
92
McCarran Amendment did not repeal the disclaimer of the enabling act.
The language of the enabling act and of the state constitution clearly provides that the state's relinquishment of jurisdiction over Indian property
rights can be reversed only with the consent of both the United States and the
people of New Mexico. 9 3 The court adduced no evidence of state approval
of the modification and, therefore, the court apparently assumed that Congress may effectively alter the terms of state enabling acts and state constitutions through unilateral action. That the result of the court of appeals'
decision in this case was to increase the authority of the New Mexico state
government does not minimize the significance of this declaration.
The ancillary issue of whether the federal government or the Indian
tribes are the appropriate defendants in Indian reserved water rights litigation also was addressed by the Tenth Circuit in jicarilaApache Tribe v. United
Stales. 94 The court affirmed that "the United States is the proper party defendant in any general water rights adjudication proceeding, whether
brought in federal court or state court, relating to federally created water
rights, including those reserved for use by Indian tribes."' 9 5 The appellate
court noted, however, that this rule does not preclude the affected Indian
tribes from obtaining private counsel to guarantee against any possible conflict of interest. 96 Since the Jicarilla Apache tribe had pending water rights
claims against the United States, and as several Indian tribes were affected
by the New Mexico general water rights adjudication, this case provided a
good example of the need for this independent right of intervention.
D.

Distributon of Appropriation Funds to Individual Tribal Members

In Whiskers v. United States,9 7 the central issue was whether the funding
and distribution schemes enacted by Congress, as compensation for lands
taken from the Southern Paiute Nation, created a trust to be administered
by the Secretary of the Interior. The case arose because Chloe Whiskers, a
member of the Southern Paiute tribe potentially eligible to receive benefits
under the distribution scheme, failed to register for her share of the funds
ity to New Mexico. 601 F.2d at 1135. This analysis, however, begs the question of whether New
Mexico had accepted this delegation of authority.
92. 601 F.2d at 1130.
93. Id. at 1128.
94. Id. at 1127.
95. Id.

96. Id.
97.

600 F.2d 1332 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1028 (1980).
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within the period prescribed by the Secretary. 98 When her delayed request
for funds was denied, Chloe Whiskers brought an action in the United States
District Court for the District of Utah, seeking damages against the United
States. Whiskers alleged breach of trust and statutory duties and claimed an
99
unconstitutional taking of her property.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the district court, held that the Southern Paiute Judgment Distribution Act (the
Distribution Act)' 0 0 neither expressly nor implicitly created a trust relationship between the Secretary and potential recipients of the benefits.' 0 Although the court concurred with Whiskers' contention that, absent clear
congressional intent to the contrary, a trust relationship is created when the
word "trust" is used in an appropriations statute, the appellate tribunal
found that neither the Second Supplemental Appropriations Act (the Appropriations Act)' 0 2 nor the Distribution Act mentioned the creation of a
trust. Congress nowhere stated that the Southern Paiute funds created by
these acts should be held in trust pending distribution of the funds. The
Distribution Act instructed the Secretary to establish procedures by which
the department could determine those persons eligible for the payments. In
failing to meet the enrollment deadline promulgated by the Secretary,
Whiskers and all other Indians in her position were precluded from fund
distribution.
The principle argument urged by Whiskers was that section 725s of Title 31 mandates that funds appearing on government records, including Indian monies, are to be classified by the Treasury Department as trust
funds.10 3 The court of appeals acknowledged that the statutory language
appeared to include those funds appropriated by Congress for the Paiutes.
The court asserted, however, that a closer analysis of the statute revealed
that the funds referred to in section 725s were limited to a narrow category
of monies set aside for Indians. The appeals court declared that only income
resulting from the leasing of certain Indian lands originally reserved for
10 4
agencies and schools was to be included in the section 725s trust funds.
The trust monies are to be spent by Indian schools and agencies. The Appropriation and Distribution Acts' grant to the Southern Paiute Nation, as a
fund appropriated in settlement of Indian claims, was deemed not to fall
within the narrow category of trust funds described in section 725s.105
The relationship between the United States government and the Indian
tribes may be characterized as a fiduciary one. The court of appeals found,
98.

Id. at 1334.

99. Id.
100. Pub. L. No. 90-584, 82 Stat. 1147 (1968) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (1976)).
101. 600 F.2d at 1339.
102. Pub. L. No. 89-16, tit. iv, 79 Stat. 108 (1965).
103. 31 U.S.C. § 725s(a)(20) (1976) provides:
(a) The funds appearing on the books of the Government . . . shall be classified on
[including]
the books of the Treasury as trust funds ....
(20) Indian moneys, proceeds of labor, agencies, schools, and so forth (5t301).
104. 600 F.2d at 1336, citing 78 Cong. Rec. 8242 (1934) (remarks of Rep. Griffin) and Hearing on H.R. 9410 before the Subcommittee on Permanent Appropriations of the House Appropriations Committee, 73d Cong., 2d Sess., 255, 258 (1934).
105. 600 F.2d at 1336-37.
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nevertheless, that the test enunciated in United States v. Testan,10 6 requiring
an allegation of substantive statutory violations in actions against the United
States, had not been met by Whiskers' claim of a fiduciary breach. In Testan, the Supreme Court had concluded that the Tucker Act,' 0 7 the statute
under which Whiskers had claimed standing to bring the damages suit, was
not of itself a grant of jurisdiction. Claims under the Tucker Act must be
supported by a chargc that a specific federa statute, affording compensation
by the United States for damages sustained, pertains to the case. 108 As the
Tenth Circuit court could find no statutory, regulatory, or constitutional impropriety in the Secretary's failure to hold Whiskers' funds in trust, the court
concluded that there could be no violation of a substantive right, and that
certainly there was no specific congressional mandate to compensate persons
in Whiskers' situation.
Whiskers also had argued that the express language in Cheyenne-Arapaho
Tribes v. United States 10 9 mandated the classification of all judgments of the
Indian Claims Commission, under which the Appropriation Act and the
Distribution Act had been legislated, as trust funds. The court of appeals
distinguished the Cheyenne-Arapaho decision on the basis that "specific congressional legislation had declared the funds in Cheyenne-A rapaho to be held in
trust."'O The court noted that there was no similar language in the acts
relied upon by Whiskers. The court of appeals summarily disposed of
Whiskers' fifth amendment taking claim, reasoning that since the Distribution Act provided for group claims, as opposed to providing individual property rights, Whiskers "had no constitutionally recognizable . . . property
rights in the undistributed fund of which [she] could have been deprived in
violation of the Fifth Amendment.""'
By strictly construing the Appropriation and Distribution Acts, the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals indicated an unwillingness to infer a trust
relationship between Indian tribal members and the Secretary of the Interior, even where the Secretary is charged with distributing compensation
funds granted by the Indian Claims Commission and subsequently approved
by Congress. If individual tribal members are to preserve the right to compensation awards, even in the face of the Secretary's improper administration of the tribal funds, specific language decreeing the creation of a trust
relationship must be included by Congress in the appropriations acts. Without specific statutory language, applicants qualified for federal compensation who do not strictly adhere to procedures established by the Secretary
will be precluded from subsequent damage claims against the United States.
E.

Anti-Ahienation Clause of the GeneralAllotment Act
Whether the anti-alienation clause of the General Allotment Act (Act)
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.

424 U.S. 392 (1976).
28 U.S.C. § 1346(a) (1976).
424 U.S. at 398.
512 F.2d 1390, 1392 (Ct. C1. 1975).
600 F.2d at 1337.
600 F.2d at 1338-39.
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runs with the land or is limited
confronted the Tenth Circuit
States.' 1 2 The court of appeals
land run with the land and are

to the original allottee was the issue which
in Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co. v. United
held that alienation restrictions on allotted
1 13
not personal to the individual allottee.

William Robedeaux, an Otoe Indian, was granted an allotment of Otoe
reservation land under the General Allotment Act of 1907. He subsequently
conveyed his allotted land, by deed, in 1950, to his son Willis. Willis entered
into an agreement with the Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company to exchange the allotted land for other land. The exchange was approved by the
Secretary of the Interior. Allotted land is held in trust by the United States
and is not subject to encumbrances by creditors for debts incurred by the
allottee prior to issuance of the final patent. 14 Red Rock Co-op, a judgment creditor of Willis, asserted a lien on the proceeds of the condemnation
of the land and objected to the transfer agreement entered into by Willis as
interfering with Red Rock Co-op's rights as a judgment creditor."1 5
The Tenth Circuit, in upholding Willis' right to exchange the allotted
land, noted that although Willis was technically a grantee rather than an
heir, he was, for practical purposes, an heir to his father's allotted land and
as such subject to the same restrictions. The appellate court relied upon the
holding of Stevens v. Commissioner," 6 a case wherein the Ninth Circuit had
concluded that the Indian lands tax exemption applied to allotted land
purchased by another Indian. The Ninth Circuit had noted the federal policy of encouraging the consolidation of larger blocks of land by Indians for
purposes of economic viability. Because the protective provisions in the Act
applied to the Indian transferee of allotted lands in Stevens, even though the
transferee was not an heir, the Tenth Circuit court reasoned that it was congressional policy to extend the Act's anti-alienation provisions to grantees as
well as to heirs. Therefore, judgment creditors such as Red Rock Co-op cannot assert liens on transferred allotted lands prior to patent.
F.

Indian Trust Lands Included inthe Term 'Indian Country"

The issue facing the appellate court in Chqenne-Arapaho Tribes v.
Oklahoma' t7 was whether the Assimilative Crimes Act"" granted jurisdiction to the states to impose state hunting and fishing laws on lands held in
trust by the federal government for Indians. The Cheyenne-Arapaho reser1
and clarified by an executive order in
vation was created by two treaties i9
1869.120 Hunting and fishing rights were not discussed in the text of the
112. 609 F.2d 1365 (10th Cir. 1979).
113. Id. at 1367.

114. 25 U.S.C. § 354 (1976).

115. 609 F.2d at 1366.
116. 452 F.2d 741, 747 (9th Cir. 1971).
117. 618 F.2d 665 (10th Cir. 1980).

118. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1151-1165 (1976).
119. Treaty with the Cheyennes and Arapahoes, 14 Stat. 703 (1865); Treaty with the Cheyenne Indians, 15 Stat. 593 (1867).
120. 618 F.2d at 666.
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treaties or in the executive order. Under the General Allotment Act,'12 the
President was authorized to allot portions of Indian reservations to individual tribal members and to sell the excess to private parties. The Cheyenne122
Arapahoe reservation was subsequently disestablished.
Oklahoma apparently had been exercising jurisdiction over the trust
lands within the disestablished reservation.1 23 The Cheyenne-Arapaho tribe
brought an injunctive action seeking to halt this practice. Since Indian
hunting and fishing rights within "Indian Country"' 124 are determined
under exclusive tribal jurisdiction, the Tenth Circuit had to decide whether
trust lands within a disestablished reservation are included in the definition
of the term "Indian Country," thereby rendering them immune from state
hunting and fishing regulations.
The Tenth Circuit court relied principally on the recent decision in
UnitedStates v. John,125 wherein the Supreme Court held that criminal jurisdiction over Indian trust lands was vested exclusively in the United States.
The court of appeals also noted that a 1945 Solicitor's Opinion had stated
that lands acquired in trust for the Cheyenne-Arapaho tribe were classified
as reservation lands.' 2 6 Based on the Supreme Court's opinion in John, and
on the 1945 Solicitor's Opinion, the Tenth Circuit court found that the
127
Cheyenne-Arapaho trust lands should be considered "Indian Country."'
Oklahoma therefore had no authority to regulate Indian hunting and fishing
activities on trust lands.
The court of appeals rejected Oklahoma's argument that the Assimilative Crimes Act gave the state jurisdiction over hunting and fishing activities, asserting that the Act did not incorporate state criminal statutes which
are inconsistent with federal policies. Particular reliance was placed on the
Act's section 1162(b), 128 which specifically guarantees Indian hunting and
121.

Act of Feb. 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388, as amendedby Act of May 8, 1806, ch. 2348, 34

Stat. 182.

122. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 543, 26 Stat. 989, which ratified an earlier agreement between
the United States and the tribes, and which provided:
The said Cheyenne and Arapaho tribes of Indians hereby cede, convey, transfer, relinquish, and surrender forever and absolutely, without any reservation whatever, express
or implied, all their claim, title, and interest of every kind and character, in and to the
lands [established by the executive order].
26 Stat. 1022. The Act also provided that the lands were to be held in trust by the United
States. 26 Stat. 1024.
123. In Ellis v. Page, 351 F.2d 250, 252 (10th Cir. 1965), the court had held that the cumulative effects of the several acts disestablished the reservation. The lands within the disestablished reservation were classified into three categories: 1) individual allotments, 2) trust lands,
and 3) non-Indian lands. In the 1980 case, the Tenth Circuit was concerned with the second
category.
124. The term "Indian Country" is defined, in 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1976), as comprising all
Indian reservation land, including patented and easement lands, "all dependent Indian Communities," and all Indian allotments with restrictions against alienation still in effect.
125. 437 U.S. 634 (1978).
126. 59 Interior Dec. 1 (1945).
127. 618 F.2d at 667-68.
128. 18 U.S.C. § 1162(b) (1976) provides, in part:
Nothing in this section ... shall deprive any Indian or Indian tribe, band, or community of any right, privilege, or immunity afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or
statute with respect to hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing,-r regulation thereof.
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fishing rights on trust lands. The appellate court agreed with the United
States argument that it would be inconsistent for Congress to have prohibited state control of Indian hunting and fishing rights in section 1162(b), and
then to have given this authority back, indirectly, through other, less explicit
1 29
language in the Act.
II.
A.

NATURAL GAS SALES CONTRACTS

Interpretationof FavoredNations Clauses

In Superior Oil Co. v. Western Slope Gas Co., 130 the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals was asked to settle a contract dispute between the buyer and seller
of natural gas. The contract, delineating the conditions of the intrastate sale
of natural gas, included a favored nations clause requiring the buyer to pay
to the seller a purchase price equal to the highest price paid to any other
seller within a specific geographic area. The natural gas sales contract also
included a savings clause, whereby the buyer's obligation to pay the higher
price was made subject to several factors, including the quality of the gas,
the bases of measurement, delivery pressure, and "other conditions of sale."
When challenged by seller's claim that buyer was paying a higher price to
certain other sellers in contravention of the favored nations clause, buyer
defended by noting that the higher prices were being paid as a result of a
Federal Power Commission (FPC) "vintaging" order. 13' The buyer asserted
that vintaging, as one of the "other conditions of sale" contemplated by the
contracting parties as an exception to the favored nations clause, should not
be a factor in determining the price paid to seller. The Tenth Circuit, overruling the district court, found that the phrase "other conditions of sale" did
not include vintaging,132 and hence the FPC's order did not protect buyer
from paying higher prices to seller when buyer paid higher prices to local
133
sellers subject to the FPC's jurisdiction.
Superior Oil, a natural gas production company, had entered, in 1964,
into a 20-year natural gas contract with Western Slope. The contract contained a favored nations clause, which stated that Western Slope would pay
Superior a rate equal to the price that Western Slope paid other natural gas
suppliers within a three-county area of Colorado, if that price was higher
than that being paid Superior.' 34 In 1972, Western Slope notified Superior
See also 18 U.S.C. § 1165 (1976).
129. 618 F.2d at 669.
130. 604 F.2d 1281 (10th Cir. 1979).
131. "Vintaging" refers to the date when a successful well is drilled, with gas from older
wells being priced lower than gas from recently drilled wells. 604 F.2d at 1284.
132. 604 F.2d at 1291.
133. Most of the regulatory responsibilities of the now defunct Federal Power Commission
have been assumed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission. The federal regulatory
agencies have authority over natural gas which is to be sold interstate.
134. Article 8.4 of the contract provides, in part:
If, at any time during the term of this Agreement, Buyer pays to a producer of natural
gas in Mesa, Garfield, and Rio Blanco County, Colorado, for the purpose of reselling
such gas in its Colorado market area, a price per MCF higher than that being paid to
Seller hereunder, due consideration being given to the quality of the gas, bases of
measurement, delivery pressure, and other conditions of salte, Buyer shall, commencing
upon the date of the first delivery of such natural gas at such higher price, and contin-
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Oil that it was paying a higher rate to other suppliers in the vicinity under
an FPC order and explained that it would begin paying Superior Oil at an
equal rate, even though the FPC order applied only to natural gas contracts
instituted on or after June 17, 1970.135 In 1974, Western Slope informed
Superior Oil that the favored nations clause was being triggered again, this
time as a result of Western Slope's contract with a supplier of gas from wells
drilled on or after January i,i973.1 3 6 In 1975, however, Superior Oil discovered that Western Slope was paying a higher price to yet another supplier in the three-county area-fifty cents per mcf compared with forty-five
cents per mcf paid to Superior Oil. Superior Oil notified Western Slope that
the buyer was violating the favored nations clause. Western Slope replied
that it had been advised that the vintaging concept established by the FPC
was included in the phrase "other conditions of sale" in the favored nations
clause of the 1964 agreement and that, under the vintaging scheme, Superior
Oil was receiving a fair rate. Superior Oil reminded Western Slope that a
triggering of the favored nations clause had occurred under previous FPC
orders, which included vintaging schedules. Superior Oil noted that Western Slope's position was inconsistent with its past practice. When Western
Slope refused to increase the price paid to Superior Oil, the seller filed a
complaint against Western Slope, alleging buyer's failure to pay the full con37
tract price.'
The Tenth Circuit attempted to discern what the intent of the contracting parties was at the time of the agreement's negotiation in 1964. In so
doing, the court of appeals found that the intrastate utilization clause of the
contract demonstrated that both Superior Oil and Western Slope intended
that their contract should not come under FPC jurisdiction.' 38 The court
examined Western Slope's pre-1975 actions regarding the favored nations
clause. By increasing the rate paid to Superior Oil without regard to the
FPC's vintaging schedule in effect during the earlier period, the court felt
that Western Slope indicated that it did not consider vintaging to be in39
cluded in the term "other conditions of sale."'
Western Slope had relied primarily on the Seventh Circuit's holding in
Pure Ol v. FPC14° to support its position that all factors, including vintaging,
uing so long as such higher price is paid for such gas, increase the price being paid to
Seller hereunder to equal such higher prices.
604 F.2d at 1282 (emphasis supplied by the court).
135. 604 F.2d at 1283.
136. Id. at 1283-84.
137. Id. at 1284-85.
138. Article 7.1 of the contract provides, in part:
Buyer represents that it is engaged solely in intrastate transportation of natural gas
within the State of Colorado and represents that gas purchased hereunder shall be sold
and used only in connection therewith. In the event Buyer should, at any time, propose to sell or use gas purchased hereunder in such manner that. . . will subject Seller
to the jurisdiction of the Federal Power Commission or any successor body . . . .
Buyer shall notify Seller at least ninety (90) days before such resale or other disposition
is commenced and Seller shall have the right hereunder, upon thirty (30) days' notice
to Buyer to terminate this agreement.
Id. at 1283.
139. 604 F.2d at 1289.
140. 299 F.2d 370 (7th Cir. 1962).
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were included in the clause. The Tenth Circuit acknowledged the Pure Oil
decision and agreed that peaking capacity was included in the savings
clause; peaking capacity, however, is a physical characteristic of natural gas
41
The
while there is no physical difference between "old" and "new" gas.1
court of appeals also distinguished the Pure Oil decision on the basis that the
contract in that case involved interstate gas and as such it was subject to
in the instant
Commission regulations. The court noted that the contract
142
controversy concerned the intrastate sale of natural gas.
The court of appeals concluded that since vintaging was not contemplated by the parties as one of the "other conditions of sale" restricting the
favored nations clause, vintaging could not relieve Western Slope of its duty
to pay the higher price to Superior Oil. 143 Judge Barrett, in a concurring
opinion, stated that favored nations clauses should be declared void as
against public policy. 144 The concurrence urged the district court to consider this issue on remand.
B.

Restrzitions on Interstate Contract Termination Under Section 7(b) of the
Natural Gas Act

The higher prices available in intrastate markets for natural gas persuaded two oil and gas producers to attempt termination of interstate gas
purchase agreements. In both of these cases, the Tenth Circuit court found
that the attempted terminations were invalid because the wells, from which
the oil and gas flowed, previously had been dedicated to interstate markets
under Federal Power Commission (Commission) public convenience and necessity certificates. The wells had not been abandoned formally under the
Commission's administrative procedures. These Tenth Circuit decisions reflect the trend in recent Supreme Court opinions. The Court has sought to
restrict the ability of producers to discontinue unilaterally interstate distributor contracts. Absent Commission approval, gas from wells dedicated to
45
Lease expirainterstate markets cannot be diverted to intrastate markets.'
tion or non-use of the wells do not obviate the necessity for formal abandonment proceedings.
The issue of interstate abandonment through lease expiration arose in
Amarex, Inc. v. FERC.146 In 1970, Amarex had succeeded, by assignment, to
a leasehold interest in an Oklahoma oil and gas field. The lease, by its terms,
was to expire in 1972. After acquiring the leasehold, but prior to 1972,
Amarex entered into a gas purchase contract with Arkansas Louisiana Gas
Company (Arkla) whereby Arkla agreed to purchase the gas produced from
141. 604 F.2d at 1290-91.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1291.
144. Id. at 1291-97 (Barrett, J., concurring).
145. United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. McCombs, 442 U.S. 529 (1979); California v. Southland
Royalty Co., 436 U.S. 519 (1978); Sun Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 170 (1960); Sunray MidContinent Oil Co. v. FPC, 364 U.S. 137 (1960); Atlantic Refining Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
360 U.S. 378 (1959). See aLo Phillips Petroleum Co. v. FPC, 556 F.2d 466 (10th Cir. 1977).
146. 603 F.2d 127 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. deneid, 100 S. Ct. 1067 (1980). The regulatory responsibilities of the Federal Power Commission have been assumed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission.
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"all wells now or hereafter completed" on the lands covered by the
Oklahoma lease. 14 7 The contract included the gas produced from the quarter section, which gas became the subject of the dispute. After entering the
contract, Amarex filed a petition with the Commission seeking a "small producer" certificate of convenience and necessity, which was granted in 1971.
The effectiveness of the certificate was for an unlimited duration.
Amarex began natural gas deliveries to Arkla in 1971, although the gas
delivered was not from the Oklahoma leasehold. Upon expiration of the
Oklahoma leasehold in 1972, Amarex entered into another lease agreement
with the fee owner for a term of five years. A gas well had been drilled, and
there was production from the leasehold, but Amarex refused to deliver the
leasehold's gas to Arkla. After both parties filed petitions with the Commission, the federal agency directed Amarex to deliver the natural gas to
Arkla. 148
The issue presented to the court of appeals was whether Amarex's certificate of public convenience and necessity, together with its contract with
Arkla, required it to deliver natural gas produced from the Oklahoma lease.
Amarex asserted that because the lease had been renewed subsequent to
both the distribution contract and the certificate's issuance, and since gas
had not been actually produced until 1975, Amarex was relieved of any duty
to deliver the gas to Arkla. The Tenth Circuit, in concluding that the gas
produced on the leasehold was dedicated to the interstate market, relied
heavily on the Supreme Court's decision in Califomi'a o. Southland Royalty
Co. 149 In Southland, the fee owner of certain Texas acreage had entered into
a fifty year lease with lessee, Gulf Oil Corporation. Gulf subsequently contracted to sell gas interstate and obtained a certificate of public convenience
and necessity from the Commission to facilitate its interstate sales. Prior to
the expiration of Gulf's lease, Southland Royalty Company obtained fee title
to the acreage. Upon the expiration of the original fifty year lease in 1975,
the remaining oil and gas reserves automatically reverted to Southland.
Southland contracted to sell the gas intrastate; the Commission prevented
delivery because Southland had not petitioned for a ruling of "abandonment" pursuant to the procedure established in Section 7(b) of the Natural
Gas Act. 150 Since the original certificate was of unlimited duration, Southland was ordered to continue delivery to the interstate distributor. The
Court asserted that the fact that the original lessee no longer had an interest
in the land did not alter the circumstance that the wells had been dedicated
51
to interstate service.1
Id. at 128.
Id. at 129.
149. 436 U.S. 519 (1978).
150. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(b) (1976) provides:
No natural-gas company shall abandon all or any portion of its facilities subject to the
jurisdiction of the Commission, or any service rendered by means of such facilities,
147.
148.

without the permission and approval of the Commission first had and obtained, after
due hearing, and a finding by the Commission that the available supply of natural gas
is depleted to the extent that the continuance of service is unwarranted, or that the
present or future public convenience or necessity permit such abandonment.

151.

436 U.S. at 525.
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Although acknowledging that the question in Southland was not precisely the one presented in Amarex, the court of appeals stated that the
Supreme Court's holding in Southland was dispositive of the instant case.
Once a natural gas field has been dedicated to interstate commerce pursuant
to issuance, by the Commission, of a certificate of convenience and necessity,
all gas in the field is subject to the certificate and gas produced from these
fields cannot be diverted to intrastate sale without compliance with the statutorily mandated abandonment procedures.' 5 2 The Tenth Circuit ruled
that because Amarex had dedicated the Oklahoma gas to interstate commerce pursuant to a certificate granted by the Commission, all gas produced
on the leased lands should be delivered to Arkla absent a Commission determination of abandonment. The court noted that it was irrelevant that the
153
original lease had expired before production on the leased lands began.
Another aspect of the abandonment issue was decided on the same day
in Texas Oil & Gas Corp. v. Michigan Wisconsin Pipe Line Co.' 54 In this case, the
dispute centered upon leases originally held by Shell Oil Company, Texas
Oil's predecessor. The leases of Oklahoma oil and gas lands were the basis
for a gas purchase agreement between Shell and Michigan Wisconsin,
whereby Shell committed all natural gas produced from the leased lands to
interstate sale. When a successful well was drilled in 1962, Shell began delivery of all of the natural gas produced to Michigan Wisconsin, pursuant to a
55
certificate of convenience and necessity issued by the Commission.1 Texas
Oil meanwhile had begun production within the same unitized tract and
had entered into an intrastate contract for the delivery of gas to an
Oklahoma distributor. Shell abandoned and plugged its well in 1969 with
56
the permission of the Oklahoma Corporation Commission.'
Obtaining Shell's interest in the lease at issue, Texas Oil instituted a
declaratory judgment action in federal district court to quiet title against
Michigan Wisconsin's contractual claim to the gas and for a determination
that the gas produced from the lease was not dedicated to interstate commerce. 157 The district court, in quieting title to the gas in Texas Oil, ruled
that the Commission had no primary jurisdiction to determine the abandonment issue and that the Oklahoma Corporation Commission's permission to
abandon was sufficient to terminate the interstate dedication. 158
152. See, e.g., United Gas Pipe Line Co. v. McCombs, 442 U.S. 529 (1979). In McCombs, the
Supreme Court reversed a Tenth Circuit decision which had held that a gas field, from which
there had been no production for several years, and on which a new deeper well had been
drilled so as to produce gas, had been abandoned in fact although no formal abandonment
procedure had been instituted. McCombs v. FERC, 570 F.2d 1376 (1978); see Overview, Lands
and Natural Resources, Fifth Annual Tenth Circua Sume, 56 DEN. L.J. 517, 531 (1979). The
Supreme Court declared that there could be no abandonment of a natural gas field dedicated to
interstate commerce absent a finding of abandonment, by the Commission, following a § 7(b)
hearing. 442 U.S. at 543.
153. 603 F.2d at 131. Judge Barrett, in concurrence, maintained that the Southland decision
cannot be broadened to include dedications beyond those lands included in oil and gas leases
from which production was in fact realized. 1d. at 132.
154. 601 F.2d 1144 (10th Cir. 1979).
155. Id.at 1145.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
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The Tenth Circuit, reversing the district court's holding, found that the
Commission had primary jurisdiction to determine the question of the abandonment of gas wells dedicated to interstate markets. The district court had
relied erroneously on the Tenth Circuit's earlier decision in Wessely Energy
Corp. v. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. 159 as dispositive of the primary jurisdiction
issue. The court of appeals, however, distinguished the Wessel case from the
Texas Oil and Amarex situations because in Wessely, although a predecessor
lessee had entered a contract for the sale of natural gas interstate, no natural
gas was ever produced during the time of the lease. When the second lessee
entered into a gas purchase contract with an intrastate distributor, the Wesseoy court determined that the second lessee was not bound by the previous
lessee's contract with the interstate distributor. 160 Conversely, in the instant
case, gas had been produced and was distributed in interstate commerce for
seven years before Shell's well was shut down. 16 ' Following the Supreme
Court's Southland rationale, the Tenth Circuit held that once gas is produced
from a lease pursuant to a certificate of convenience and necessity issued by
the Commission, and once the gas begins to flow in interstate commerce, all
of the gas produced from the lease is dedicated to interstate commerce and
cannot be terminated absent Commission approval. 162
III.
A.

PUBLIC LANDS

Mineral Title Questions

In Amoco Production Co. v. United States, 163 the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals was asked to determine the timeliness of a quiet title action filed
against the United States.' 64 The court was called upon to interpret the
constructive notice provision of a statute authorizing suit against the United
States if filed within twelve years of the plaintiffs actual or constructive
knowledge of an adverse title claim of the federal government. 165 The court
of appeals determined that a quitclaim deed which did not appear in the
grantor-grantee chain of title but which was recorded in the Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) tract index did not constitute constructive notice to a
subsequent grantee so as to commence the running of the statute of limitations. 166
159. 593 F.2d 917 (10th Cir. 1979).

160. Id. at 920. The Wessey court held that "with no drilling, no production, no facilities,
there was no introduction of gas into the interstate market or any market. The Natural Gas Act
was never applicable to the tract." Id.
161. 601 F.2d at 1146.
162. See 436 U.S. 519, 527-28 (1978).
163. 619 F.2d 1383 (10th Cir. 1980).
164. See 28 U.S.C. § 2409a (1976) provides, in part:
The United States may be named as a party defendant in a civil action under this
section to adjudicate a disputed title to real property in which the United States
claims an interest, other than a security interest or water rights.
165. 28 U.S.C. § 2409a(f) (1976) provides:
Any civil action under this section shall be barred unless it is commenced within
twelve years of the date upon which it accrued. Such action shall be deemed to have
accrued on the date the plaintiff or his predecessor in interest knew or should have
known of the claim of the United States.
166. 619 F.2d at 1392.
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In 1942, the Federal Farm Mortgage Corporation (FFMC) conveyed a
fee interest in the disputed Utah land to the Newton family. The conflict
arose over the grantor's subsequent conveyance of one-half of the mineral
interest in the Newton tract to the United States by quitclaim deed in 1957.
Amoco, the lessee of the Newton family company which claimed fee title,
sued the United States to quiet title to its mineral interests. The United
States defended, claiming that the action was barred by the twelve year statute of limitations. When the district court ruled that the action was timely,
the United States sought to introduce evidence challenging the validity of
the Newton's 1942 deed. The district court excluded all of the United
67
States' proffered evidence and granted summary judgment for Amoco.'
On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's conclusion
that it was unreasonable to assume that Amoco had constructive notice of a
stray deed.'68 The court of appeals emphasized that whereas Utah law was
ambiguous and inconclusive on the issue of constructive notice, the federal
courts could not assume that Amoco "should have known" of the 1957
FFMC mineral conveyance to the United States.169 The appellate court did
overturn the district court's grant of summary judgment, however, asserting
that the exclusion of all of the evidence tendered by the United States was
error. The Tenth Circuit noted that the trial court had misinterpreted sev0
eral rules of evidence.17
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals was afforded a further opportunity
to delineate the parameters of constructive notice to grantees of interests in
the public lands in Winkier v. Andos.17' The case involved a challenge to the
rights of an assignee of a second priority drawee of a noncompetitive federal
oil and gas lease by the first drawee who had contested successfully the Department of Interior's invalidation of his right to the oil and gas lease. Although the court of appeals remanded the case for further deliberations at
the district court level, it outlined the various factors to be considered in
determining whether a lessee is a bona fide purchaser and, as such, is protected from administrative errors made by Interior in granting the lease.
The case arose from Winkler's efforts to obtain an oil and gas lease to
which the Tenth Circuit previously had declared he was entitled.' 72 Win167. Id. at 1387.
168. Id. at 1389.
169. Id. at 1388.
170. The trial court had not allowed the BLM file copy of the recorded deed into evidence,
basing its decision on FED. R. EVID. 1005 which provides that a certified, recorded copy of a
deed appearing in the county recorder's office and received into evidence precludes acceptance
of any other evidence. The Tenth Circuit, after quoting from the notes of the Advisory Committee relative to rule 1005, found that the rule applied to "the actual record maintained by the
public office . . . , not the original deed from which the record is made." 619 F.2d at 1390.
Since the contents of the original deed were at the crux of the controversy, FED. R. EvID.
1004(1), "which authorizes the admission of other evidence of the contents of a writing if all
originals are lost or destroyed, rather than Rule 1005, is applicable to the 1942 deed." Id. The
court also applied FED. R. EVID. 406, which allows introduction of the routine practice of an
organization, in finding that the conformed copy of the deed from the BLM files was properly
introduced and should have been received into evidence, assuming that the United States could
obtain proper authentication from the BLM office under FED. R. EviD. 901 and 902.
171. 614 F.2d 707 (10th Cir. 1980).
172. Id. at 708-709.
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kler had been the first drawee for a noncompetitive oil and gas lease on
certain Wyoming acreage; the Department nevertheless rejected his entry
card because of a name insufficiency. 173 Although the Tenth Circuit ultimately vindicated Winkler's right to the lease, the second drawee had been
given the lease in the interim. The second drawee assigned her rights to the
74
Davis Oil Company.1
After the initial rejection of Winkler's application by the Wyoming
State Office of the BLM, he appealed, unsuccessfully, to the Interior Board
of Land Appeals (IBLA).1 75 Although Winkler sought relief in federal district court, he did not request a preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order to stay the issuance of the lease. Winkler failed to file a lis
pendens on the subject lease as required under section 1964 of Title 28.176
Consequently, no actual or constructive notice was provided to the second
drawee or to her assignee, Davis Oil Company, under Wyoming law.
Davis Oil, however, failed to search BLM records to assure itself that
there was no claimed adverse interest, relying on issuance of the lease by the
BLM as sufficient assurance that the award was not contested. By the time
Davis Oil filed notice of the assignment in the BLM office, the office had
received notice of Winkler's federal court action, and, as a result, the BLM
delayed approval of the assignment. Two years later, in 1977, the BLM informed Davis Oil of the court action, but rather than wait until the Tenth
Circuit had rendered an opinion, the BLM approved the assignment. At all
times after this BLM approval of the assignment, Davis Oil had actual no177
tice of Winkler's court action.
The
Mineral
Udall' 79
the date

Tenth Circuit noted that the bona fide purchaser provision of the
Leasing Act' 78 and the holding in Southwestern Petroleum Corp. v.
demonstrated that the time of bona fide purchaser determination is
of the assignment, not the date of BLM approval of a transfer of

173. The BLM initially rejected Winkler's entry card because he had stamped "F.A. Winkler Agency" on one side, implying that the card was endorsed by a corporation. A corporation
is required to provide supplemental information not supplied by Winkler. 43 C.F.R. § 3112.21 (a) (1979). See Winkler v. Andrus, 594 F.2d 775 (10th Cir. 1979). Seealso Overview, Admibstratie Law, Sixth Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, 57 DEN. L.J. 131 (1980).
174. 614 F.2d at 709.
175. The issuance of the oil and gas lease was suspended during Winkler's administrative
appeal, pursuant to 43 C.F.R. § 4.21(a) (1978), which provides, in pertinent part: "[A] decision
will not be effective during the time in which a person adversely affected may file a notice of
appeal, and the timely filing of a notice of appeal will suspend the effect of the decision appealed from pending the decision on appeal."
176. 28 U.S.C. § 1964 (1976) provides that an action in federal court against real property
interests, including federal interests, must be recorded in the county office where the property is
located to constitute constructive notice to potential purchasers, if state law so requires. This
federal provision was triggered by state law. Wvo. STAT. § 1-6-108 provides, in part:
In an action in a state court or. in a United States district court affecting the title or
right of possession of real property . . . the plaintiff at the time of the filing of the
complaint . . . , may file in the office of the county clerk in which the property is
situate a notice of pendency of the action . . . . From the time of filing the notice a
subsequent purchaser or encumbrancer of the property shall have constructive notice
of the pendency of the action.
177. 614 F.2d at 709-10.
178. 30 U.S.C. § 184(h)(2) (1976).
179. 361 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1966). In Southwestern, the Tenth Circuit held that bona fide
purchaser status under 30 U.S.C. § 184 was to be determined by common law standards; je.,
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interest. Since Winkler had not filed a lis pendens on the contested lease, as
he was required to do under both federal and state law, Davis Oil could not
have been on constructive notice under the Wyoming standard. 180 The
court noted, however, that the test of constructive notice under Southwestern
is whether the circumstances are sufficient to put a man of ordinary prudence on inquiry, an inquiry which, if diligently followed, would lead to
discovery of defects in title.18 1 Davis failed to conduct a title examination of
the Wyoming State Office BLM records before acquiring the lease assignment. Davis contended that it is standard industry practice to conduct a
title examination only on lease assignments involving large cash payments.
The court of appeals rejected this argument as not supported by case precedent.1 8 2 Under the Southwestern holding, as applied in O'Kane v. Walker,1 8 3 a
BLM record search is mandatory for bona fide purchaser status, since any
facts relevant to the situation would include notices of court action con184
tained in BLM records.
The Tenth Circuit emphasized that when Davis took its assignment,
BLM records reflected that Winkler had made an unsuccessful administrative appeal. But Davis was also deemed to have constructive notice of the
applicable statutes, particularly section 226-2 of Title 30, which states that
an unsuccessful administrative appellant has ninety days after an adverse
IBLA decision to seek judicial relief.18 5 To be a bona fide purchaser Davis
Oil should have waited for the expiration of the ninety-day period before
taking its assignment. ' 86 The appellate court concluded by stating that the
general rule is that a person taking a real property interest does so at his peril
and that a lawsuit is considered pending until the time for appeal has
passed. 187 The district court decision was remanded for further hearings to
determine if Davis was a bona fide purchaser under the ordinary prudent
88
man standard of Southwestern.1
This decision apparently voids a long-standing oil and gas industry
practice of relying on BLM issuance of leases to qualify assignees as bona
fide purchasers. Assignees of second drawees must now wait until the ninetyday appeal period has expired after an adverse decision of the IBLA to assure themselves that no federal court action has been taken by the first
that he "acquired his interest in good faith, for valuable consideration, and without notice of
the violation of the departmental regulations." Id. at 656.
180. 614 F.2d at 712.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 713.
183. 561 F.2d 207 (10th Cir. 1977). In O'Kane, the assignee of a second drawee was held to
be a bona fide purchaser because he had employed an abstractor to conduct a title examination
of BLM records. The examination had produced no evidence of any adverse claims or interests.
184. 614 F.2d at 713.
185. Id. 30 U.S.C. § 226-2 (1976) provides, in part: "No action contesting a decision of the
Secretary involving any oil and gas lease shall be maintained unless such action is commenced
or taken within ninety days after the final decision of the Secretary relating to such matter."
186. 614 F.2d at 714.
187. Id See Wilkin v. Shell Oil Co., 197 F.2d 42 (10th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 854
(1952).
188. 614 F.2d at 714-15. The federal district court subsequently found that Davis Oil Com-

pany was not a bona fide purchaser and therefore the assignment of the lease issued to the
second drawee was void. Winkler v. Andrus, No. 76-127k (D. Wyo. Aug. 5, 1980).

DENVER LAWJOURNAL

(Vol. 58:2

drawee. Alternatively, assignees could condition payment to drawees upon
the absence of any federal court action within the ninety-day period.
A question not answered by the Tenth Circuit is whether an assignee of
a first drawee who has been issued an oil and gas lease from the BLM can be
a bona fide purchaser before the initial thirty-day protest period has expired.
Past BLM practice has been to consider the first drawee's assignee a bona
fide purchaser even if a protest by the second or tiird drawee utimately is
upheld; in such cases the first drawee's overriding royalty has been cancelled
but the assignee has been allowed to retain the lease. Under the Tenth Circuit's decision in this case, it would appear that the first drawee's assignee
would be required to wait until the thirty-day protest period has elapsed,
since the assignee is on constructive notice of this regulation. A related question is whether the thirty-day period begins to run on the day of the drawing
or on the date the second drawee is notified by the BLM that the first
drawee's entry card is considered valid.
B.

Grazing Allotment Reduction Drograms

In Valdez v. Applegate, 18 9 the Tenth Circuit held that commencement of
a court action challenging a grazing management program operates to stay
implementation of the program until the case has been determined.'9 ° In
making this determination, the court of appeals apparently ignored the clear
implication of a provision in the November 27, 1979 Appropriations Act for
the Department of the Interior.) 9 '
Pursuant to an Environmental Impact Statement prepared under an
order issued by the District of Columbia District Court in NRDC v. Morton,' 9 2 the BLM began implementation of the Rio Puerco Livestock Grazing
Management Program. The program called for reductions in grazing permit areas, and some of the affected permittees instituted an action to enjoin
the implementation of the program. The federal district court denied the
motion for a preliminary injunction and the plaintiffs appealed to the Tenth
Circuit, which issued a stay of program implementation until it rendered a
decision. 193
The United States claimed that the issue was moot because of a provision in the 1979 Appropriations Act stating that reductions of grazing allotments amounting to no more than ten percent were effective "when so
189. 616 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1980).
190.

Id. at 573.

191.

Pub. L. No. 96-126, 93 Stat. 954, 956 (1979) states in part:

Providedfurther, That an appeal of any reductions in grazing allotments on public
rangelands must be taken within 30 days after receipt of a final grazing allotment
decision or 90 days after the effective date of this Act in the case of reductions ordered
during 1979, whichever occurs later. Reductions of up to 10 per centum in grazing
allotments shall become effective when so designated by the Secretary of the Interior.
Upon appeal any proposed reduction in excess of 10 per centum shall be suspended
pending final action on the appeal, which shall be completed within 2 years after the
appeal is filed.
192. 388 F. Supp. 829, 838-41 (D.D.C. 1974), aJ'd,527 F.2d 1386, (D.C. Cir.), cert.
dented,
427 U.S. 913 (1976).
193. 616 F.2d at 571.
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designated by the Secretary."' 9 4 Since the grazing reductions being challenged were apparently within the ten percent limit, the United States argued that the reductions were effective immediately.
In rejecting this argument, the court relied on a provision in the 1976
Federal Land Policy and Management Act which states that "judicial review of public land adjudication decisions be provided by law."' 9 5 The
court interpreted this to mean that implementation of a program affecting
public lands while the program was being judicially contested was "not con96
sonant with judicial review."'
The court further held that the plaintiffs had demonstrated sufficient
likelihood of success on the merits and a sufficient showing of irreparable
harm to warrant a preliminary injunction prohibiting program implementation until the case was determined on the merits. An apparently crucial
concern of the court was the fact that some permittees would be forced out of
their livestock operations and that the program's probability of success in
reducing costs to the permittees was questionable.' 9 7 However, by ignoring
the express provisions of the Appropriations Act, which gave the Secretary
discretionary power to implement grazing reductions of ten percent or less,
the court may have left itself open to the criticism that it exceeded statutory
limits.
C.

RailroadRights-of-Way
1.

Mineral Interests in Railroad Rights-of-Way

The continuing controversy over mineral interests in railroad rights-ofway grants resurfaced in Energy TransportationSystems, Inc. v. Union Pacifw Railroad Co.,' 98 a consolidation of two decisions at the federal district court
level. 199 The Tenth Circuit disposed of two questions that have been plaguing the courts for years-whether mineral reservations were granted to railroads under the Union Pacific Railroad Act of 1862 (Act); 2 °0 and, if they
were, what type of mineral grant was envisioned. The court found that section 2 of the Act, 2 0 ' which granted the actual right-of-way for railroad construction across the public domain, did not include the servient mineral
194.

Id. See note 191 supra.

195. 616 F.2d at 572. See also 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(6) (1976).
196. 616 F.2d at 572.
197. Id.
198. 606 F.2d 934 (10th Cir. 1979).
199. Energy Transp. Systems, Inc. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 456 F. Supp. 154 (D. Kan.
1978); Energy Transp. Systems, Inc. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 435 F. Supp. 313 (D. Wyo. 1977).
200. 12 Stat. 489, as amended by Act of July 2, 1864, 13 Stat. 356.
201. Section 2 of the Act provides, in part:
IT]he right of way through the public lands be, and the same is hereby, granted to said
company for the construction of said railroad and telegraph line: and the right,

power, and authority is hereby given to said company to take from the public lands
adjacent to the line of said road, earth, stone, timber, and other materials for the
construction thereof; said right of way is granted to said railroad to the extent of two
hundred feet in width on each side of said railroad where it may pass over the public
lands,....
12 Stat. 491.
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estate, while the grant, under section 3,202 of alternate township sections ad20 3
joining the railroad did include the mineral estate.
Energy Transportation Systems, Inc. was planning to construct an underground coal slurry pipeline from Wyoming to Arkansas. It had obtained
rights-of-way from successors to a Wyoming homestead patent issued in
in the Uted States
1913, with neither a reservation of the _mineral s t
nor any mention of conflicting mineral interests by Union Pacific. Union
Pacific had a right-of-way granted pursuant to section 2 of the Act which cut
across the land and under which Energy Transportation Systems' pipeline
had to pass. Because Union Pacific would not allow the company to construct the pipeline under Union Pacific's right-of-way, the coal slurry pipe
line company sought a declaratory judgment to determine what, if any, right
Union Pacific had to the mineral estate. The trial court found that Union
2°4
Pacific did not have title to the mineral estate beneath its right-of-way.
Union Pacific relied principally on Northern Pacift Railway Co. v. Townsena 0 5 as support for its claim that Union Pacific had been granted a limited fee which included the mineral estate. The district court, however,
distinguished the Northern Paqiic decision because that case had involved a
homestead patentee's claim to the surface estate of the adjoining railroad
right-of-way and did not address the railroad's mineral estate rights.2° 6 The
trial court then followed the holdings in United States v. Union Pacifc Railroad
20 7
Co.
and Wyoming v. Udall.208 The latter stated that the exception of mineral lands as reserved to the United States under section 3 also applied to
section 2 and that, therefore, the United States had a right to the oil and gas
underneath the right-of-way. Finding these decisions dispositive of the issue
in the case before it, the district court held that Union Pacific had only sur20 9
face rights in the section 2 right-of-way grant.
The Tenth Circuit reached a different conclusion for those lands
granted as inducement for railroad construction under section 3 of the Act.
These grants were for odd-numbered township sections located in Kansas.
Union Pacific's successors conveyed these lands to the present title holder,
who had given Energy Transportation Systems an underground easement
for its pipeline. Union Pacific argued that the Northern Paqfic decision had
precluded the original railroad company from conveying its mineral estate
in the right-of-way adjacent to the odd-numbered sections when it transferred its title to a third party. The court of appeals noted that the Northern
202. Section 3 of the Act provides, in part:
[T]here be, and is hereby, granted to the said company, for the purpose of aiding in
the construction of said railroad . . . , every alternate section of public land, desig-

nated by odd numbers

. . . ,

and within the limits of ten miles on each side of said

road, ....
203. 606 F.2d at 937-38.
204. 435 F. Supp. at 319.
205. 190 U.S. 267 (1903).
206. 606 F.2d at 936.
207. 353 U.S. 112 (1957). In this case, the Court held that the reservation of "mineral
lands" in section 3 of the Act also applied to the section 2 right-of-way grants and that, therefore, Union Pacific had no right to drill oil and gas wells on right-of-way lands.
208. 379 F.2d 635, 640 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 985 (1967).
209. 606 F.2d at 937.
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Pacific Court's ruling, that a railroad cannot alienate its right-of-way grant,
that the
pertained only to the surface estate. The Tenth Circuit declared
2 10
servient mineral estate could be conveyed by the railroad.
The appellate court's rationale is questionable because, if the railroad
did not have an interest in the mineral estate sufficient to justify oil and gas
exploration, as determined by the Supreme Court in Union Pacific,2 1' it appears implausible to assert that the railroad had the right to convey the mineral interest to a third party. A logical extension of the Union Pacif#decision
would be a holding that the mineral estate remained in the United States
and that any easement in the underground area should be obtained from the
United States as holder of the mineral interest. In any event, this decision
has resolved an important issue involving the right of a pipeline company to
cross the subsurface of railroad rights-of-way and has helped open the way
for development of coal slurry pipelines.
2.

Railroad Rights-of-Way and State In-Lieu Selections
railroad rights-of-way in

The Tenth Circuit addressed another aspect of
yoming v. Andrus. 2 12 Wyoming filed a patent application for a school section with the Wyoming BLM office in 1970,213 excluding that portion of the
school section traversed by a railroad right-of-way. The BLM informed Wyoming that it would issue a patent for the entire school section, subject to the
24
right-of-way easement. Wyoming then filed for a lieu land selection " to
indemnify the state for the right-of-way area. The BLM refused to allow the
selection, stating that Wyoming was not entitled to lieu lands as indemnification for the easement. Wyoming appealed the decision to the Interior
2 15
The
Board of Land Appeals (IBLA), which upheld the BLM decision.
216
decision.
IBLA
the
affirmed
Wyoming
of
District Court for the District
The issue presented on appeal was whether the grant of a right-of-way
to a railroad, prior to the enactment of the Wyoming Enabling Act, was a
"prior disposition" that entitled Wyoming to lieu selections for that part of
the school section sold or otherwise disposed of.2 1 7 In finding that railroad
rights-of-way create surface rights only, with certain profit i prendre rights
to coal and iron ore, the court of appeals affirmed other recent decisions
210. Id. at 938.
211. The 1957 Unmon Pat fl decision implied that the railroad never had a right to mineral
lands as part of those alternate, odd-numbered sections granted by section 3 of the Act. 353
U.S. at 114.
212. 602 F.2d 1379 (10th Cir. 1979).
213. Wyoming filed the application pursuant to 43 U.S.C. § 871(a) (1970), which statute
authorized the issuance of patents to states for certain township school sections. This statute
was repealed by the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1782
(1976). Patent applications which already were pending are protected under a savings clause in
43 U.S.C. § 1701 (1976).
214. Under 43 U.S.C. §§ 851-852 (1976), states are permitted to select indemnity lands, of
equal acreage, for those school sections to which the state was entitled but in which title did not
vest because of homestead claims, mining entrys, Indian, military or other reservations by the
See also Act
United States, and those lands "otherwise disposed of by the United States .
of July 10, 1890, ch. 664 (Wyoming's Enabling Act), 26 Stat. 222.
215. State of Wyoming, 27 I.B.L.A. 137, 83 Interior Dec. 364 (1976).
216. Wyoming v. Andrus, 436 F. Supp. 933 (D. Wyo. 1977).
217. 43 U.S.C. § 851 (1976). See note 214 supra.
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concerning the type of interest conveyed by these grants. 2 ' 8 The court noted
that, under the Act of July 1, 1862,219 Union Pacific Railroad Company was
given surface use only, through the grants of rights-of-way, with the United
States retaining a mineral reservation, except for coal and iron ore incident
to the use of the right-of-way. 220 The appellate court also relied on the assumption that Congress was aware of the Union Pacific's right-of-way when
it passed the General indens• ification Act of...
,221 which Act listed the
types of prior dispositions subject to in lieu selections by the states. Since
railroad rights-of-way were not listed specifically among those dispositions
for which a state could select lieu lands, the appellate court reasoned that
Congress did not intend to include the right-of-way grants as prior disposi22 2
tions.
The Tenth Circuit limited its earlier decision of Wyoming
Uda//,
I. 223
wherein the court had held that although the 1862 Act did not give Union
Pacific or Wyoming a mineral interest in railroad rights-of-way, the right-ofway grant constituted a "prior disposition. ' 224 The court reconciled this latest decision by contending that its previous statements were dicta. The court
further noted that Wyoming's continuing claim to a reversionary interest in
the right-of-way, 225 was inconsistent with its argument that the land had
been previously disposed. 2 26 Since the fee interest in these rights-of-way remained in the United States, and since the legislative history and a contemporaneous opinion by the Secretary 227 indicated that these lands were not
considered among those subject to in lieu selections, the court of appeals held
that Wyoming had no right to claim lieu land for that portion of the school
228
section crossed by the railroad right-of-way.
218. Eg., Energy Transp. Systems, Inc. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 606 F.2d 934 (10th Cir.
1979). See text accompanying notes 198-211 supra.
219. 12 Stat. 489 (1862).
220. United States v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 353 U.S. 113 (1957).
221. Act of Feb. 28, 1891, ch. 384, 26 Stat. 796 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 851 (1976)).
222. 602 F.2d at 1384.
223. 379 F.2d 635 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 985 (1967).
224. Id.
225. 602 F.2d at 1384. The court noted that its decision, in Wyoming v. Udall, that "neither
the railroad nor Wyoming was entitled to these minerals" indicated that there was no disposition of these lands by the United States in spite of its later use of the term "prior disposition."
This claim was brought under the Railroad Right-of-Way Abandonment Act, 43 U.S.C. § 912
(1976).
226. 602 F.2d at 1384.
227. The court gave considerable weight to an opinion issued by the Secretary of the
Interior at the time of Wyoming's Enabling Act in 189f, which stated, in reference to in lieu
selections:
No provision is made by law for indemnifying the state in cases where the school
section is crossed by railroads, claiming the right of way either under the act of March
3, 1875, or by a special grant from Congress .....
13 Pub. Lands Dec. 454-55
(1891).
228. 602 F.2d at 1385-87. The debate over in lieu selections continues. The Supreme Court
recently overturned a Tenth Circuit decision which permitted states to select in lieu lands of
comparable mineral value to those school sections lost because of prior dispositions. Utah v.
Kleppe, 586 F.2d 756 (10th Cir. 1978). In Andrus v. Utah, 100 S. Ct. 1803 (1980), the Court
held that it was within the discretionary power of the Secretary to determine those lands available for in lieu selections, even if their mineral value was much less than those lands lost. Utah
was claiming rights to lands rich in oil shale. See Umited States Supreme Court Review of Tenth Circuit
Decisions within this Seventh Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, infa at 534.
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IV.

ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

Two cases of importance in the environmental area were decided by the
Tenth Circuit in the last year. In EnvironmentalDefense Fundv. Andrus, 229 the
court of appeals held that variations in an approved plan for the production
of oil shale on federally leased land did not require a supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), because the modifications would not cause
any different or more severe effects upon the surrounding area than those
environmental effects dealt with in the original EIS. In UnitedStates v. Texas
Pipehne Co., 230 the court reaffirmed its definition of "navigable stream"
under the Clean Water Act as established in United States v. Earth Sciences,
23 1
Inc.
A.

Modifcation of Development Plans

The imminent federal oil shale leasing program by the Department of
Interior has come under attack by environmental groups. The possibilities
of severe and permanent alteration of land, air, and water quality incident to
a large scale oil shale industry has prompted environmental groups to challenge all aspects of the proposed leasing scheme. When Interior first proposed an experimental prototype oil shale leasing program in 1969, the
Secretary issued a seven step procedure to be followed, with an exhaustive,
comprehensive EIS for all aspects of the proposed oil shale leasing program. 23 2 After approval of the final EIS, bonus bids were accepted. Two of
the lessees conducted baseline studies for site-specific analyses and issued
final environmental baseline reports in October, 1976. Detailed Development Plans (DDP's) also were prepared in 1976. In 1977, modifications were
incorporated into the DDP's, principally for "in situ" retorting. The Secretary determined that no supplemental EIS was necessary for these DDP's.
The Environmental Defense Fund filed suit to force the Secretary to prepare
2 33
a supplemental EIS for the "in situ" modifications.
Finding that a supplemental EIS for the modified "in situ" DDP's was
not necessary, the court of appeals emphasized that the requirements of the
National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA) are procedural and do not
control internal departmental decision-making.2 34 The court also reiterated
229.
230.
231.

619 F.2d 1368 (10th Cir. 1980).
611 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1979).
599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1979).

232. The procedure included:
1) promulgation of an EIS;
2) approval of an overall prototype program based on the environmental description
and analysis of the EIS;
3) solicitation of competitive bids and awarding of leases for the tracts reviewed in
the EIS;
4) filing by the lessees of Detailed Development Plans (DDP's), supplements and
modifications thereto, if needed;
5) review and approval of the DDP's by the area oil shale supervisor;
6) specific site authorizations, such as rights-of-way; and
7) development of deposits on leased tracts in compliance with the terms of the lease
and the DDP.
619 F.2d at 1371.

233. Id. at 1370-74.
234.

See Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc.,
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its position that remote environmental effects of a proposed federal agency
action do not need detailed discussion in an EIS. The Tenth Circuit adhered to the "rule of reason" standard established by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in NRDC v. Morton.2 35 Noting that the Environmental
Defense Fund had not disputed the adequacy of the 1973 EIS but was arguing that supplemental, site-specific EIS's were required for the new, modified
in-situ retorting, the Tenth Circuit stated that NEPA did not mandate a
detailed analysis of every federal implementing action. NEPA requires only
236
that the agency take a "hard look" at the alternatives.
Relying on the standard of review for determining the adequacy of an
EIS set forth in Save Our Invaluable Land (Soil), Inc. v. Needham, 23 7 the Tenth
Circuit found that the 1973 EIS, which included programmatic, site-specific,
and regional analyses of the proposed oil shale leasing program, had adequately discussed the environmental effects of the modified in-situ retorting. 238 Acknowledging that the modified in-situ plans had not been
specifically addressed, the court nevertheless held that the in-situ retorting
modification did not demonstrate any "unknown, undescribed, or unidenti239
fied" effects on the environment not previously noted in the original EIS.
Because the 1973 EIS contained a reasonable, good faith discussion of each
of the five NEPA procedural requirements for all future actions under the oil
shale leasing program, no separate, supplemental EIS was required. 2 4° Following the decision in Kleppe v. Sierra Club,24 t the Tenth Circuit restated that
an EIS need not resolve all of the issues incident to a proposed governmental
action. The EIS need only insure that all issues are identified fully, so that
435 U.S. 519 (1978); Jette v. Bergland, 579 F.2d 59 (10th Cir. 1978); Wyoming Outdoor Coordinating Council v. Butz, 484 F.2d 1244 (10th Cir. 1973); National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455
F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971).
235. 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972) wherein the court stated that:
We reiterate that the discussion of environmental effects of alternatives need not be
exhaustive. What is required is information sufficient to permit a reasoned choice of
alternatives so far as environmental aspects are concerned.
. . Furthermore,
F
the requirement in NEPA of discussion as to reasonable alternatives
does not require "crystal ball" inquiry ....
The statute must be construed in the
light of reason ....
Id. at 836-37.
236. See Manygoats v. Kleppe, 558 F.2d 556, 560 (10th Cir. 1977).
237. 542 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 945 (1977). The standard of review
established by the Tenth Circuit to determine EIS adequacy was 1) whether the EIS addressed
the five requirements set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976); and 2) whether the EIS was a
good faith effort to comply with NEPA. Id. at 542-43.
238. 619 F.2d at 1382.
239. Id.
240. Id.
241. 427 U.S. 390 (1976). In Kleppe, the Court held that a regional EIS was not a prerequisite for Interior's issuance of coal leases or for other activities incident to coal leasing. The
Secretary was in the process of completing an interim report on the potential impact of coal
development in the Northern Great Plains when the Sierra Club sued to enjoin him from further leasing until the regional EIS was prepared. Noting that the Secretary had not proposed
any legislation or plan for the development of coal on a regional basis, the Court held that the
triggering provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1976) had not been met. Id. at 398-402. The
Tenth Circuit found that implicit in the Kleppe decision was the approval by the Court of the
Secretary's procedures and actions in the preparation of the interim report, procedures similar
to the seven-step process employed in the instant case. 619 F.2d at 1377.
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agency personnel can make informed and reasoned choices. 242
B.

"Navigable Waters" in the Clean Water Act

In United States v. Texas Pipeline Co., 243 the Tenth Circuit reaffirmed the
definition of "navigable waters" that it had established in United States v.
Earth Sciences, Inc.2 44 A pipeline owned by Texas Pipeline Company had
been hit by a bulldozer, causing the release of the equivalent of 600 barrels
of oil. Texas Pipeline immediately notified the Coast Guard and acted expeditiously in constructing a temporary dam to contain the oil, but the Coast
Guard, after commending Texas Pipeline for its efforts, levied a $2,500 civil
2 45
penalty against the company under provisions of the Clean Water Act.
Texas Pipeline argued that because the creek into which the oil had run was
not a "navigable water" the provisions of the Act were not triggered. The
creek, an unnamed tributary of Clear Boggy Creek, ultimately emptied into
Red River; the tributary and creek had intermittent flows, generally only
246
after heavy rainfalls.
The Tenth Circuit held, as it had in Earth Sciences, that "navigable waters" under the Clean Water Act had a much broader definition than that
which is accorded the conventional meaning of "navigable. 2 4 7 The stream
involved in the Earth Sciences case was confined to one county where two
dams collected the entire flow; yet the stream was determined to be navigable because of its impact on interstate commerce. 248 The water from the
unnamed tributary in the instant case eventually flowed into a large interstate river; therefore, the stream was included in the definition of navigable
waters contained in the Clean Water Act, regardless of whether there was
any water flowing in it, or in Clear Boggy Creek, at the time of the oil spill242.
243.
244.
245.
(3)

619 F.2d at 1378.
611 F.2d 345 (10th Cir. 1979).
599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir. 1979).
33 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (1976), which provides, in part:
The discharge of oil or hazardous substances into or upon the navtgable waters of
the United States . . .is prohibited ...

(6)

Any owner or operator of any . . . , on shore facility, . . . from which oil or a
hazardous substance is discharged in violation of paragraph (3) of this subsection
shall be assessed a civil penalty by the Secretary of the department in which the
Coast Guard is operating of not more than $5,000 for each offense. (emphasis
added).
For a discussion of the fifth amendment implications of these provisions of the Clean Water
Act, see the comments on Ward v. Coleman, 598 F.2d 1187 (10th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 100 S. Ct.
2636 (1980) in United States Supreme Court Review of Tenth Circuit Decisions within this Seventh
Annual Tenth Circuit Survey, 67fra at 531.
246. 611 F.2d at 345.
247. Id. at 347. The definition of "navigable waters" in 33 U.S.C. § 1363(7) (1976) is "the
waters of the United States, including the territorial seas."
248. 599 F.2d at 374-75. Although recognizing that, by stipulation of both parties, the
stream was not "navigable in fact nor is it used to transport any goods or materials," the Tenth

Circuit found that the stream supported trout and beaver and water from the stream was used
for agricultural irrigation, from which products were "sold in interstate commerce." Id. at 375.
This constituted a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce to bring the stream within the meaning of "navigable waters" as intended by Congress. See S. REP. No. 1236, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in [1972] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWs 3668, 3822.
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age. 249
V.

WATER LAW

The Tenth Circuit decided two cases in the water law area during the
past yea,
r,./.
A1pache 'flhe v. United Sates has been discussed previously. 2 50 The other water case concerned a continuing controversy over the
reservoir rights of Denver vis A vis the United States. In United States v. Northern Colorado Water Conservancy Ditrict 25 1 the Tenth Circuit upheld a district
court decision which had concluded that Denver was precluded from raising
legal protests against the release of water from the Dillon Reservoir to the
Green Mountain Reservoir because of the city's participation in stipulations
in previous court decrees.
Green Mountain Reservoir was constructed in 1943 on the Blue River
on the eastern slope of the Colorado Rockies as part of the Colorado-Big
Thompson Project. The purpose of the project was to bring western slope
waters to the more developed eastern range. Approximately one-third of the
reservoir water is returned to the western slope, while the remainder is used
"primarily for power purposes" on the eastern slope. After the water is released, it is available without charge "to supply existing irrigation and domestic appropriations of water. ' 25 2 In 1955, a stipulation was agreed upon
between the United States and several state appropriators, including Denver, as to the water rights for the Colorado-Big Thompson Project and other
water uses on the Blue River. Section 4(a) of the stipulation, which was
incorporated into the 1955 decree of the United States District Court for the
District of Colorado, reads:
The rights of the City and County of Denver and the City of Colorado Springs are limited solely to municipal purposes as herein described and subject to the rights of the United States of America to fill
each year the Green Mountain Reservoir to a capacity of 154,645
acre feet for utilization by the United States of America [for power generation] 253
After Denver completed construction of the Dillon Reservoir, upstream
from the Green Mountain Reservoir, in 1963, the city began to impound
water normally flowing into the federally-operated facility. Suit was filed by
the United States to enjoin Denver from continuing this impoundment; another stipulation was entered by Denver following an April, 1964 decree. In
this second stipulated agreement, Denver acknowledged that the United
States had a right to fill the Green Mountain Reservoir to capacity each year
and that "Denver and Colorado Springs may not exercise their decreed right
to divert the waters of the Blue River except with approval by the Secretary
254
of the Interior.
249. 611 F.2d at 347.
250. See text accompanying notes 68-96 supra.
251.
252.
253.
254.

608 F.2d 422 (10th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 425 (quoting S. Doc. No. 80, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937)).
Id. at 425-26.
Id. at 427.
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In the summer of 1977, following a winter of below average snowfall,
Denver refused to deliver 28,622 acre feet of water to the Green Mountain
Reservoir. The Regional Director of the Bureau of Reclamation stated that
this water was necessary to fill the Reservoir to its decreed capacity. A de255
claratory judgment action was subsequently filed against Denver.
The central issue confronting the Tenth Circuit was the interpretation
of a clause in the Senate document concerning the operation of the Green
Mountain Reservoir as it related to the subsequent stipulations. Denver contended that since the primary purpose of the water stored in the Green
Mountain Reservoir was for "power purposes," the city should be able to
deliver to the United States an amount of electrical power equivalent to that
which would be generated if the water it was impounding in Dillon Reservoir were released. Denver asserted that because it had the right to use the
water for agricultural and domestic purposes, the United States electrical
256
generating right was subservient to Denver's uses.
The Tenth Circuit noted that Denver was neither a beneficiary of the
Colorado-Big Thompson Project nor a party to the Colorado River Compact
of 1922. Because of this, the city could not raise issues such as beneficial use.
Denver's rights were deemed limited to the 1955 and 1964 court-approved
stipulations, which expressly required Denver to release the water stored in
Dillon Reservoir until the storage capacity of the Green Mountain Reservoir
was filled. The court of appeals affirmed the lower court's finding that:
[T]he 1955 decree determined that the United States' right to the
water [from the Blue River] was superior to Denver's; under the
1964 decree it was provided that Denver had no right, title or interest in the Green Mountain Reservoir or in the water which the
United States may or is entitled to store therein; [and that] under
the Blue River
the 1964 decree, . . . Denver could not divert
25 7
water except with approval by the Secretary.
Although no new legal ground was broken by this Tenth Circuit water
decision, the settlement of the case should resolve finally the long-standing
dispute as to which water rights are superior on the transmountain diversion
affected by the Colorado-Big Thompson Project. It is now apparent that
Denver's water rights in the Dillon Reservoir are subject to the superior
rights of the United States to fill the Green Mountain Reservoir to its annual
decreed capacity.
Stephen M Brown

255.

Id. at 427-28.

256. Id. at 428.
257. Id. at 428-29.

ANDRUS V SHELL OIL Co.: THE MARKETABILITY STANDARD
AND THE OIL SHALE EXCEPTION
In Andrus v. Shell Oil Co. ,' the United States Supreme Court affirmed a
Tenth Circuit decision which had held that a future marketability standard
applies to oil shale claims located prior to 1920.2 In so holding, the Supreme
Court created an exception to the present marketability standard established
in Coleman v. United Slates. 3 This comment will discuss the factual and legal
background of the case and examine the Supreme Court's reasoning; furthermore, the comment will analyze the soundness of the Court's rationale
and offer some policy considerations relating to the effect of the decision on
the oil shale leasing program.
I.

FACTUAL AND LEGAL BACKGROUND

In 1872, Congress passed the General Mining Law, 4 opening up large
areas of federal lands to private entrepreneurs in order to promote the exploration and development of American mining resources. The requirements
for a private citizen to obtain a mineral patent are minimal. One requirement is that the claim be maintained through yearly assessment work until
such time as a patent for the particular claim issues from the government.
Assessment work is defined as work to improve the mining claim, which cannot be "less than $100 worth of labor . . . or improvements made during
each year." 5 Furthermore, the patent may issue only upon a showing that
1. 100 S. Ct. 1932 (1980).
2. Shell Oil Co. v. Andrus, 591 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1979). For a history of the protracted
litigation leading to this decision, as well as an analysis of the Tenth Circuit's reasoning, see
Overview, Lands and Natural Resources, Strth Annual Tenth Circult Surmeg, 57 DEN. L.J. 293, 293-96

(1980).
3. 390 U.S. 599 (1968).
4. Act of May 10, 1872, ch. 85, 17 Stat. 91 (current version at 30 U.S.C. §§ 22, 26, 28, 29
(1976)).
5. 30 U.S.C. § 28 (1976). The $100 assessment work requirement, although not an issue
in this case, has presented problems for oil shale locators. In 1920, immediately preceding passage of the Mineral Leasing Act, speculators rushed to locate oil shale claims on the public lands
under the provisions of the Mining Law. See Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp., 400 U.S. 48, 54 (1970).
Although the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 removed oil shale from the category of minerals
locatable under the Mining Law, the Act included a saving clause whereby valid pre-Act claims
were preserved so long as they were maintained in accordance with the law. Id. at 51. Because
the Act removed the possibility that oil shale locations be usurped by subsequent locations or by
subsequent challengers to pre-Act oil shale claimants, and because the pre-Act law prohibited
the federal government from challenging the validity of mining claims because of claimant's
failure to do assessment work, oil shale speculators became less diligent in their asessment work.
See Udall v. Oil Shale Corp., 406 F.2d 759 (10th Cir. 1969), rev'dth Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp.,
400 U.S. 48 (1970).
The Interior Department challenged the validity of oil shale claims for failure of claimants
to do the statutorily required assessment work. In United States v. Krushnic, 280 U.S. 306
(1930), and again in Ickes v. Virginia-Colorado Development Corp., 295 U.S. 639 (1935), the
Supreme Court declared that the 1920 Mineral Leasing Act had not altered the pre-Act law
insofar as it pertained to the authority of the government to challenge mining claims for insufficiency of the assessment work. Interior acquiesced to the Court's pronouncements, for a while.
In the 1960's, however, Interior again challenged certain mining claims involving oil shale
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6
the claimant has expended a total of $500 on the development of the claim.

In addition to the improvement requirements, a mining location, to be
patentable, must contain "valuable mineral deposits." 7 Since the enactment
of the General Mining Law, determination of what constitutes a valuable
mineral deposit has been the subject of much litigation and several Department of Tnterior decisions. Interior's first interpretation of the term came in
the watershed decision of Castle v. Womble, 8 in 1894. In this decision, the
Secretary of the Interior explained that "where minerals have been found
and the evidence is of such a character that a person of ordinary prudence
would be justified in the further expenditure of his labor and means, with a
reasonable prospect of success, in developing a valuable mine, the requirements of the statute have been met." 9 This "prudent man" test established
in Castle v. Womble, though later modified by the Supreme Court's Coleman
decision, remains the standard by which Interior officials determine the
existence of a valuable mineral deposit on mining claims.
Andrus v. Shell Oil Co. involved two groups of oil shale claims, 1° known as
the Mountain Boy and Shoup claims, located on public lands in 1917 and
1918. Subsequently, in 1920, Congress amerided the General Mining Law
by enacting the Mineral Leasing Act.tI The Leasing Act provided that certain public domain mineral lands, including oil shale lands, would no longer
be available for location under the Mining Law, but the 1920 Act provided
that the minerals under these public lands could be obtained through a
newly-established departmental leasing system. The Leasing Act contained
a saving clause, however, which preserved "valid claims existent on February
25, 1920, and thereafter maintained in compliance with the laws under
which initiated, which claims may be affected under such laws, including
because of claimant's failure to do the required assessment work. The Tenth Circuit, per Judge
Seth, was indignant with the Department and, citing Krushnic and Viigirna-Colorado,upheld the
validity of the oil shale claims. Udall v. Oil Shale Corp., 406 F.2d 759 (10th Cir. 1969).
In Hickel v. Oil Shale Corp., 400 U.S. 48 (1970), the Supreme Court, limiting Krushrn and
Vrginia-Coloradoto their facts, reversed the Tenth Circuit and declared the oil shale claims to be
invalid, as requested by the Department. The Court reasoned that, as the saving clause of the
1920 Mineral Leasing Act required the maintenance of pre-Act claims, including assessment
work in substantial compliance with 30 U.S.C. § 28, as a condition for the continuing validity of
the claims, Congress must have implied that the Department would have some means of enforcing the statutory provision. Asserting that statements to the contrary in Krushnic and VirgintaColorado were dicta, the Court concluded that the failure of locators to do assessment work on oil
shale claims gives the government the right to declare forfeiture. 400 U.S. at 52-58.
6. 30 U.S.C. § 29.
7. Id. at § 22. The discovery of a valuable mineral deposit is the prerequisite to the establishment of a valid mining claim.
8. 19 Pub. Lands Dec. 455, 457 (1894). Accord, Best v. Humboldt Placer Mining Co., 371
U.S. 334, 335-36 (1963); Cameron v. United States, 252 U.S. 450, 459 (1920).
9. 19 Pub. Lands Dec. at 457.
10. The term "oil shale" is a misnomer, for the rock formations in which oil shale is found
contain neither oil nor shale in its natural state. The rock is actually a marlstone which contains
an organic matter called kerogen. When kerogen is heated to between 500 and 900 degrees
Fahrenheit, it will yield a petroleum product which is approximately 66% liquid oil, plus a fuel
gas and a coke-like solid. The oil obtained from the heating process is high in sulfur and nitrogen content and can be refined into products similar to crude oil. Note, The Disputed Oil Shale
Claims: Background and Current Confict, 51 MINN. L. REV. 1154, 1154 n.l (1967).
11. Act of Feb. 25, 1920, ch. 85, 41 Stat. 437 (current version at 30 U.S.C. §§ 22, 48, 49,
171, 181-194, 201-209, 211-214, 221, 223-229, 229a, 241, 251, 261-263 (1976)).
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discovery."' 2 Oil shale claims were included in this saving clause, thereby
entitling the Mountain Boy and Shoup claims to proceed to patent under
the Mining Law.
At the time of its passage, the Mineral Leasing Act, with its saving
clause, evoked few comments from congressmen; especially lacking were
comments concerning the requirements for a valid discovery of oil shale.
The purpose of the saving clause, according to Congressman Taylor of Colorado, was to prevent any federal department from denying a pre-1920 oil
shale locator from the pursuit of a valid claim. 13 Three months after the
enactment of the Mineral Leasing Act, Interior ruled that patentability of oil
shale placer claims 14 was dependent upon a showing that the claims were
15
valuable because of the oil shale deposits.
In 1905, the Supreme Court had adopted the Castle v. Womble test in
Chrisman v. Miller.16 Thus, by 1920, there existed both an Interior ruling and
a Supreme Court decision holding that a valuable mineral deposit was to be
determined by the prudent man test. Yet, between 1920 and 1960, Interior
periodically issued oil shale patents on the basis of another test, enunciated
in 1927 by an assistant secretary of the Department, in Freeman v. Summers. 7
In Freeman, oil shale was declared to be a unique mineral, one which could
be patented under the general mining laws based solely on its future marketability potential. ' 8
The special future marketability test for oil shale remained in effect until 1964, when Interior re-examined the position taken in Freeman and determined that the Freeman future marketability standard was inconsistent with
the mining statutes. This change in position prompted the Secretary of Interior to file complaints contesting the oil shale claims located in 1917 and
12. 30 U.S.C. § 193 (1976).
13. 59 CONG. REC. 2711-12 (1920). See also 59 CONG. REC. 2709 (1920); 58 CONG. REC.
4444, 4579-84 (1919).
14. "Placer claims" are those claims in which a deposit of valuable minerals is found loose,
in sand or gravel, instead of in a vein. The term includes gulch claims, old channels, and drift
diggings. The United States mining acts have categorized all minerals as either placer or lode
claims. If a mineral deposit is "in place," or in a vein, it is a lode claim. E. DE SOTO & A.
MORRISON, MORRISON's MINING RIGHTS 252-53 (16th ed. 1936).
15. Instructions, 47 Pub. Lands Dec. 548, 551 (1920). The Department's policy statement
is set forth:
Oil shale having been thus recognized by the Department and by the Congress as a
mineral deposit and a source of petroleum . . . lands valuable on account thereof
must be held to have been subject to valid location and appropriation under the
placer mining laws to the same extent and subject to the same provisions and conditions as if valuable on account of oil or gas.
16. 197 U.S. 313 (1905).
17. 52 Pub. Lands Dec. 201 (1927).
18. Id. at 206. The standard for determining the value of oil shale deposits, enunciated in
Freeman, follows:
While at the present time there has been no considerable production of oil from
shales, due to the fact that abundant quantities of oil have been produced more cheaply from wells, there is no possible doubt of its value and of the fact that it constitutes
an enormously valuable resource for future use by the American people.
It is not necessary, in order to constitute a valid discovery under the general mining laws sufficient to support an application for [an oil shale] patent, that the mineral
in its present situation can be immediately disposed of at a profit.
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1918.19 While Interior offered several reasons for its change of position on
the validity of the pre-1920 oil shale locations, the most important rationale
advanced was that no valuable mineral deposit existed within the claims
when they were originally located.
The Secretary's protest was heard before an administrative law judge in
1967, but the decision was not rendered untir 1970.20 During this time, the
Supreme Court, in United States v. Coleman,2 ' modified the prudent man standard, as enunciated in Castle v. Womble, by introducing a present marketability requirement as a guide in determining the value of a mineral deposit.
The "marketability test," an extension of the Castle v. Womble prudent man
test, stated that, if the mineral could not be marketed at a profit at the time of
location, the mineral deposit was not, in fact, valuable. 22 The administrative
law judge examining the oil shale claims nevertheless held that he was
bound by Interior's Freeman position and he adjudged that the validity of the
pre-1920 oil shale claims was to be determined on the basis of the Freeman
future marketability standard. It was clear from his opinion that, but for the
Freeman decision, he would have found no valuable mineral deposits in the
23
pre-1920 oil shale locations.
Interior appealed the administrative decision to the Interior Board of
Land Appeals (Board). The Board reversed the administrative law judge's
decision on June 28, 1974,24 reasoning that the original oil shale locators
failed the test of value because there had been no present, reasonable prospect of successfully operating an oil shale mine, at a profit, at the time of
location. It declined to consider the evidence presented by the claimants as
to the speculative value of the oil shale. The Board overruled Freeman as
being inconsistent with both the General Mining Law of 1872 and the 1920
amendments thereto. 25 Considering the reliance by the parties involved, the
purposes of the statute, public policy, and the harm to both the government
and the oil shale claimants, the Board held that the reversal of Freeman
should be applied retroactively, invalidating both the Mountain Boy and
Shoup claims. 26 The Secretary subsequently ordered that the claims be cancelled.
After cancellation, the oil shale claimants appealed to the United States
District Court for the District of Colorado. Both the claimants and the government moved for summary judgment. The district court found for the
claimants. 27 The court based its decision on findings that the pre-1920 locations were valuable mineral deposits, that Congress had approved the Freeman rule, and, alternatively, that Interior was estopped from denying the
19.
20.
A copy
Andrus
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.

100 S. Ct. at 1935.
Decision of Dalby, J. (Apr..1 7, 1970). The decision of Judge Dalby was not reported.
of the full decision may be found in Appendix F, Petition for Certiorari at 166a-67a,
v. Shell Oil Co., 100 S. Ct. 1932 (1980).
390 U.S. 599 (1968).
Id. at 602.
See note 20 supra at 166a-67a.
United States v. Winegar, 81 Interior Dec. 370_(1974).
Id. at 396-99.
Id. at 399.

27. Shell Oil Co. v. Kleppe, 426 F. Supp. 894 (D. Colo. 1977).
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28
validity of the claims.

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, per Chief Judge Seth, affirmed the
district court in Shell Oil Co. v. Andrus. 29 The court of appeals reasoned that
the Freeman standard had become an annexation to the mining law of 1872
to such an extent that it could not be removed without affirmative congressional action. The Tenth Circuit asserted that the intensive congressional
investigations into the test without any subsequent modification of the Freeman standard constituted a congressional ratification of the future marketability test for oil shale.30 Chief Judge Seth noted that Congress was fully
aware of the Freeman standard in 1930 when it conducted investigations into
the possibility that the original oil shale locations were fraudulent. Since
Congress, at the conclusion of these investigations, did not call for the imposition of the prudent man standard to satisfy oil shale discovery requirements, the Tenth Circuit found that Congress had affirmatively approved
the future marketability standard of Freeman.31 The Tenth Circuit emphasized Interior's "contemporaneous construction" of the oil shale marketability standard in both the Freeman decision and the 1920 Secretarial
instructions regarding oil shale claims. 3 2 The court of appeals was convinced that these departmental interpretations, coupled with apparent congressional approval of these interpretations, were sufficient to demonstrate
the creation of an oil shale exception to the Castle o. Womble prudent man
33
standard.
II.

CONGRESSIONAL RATIFICATION AND CONTEMPORANEOUS
CONSTRUCTION

In a six to three decision, the Supreme Court affirmed the holding of the
Tenth Circuit. 34 Chief Justice Burger, for the majority, dealt extensively
with the legislative history of the 1920 Mineral Leasing Act and with the
subsequent actions taken by Congress in considering the Freeman decision.
The majority asserted that the 1920 Act was passed as an effort to put an end
to the question of oil shale patentability. The Court concluded that the marketability requirement of the General Mining Law was met by the pre-1920
oil shale claims. 35 The Court relied, as had the Tenth Circuit, upon the
contemporaneous construction of the Freeman decision, the 1920 Secretarial
instructions and the subsequent patenting by Interior officials of many pre36
1920 oil shale claims.
The Supreme Court also adopted the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit
concerning the 1930 congressional hearings on the issue of the patentability
of the pre-1920 oil shale locations. Since the Senate committee conducting
28.

Id.

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

591 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1979). Ski note 2 supra.
Id. at 602.
Id. at 604.
Id. at 603-04. See notes 15, 18 supra.
Id. at 605.
Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 100 S. Ct. 1932 (1980).
100 S. Ct. at 1937-38.
Id. at 1936-37.
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the investigations did not issue a report, and the House of Representatives,
after its hearings, did not reject the future marketability standard of Freeman,
the Court held that Congress had specifically affirmed the future marketabil37
ity test for oil shale locations.
Chief Justice Burger stated that for the Court to find oil shale "nonvaluable" would be unlawful judicial invalidation of congressional intent to
apply a future marketability standard for oil shale locations as demonstrated
by the 1930 hearings and by the 1956 congressional modification of the 1920
Mineral Leasing Act. 38 The Court also noted the irony of Interior's attempts to have the oil shale claims adjudged non-valuable at a time when all
alternative energy sources were becoming extremely valuable because of the
United States energy crisis. Though not directly addressing the estoppel issue, the Court noted that Interior had consistently applied the Freeman rule
39
for thirty-three years.
In his dissent, Justice Stewart declared that he was unable to find anything in the legislative history of the Mineral Leasing Act which would permit creation of a less stringent test for oil shale locations. 4° He noted that
although the congressional hearings of 1930 focused on the Freeman decision,
the Freeman standard was never expressly approved. The Justice further asserted that, even if congressional approval for the Freeman decision were
found, it would not be sufficient to overrule the plain meaning of the saving
clause of the 1920 Act. 4 1 The dissent also pointed out that the 1956 congressional amendment to the Mineral Leasing Act had nothing to do with the
question of valuable mineral deposits as that term related to oil shale claims.
Justice Stewart found that the Mountain Boy and Shoup claims necessarily
42
failed the valuable mineral deposit test.
III.

ANALYSIS OF THE COURT'S RATIONALE

Chief Justice Burger stated that the 1920 Mineral Leasing Act was enacted in order to put an end to the question of patentability of oil shale. He
did not totally rely on the 1920 Act, however, as he also emphasized subsequent legislative actions and Interior decisions. 43 To have stated that the
1920 Act settled patentability questions would have been incorrect. One
commentator has noted that the Mineral Leasing Act of 1920 was the result
of a controversy between the Interior Department and private parties over
the ownership of natural resources. 44 It also has been stated that "Congress
37. Id. at 1940 n.10 (citing H.R. REP. No. 2537, 71st Cong., 3d Sess. (1931)).
38. Id. at 1941.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 1942-43 (Stewart, J.,. dissenting).
41. Id. at 1943. The dissent recognized that neither the Board of Land Appeals nor the
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held that there was no evidence that claimants had met the
prudent man test of value. Justice Stewart noted, however, that the hearing examiner had
specifically stated that the Mountain Boy and Shoup claims failed the 1920 test for value. Indeed, none of the numerous adjudicatory panels found that the Castle test, as supplemented by
Coleman, had been met by the respondent.
42. Md.at 1944.
43. Id. at 1937-38.
44. Foreword to H. SAVAGE, THE ROCK THAT BURNS at v (1967).
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was well aware that oil shale was an undeveloped natural resource; [and]
that there was no precedent nor handbook to supply the answers to many
complex problems."' 45 With so many unresolved issues before Congress at
that time, it is difficult to see how the Court could conclude that the 1920
Act resolved all oil shale patentability questions. The suit between Shell Oil
and Interior demonstrates that for several decades questions concerning oil
shale patentability have not been answered.
A.

The Freeman Decision

The Court relied, as had the lower courts, on the future marketability
test established in Freeman. The District Court for the District of Colorado
found, for example, that the Freeman decision was not an undue extension of
the test of the prudent man as established by Castle v. Womble, since the prudent man would consider the future marketability of the fruits of his labor in
deciding whether to continue his project. 46 The decision in Castle v.Womble,
however, contains language that negates such a conclusion. In Castle v. Womble, Secretary Smith stated that a claimant's hopes and beliefs would not be
useful in determining the value of mineral deposits and that the requirement
of value related only to the present available facts, "not to the probabilities
47
of the future."
It is significant that the only precedent cited in Freeman in support of the
future marketability standard was Narver v. Eastman,48 a case wherein the
Board had held that a valid discovery does not require disposal of the mineral at a profit. The Board in Narver had compared a mineral locator to a
farmer who has a bad year and yet sells his crops in order to recoup some of
the loss. While the farmer receives no profits from his labor, it could not be
argued that his crops were without value. 49 The Freeman decision's reliance
on such an analogy, however, was unsound. If a prudent farmer had known
before planting his crops that he would not realize a profit, then he would not
have planted at all. 50 Based on the economic information available to the
oil shale claimants throughout the history of the claims, no claimant could
have considered oil shale development economically viable. Thus, the oil
shale claimants are in the position of the hypothetical farmer who knows,
prior to planting, that his crops will not produce a profit.
The Court also relied on subsequent congressional approval of the Freeman test. 5 ' It is doubtful, however, that the hearings on which the majority
relied constituted a ratification of the Freeman decision. Congress clearly was
aware of the Freeman decision, since it had been the focus of several congressional hearings. But it is debatable whether awareness equals approval. The
district court felt that the failure of Congress to change the discovery requirements under Freeman demonstrated congressional adoption of the Free45. Id.

46. Shell Oil Co. v. Kleppe, 426 F. Supp. 894, 896 (D. Colo. 1977).
47. 19 Pub. Lands Dec. at 457.
48. 34 Pub. Lands Dec. 123 (1905).
49. Id. at 125.
50. United States v. Winegar, 16 I.B.L.A. 112, 170 (1974).
51. 100 S. Ct. at 1939-40.
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man standard. 52 The Tenth Circuit adopted the district court's conclusion,
finding that congressional inaction, in the face of the many alternatives
which it could have taken to overrule Freeman, manifested a congressional
53
intent to follow the Freeman test.
It is significant that neither of the lower federal courts cited case law or
statutory provisions for the proposition that non-action equals ratification.
Such a conclusion is clearly at odds with the Court's position in the cases of
TVA v. Hi'/15 4 and SEC v. Sloan, 55 wherein the Court held that congressional
intent to repeal a recognized standard must be clear and express. In fact, the
only action taken by Congress after the Freeman investigations was the dispatch of a letter, from the chairman of one of the investigatory committees
to the Secretary, instructing him to "proceed to final disposition of pending
applications . . . in conformity with the law." 56 To endorse the concept
that statutory law may be amended by the inaction of the legislative body
establishes a potentially dangerous precedent, especially when the inaction
is, in turn, based on an arguably erroneous administrative interpretation of
the statutes.
B.

Determinaton of "Valuable Mineral Deposits"

The Supreme Court stated that the question presented in Andrus v. Shell
Oil Co. was whether "oil shale deposits located prior to the 1920 Act are
'valuable mineral deposits' patentable under the savings clause of the Act." ' 57
By deciding, on the basis of Freeman, that these oil shale deposits had future
value and were therefore valuable mineral deposits, the Court precluded Interior from applying the present marketability standard established in Castle
v. Womble. Yet, the Castle v. Womble test was the only interpretation of the
term "valuable mineral deposit" available when the original Shoup and
Mountain Boy claims were located in 1917 and 1918 and when the Mineral
Leasing Act was passed in 1920. Thus, with respect to the original location
of these claims, the only test which could be applied was that of Castle v.
Womble. The purported change in this standard effected by Freeman occurred sevenyears after the enactment of the Mineral Leasing Act. The Supreme
Court held, however, that these pre-1920 claims need only meet the 1927
standard established in Freeman. The Supreme Court's retroactive use of the
Freeman test to change a standard in effect at the time of the Leasing Act's
passage is questionable.
Davis v. Wiebold, a Supreme Court case decided prior to the location of
the Mountain Boy and Shoup claims and prior to the Freeman decision, had
held that the burden was on the mineral claimant to show that his claim
was, as a present fact, mineral in character and capable of actual production. 58 Wiebold also conditioned patentability on the existence of a mineral
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

426 F. Supp. at 901.
591 F.2d at 601.
437 U.S. 153, 189 (1978). See also Cleveland v. United States, 329 U.S. 14 (1946).
436 U.S. 103, 119-21 (1978).
Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 18, Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 100 S. Ct. 1932 (1980).
100 S. Ct. at 1934.
Davis v. Wiebold, 139 U.S. 507, 523 (1891).
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deposit that could be extracted at a profit through present expenditures and
59
The Wiebold deeffort rather than through some future, speculative value.
cision supports the Castle v. Womble and Coleman tests rather than the test
enunciated in Freeman.
For the Court to ignore the prudent man standard for value established
by administrative ruling and Supreme Court precedent in effect when the
Leasing Act was passed, and for the Court to disregard the fact that no legislative amendment to the prudent man standard was added at that time,
contradicts both applicable law and the intent of the legislative body. The
inherent weakness in determining legislative intent by examining subsequent
administrative decisions and subsequent congressional hearings, rather than
by looking to the fact that there was a pre-existing standard not changed by
the statute, is evident. Though Chief Justice Burger recognized, in a footnote, that the Court had approved an extension of the Castle v. Womble test in
the Coleman decision by requiring the mineral to be "extracted, removed,
and marketed at a profit," the Chief Justice stated that this new standard
6°
Even if a prudent man would have
did not apply to the oil shale claims.
chosen to expend money and labor in developing oil shale claims, there is no
evidence that the actual production of oil shale was then, or at any time
since, marketable. It is clear that, had the Court followed its decision in
Coleman, the result would have been an invalidation of the oil shale claims
because of failure to meet the present marketability test.
Evidence of the lack of marketability of oil shale to date is abundant.
As noted by the Board, a half-century has failed to show a single commercial
operation on any of the patented or unpatented oil shale claims. Forty years
of intermittent efforts have failed to produce even the beginnings of an industry which could process oil shale economically. Based on the definitions
of value as adopted by the Supreme Court both in the early part of this
century in Castle v. Womble, and as late as 1968 in Coleman, the Court's decision to adopt Freeman as the absolute test for oil shale marketability indicates
that the present Court was predisposed to find the oil shale claims valuable.
C.

The Estoppel Argument

Although the Court did not specifically address the estoppel issue, the
Court's use of the contemporaneous construction argument seems to be very
much like estoppel. By looking at the history and administrative developments subsequent to the passage of the Leasing Act, and by holding that
Interior should not be permitted to invalidate pre-1920 claims because of the
reliance of the claimants on subsequent Interior interpretations and actions,
the Court seemed to be making an equitable estoppel argument. This case
was not the first in which the Court applied principles of equitable estoppel
against the government with regard to oil shale. Interior has been estopped
on several previous occasions from denying the validity of oil shale patents
6
on the basis of the assessment requirements of the mining laws. i
59.
60.
61.

Id. at 525.
100 S. Ct. at 1935 n.4 (citing United States v. Coleman, 390 U.S. at 602).
See note 5 supra.
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In recent years the emphasis on equitable estoppel has been to achieve
fairness between the parties, and the traditional restrictions on the assertion
of the doctrine against the government have had only limited effect. 62 Even
current decisions, however, are quick to subordinate the interest of the individual, who has a valid estoppel argument, to the interests of the public, as
represented by the government, when the facts indicate that estoppel would
cause much greater harm to the public than to the individual. One of the
earliest cases holding that estoppel would not apply against the government
was United States v. Lazy FC Ranch. 63 The Ninth Circuit, in this case, held
that, although estoppel would normally apply in the situation, it would be
allowed only where the public interest would not be unduly harmed and
where public policy would not be significantly frustrated. 64 The public interests sacrificed by the Supreme Court's decision in Andrus v. Shell Oil Co.
include the large mineral windfall to the respondent, which will now not
have to bid for lease agreements. This represents a substantial loss of funds
which would otherwise go into the public fisc. It appears that this consideration would have been sufficient to justify the Court's denial of the oil shale
patent applications.
IV.

POLICY CONSIDERATIONS

The general policy behind the mining laws was enunciated in Cataract
Gold Mining Co. ,65 in which the Board referred to the early history of the
United States efforts to develop a consistent policy to promote and encourage the discovery and development of minerals. The Supreme Court
alluded to this position in commenting on the need for a sharp increase in
alternative energy sources and by noting the ironic position of Interior in
challenging the validity of claims which could promote production of an
66
alternate energy source.
What is unclear, however, is how a different outcome would jeopardize
the production of these oil shale reserves. The district court declared that it
wanted to avoid tying up oil shale claims in years of litigation. 6 7 But a decision invalidating the claims would have terminated the litigation as quickly
as a ruling in favor of patentability. Also, in its decision giving Shell Oil a
potential monopoly on these particular claims, the Court removed the possibility of competitive bidding for leases, thereby reducing the competitive incentive for producers to explore and develop the oil shale resources in the
most efficient manner. The Court has, in effect, restricted the market forces
of supply and demand by creating a partial monopoly for Shell Oil Company.
While the invalidation of the oil shale claims would have resulted in a
financial loss to respondents, this loss could be justified in light of the grave
62. See Comment, Emergence of an Equlable DoctrIne of EstoppelAgainst the Government-The Oil
Shale Cases, 46 U. CoLo. L. REV. 433, 446 (1975).
63. 481 F.2d 985 (9th Cir. 1973).
64. Id. at 989.
65. 43 Pub. Lands Dec. 248 (1914).
66. Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 100 S. Ct. at 1941.
67. Shell Oil Co. v. Kleppe, 426 F. Supp. at 907.
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harm incident to a perpetuation of the Freeman interpretation of the General
Mining Law. A continuation of the erroneous Freeman administrative ruling
serves neither the mining laws nor the public. The practical effect of the
Andrus v. Shell Oil Co. decision has been to open the way for the patenting of
more than five million acres of federal land for $2.50 an acre. Clearly, the
resulting monetary loss to the government, which would have been able to
lease the oil shale lands on a competitive basis, is tremendous.
By allowing public lands to go to respondents outside of the leasing
system, the objectives of the oil shale leasing regulations and the policies
behind them have been circumvented. The leasing regulations are designed
to
foster improved technology for mining and recovery of shale oil
and other mineral components of oil shale, to encourage competition in the development and use of oil shale and related mineral
resources and [to] develop a basis for future competitive leasing of
federal oil shale lands, to encourage participation by companies
which are not favorably situated with respect to access to reserves
of the minerals which are present in oil shale, to prevent speculation and windfall profits, and to provide reasonable revenues to the
Federal and state governments-all under mining operation and
production practices that are consistent with good conservation
68
management of the overall resources in the oil shale regions.
These policy considerations cannot be treated lightly. They go to the very
heart of our mineral leasing system and should have been considered by the
Court. The Court has taken on a mask of equity and justice, yet it has
avoided very important environmental and developmental considerations.
The decision in Andrus v. Shell Oil Co. is an example of the Court's ability
to rationalize a result which it deems favorable, regardless of applicable legal
precedent and congressional intent. The result has been a potentially massive windfall for a few oil companies and a substantial loss to the people of
the United States.
Witliam G Myers, IHI

68. Anderson, 4cquznng Rights to Minerals Associated With or ContainedIn OhShal, 13 ROCKY
MTN. MIN. L. INST. 233, 243 (1967).

PATENTS
SYNERGISM AND NONOBVIOUSNESS:

THE TENTH CIRCUIT

ENTERS THE FRAY
INTRODUCTION

The federal courts of appeals are in conflict on the standard to be used
to determine the patentability of "combination" patents under the statutory
nonobviousness requirement for patent validity. As distinguished from an
entirely new innovation, a "combination" is the product of using or uniting
commonly known devices together to function as one complete apparatus.
When the overall effect of the combination produces an unpredictable
change from the individual components' functions, the result is termed "synergistic." Synergism then is the combining of known elements to produce a
unique result.'
In essence, the question dividing the appellate courts is whether synergism is a necessary result that must be achieved by combination patents
under the guidelines for determining nonobviousness established by the
Supreme Court in Graham v. John Deere Co. 2 In Graham, the Supreme Court
interpreted the statutory nonobviousness requirement and announced that
this prerequisite to patentability was to be evaluated under objective standards. The Graham nonobviousness standards provide that in determining
patent validity, the patent must be examined in light of the prior art as it
existed at the time the innovation was developed. Additionally, three factual inquiries must be undertaken by the reviewing court: 1) the nonobviousness considerations in view of the prior art; 2) the differences between the
prior art and the claims at issue; and 3) the level of ordinary skill in the
3
pertinent art.
The present controversy among the circuits centers around the applicability of the synergism doctrine to combination patents. The synergism approach is a digression to an earlier, subjective standard of "invention"
previously imposed by the courts before the advent of the statutory nonobviousness criteria. This split between the circuits developed from language
contained in the Supreme Court's decisions in Anderson's-Black Rock Inc. v.
5
4
Pavement Salvage Co., and Sakraida v. Ag Pro Inc.
In holding that the patents at issue were invalid for failing to meet the
statutory nonobviousness requirement, the Supreme Court, in these cases,
obliquely referred to the word "synergism" to describe the result achieved by
1. According to THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY at 1305 (1969), synergism is

"[t]he action of two or more substances ...
incapable."
2. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
3. Id. at 17.
4. 396 U.S. 57 (1969).
5. 425 U.S. 273 (1976).

to achieve an effect of which each is individually
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a combination patent. Without the benefit of further elaboration by the
Supreme Court, either specifically endorsing a synergism standard or prescribing tests for its application, many of the lower federal courts adopted
the term and employed it as a measure for combination patents. As most, if
not all, patents contain combinations of old or known elements, the use of
the criterion has vast implications for restricting the scope of patentable innovations.
The confusion that now exists among the circuits is exemplified by the
1979 Tenth Circuit decisions. In the August 1979 decision of Plastic Container
Corp. v. ContinentalPlastics of Oklahoma, Inc., 6 the Tenth Circuit, in an opinion
written by Judge Robert Miller, 7 held that synergism was not a requirement
for the nonobviousness test. In remanding the case to the district court for
consideration of the nonobviousness issue, the court stressed that only the
guidelines espoused in Graham are determinative of the question of nonobviousness. A premise of the Plastic opinion was that "Congress expressly mandated nonobviousness, not synergism, as the sole test for the patentability of
novel and useful inventions. . . . [A]s section 103 [of the 1952 Patent Act]
applies to all patent claims, there is no justification why patentability of a
combination patent should be measured by a different standard than any
other type of invention."8 Conversely, the May 1979 opinion in True Temper
Corp. v. CF&I Steel Corp.,9 written by Judge Holloway, stated without explanatory comment that synergism was required. "A combination of known
elements may be patentable, but the result in such a case must be truly synergistic. Combination patents are subjected to a scrutiny 'proportioned to
the difficulty and improbability of finding invention in an assembly of old
I
elements.' ,"t In the March 1979 decision of Deere & Co. v. Hesston Corp.,
the court, in an opinion written by Judge Doyle, held that for the combination of old elements to be patentable, a synergistic effect must be achieved.
This note argues that the Tenth Circuit in Plastic correctly rejected the
requirement of synergism in combination patents. In evaluating the impact
of the Supreme Court decisions of Black Rock and Sakraida on the synergism
question in the appellate circuits, a review of recent decisions of each circuit
will be undertaken.
I.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NONOBVIOUSNESS STANDARD

The Constitution provides that "Congress shall have Power . . .To
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries .... ,,'2 Patent law, founded on this constitutional
clause, rewards inventors by conferring a limited monopoly for their innova6. 607 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1979), cer. denied, 100 S.Ct. 672 (1980).

7. Judge Robert Miller, of the United States Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, sat
by designation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 293(a) (1976).
8. 607 F.2d at 905 n.48.
9. 601 F.2d 495 (10th Cir. 1979).
10. Id. at 506.
11.
12.

593 F.2d 956 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 75 (1980).
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.8.
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tions that achieve actual invention status. 13 The accepted argument for pro4
viding patent protection is to encourage the discovery of new technology.'
This incentive to the inventor, the exclusive utilization of the patent, is
weighed against the public's interest in access to new technology. In balancing these conflicting interests, the interest which furthers the notion of a federal constitutional mandate for a competitive economy, in theory, should
prevail. 15 In view of the Constitution's grant of authority to Congress to
award a proprietary monopoly, the patent monopoly should prevail. The
long range interests of providing incentives to the inventor are greater, therefore, than the public's short range interest in access.
In accordance with the constitutional grant of authority and with these
policy considerations in mind, Congress established the statutory prerequisites for patentability. These requirements include three primary tests of invention: utility, 16 novelty, 17 and nonobviousness. 8 Historically, utility was
the only measure of a patent's validity. The Patent Act of 1790 granted
13. The patent owner has the exclusive right to manufacture, distribute, license, or sell the
patent for a term of 17 years. After this term, the patented innovation is dedicated to the
public. 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1976).
14. In exchange for this proprietary monopoly, a patent claim must describe the patent in
such a manner that knowledge of the patent can be shared with the world.
The specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the
manner and process of making and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact
terms as to enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which it is
most nearly connected, to make and use the same, and shall set forth the best mode
contemplated by the inventor 6f carrying out his invention.
35 U.S.C. § 112 (1976).
15. The operation of federal patent . . . laws is assumed to advance the federal competitive mandate. Each law grants a proprietary monopoly over subject matter that,
but for the grant, would lie in the public domain. The Constitution's authorization to
Congress to grant patent and copyright protection represents a judgment that, although short range competitive interests would benefit from immediate and free public access to technological and artistic innovation, to permit such access would destroy
incentive to innovate; new products and works would not be introduced into the market and consequently the long range competitive situation would decline.
Goldstein, The Compettive Mandate.- From Sears to Lear, 59 CALIF. L. REV. 873, 878 (1971).
16. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1976) reads: "Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement
thereof, may obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title."
17. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (1976) reads:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless--(a) the invention was known or used by others in this country, or patented or
described in a printed publication in this or a foreign country, before the invention
thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a
foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year prior to
the date of the application for patent in the United States . ...
18. Nonobviousness, long a condition for obtaining a patent in American law, means
that an invention must not have been obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art to
which the subject matter of the invention pertains at the time of the invention and in
the light of the teachings of the prior art. Nonobviousness is distinct from novelty in
the sense that an invention may be obvious even though it is not identically disclosed
anywhere in the prior art.
The general purpose behind the requirement of nonobviousness is the same as
that behind the requirement of novelty. It serves to limit patent monopolies to those
innovations that in fact serve to advance the state of the useful arts. New problems
arise and call for new solutions. A patent monopoly may issue only for those literally
new solutions that are beyond the grasp of the ordinary artisan who had a full understanding of the pertinent prior art.
2 D. CHISOLM, PATENTS § 5.01 (1978).
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patents for innovations that were useful and important.1 9 That test inquired
as to whether the invention actually worked or did a better job than earlier
devices. 20 Three years later, the standard of novelty was added. 2 ' This criterion was a measure of the innovation's "newness." Novelty determined if
the innovation existed in written form or if it was in actual public use prior
to the time the patent was sought. 22 Thus, the early test of patentability was
23
whether the innovation was "new and uset-Ul.'
Before the institution of the nonobviousness requirement, the judiciary
espoused a third standard: that the innovation had to be an "invention."
The Supreme Court case originating the patentability standard of "invention" was Hotchkiss v. Greenwood.24 In rejecting the validity of the patent, the
Court found that although the replacement of wooden door handles with
ceramic knobs was new, the elements of the improved doorknob were old
and well known and devoid of the ingenuity of invention. Distinguishing
between those innovations that were patentable and those that were not, the
Court stressed that
unless more ingenuity and skill . . . than . . . [that] possessed by
an ordinary mechanic acquainted with the business [was required]
• . . there . . . [would be] an absence of that degree of skill and
ingenuity which constitute essential elements of every invention.
In other words, the improvement is the work of the skillful mechan25
ic, not that of the inventor.
Construing this standard, however, proved the word "invention" to be a
term of legal art. As the Supreme Court subsequently noted, "the truth is
[that] the word [invention] cannot be defined in such manner as to afford
any substantial aid in determining whether a particular device involves an
' 26
exercise of the inventive faculty or not."
The courts, nevertheless, continued to use the "invention" standard,
and the judicial construction of "invention" evolved into an increasingly severe test. The culmination of this strict scrutiny is illustrated in Cuno Engi19. Patent Act of April 10, 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109, 110 (1790).
20. In the famous "useless steroid" case, Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966), the
Supreme Court rejected the patent of a chemical steroid because the specification of the patent
claims did not indicate any use for the steroid. Until such time as there was an actual use for
the steroid, no patent would be granted. The claimed innovation had failed the test of usefulness.

21. 1 Stat. 318 (1793).
22. See Note, Novelty and Reduction to Practice.- Patent Confusion, 75 YALE L.J. 1194 (1966).
23. See Rich, tPhnzctes of Patentabiliy, 28 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 393 (1960).
24. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850).
25. Id. at 266. The rationale for this judicially sanctioned third test is that an implicit
limitation on the constitutional grant of authority to confer patent status requires that it be
given only to those innovations that contribute to the public knowledge. Thus, when the contribution to public knowledge is insubstantial, such that anyonq familiar with the technology
could have accomplished the same result, no monopoly should be granted.
26. McClain v. Ortmayer, 141 U.S. 427 (1891). The Supreme Court further stated:
Courts, adopting fixed principles as a guide, have by a process of exclusion determined
that certain variations in old devices do or do not involve invention; but whether the
variation relied upon in a particular case is anything more than ordinary mechanical
skill is a question which cannot be answered by applying the test of any general definition.
Id. at 427.
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neering Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp.,27 wherein the Supreme Court further
restricted the scope of patents by proposing the "flash of creative genius"
test. 28 In this case, the patent advanced the state of the art of automobile
cigarette lighters with the addition of cordless, thermostatically-controlled
heat. 29 Although the Court conceded that the patent combination was "new
and useful," 30 it instructed that "the new device, however useful it may be,
'3
must reveal the flash of creative genius, not merely the skill of the calling." '
Echoing this strict standard for patentability, the Supreme Court in

Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp.32 reversed the
decisions of both the district court 33 and the court of appeals 34 and held the
patent under consideration to be invalid. The patent involved a grocery
cashier's counter that contained a rack for manually moving the groceries
over the counter from the customer to the cashier. 35 At the initial adjudication of the patent claim, the district court found that although each element
of the patent was known in the prior art, the blend was "a decidedly novel
feature and constitute[d] a new and useful combination." ' 36 The Supreme
Court reversed. In determining that the patent was invalid, the Supreme
Court held that "[tihe conjunction or concert of known elements must contribute something; only when the whole in some way exceeds the sum of its
parts is the accumulation of old devices patentable. ' 37 Further, the Court
cautioned the lower tribunals that "courts should scrutinize combination
patent claims with a care proportioned to the difficulty and improbability of
'38
finding invention in an assembly of old elements."
27. 314 U.S. 84 (1941).
28. Id. at 91. According to one commentator, the judicial evolution towards the strict tests
of patentability came not from
any authoritative break from established guidelines that produced these shifts, but
only the slightest nuance in wording. For example, although the trend toward findings of invalidity which followed on the heels of Cuno has been attributed to the
Court's adoption there of a test that, to be patentable, subject matter must stem from
a "flash of creative genius," Curo, in fact, reflects no intention to replace, or even to
augment, the objective Hotchkirs standard with a subjective measure. Cuno's purportedly new test of invention actually dates back to Hollisterv. Benedict & Burnham Mifg.
Co., 113 U.S. 59 (1885); and, as in Httollister, the term was used in an offhand way to
describe the opposite of what Hotchkis called ordinary skill. Had Justice Douglas instead coined a term such as "extraordinary skill," the lower courts would probably
have imputed to it, too, a high, subjective requirement.
Cooch, The Standardsoflnvention tn the Courts, in DYNAMICS OF THE PATENT SYSTEM 34, 56 (W.
Ball ed. 1960).
29. 314 U.S. at 87.
30. Id. at 90.
31. Id. at 91.
32. 340 U.S. 147 (1950).
33. Bradley v. Great At. & Pac. Tea Co., 78 F. Supp. 388 (ED. Mich. 1948).
34. Great Atd. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 179 F.2d 636 (6th Cir. 1950).
35. 340 U.S. at 149.
36. Id. (quoting from the district court's opinion).
37. Id. at 152.
38. Id. The rationale for this scrutiny was that
the function of a patent is to add to the sum of useful knowledge. Patents cannot be
sustained when, on the contrary, their effect is to subtract from former resources freely
available to skilled artisans. A patent for a combination which only unites old elements with no change in their respective functions, such as is presented here, obviously
withdraws what already is known into the field of its monopoly and diminishes the
resources available to skillful men.
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In essence then, the lack of precision of the invention standard and the
increasingly strict tests resulted in an inconsistent body of law producing
39
subjective reviews of patent applications by the courts.
In the Patent Act of 1952, 4 0 Congress, cognizant of the widening disparity in judicial decisions on patents, added a third requirement of nonobviusness. 41 An invention :S r1-Vsj
ald a patent may not be obtained
if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented
and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would
have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art. Patentability shall not42 be negatived by the manner in which the invention was made.
The standard of nonobviousness embodied in section 103 was intended
to advance certainty and uniformity in adjudicating patent claims. 43 The
standard has not yet achieved that goal. An initial source of disagreement
developed among the circuits concerning whether section 103 altered the
previous judicial standard of "invention. ' 44 Several circuits interpreted the
section to mean that the criterion was intended only to codify the judicial
standards in use at the time of its enactment. 45 These judicial standards
were extremely strict and posed a difficult hurdle for the patent seeker to
clear. Another interpretation was that the nonobviousness standard reinstated the more liberal test of Hotchkzss-that the level of patentability was
merely something more than that which would easily have been discerned
46
by a mechanic skilled in that field.
To resolve this division among the circuits, the Supreme Court interId. at 152-53.
39. This lack of consistency prompted one commentator to note:
In the final analysis, all it amounted to was that if the court thought the invention, though new and useful, was not patentable, then it did not involve "invention"
and vice versa. The requirement of "invention" was the plaything of the judges who
as they became initiated into its mysteries, delighted to devise and expound their own
ideas of what it meant; some very lovely prose resulting.
Rich, supra note 23, at 404.
40. 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1976).
41. Id. § 103.
42. Id.
43. The Revision Notes provide:
There is no provision corresponding to the first sentence explicitly stated in the
present statutes, but the refusal of patents by the Patent Office, and the holding of
patents invalid by the courts, on the ground of lack of invention or lack of patentable
novelty has been followed since at least as early as 1850. This paragraph is added with
the view that an explicit statement in the statute may have some stabilizing effect, and
also to serve as a basis for the addition at a later time of some criteria which may be
worked out.
The second sentence states that patentability agsto this requirement is not to be
negatived by the manner in which the invention was made, that is, it is immaterial
whether it resulted from long toil and experimentation or from a flash of genius.
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976) (Historical and Revision Notes).
44. Set D. CHISOLM, supra note 18, § 5.02(4); Note, The Standards of Patentabity-Judicial
Interpretation ofSection 103 of the Patent Act, 63 COLUM. L. REV. 306 (1963); Note, The Impact of the
Supreme Court Section 103 Cases on the Standard of Patentability in the Lower Fedral Courts, 35 GEo.
WASH. L. REV. 818 (1967).

45. Hawley Prod. Co. v. U.S. Trunk Co., 259 F.2d 69 (1st Cir. 1958); Kwikset Locks, Inc.
v. Hillgren, 210 F.2d 483 (9th Cir. 1954).
46. Judge Learned Hand opined that Congress intended section 103 to signal a return to
the Hotchkiss v. Greenwood test of "obviousness to a skilled mechanic" and to repudiate the stricter
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preted the nonobviousness standard of section 103 in the leading case of Graham v. John Deere Co. 4 7 Endorsing the preferred terminology of
nonobviousness over the "invention" standard, the Court opined that nonobviousness was intended to embrace the judicial decisions which had followed the Hotchkiss test, which test required an innovation to exhibit a high
level of skill and ingenuity as a prerequisite to the issuance of patent. 48 Advocating the Hotchk'ss criterion the Court expressly abolished the "flash of
creative genius" test used in Cuno. 49 The Supreme Court continued its analysis of section 103 by asserting that, although nonobviousness is a question of
law, resolution of this requirement rests upon factual inquiries. 50 The Court
posited that each of the three factual inquiries must be met under section
103. The scope and content of the prior art are to be determined, the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue are to be ascertained, and
the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art is to be resolved. 51 The Court
concluded that "strict observance of the requirements laid down here will
result in that uniformity and definiteness which Congress called for in the
52
1952 Act.'
The three-pronged test that the Court proposed did set out a systematic
method of analysis for assessing an invention's patentability according to the
nonobviousness standard. The Court stated, however, that section 103 "was
not intended by Congress to change the general [high] level of patentable
invention." 53 As indicated by the increasing degree of strictness in the judijudicial standards that had developed. Lyon v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 224 F.2d 530, 536
(2d Cir. 1955).
In Reiner v. I. Leon Co., 285 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1960), Judge Hand again stated that in
considering the congressional intent of section 103
there can be no doubt that the Act of 1952 meant to change the slow but steady drift
of judicial decision that had been hostile to patents . . . . We cannot escape that
conclusion . . . that Congress deliberately meant to restore the old definition, and to
raise it from a judicial gloss to a statutory command.
Id. at 503.
47. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
48. Id. at 17.
Hotchkzss established that invention was a prerequisite to patentability, and further, espoused a test for determining whether invention existed. Therefore, Hotchklos
established two distinct things: an invention reqfirement and an invention test.
Under section 103 there is no longer an invention requirement for patentability;
rather, section 103 only establishes a nonobviousness test for patentability based on the
Hotchkiss invention test. The only necessary finding under section 103 is that the patented object would not have been obvious to a man of ordinary skill in the art at the
time it was discovered; a finding of invention, however, is not required.
Note, Nonobvtorenss in Patent Law.- A Question of Law or Fact?, 18 WM. & MARY L. REv. 612, 621
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Nonobviousness].
49. 383 U.S. at 15. The Court asserted, in a footnote, that the phrase "flash of creative
genius" has been misunderstood. "Although some writers and lower courts found in the language connotations as to the frame of mind of the inventors, none were so intended. The opinion approved Hotchkiss specifically, and the reference to 'flash of creative genius' was but a
rhetorical embellishment of language going back to 1833." Id. at 15-16 n.7.
50. Id. at 17.
51. Id. See Nonobvujosness, supra note 48.
52. 383 U.S. at 18.
53. Id. at 17. The Court also noted the relevance of "secondary considerations" in resolving the issue of obviousness. "Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt
but unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances
surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented. As indicia of obviousness or
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cial evolution of patentability determinations, even among those courts asserting adherence to the Hotchkiss principles, the Graham Court did not
elucidate the exact standard to be used. Rather than clarifying whether section 103 was intended to codify or overrule the severe judicial decisions prior
to the 1952 Act, the Court's decision contributed to the confusion of the
patentability standard. Furthermore, since Graham did not differentiate between new innovations and combinations or improvements of earlier innovations, many courts adhered to judicial pronouncements made prior to the
advent of section 103. These decisions distinguished combination patents
from new technology and have held combination patents to a higher level of
54
patentability.

II.

A DIFFERENT STANDARD FOR COMBINATION PATENTS: THE
SYNERGISM QUESTION

In Anderson's-Black Rock Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 55 the Supreme Court
reviewed section 103 as it applied to a combination patent in which each of
the component elements was known in the prior art. The patent consisted of
a technique for using a radiant energy generator with an asphalt paving
machine to seal joints between asphalt strips.56 In this case, the Court adhered to the guidelines it had developed in Graham.57 Using this analysis,
the Court held the patent invalid because "the combination was reasonably
obvious to one with ordinary skill in the art."158 Although in the course of its
discussion the Court noted that a combination "may result" in a synergistic
effect, it went on to hold that the device in question "was not an invention
by the obvious-nonobvious standard." 59
In Sakrazda v. Ag Pro, Inc. ,60 the Supreme Court, reversing the Fifth Circuit, ' affirmed the finding of the district court that the patent was invalid
for obviousness. The patent in question was for a new water flush system to
remove animal wastes from dairy barn floors. 62 In this decision the Supreme
Court reasoned that the patent lacked the quality of "invention" as defined
by Hotchkiss, because the patent was obvious to one skilled in the art. 63 In
6

nonobviousness, these inquiries may have relevance." Id. at 17-18 (citing Note, Subtests of "Nonobviousness" A Nontechnical Approach to Patent Validity, 112 U. PA. L. REV. 1169 (1964)).
54. See text accompanying notes 95-172 infra.
55. 396 U.S. 57 (1969).
56. Id. at 59.
57. Id. at 61-62.
58. Id. at 60.
59. Id. at 61.
We conclude that while the combination of old elements performed a useful function, it added nothing to the nature or quality of.the radiant-heat burner already
patented. We conclude further that to those skilled in the art the use of the old elements in combination was not an invention by the obvious-nonobvious standard. Use
of the radiant-heat burner in this important field marked a successful venture. But as
noted, more than that is needed for invention.
Id. at 62-63. See Note, After Black Rock. New Tests of Patentabili--TheOld Tests of lwention, 39
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 123 (1970).
60. 425 U.S. 273 (1976).
61. 512 F.2d 141 (5th Cir. 1975), rev'd, 425 U.S. 273 (1976).
62. 425 U.S. at 274.
63. Id. at 279.
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an incongruous juxtaposition, the Court first noted that the standard of obviousness had been interpreted in Graham, but it then proceeded to cite with
approval the Great Atlantic & Pactic Tea Co. case for the proposition that
combination patents are to be carefully scrutinized. 64 The standard apparently used to defeat the patent's validity was based on the Graham guidelines.
The Court concluded that the scope of the prior art included all elements of
the patent and that the combination of these elements was "the work of the
skillful mechanic, not that of the inventor." 65 The Court again digressed
from the Graham test, stating that because the patent did not result in a new
or different function, it failed the test for patentability of combination pat66
ents.
The controversy among the circuits has centered around the requirement that a synergistic result be achieved for combination patents to comply
with the nonobviousness prerequisite to patentability under section 103.
The basis for this division is that the synergism requirement would mandate
that combination patents follow a different standard than the criteria established in Graham. Adherence to the synergism requirement by a reviewing
tribunal would subject the combination patent to a stricter scrutiny than
new inventions. The point of disagreement among the circuits is that this
distinction between combination patents and new inventions was not specifically addressed in Graham. The essential argument of the courts of appeals
rejecting the synergism requirement is that Graham was the Supreme Court's
definitive interpretation of the statutory nonobviousness section and as such
addressed the patentability of all innovations. The circuits that have followed the requirement of a synergistic effect have gleaned their rationale
from the holdings of Black Rock and Sakraida.
The question thus remaining in view of the language and holdings of
Black Rock and Sakraida is whether the Supreme Court advocated that a
combination patent must be synergistic to be nonobvious under section
103.67 The answer is found in the language of both cases. In Black Rock, the
Court stated that "a combination of elements may result in an effect greater
than the sum of the several effects taken separately. No such synergistic result is argued here." 68 Initially, in the Black Rock opinion, the Court indicated that the combination was "a matter of great convenience" 69 but that it
Id. at 281.
65. Id. at 282 (quoting Hotchkiss v. Greenwood, 52 U.S. (I I How.) at 261).
64.

66. Id. The Court noted that the "patent simply arranges old elements with each performing the same function it had been known to perform, although with perhaps producing a more
striking result than in previous combinations. Such combinations are not patentable under
standards appropriate for a combination patent." Id. Perhaps the question is, if this patent was
obvious why was it not available sooner, in view of the long felt need and the commercial
success of the innovation?
67. See Note, Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc.: Combination PatentsNow Require S yergtic Eect , 15
Hous. L. REV. 157 (1977) (criticizing the synergistic effect test); Note, Patentabilityof Mechanical
Combinations. 4 Defntion of Synergism, 57 TEX. L. REv. 1043 (1979) (reconciling synergism with
the Graham standards); Note, Endorsing the Application of Non-Technical Factual Considerationsfor
Obviousness Detmnmiations in Combhalton Patent Cases, 10 ToL. L. REV. 1011 (1979) (favoring a
clear choice by Congress of either adopting or abandoning the synergism test).
68. 396 U.S. at 61.
69. Id. at 60.
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did not contain a "new or different function." 70 Most importantly for determining the synergistic effect question, the Coutrt cited the Graham analysis of
the statutory interpretation of section 103 as binding on the issue of nonobviousness. 7 1 There is little doubt that if the Court had been proposing an
additional patent test it would have analyzed and differentiated between the
svnergism test and the Graham standards. 72 In fact, it appears that the Court
was not cognizant of the inconsistency of the language it used in Black Rock
or of the potential for digression to a pre-Graham standard.
Similarly, in Sakraida, the Court did not hold that synergism is required
for patentability. 73 The focus of the Court's attention on synergism was directed to the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals' opinion. The Fifth Circuit had
held that the patent at issue did "achieve a synergistic result. . . .-74 Dismissing this contention, the Supreme Court concluded that "[wie cannot
agree that the combination of these old elements . . . can properly be characterized as synergistic, that is, 'result[ing] in an effect greater than the sum
of the several effects taken separately.' -7' Again, however, the Court used
the phrase "new and different function" with a clear implication that combination patents are subject to a different test from that prescribed in the Great
Atlantic &Pacfic Tea Co. case. This suggestion of a "new and different function test" is the crux of the division among the circuits.
As previously noted, the Great Atlantic & Pacifc Tea Co. case was the
7 6
culmination of an increasingly strict judicial standard of patentability.
Decided two years before the incorporation of section 103 into the 1952 Patent Act, the Great Atlantic &Paciic Tea Co. decision held that a combination
patent must "in some way [exceed] the sum of its parts" 77 or, in other words,
the combination must produce or achieve a synergistic result. If the courts of
appeals and the Supreme Court scrutinized combination patents according
to the holding in the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. case, then to be still an
acceptable guideline, this decision should turn on objective tests similar to
those prescribed in Graham. Although the Court in Graham did not address
the Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. issue of combination patents, there was
not, either in Graham or in section 103, language indicating that combination
patents are subject to a different or more stringent review than other patentable innovations.
Further, although the Great Atlantic & Paciftc Tea Co. Court noted the
improbability of ascertaining invention in a combination of known ele70. Id. (quoting Lincoln Eng'r Corp. v. Stewart-Warner Corp., 303 U.S. 545, 549 (1938)).
71. Id. at 61-62. See D. CHISOLM, supra note 18, § 5.02(5); Edwards, That Clunsy Word
Nonobojous!, 60 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 3 (1978); Rich, Escaping the Tyranny of Words-Is Evolution in
Legal Thinking Impossible?, 60 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'v 271, 295 (1978); Schneider, Non-Obviousness, The
Supreme Court, and the Prospectsfor Stability, 60 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 304 (1978).
. 72. The Patent Office is in agreement with this conclusion. See 949 OFFICIAL GAZETTE OF
THE U.S. PAT. OFF. No. 1, TM3 (1976).

73. For diametrically opposed views on this argument compare Mintz, The Standard of Patentability in the United States-Another Point of View, 1977 DET. C. L. REv. 755 with Sears, Combination
Patents and 35 USC § 103, 1977 DET. C. L. REv. 83.
74. 474 F.2d at 173.
75. 425 U.S. at 282 (quoting Black Rock, 396 U.S. at 61).
76. See text accompanying notes 32-39 supra.
77. 340 U.S. 147, 152 (1950).
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ments, 78 it did not apply the objective standards of Graham. The Court did
not consider the scope and content of the prior art, the differences between
the prior art and the patent, and the level of skill in that art. 79 Contrary to
the Court's contention, several cases and commentators have noted that
"[flar from being an improbable place to find patentability, the new and
unobvious 'combination' is the usual place for finding it." 80
A case on the question of patentability of a combination of known elements is United States v. Adams, 8 I decided with the Graham decision. In Adams, the Supreme Court determined that the patent, a combination of old
elements which produced a better battery, was not obvious under the prior
art. 8 2 The Court, considering the nonobviousness criteria stated that
to combine [the elements] as did Adams required that a person reasonably skilled in the prior art must ignore [certain teachings of the
art]. . . . This is not to say that one who merely finds new uses for
old inventions by shutting his eyes to their prior disadvantages
thereby discovers a patentable innovation. We do say, however,
that known disadvantages in old devices which would naturally
discourage the search for new inventions
may be taken into ac8 3
count in determining obviousness.
No mention was made in Adams that the components of the battery must
have produced a synergistic effect. Additionally, the Court concluded that
"[i]t begs the question . . .to state merely that [the patent's elements] were
individually known battery components. If such a combination is novel, the
issue is whether bringing them together as taught by [the inventor] was obvious in the light of the prior art."' 84 The judicial precedent after the enactment of section 103 in 1952 does not support the courts that continue to
follow the Court's GreatAtlantic &Pacqic Tea Co. holding. If the Court meant
to pronounce in Sakraida a higher standard for patentability-that of synergism for combination patents-the Court should have specifically enunciated such a standard.
78. Id. at 152.

79. 383 U.S. at 17.
80. Rich, supra note 70, at 296.
If the holding of the Great Atlanttc & Paqcf Tea Co. case is carried to its furthest extreme,
then only those innovations that represent decidedly new technology would be considered worthy of patent protection. This position is clearly contrary to the statutory policy of conferring
patents. See, e.g., Shaw v. E.B. & A.C. Whiting Co., 417 F.2d 1097 (2d Cir. 1969), cert.
denied,
397 U.S. 1076 (1970); Reiner v. I. Leon Co., 285 F.2d 501 (2d Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S.
929 (1961). "It is idle to say that combinations of old eiements cannot be inventions; substantially every invention is from such a 'combination': that is to say, it consists of former elements
in a new assemblage." 285 F.2d at 503.

81. 383 U.S. 39 (1966).
82. Justice White dissented, but he did not file an opinion, 383 U.S. at 52. In his patent,
Adams claimed creation of a nonrechargeable wet electric battery.
83. Id. at 51-52.

84. Id. at 50. The elements of Adams' patented battery were electrodes composed of magnesium and cuprous chloride. When these electrodes were combined, the resulting battery was
only the sum of its parts. The battery did not, under any definition of synergism, produce a
synergistic effect. There was no discussion in the Adams decision that something other than a
better battery, in terms of voltage, capacity, and ability to be water-activated, was patented.
Thus, the focus of the Adams court was placed on the unobviousness of creating (or combining
the components of) the combination, not on the examination of the quality of the results
achieved.
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It could be argued that the Supreme Court did intend to hold combination patents to a different and stricter standard. In the same year that Sakraida was decided, the author of the Sakraida decision, Justice Brennan,
joined Justice White in dissenting from the denial of certiorari in a case involving a district court's ruling of nonobviousness in a combination patent.85
Citing the Great Atlantic & Pacifi Tea Co. decision, the dissenting Justices
asserted that
[w]here the patent claim is for a combination of existing elements,
"[c]ourts should scrutinize [such] claims with a care proportioned
to the difficulty and improbability of finding invention in an assembly of old elements." When a device consists of a mere aggregation of segments of the prior art, there is an increased danger
that a patent will withdraw into its monopoly what is already
known and add nothing to the sum of useful knowledge. Thus, to
be patentable, a combination of elements must produce something
elements; there must be a synermore than the sum of the pre-existing
86
gistic result that i's itself nonobvious.
Since the district court had not made any findings that the combination
produced a synergistic result, 87 and because each component of the combination had previously been used to perform the same function it performed
in the patented device, the dissenting Justices contended that the district
court had "departed from the clear teachings of the Court's prior cases." 88
The dissenters' conclusion certainly was at odds with the Second Circuit's
approval of the district court's analysis. 89 The Second Circuit asserted that
the district court's "lucid and complete opinion. . . properly determined all
of the issues" and that the "record amply supports the finding that the...
patent constituted a major breakthrough in the art. . . and was not antici9
pated by prior patents."
Apparently, the other members of the Supreme Court did not agree
with the dissenting Justices' position on the patentability of combinations,
for only Justices White and Brennan dissented from the denial of certiorari. 9 1 This lack of concurrence with the dissenting Justices' position was
exemplified in Dann v. Johnston.9 2 In Dann, decided three weeks before Sak4
argued that synerraida, the briefs of the petitioner 9 3 and one of the amitci9
gism was an essential prerequisite for patentability. Since the patent at issue
was not synergistic, they argued that it was therefore invalid. Justice Marshall, writing the Court's opinion, evaluated the patent claims using only the
Graham analysis, and completely ignored the synergism issue.
85.

Roanwell Corp. v. Plantronics, Inc., 429 U.S. 1004 (1976).

86. Id. at 1006 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
87. Plantronics, Inc. v. Roanwell Corp., 403 F. Supp. 138 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
88. 429 U.S. at 1008.
89. 535 F.2d 1397 (2d Cir. 1976) (per curiam).
90. Id. at 1398.
91. The dissenting Justices indicated that the crowded court docket was the reason the case
was not granted certiorari. 439 U.S. at 1009.
92. 425 U.S. 219 (1976).
93. See Brief for Petitioner at 29, Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976).
94. See Brief for Amicus Curiae, Computer and Bus. Equip. Mfrs. Assoc., at 9, Dann v.
Johnston, 425 U.S. 219 (1976).
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The undesirable confusion engendered by the Supreme Court's decisions on the question of synergism is amplified by the conflicting standards of
the federal courts of appeals. A review of the appellate decisions of each
circuit 9 5 is necessary to allow the practitioner to appreciate the judicial
96
schism which has developed.
III.

JUDICIAL CONTRADICTION:

DIVISION AMONG THE FEDERAL

COURTS OF APPEALS

A.

Advocates of the Graham Standardr-Rjecttgthe Synergism Test
k

1.

The Sixth Circuit

The latest patent decision of the Sixth Circuit, Smith v. 4cme,9 7 reviewed
the synergism question. Acknowledging that the purpose of the synergism
test is to grant patent protection to a combination which contributes new
knowledge to a particular technology, the appellate court concluded, how98
In
ever, that synergism is not a separate test for determining patentability.
a curious analysis of the Black Rock and Sakraida decisions, the court opined
that "the Supreme Court has recognized synergism to a limited extent as a
term symbolizing the more stringent standard for combination patent
claims." 99 Explaining this statement, the appellate court held that a combination patent must contribute to mankind's store of knowledge. Further, the
court asserted that if the synergism test were applied to reduce the emphasis
on the Graham standards, synergism would be rejected as an inappropriate
measure of patentability.°° The apparent inconsistency in the Sixth Circuit's statement that combination patents are subject to a "more stringent
standard" while professing to adhere to the Graham standards is difficult to
reconcile. The court simply may have meant that combination patents require stricter judicial inquiry to distinguish prior art from new innovations.
Moreover, to speak in terms of a symbolic reminder of the standard of nonobviousness for combination patents is of questionable judicial value in
adjudicating patent claims. Despite this confusing language, the Sixth Cir95. The Fourth Circuit is noticeably absent from the circuit reviews. At the appellate
level, the Fourth Circuit has not addressed the synergism question since the Supreme Court's
Sakrada decision. This review is limited to appellate decisions or significant district court cases
handed down after Sakraida. Although the Fourth Circuit's position on synergism is inconclusive, several Fourth Circuit district court cases adhere to the synergism requirement for patentability of combination patents. See Duplan Corp. v. Deering Milliken, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 648,
750-51 (D.S.C. 1977); Joy Mfg. Co. v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 441 F. Supp. 1331 (S.D.W.Va. 1977);
Ward Mach. Co. v. Staley Mach. Corp., 409 F. Supp. 273 (D. Md. 1976).
96. Because of the availability of forum shopping, the division among the appellate courts
is of particular importance to patent attorneys. Depending upon the patent litigation being
contemplated, the attorney should assess the previous holdings of each circuit and file suit in the
circuit where the holdings are most favorable to the client's position.
97. 614 F.2d 1086 (6th Cir. 1980). The earlier decisions by the Sixth Circuit had passively
followed the language in Sakraida. American Seating Co. v. National Seating Co., 598 F.2d 611,
620-21 (6th Cir. 1978); Reynolds Metals Co. v. Acorn Bldg. Components, Inc., 548 F.2d 155,
161 (6th Cir. 1977). Seegenerally Nickola v. Peterson, 580 F.2d 898 (6th Cir. 1978).
98. 614 F.2d at 1094.
99. Id. at 1095.
100. Id.
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cuit does consider Graham as the accepted standard of patentability, applicable to both new innovations and combinations.
2.

The Seventh Circuit

In the leading case of Republic Industries, Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co.,101 the
Seventh Circuit held that serctinn 103 and the Graham standards comprise the

only criteria for determining nonobviousness. The court reached this conclusion after carefully scrutinizing the synergism requirement and rejecting
02
any vestiges of the use of synergism in evaluating patent claims.'
In Republc, the Seventh Circuit was asked to determine whether a fire
door, which combined elements of prior art, was patentable. 10 3 Even
though the innovation was the first to unite the known elements, the court,
using the Graham guidelines, found that the combination patent was invalid.
Its rationale was that at the time the combination was made, it would have
04
been obvious to a person having ordinary skill in the art.'
Republic was the first case from the courts of appeals that perceptively
analyzed the requirement of synergism. As such, it is a landmark decision. l0 5 In considering the synergism question, the Seventh Circuit focused
on two essential inquiries: 1) whether the Supreme Court in Black Rock and
Sakraida advocated a synergism test for combination patents, ' 6 and 2) if so,
whether the synergism test comported with the statutory standards prescribed in section 103 as interpreted in Graham.'0 7 Addressing the first inquiry, the appellate court reasoned that because the patent validity issues
presented in both Black Rock and Sakraida were analyzed under the Graham
101.

592 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1979).

102. A decision by the Seventh Circuit two years before Repubiw had reversed a lower court
ruling of patent validity on the ground that the patent did not produce a synergistic effect. The
appellate decision held that "[u]nless the combination is 'synergistic, that is, result[ing] in an
effect greater than the sum of the several effects taken separately,' it cannot be patented." St.
Regis Paper Co. v. Bemis Co., 403 F. Supp. 776 (S.D. 11. 1975), rev'd, 549 F.2d 833, 838 (7th Cir.
1977) (citations omitted). The same district judge, Judge Morgan, who had been reversed in S.
Regis, can be credited with a thoughtful analysis of the synergism requirement and of the
Supreme Court's decisions in Black Rock and Sakraida, which persuaded the appellate court to
review its holding in St. Regis. The district court found that the synergism effect test precluded
the measurement of the results achieved by the combination and instead, required that the sum
total of the effect be greater than the sum of the effects of each element taken separately. Additionally, the district court noted:
As is the case with the Black Rock reference, it is far from clear that Sakraida approved
the principle that "synergistic effect" is the guiding criteria of nonobviousness. The
Court did not so state. It simply refuted the existence of synergistic effect in the particular combination with which it was there concerned.
Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 433 F. Supp. 666, 671 (S.D. I11.
1977), afd,592 F.2d
963 (7th Cir. 1979).
103. The patent at issue was a fire door which combined two known elements: 1)a multiple-point hold-open, i., the door could be held open at any point between closed and fully
open positions; and 2) a momentary manual release, ie., the door could self close if slightly
pushed or pulled. 592 F.2d at 966-67.
104. Id. at 975-76.
105. The Sixth and Tenth Circuits have followed the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Republic
and rebuked earlier holdings which had embraced the synergism test. The Second, Third, and
Ninth Circuits have empathized with the Republic decision, but have decided cautiously to await
further holdings from the Supreme Court before rejecting the synergism test.
106. 592 F.2d at 967.
107. Id. at 969.
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tripartite standards, neither decision departed from the established patentability standards, and, consequently, could not be cited as support for the
synergism test.' 0 8 As to the second inquiry, the Seventh Circuit determined
that the synergism test would require a reviewing court to inspect the combination's operation after the elements were brought together, not at the time
the invention was made. 10 9 The Seventh Circuit asserted that evaluating
the performance of the combination without considering the obviousness of
the combination is not in accordance with the Graham directive to follow
section 103.110 Thus, the cogent conclusion of the Seventh Circuit was that
synergism is not an acceptable test of paten tability. The Seventh Circuit
added, as a final note, that until the Supreme Court or Congress specifically
mandates otherwise, it would continue to apply section 103 and Graham.'"
3.

The Tenth Circuit

As noted previously," ' 2 the initial determinations of the Tenth Circuit
on the synergism questions in Deere & Co. v. Hesston Corp. 113 and True Temper
Corp. v. CF&ISteel Corp. 114 stated without explanatory comment that synergism is a precondition to patentability. Contending that these statements in
the Hesston and True Temper cases were broad dicta, the latest Tenth Circuit
decision, Plastic Container Corp. v. ContinentalPlastics of Oklahoma, Inc."1 5 repu108. Id. at 968-69.
109. Id. at 971.
110. Id. at 971-72.
111. Id. at 971. For a recent article on this case see Note, Patent Law--Requirementsfor Patentabihi,-To Determine Whether a Device that Combines Well-Known Eements, None of Which Performs
Any New or Different Function in the Combination, Is Obvious to a Man of Ordinay Skill A Court Should

Apply the Graham Test and not a Synergy Test-Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592
F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1979), 48 GEO.WASH. L. REV. 110.(1979).
112. See notes 6-11 supra and
113. 593 F.2d 956 (10th Cir.
114. 601 F.2d 495 (10th Cir.
rights, and Unfair Competition, Sixth

accompanying text.
1979).
1979). True Temper was discussed in Patents, Trademarks, CopyAnnual Tenth Circuit Survey, 57 DEN. L.J. 305, 310 (1980). The

survey noted that the court in True Temper held that "for a combination of known elements to be
patentable, the result must be synergistic. Since the plaintiff's process took essentially the same
steps in producing rail anchors as did prior art, mere automation of the process was held to be
obvious, i.e., conceivable to a worker of ordinary skill in that industry." Id.at 311-12. Although
the True Temper findings of obviousness of the patent at issue rested essentially on Graham standards, synergism does not imply that the patented process is conceivable to a person skilled in
the art.
115. 607 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 672 (1980). The other issues
addressed by the court in Plasti were collateral estoppel, see Blonder-Tongue Laboratories, Inc.
v. University of I11.
Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971); intervening rights after patent reissue, see
generaly Dunner & Lipsey, The New Reissue Practice, 61 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 68 (1979); Federico,
Intervening Rights 6n Patent Reissues, 30 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 603 (1962); Note, Equitable Defenses to
a Broadened Reissue Patent, 1964 WASH. U.L.Q. 229; fraud on the Patent Office, see Cullen &
Vickers, Fraud in the Procurement of a Patent, 29 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 110 (1961); and attorneys
fees, see generally Stroup, Patentee's Monetary Recovey From an Infringer, 59 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'y 362
(1977); Note, Damages and Account of ProfAs in Trademark, Trade Secrets, Copynght and Patent Law, 3
AUCKLAND U.L. REV. 188 (1977).

The only other patent case decided by the Tenth Circuit in this survey period was Milgo
Electronic Corp. v. United Business Communications, Inc., 623 F.2d 645 (10th Cir. 1980). This
per curiam decision before Judges Barrett, Doyle, and Logan involved a direct infringement suit
concerning a patent which represented a significant new technology and the state of the art in
that field. In a well-reasoned opinion, in which the court addressed the issues of patent validity,
agency relationship, damages, and attorneys fees, the patent was held to be patentable and
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diated the synergism test. In remanding the question of the nonobviousness
of the patent at issue to the district court level, the Tenth Circuit court mandated that the analysis of nonobviousness be in accordance with the Graham
standards. Specifically, the appellate court held that the Graham guidelines
"do not require that, for a combination of known elements to be nonobvious,
the result achieved by the combination must be synergistic."' 16 In the
Plastic decision, written by judge Miller, 1 7 the court relied upon the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Republic for support of the Tenth Circuit's rejection of the synergism test. Citing the crux of the Seventh Circuit's
repudiation of the synergism requirement, the Tenth Circuit noted that synergism had not been mentioned either in section 103 or in Graham. The
appellate court further noted the defects in the synergism test, which initially
assumes that the combination of the known elements was obvious. The
court found that the test looks to the performance of the combination after
the invention is complete, not at the time the elements are combined. Because these defects are inherent in the application of the synergism test, and
because the test does not comport with the statutory prerequisites of patentability, the Tenth Circuit court rejected the synergism requirement." 8
B.

Adherents to the Synergism Test
1. The First Circuit

The First Circuit, without specifically analyzing Black Rock or Sakraida,
has adopted the language of these cases, which cite to the strict Great Atlantic
& Paci/ic Tea Co. test of validity for combination patents. Deciding in favor
of the validity of combination patents in its two most recent patent decisions,
the First Circuit reached both results after finding that each combination
achieved a synergistic effect. The rulings on the nonobviousness question
hinged on the synergistic result; therefore, it is unclear whether this circuit
recognized the synergism test as a separate test for nonobviousness or
whether it used the test to supplement the Graham standards.
In ITTv. Raychem Corp., 1 9 the First Circuit affirmed a lower court ruling which had held that the patent was valid and had been infringed. The
patent involved a wire insulation composed of polyolefin and polyvinylidene
infringed. Because the infringement was willful and flagrant, the court awarded treble damages
in excess of two million dollars. The section of the case devoted to damages is especially instructive on the evaluation of damages in an infringement suit. On direct patent infringement, see
generaly Harmon, Direct Infringement of Patents, 58 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 739 (1976); Rowland, The
Interplay of the Doctrines of Equivalents and File Wrapper Estoppel, 29 GEO. WASH. L. Rav. 917
(1961); Whale, The ABCD's of PatentInfingement, 62 J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 136 (1980).
116. 607 F.2d at 904.
117. Judge Miller sat by designation from the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. For a
discussion of the viewpoint of the patent judges, see notes 162-67 infa and accompanying text.

118. 607 F.2d at 905 n.48.
119. 538 F.2d 453 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 886 (1976). One commentator has argued
that Raychem "skinned the synergism cat: in applying th6 synergism requirement as an interaction between the components of the patent, not as a unique and unexpected result. This type of
application then was similar to the Supreme Court's analysis of nonobviousness in Adams." Geriak, Synergism--The Artificial Bamer to Patentability,in NONOBVIOUSNESS-THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY 7:301 to :309 (Witherspoon ed. 1978). The First Circuit,
nevertheless, has continued to analyze patent claims using the synergism requirement.
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fluoride.12 0 Although the constituents of the wire were well known, the district court found that uniting these materials in the wire produced some
unexpected and surprising results.121 ITT, the plaintiff-appellant, asserted
that the patent was obvious because the new insulation was merely a combination of known materials assembled in a known pattern and exhibiting predictable characteristics.' 22 On review, citing both the Graham analysis and
the Sakraida language requiring a new and different result in combination
patents, the First Circuit held that the patent was valid. The appellate court
stated that the standard espoused for combination patents is "whether the
new combination 'result(s) in an effect greater than the sum of several effects
taken separately.' 123 Based upon the trial.court's factual findings-that
the temperature rating of the combined insulation was "unpredictably
high," as compared with the individual components, and that the insulation
was unexpectedly flame resistant' 24 -the court affirmed the finding that the
25
requirement of a synergistic effect was met.'
The First Circuit applied the strict patentability test in Rosen v. LawsonHemphill,' 26 where it affirmed that the patent satisfied the nonobviousness
standard. The appellate court stated that although the combination of the
elements was old, "the combination is patentable if it is based upon an inventive improvement in one of the elements that permits the combination
device to produce a beneficial result never previously obtained.' 27 The
court concluded, in other words, that the combination patent must produce
a synergistic result.
2.

The Third Circuit

Although the Third Circuit's initial position was that Sakraida emphasized the Graham test of nonobviousness,' 28 the appellate court subsequently
decided, in Sims v. Mack Truck Corp. 129 that combination patents should be
held to a higher standard of patentability. In Sims, the plaintiff alleged that
the patent, which was a change in the discharge location of a concrete mixer
truck from the rear of the vehicle to the front, 3 0° had been infringed. The
district court found that the patent was valid and that it had been in120. 538 F.2d at 454.
121. Id. at 456.
122. Id. at 457.
123. Id. (citing Bladk Ro, 396 U.S. at 61, quoted in Sakraida, 425 U.S. at 270).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. 549 F.2d 205 (Ist Cir. 1976).
127. Id. at 209.
128. See Systematic Tool & Mach. Co. v. Walter Kidde & Co., 555 F.2d 342 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 857 (1977). The Third Circuit noted the recent decision of Sakraida by the
Supreme Court, but in analyzing the obviousness of the patent, the circuit court cited that part
of Sakraida which endorsed the Hotchkirs test of the degree of skill and ingenuity exhibited by the
patented innovation. Id. at 347-48. See generally American Sterilizer Co. v. Sybron Corp., 614
F.2d 890 (3d Cir. 1980), petitionforcert.fdted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3039 (U.S. June 6, 1980) (No. 79-1916)
(hinging exclusively on the determination of nonobviousness under the Graham standards); Aluminum Co. of Am. v. Amerola Prod. Corp., 552 F.2d 1020, 1027 (3d Cir. 1977).
129. 608 F.2d 87 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S.Ct. 1319 (1980).
130. 608 F.2d at 88.
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13 2
The Third Circuit reversed.

After sketching the history of the nonobviousness standard, 33 the court
held that both Black Rock and Sakraida stood for the proposition that the
Supreme Court required a higher standard of patentability for combination
patents.' 34 The Third Circuit asserted that "in determining obviousness in a
combination patent [the courts] must undertake the tripartite Graham inquiry without losing sight of the necessity to determine whether the device
performs its function in an innovative fashion."' 135 The appellate court concluded that although the third Graham inquiry of obviousness, which requires an analysis and a comparison of the level of ordinary skill in the
pertinent art with the patented innovation, was the usual measure of patent
validity, a combination patent must, in its total function, produce a more
striking improvement upon the prior art.
In holding that the patent at issue failed to meet the Graham standard
for nonobviousness, the court declined to rule on the question of whether
synergism is a prerequisite to a finding of patent validity.' 36 Aware of the
division of the circuits on the synergism issue, 137 the Third Circuit nevertheless posited that the Supreme Court's precedents on combination patents
38
required these patents to meet a stringent test of patentability.1
3.

The Fifth Circuit

The Fifth Circuit is the federal court of appeals from which came the
Sakraida case. 139 In its opinion in Sakraida, the Fifth Circuit's rationale for
upholding the validity of the patent was that the elements of the combination patent were so joined as to produce a synergistic effect.t4° Accordingly,
it is not surprising that the Fifth Circuit has endorsed the synergism test.
In John Z0'nk Co. v. National Airoil Burner Corp., 141 the Fifth Circuit found
that the language of Great Atlantic & Pacifi Tea Co., Black Rock, and Sakraida
required a combination patent to achieve a synergistic result as a prerequisite to patentability.' 42 The analysis of the patent claims, however, turned
on the Graham standards.
131. Id. at 89.
132. Id. at 88.
133. Id. at 89-92.
134. Id. at 90. The Third Circuit in Sums found support for requiring combination patents
to meet a higher level of patentability in a policy argument. The court reasoned that to grant
combinations a monopoly would restrict the public's access and use of technology which is
already known and available.
135. Id. at 91.
136. Id. at 93.
137. Id. Although the court had earlier noted the dissenting Justices' viewpoint in
Roanwell Corp. v. Plantronics, Inc., 429 U.S. 1004 (1976), the circuit court did not endorse
either the acceptance or the rejection of the synergism test. 608 F.2d at 90-91.
138. 608 F.2d at 93.
139. 474 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1973).
140. Id. at 173.
141. 613 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1980). The patent in this'case was for flare burners designed for
efficient smokeless burning of waste gases in gas refinery smoke stacks. The patent was considered by the expert testimony in the case as a breakthrough in the art. The patent was extremely
successful, with sales of approximately twenty million dollars. Id. at 555.
142. Id.
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In Huron Machine Productsv. A. & E Warbern, Inc. ,143 the court of appeals
affirmed the district court's decision that the patent for a special grip plastic
clothes hanger was valid and had been infringed. In considering the defendant's assertion that the patent was invalid for failing the nonobviousness test,
the Fifth Circuit noted with approval the requirement that a combination
patent must achieve a synergistic result.1 44 Dismissing the defendant's contention of obviousness, however, the court found that the patented hanger
was substantially different from the prior art. 145 The court concluded that
the patent represented "the exercise of inventive skill" 1 46 and thus satisfied
the requirements for patentability.
Although the court did not analyze the synergism test in either case, nor
did it base its decisions on a finding that a synergism had resulted, its adherence to this test will be of probative value in subsequent patent validity cases
1
in the Fifth Circuit. 47
4.

The Eighth Circuit

The Eighth Circuit has declared that synergism is a required test for
determining the patentability of combinations. In actual practice, however,
the court has not used this requirement to evaluate the validity of any patent. 148
The Eighth Circuit, in. Reinke Manufacturing Co. v. Sidney Manufacturing
Corp.,149 applied the Graham standards to determine that the patent at issue
was obvious and therefore invalid. 150 The court concluded that although
the improvements of the patent were desirable features, any "hypothetical"
person skilled in the field could have accomplished the same patented improvements by studying the prior art. 15 1 The court underscored its adherence to the principles of the synergism test by declaring that in examining
the patent claims, "we will not only consider whether it was obvious that by
putting together the various elements used the result would be the effect
achieved in the [patent]; we will also consider whether the effect is a new
15 2
effect, or simply each of the items performing its expected function.'
143. 615 F.2d 222 (5th Cir. 1980).
144. Id. at 224. The court expounded that as a precondition to patent validity for a combination patent, "there must be an unexpected, unusual or synergistic result." Id.
145. Id. at 225. The patent owners had successfully maintained five previous infringement
suits.
146. Id.
147. Robbins Co. v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 554 F.2d 1289, 1295 (5th Cir. 1977); Whitaker v.
Barwick Indus., 551 F.2d 622 (5th Cir. 1977).
148. See Reinke Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Sidney Mfg. Corp., 594 F.2d 644 (8th Cir. 1979); Clark

Equip. Co. v. Keller, 570 F.2d 778, 788 (8th Cir.), cert. dtnjid, 439 U.S. 825 (1978). The Clark
court stated that "in the patent law context, 'synergism' has no talismanic power; synergism is
merely one indication of nonobviousness."

149.
150.
151.
152.

594 F.2d 644 (8th Cir. 1979).
Id. at 645.
Id. at 652.
Id. at 648 (emphasis in original).

Id. at 789.
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The District of Columbia Circuit

In Robintech, Inc. v. Chemidus Wavin Ltd ,153 the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed a lower court's finding that a patent was
invalid for obviousness.1 54 The synergism discussion was limited to a reply
to the patent owner who argued that the district judge erred in relying on
The appellate court
the absence of synergism to determine patentability. 1
rejected his assertion, countering that the Supreme Court's decision in Sakraida adopted this test for combination patents.1 56 The court's decision on
patent invalidity, however, rested on the Graham standards. The court of
appeals stated that the determination of the invention's unpatentability was
57
conclusive without the use of the synergism test.'
C.

Questioning The Applicability Of Synergism: Uncertain Conclusions
1.

The Second Circuit

Without specifically rejecting the synergism test, the Second Circuit, in
strong language, repudiated any notion that the Supreme Court in Sakraida
had departed from the Graham interpretation of section 103. The court of
appeals declared that
we do not agree with what amounts to an oblique suggestion that
the dicta in the Supreme Court's opinion overruled the statutory
test of nonobviousness established by [section 103] along with the
analytical guidelines for that test established by the Court in Graham v. John Deere Co. . . . which the opinion in Sakraida cites with
approval.'- 58
The Second Circuit, in Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Gyromat Corp., 59 reversed a lower court ruling and held that a patont was invalid for obviousness. The defendants argued on appeal that the patent was invalid
because it only combined old elements and that predictable combinations
were not patentable.'6° The appellate court, however, in reiterating the established test of nonobviousness, stated that an invention is patentable if the
differences between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior
art is such that the new device would not have been obvious to a person
skilled in the pertinent art. 161
153.

[1980] 205 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 873.

154. The patent at issue consisted of a device for forming internal grooves in plastic piping.
Id. at 875.
155. Id. at 873.
156. Id. at 874.
157. Id.
158. Champion Spark Plug Co. v. Gyromat Corp., 603 F.2d 361, 372 (2d Cir. 1979). The
Second Circuit, prior to Champion, had not stated whether the circuit approved or disapproved
of synergism. See Eutectic Corp. v. Metco, Inc., 579 F.2d I (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 867
(1978); Digitronics v. New York Racing Assoc., Inc., 553 F.2d 740 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
860 (1977); and U.S. Philips Corp. v. National Micronetics, Inc., 550 F.2d 716 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 859 (1977).
159. 603 F.2d 361 (2d Cir. 1979).
160. Id. at 372.
161. Id.
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62
who
The unanimous decision was written by Judge Robert Miller,'
was sitting by designation from the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.
Thus, part of the basis for the strong rejection of the synergism test lies in the
patent judges' predilection to gauge patent validity upon statutory merits
than on the
and the subsequent guidelines established by Graham rather
63
Supreme Court's other embellishments of the patent law.'

Despite this commitment to the Graham standards, it is not clear
whether this circuit will pursue this preliminary judicial opining on the synergism question and specifically repudiate the synergism requirement. Hints
about the Second Circuit's future position on this issue perhaps can be
gleaned from decisions at the trial level. A recent district court case, Brennan
v. Mr. Hanger,Inc. ,164 noted the controversy surrounding the synergism question and expressed approval of those circuits expressly rejecting the synergism requirement.' 65 Since the district court did not view Champion as
authority on this point,' 66 the opinion made only a half-hearted acknowledgment of the synergism test. Holding that the patent at issue had met the
synergism requirement, the court concluded that "[t]he several elements of
the claimed combination cooperate to produce a highly desirable new result
not theretofore obvious: a hanger bar which is not only cheaper to make but
easier to use. This seems as close to 'synergism' as anyone will ever get with a
67
mechanical device."'
162. Judge Miller also was the author of the Tenth Circuit case, Plastic Container Corp. v.
Continental Plastics of Okla., Inc., 607 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 672
(1980). In Plastic, Judge Miller cited his earlier decision in Champion in rejecting the synergism
test. The opinion in Champion does not specifically repudiate synergism as a test for a patent's
validity, but synergism is not included as part of the preconditions to patentability.
163. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals (C.C.P.A.) has, with a note of disdain perhaps, been extremely critical of the Supreme Court's patent opinions. In 1944, the C.C.P.A.
decision, In re Shortell, 142 F.2d 292 (C.C.P.A. 1944), rebuffed the flash of genius test:
While recognizing, of course, that it is the duty of this court to follow the law as
declared by the Supreme Court . . . . it is not within the province of the courts to
establish new standards by which invention is to be determined. It seems clear to us
that the creation of new standards for the determination of what constitutes invention
would be judicial legislation and not judicial interpretation.
Id. at 296. More recently, the C.C.P.A. stated that "the term 'synergism' is applied without
qualification. Synergism, in and of itself, is not conclusive of unobviousness in that synergism
might be expected." Application of Kollman, 595 F.2d 48, 55 n.6 (C.C.P.A. 1979).
Judge Rich, author of two articles cited previously, see notes 23 & 71 supra, also disagreed
with the Supreme Court analysis of patent law in Application of Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (C.C.P.A.
1979). Judge Rich opined that the Supreme Court had misread both the statute and case law in
construing the tests of usefulness, novelty, and nonobviousness.
There are those commentators who criticize the position of the C.C.P.A. and the patent
bar. Their main objection is that the C.C.P.A. and the patent bar have adopted a "liberal"
attitude concerning patentability of small advances over the current technology. These objectors believe inventions that rightfully should be in the public domain have been given patent
protection. Thus, granting monopolies to these inventions reduces the public's access to the
innovation. For a discussion on this position, see Sears, Combination Patents and 35 USC § 103,
1977 DET. C. L. REV. 83; Note, Endorsing the Application of Non-Technical FactualConsiderationsfor
Obviousness Deteminations in Combination Patent Cases-Nickola v. Peterson, 10 TOL. L. REV. 1011
(1979).
164. 479 F. Supp. 1215 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
165. Id. at 1224-25.
166. Id. at 1225.
167. Id. Judge Conner offered an alternative to interpreting the synergism definition. He
stated that synergism is "the result produced by the overall combination. Whenever a new and
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The Ninth Circuit

Retreating from earlier opinions that had urged the requirement of synergism, the Ninth Circuit, in Palmer v. Orthoktnetics, Inc.,168 questioned the
applicability of synergism to the determination of nonobviousness. The
prior decisions of this circuit had held, without comment, that a synergistic
rc.ult must be achieved by combination .atents 169 The reason for this reversion was the appellate court's recognition that synergism fails to resolve
the question posed by section 103, namely, whether the combination of the
elements in the innovation was obvious in light of the level of skill in the art
at the time the combining was done. 1 70 Noting that the Ninth Circuit's decisions have often held "that a synergism test will assist a court in determining whether a combination patent is nonobvious," the court asserted that the
final conclusions at the fact finding level "must be guided by the requirements of section 103 and Graham v.John Deere Co. "171 The Ninth Circuit
recognized the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Repubc, but reserved judgment on rejecting the synergism test.' 7 2 This qualification, therefore, does
not indicate whether the Ninth Circuit approves or disapproves of synergism.
CONCLUSION

Perhaps the most that can be concluded from the recent divergence of
opinions is that, from Graham to the subsequent decisions in Black Rock and
Sakraida, the Supreme Court muddied the already turbid waters of judicial
evaluation of patentability under the nonobviousness standard. The nonobviousness standard developed from the dissatisfaction with the subjective judicial "invention" standard. The standards of patentability contained in
section 103 were enacted to promote consistent and definite analysis of patent claims. Requiring synergism as a condition of patentability would be a
digression from the Graham guidelines and would reintroduce subjective concepts into the adjudication of patent claims.
Additionally, the synergism test is fatally defective in view of the statutory requirements and the interpretation of these requirements in Graham.
The first flaw of the synergism test is that neither section 103 nor Graham
expressly mention synergism. This defect was noted by the Seventh Circuit:
In enacting section 103, Congress expressly mandated nonobviousness, not synergism, as the sole test for the patentability of novel
and useful inventions: indeed, synergism is not even mentioned in
desirable result is achieved, or an old result is achieved more efficiently, synergism is present."
Conner, Winning Patent Infringement Suits-The Art of Swunmzng Agatnst the Tide, in NONOBVioUSNESS--THE ULTIMATE CONDITION OF PATENTABILITY 4:401,:405 (Witherspoon ed. 1978).
168. 611 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1980).
169. See Kaeiautokomfort v. Eurasian Auto. Prod., 553 F.2d 603 (9th Cir. 1977); Deere &
Co. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 513 F.2d 1131 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 914 (1975); HewlettPackard Co. v. Tel-Design, Inc., 460 F.2d 625 (9th Cir. 1972); Regimbal v. Scymansky, 444 F.2d
333 (9th Cir. 1971); Reeves Instrument Corp., v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 444 F.2d 263 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 951 (1971).
170. 611 F.2d at 324.
171. Id.
172. Id. at n.17.
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the Patent Act of 1952. Moreover, as section 103 applies to all patent claims, there is no justification [for] why patentability of a combination patent should be measured
by a different standard than
73
any other type of invention.'
A further flaw in the synergism test is that the patent claims are not
evaluated "at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill
in the art .... .,174 The synergism test would analyze nonobviousness after
the combination was made, contrary to the section 103 language requiring a
determination of patent validity "at the time the invention was made.,,, 7 5 The
synergism test ignores the possibility that nonobviousness could be found in
the very choice of the elements. The synergism test fails because it focuses on
the result of the combination rather than on the obviousness or nonobviousness of the combination. A rejection of the synergism test does not imply
that there is no place for a synergistic result in the scheme of determining
patent validity. Instead of relying on a synergistic effect as determinative of
patentability, the new result should be considered, as with all other patent
claims, under the nonobviousness standard.
Finally, to resolve the confusion that now exists as a result of the
Supreme Court's holdings and the division in the appellate courts, the Court
should address the question of synergism. If the Court does conclude that a
synergistic result is necessary for combinations to be patentable, then it
should specifically so hold. To promote this additional criterion, the Court
should advance the tests to be used by a reviewing court in evaluating patentability, and it should distinguish the Graham standards from the synergism test. Endorsing the synergistic effect test would substantially increase
the difficulty of obtaining a patent and severely restrict the number of innovations granted patent protection.
The Supreme Court, however, has not yet specifically held that synergism is required, nor should it so hold. Using the Graham three-pronged test,
without requiring an additional standard for combination patents, courts
can still discern whether an innovation merits patent status. The ultimate
fate of the synergism question rests with Congress. Until Congress enacts
legislation prescribing different criteria for combination patents, the federal
courts, in the interest of uniformity, definiteness, and consistency, should
continue to apply the standard of section 103 as it has been interpreted by
Graham.
Hollie L. Baker

173.
174.
175.

Republic Indus., Inc. v. Schlage Lock Co., 592 F.2d 963, 971 (7th Cir. 1979).
35 U.S.C. § 103 (1976) (emphasis added).
Id. (emphasis added).

SECURITIES
OVERVIEW
2
During the past term,' the Tenth Circuit reviewed only three decisions
dealing with the Securities Act of 1933 (1933 Act) 3 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1934 Act). 4 The court considered section 12(2), 5 section
13,6 and section 17(a) 7 of the 1933 Act; section 10(b) 8 of the 1934 Act and
rule lOb-5 9 were also discussed. These Tenth Circuit decisions followed wellestablished precedents. An examination of these decisions will, nevertheless,
serve to further clarify the position of the Tenth Circuit on these securities
issues.

I.

SCIENTER AND THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS

In Werthet'm & Co. v. Codding Embgyologt'cal Sciences, Inc.,' 0 the Tenth Circuit reviewed a securities offering of a corporation organized to engage in a
special beef stock promotion. The plaintiff charged violations of section
12(2) and 17(a) of the 1933 Act and noncompliance with section 10(b) of the
1934 Act and rule lOb-5." The trial court found that the defendants had
indeed made material misstatements 12 and a material omission; 1 3 nevertheless, the trial court found for the defendant. In a decision delivered by Judge
McWilliams, the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
A.

The Section 10(b) Clatm

The trial court concluded that the misrepresentations and the omission
were the result of mere negligence and that the defendant acted in good
faith. Under Hochfelder, the absence of scienter is fatal to a private damages
action predicated on section 10(b).1 4 Judge McWilliams, noting that one's
1. This survey covers opinions filed from June I, 1979 to May 31, 1980.

2. Wertheim & Co. v. Codding Embryological Sciences, Inc., 620 F.2d 764 (10th Cir.
1980); Cronin v. Midwestern Okla. Dev. Auth., 619 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1980); and United
States v. Jensen, 608 F.2d 1349 (10th Cir. 1979).
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
4. Id. §§ 78a-78kk.
5. Id. § 77/(2).
6. Id § 77m.

7. Id § 77q(a).
8.

9.
10.
11.
12.
with the

Id. § 78j(b).

17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980).
620 F.2d 764 (10th Cir. 1980).
Id.
The defendants had misrepresented the magnitude of the cost overruns in connection
construction of a building. Id. at 766.

13. The defendants also failed to disclose that they had previously engaged in a similar
venture with another company. That enterprise had ended as a financial failure. Moreover,
the defendants were involved in a protracted lawsuit in connection with the prior venture. C.H.
Codding & Sons v. Armour & Co., 404 F.2d I (10th Cir. 1968). The plaintiffs were not informed
of this litigation. 620 F.2d at 766.
14. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976). Even assuming that the statements
were made with the requisite scienter, the trial court held, in the alternative, that the plaintiffs

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:2

"state of mind almost invariably presents an issue of fact," ruled that the
trial court's negligence finding was not clearly erroneous and hence would
not be disturbed on appeal. 15
The plaintiff urged that reckless misconduct should be deemed the
equivalent of scienter. 16 Judge McWilliams recognized that other circuits
have decided that the reach of scienter includes recklessness, 17 but the judge
concluded that the trial court's determination that the defendant's conduct
was merely negligent precluded such an inquiry in the instant case.18
The Section 12(2) and 17(a) Claims

B.

Acknowledging that a section 12(2) claim survives the lack of scienter,
the Tenth Circuit turned to section 13 of the 1933 Act, which imposes a oneyear statute of limitations commencing "after the discovery of the untrue
statement or omission." The defendant first discovered the misrepresentations in December 1973; the action was not filed until January 1975-one
month too late. Because there was insufficient evidence to toll section 13,
Judge McWilliams dismissed the section 12(2) claim.' 9
On appeal, the plaintiffs did not pursue the section 17(a) claim. At the
trial level, counsel indicated that this claim was included under the umbrella
of rule lob-5. 20 This presents a vivid illustration of how Aaron v. SEC2 1 may
well move the battleground for securities fraud from section 10(b) to section
17(a). That rule lOb-5 has overshadowed section 17(a) in the past is without
question. The implications of Aaron on private damage actions based on
section 17(a), however, may well breathe new life into this anti-fraud provision.

Hochfelder and Aaron both stand for the proposition that the scienter requirement under the anti-fraud sections does not turn upon the identity of
the plaintiff or upon the nature of the relief sought; rather, what is determinative is the language and legislative history of the statutory provision. It
seems, therefore, that this logic allows a private plaintiff seeking money damages to prevail under section 17(a)(2) and (3) without a showing of scienter.
The catch, of course, is that the Supreme Court has not yet decided whether
it will imply a private action under section 17(a) of the 1933 Act. 22 Until the
Court resolves this question, private plaintiffs undoubtedly will pursue section 17(a) claims with much more vigor than they have in the past.
could not show that they had in fact relied on the representations or that they had acted with
due diligence in the transaction. 620 F.2d at 766.
15. Id.

16. The Hochfelder Court refrained from deciding whether reckless behavior was a form of
scienter. 425 U.S. at 193 & 194 n.12.

17.

Rolf v. Blyth, Eastman, Dillion & Co., 570 F.2d 38 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1039

(1978); Sunstrand v. Sun Chem. Corp., 553 F.2d 1033 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 875 (1977).

18. 620 F.2d at 766-67.
19.
20.
21.

Id. at 767.
Id.
100 S. Ct. 1945 (1980).

22. Id. at 1951. For a detailed discussion of the Aaron decision and its possible ramifications, see Aaron v. SEC: The Szinter Requirement in SEC Injunctive Actions, which immediately
follows this overview, inyra at 493.
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II.

BOND COUNSEL AND TRUSTEE'S LIABILITY

Cronin v. Midwestern Oklahoma Development Authorty,23 involved a securities fraud action by purchasers of two issues of industrial development revenue bonds. The bonds went into default, and numerous defendants were
named in the litigation. 24 The purchasers' complaint alleged, in part, that
the bond counsel'and trustee had violated or aided and abetted violations of
rule lOb-5 by failing to disclose certain allegedly material facts. The district
court granted summary judgment to the bond counsel and to the trustee,
and the plaintiffs appealed. Judge Doyle, speaking for the Tenth Circuit
panel, directed the trial court to vacate all of the summary judgment orders.
In essence, Judge Doyle overruled the trial court's decision because the "orders are replete with conclusory statements" and the facts surrounding the
bonds' issuance needed further development. 25 The Tenth Circuit did look,
however, to one legal conclusion of the lower court. The trial court assumed
that since the express fraud was committed by a broker-dealer's sales representative, the purchasers were required to prove that the bond counsel and
the indenture trustee were privy to the misrepresentation. Judge Doyle disagreed. He noted that the defendants would be liable if "shown to have had
participat[ed] in the issuance of the bonds and thus [to have] owed a duty to
all of the buyers to reveal the facts . . . and [liability would also result] if the
defendant-lawyers and banks knowingly aided the underwriter in the issu'26
ance of value-depleted bonds."
III.

BROKER'S FRAUD UNDER SECTION 17(A)

The Tenth Circuit confronted a criminal prosecution based on alleged
violations of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act in United States v. Jensen. 27 The
defendant was the principal operator of a stock brokerage firm called Associated Underwriters (Associated). Associated operated by having an investor
enter into a "conversion investment contract." Under this agreement, Associated would select certain securities, using the investor's funds for the
purchase price. Next, both a "call" option and a "put" option 28 would be
acquired on these securities. As additional protection, the put options were
to be guaranteed by a financially secure institution. Thus, the investors were
promised a fixed return on their investment, not subject to the vagaries of
the stock market.
Associated fell into financial difficulties. One of Associated's customers
defrauded the brokerage house out of $300,000. Many of these stocks were
sold to the investor's accounts at prices far in excess of their fair market
23. 619 F.2d 856 (10th Cir. 1980).
24. The defendants included: the bond issuer and its officials, the private corporation
which received the bond proceeds, the underwriters, the bond counsel, the indenture trustees,
and the broker-dealers involved in selling the bonds to the plaintiff.
25. 619 F.2d at 862.
26. Id.
27. 608 F.2d 1349 (10th Cir. 1979).
28. The purchaser of a call option has the right to buy stock at a given price. In contrast,
the put option gives one the right to sell a given number of shares of stock, at a specific price,
within a specified time frame.
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value. Moreover, the defendant began to function as the writer of both the
put and call options, as well as becoming the guarantor of the put option,
thus, guaranteeing its own legal obligations. Associated subsequently went
29
bankrupt and left its customers with virtually worthless stock.
On appeal, the defendant, Jensen, argued that there was no sale of the
common stock. Instead, he argued that the investors merely purchased an
investment contract. 30 Judge Logan, speaking for the court, focused on the
legal obligations between the defendant and the investors. Specifically, the
court considered whether Jensen was acting in the capacity of a broker or of
a debtor. The court examined Jensen's representation that the investor's
money would be used to purchase stocks, "which were then placed in the
individual accounts, with each investor being notified." Concluding that
this was essentially a brokerage account, the court held that purchases of
31
stock by brokers are the equivalent of sales to the customers.
The defendant urged that there was no fraud committed within the
meaning of subsections (2) and (3) of section 17(a). Judge Logan rejected
this argument, finding misrepresentations, 32 omissions, 3 3 and a fraudulent
34

course of business.
Finally, Jensen contended that the fraudulent practices did not have the
necessary nexus to the sale of securities. The Tenth Circuit also rejected this
argument, reasoning that "fraud does not have to relate directly to the value
or nature of stock to be a section 17(a) violation. '35 After viewing the transaction as a whole, Judge Logan concluded that if stock was sold, then section
17(a) applies, and if a section 17(a)(2) or (3) fraud was committed at some
point in the transaction, then there was the requisite fraud in the sale of the
36
securities.
Steve M. Skoumal

29. 608 F.2d at 1353.
30. Id.
31. Id.

32. The court noted that, contrary to Jensen's original statements, Associated acted as the
guarantor, with Jensen writing the put and call options on worthless stock. Id. at 1354.
33. The defendant failed to notify the investors of the changed nature of the investment
agreement. Id.
34. Jensen used stock that he knew was essentially worthless, selling it to the investors at
highly inflated prices. Furthermore, he devised a "sham put and call option transaction" and
then guaranteed the put options himself. Id.
35.

Id.

36. Id. at 1354-55.

AARON V SEC: THE SCIENTER REQUIREMENT IN
INJUNCTIVE ACTIONS

SEC

The recent decision of the Supreme Court in Aaron v. SEC' is one whose
2
immediate impact will be felt in all federal courts. The Court in Aaron
significantly altered the enforcement scheme of the anti-fraud provisions of
3
the SecuritiesAct of 1933 (1933 Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of
4
1934 (1934 Act). The question in Aaron was whether the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC or Commission) is required to establish scien6
ter 5 as an element of a civil enforcement action to enjoin violations of sec1. 100 S. Ct. 1945 (1980).
2. A look at scienter in the Tenth Circuit follows at notes 15-45 inh/a and accompanying
text.
3. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1976).
4. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78kk (1976).
5. The Aaron Court defined scienter as "an intent on the part of the defendant to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud." 100 S. Ct. at 1950. This is in accordance with Ernst & Ernst v.
Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976), which defined scienter as "a mental state embracing intent to
deceive, manipulate, or defraud." Id. at 193 n.12. As in Hochfe/der, the Supreme Court in Aaron
reserved judgment whether scienter may be defined to include "reckless behavior." 100 S. Ct. at
1950 n.5.
The Tenth Circuit in the pre-Hochfelder decision of Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975), imposed a "scienter or conscious fault" requirement on
a private party seeking money damages under 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980) (rule lOb-5). 507
F.2d at 1361-62. The Tenth Circuit has also ruled that a private plaintiff need only prove that
the defendant was negligent. Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 474
F.2d 514, 521 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973). In 1976, the Supreme Court in
Hochfeldrconcluded that a private cause of action for money damages will not lie under either
§ -10(b) of the 1934 Act or under rule lOb-5 in the absence of an allegation of scienter. 425 U.S.
at 193.
Whether reckless conduct constitutes scienter in the Tenth Circuit has not been directly
addressed by the court of appeals. See, e.g., Holdsworth v. Strong, 545 F.2d 687 (10th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 430 U.S. 955 (1977). However, in Utah State Univ. of Agriculture & Applied Science v. Bear, Stearns & Co., 549 F.2d 164, 169 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 890 (1977), the
Tenth Circuit concluded that willful or intentional misconduct, or its equivalent, is an essential
element under § 10(b) of the 1934 Act. Even in the face of Bear, Steams &Co., the Tenth Circuit
nevertheless seems to have adopted a noncommittal position as to the scope of scienter. In the
recent decision of Wertheim & Co. v. Codding Embryological Sciences, 620 F.2d 764 (10th Cir.
1980), the court noted:
We recognize that recklessness has been held to be tantamount to scienter in some
circumstances . . . . However, recklessness has been defined, in such context, as a
frame of mind which comes closer to being a lesser form of intent than merely a
greater degree of ordinary negligence . . . . The trial court's determination that the
[defendants] were only negligent negates the argument that they were guilty of reckless conduct, if indeed there was no actual intent to deceive.
Id. at 766-67 (citations omitted).
6. The Commission is expressly empowered under § 20(b) of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 77t(b) (1976), to seek injunctive relief:
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or about to
engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a violation of the
provisions of this subchapter [e.g., section 17(a)], or of any rule or regulation prescribed under authority thereof, it may in its discretion, bring an action in any district
court of the United States . . . to enjoin such acts or practices, and upon a proper
showing a permanent or temporary injunction or restraining order shall be granted
without bond.
Similarly, § 21(d) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976), expressly authorizes the
Commission to seek injunctive relief:
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tion 17(a) of the 1933 Act, 7 section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, 8 and rule lOb-5, 9
promulgated under section 10(b).
The Aaron Court decided that section 10(b) of the 1934 Act 10 and section 17(a)(1) of the 1933 Act"' are violated only when the defendant has
acted with a willful intent to defraud. On the other hand, the Aaron Court
held that sections 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3) of the 1933 Act require no proof of
scienter;' 2 a finding of negligence is sufficient. The Court aisu concludcd
that because the SEC must prove some likelihood of a future violation before
an injunction can issue,1 3 "an important factor in this regard is the degree of
intentional wrongdoing evident in a defendant's past misconduct."'' 4 This
note will examine the state of the law before Aaron, the analysis employed by
the Aaron Court, and the implications of this decision for the federal courts.
I.

THE STATE OF MIND REQUIREMENT IN
PROCEEDINGS:

SEC

INJUNCTIVE

THE TENTH CIRCUIT

The question of whether the Commission 5 must show that the defendant in an injunctive proceeding acted with scienter has been fertile ground
for commentary.' 6 When examining the history of scienter as a necessary
Whenever it shall appear to the Commission that any person is engaged or is about to
engage in acts or practices constituting a violation of any provision of this chapter
[e.g., § 10(b)], the rules or regulations thereunder [e.g., rule l0b-5(l)] . . .it may in its
discretion bring an action in the proper district court of the United States . . . to
enjoin such acts or practices, and upon a proper showing a permanent or temporary
injunction or restraining order shall be granted without bond.
7. 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a) (1976). For the text of§ 17(a), see note 31 ingfa.
8. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1976). For the text of§ 10(b), see note 20 infra.
9. 17 C.F.R. § 240. lOb-5 (1980). For the text of rule 1Ob-5, see note 20 infa.
10. 100 S. Ct. at 1954-55.
It. Id. at 1956.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1959.
14. 100 S. Ct. at 1958. Chief Justice Burger went even further in his concurrence. The
Chief Justice noted that it will "almost always be necessary" for the Commission to establish the
defendant's intent to deceive before a court will issue an injunction. Id. at 1959.
15. This survey will limit itself to a consideration of the Commission, rather than private
parties, as plaintiff. While the outcome of a private injunctive action is identical to that of an
SEC injunctive proceeding, the elements of the action differ significantly. See generally Note,
Scienter and Injunctive Relief Under Rule lOb-5, 11 GA. L. REv. 879, 880 n.9 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as GA. L. REV.]. The Commission, because its injunctive power is a creature of statute,
must seek its injunction under either § 20(b) of the 1933 Act or § 21(d) of the 1934 Act. (For the
text of these sections, see note 6 supra). In contrast, the private plaintiff seeking an injunction
must show both irreparable harm and the inadequacy of a remedy at law. The private injunctive action is judicially inferred; therefore, traditional equity principles apply. Ronbeau v.
Mosinee Paper Corp., 422 U.S. 49, 57 (1975) (private injunction sought under § 13(d) of the
1934 Act); W. DE FUNIAK, HANDBOOK OF MODERN EQUrTY 33-37 (1950).

For an argument

that the SEC and private injunctive actions should, as a matter of policy, contain the same
requirements, see Note, Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper Corporation and lmphed FI'wate Rights of Aclion, 28 HASTINGS L.J. 93, 114 (1976).
16. E.g., Berner & Franklin, Sienterand Securitier and Exchange Commisslin Rule l0-5 Injuctiwe
Actions: A Reappraial in Light of Hochfelder, 51 N.Y.U.L. Rev. 769 (1976); Harkleroad, Requirements for Injunctive Actions under The Federal Securities Laws, 2 J. CORP. L. 481 (1977); Lowenfels,
Scienter or Negligence Required for SEC Injunctions under Section 10(b) and Rule 0b-5:. A Fascinating
Paradox, 33 Bus. LAW. 789 (1978); Mathews, Liabilities ofLawyers Under the Federal Securittes Laws,
30 Bus. LAW. 105 (Sp. Issue, Mar. 1975); Note, The Seienter Requirement in SEC Injunctive Enforcement of Section 10(b) After Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 419 (1977) [hereinafter cited as The Scienter Requirement]; Note, Injunctive Reief in SEC Civl Actions: The Scope ofJudiial
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element in an action for injunctive relief, it is important to note whether the
case was decided before or after Ernst &Ernst v. Hochfelder.17 In 1976, the
Supreme Court concluded in Hachfelder that a private action for money damages will not lie under either section 10(b) of the 1934 Act or rule lOb-5 in
the absence of an allegation of scienter. 18 The Hochfelder Court expressly
declined, however, to decide whether proof of scienter is required in SEC
injunctive proceedings for violations of section 10(b). 19
A.

20
Pre-1976 Violations of Secton 10(b) of the 1934 Act

Prior to Hochfelder, most courts that considered whether proof of any
particular mental state was necessary in SEC injunctive actions for section
10(b) violations adopted a negligence standard. 2 1 Disagreement existed
among the circuits, however, as to whether scienter or22 mere negligence was
the appropriate standard in private damages actions.
Discretion, 10 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. 328 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Note, Juthital Ditcretion]; GA. L. REV., supra note 15; Comment, Sienter And SEC Injunctive Suits: SEC v. Bausch &
Lomb, Inc. and SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 90 HARV. L. REV. 1018 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Comment, SEC Injunctive Suits]; The Supreme Court, 1975 Term, 90 HARV. L. REV. 255
(1976); Note, SEC Enforcement Actions to Enjoin Viotlations ofSection /0(b) and Rule 1ob-5- The Scienter
Question, 5 HOFSTRA L. REV. 831 (1977); and Note, New Light on an Old Debate. Negligence V.
Scienter in an SEC Fraud Injunctive Suit, 51 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 759 (1977) [hereinafter cited as New
Light on an Old Debate].
17. 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
18. Id. at 193.
19. "Since this case concerns an action for damages we... need not consider the question
whether scienter is a necessary element in an action for injunctive relief under § 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5. Cf SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963)." Id. at 194 n.12.
20. This discussion is limited to SEC injunctive actions alleging violations of§ 10(b) of the
1934 Act or rule lOb-5. Section 10(b) of the 1934 Act makes it "unlawful for any person. . . to
use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. . . any manipulative or
deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as the
Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public interest." 15 U.S.C.
§ 78j(b) (1976).
Under this section, the SEC promulgated rule lOb-5, which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person . . .
(1) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2)
To make any untrue statements of a material fact or to omit to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the sale or purchase of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1980).
For an examination of SEC proceedings based on § 17(a) of the 1933 Act, see notes 148-229
infja and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 809 (2d Cir. 1975); SEC v.
Dolnick, 501 F.2d 1279, 1284 (7th Cir. 1974); SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535, 541 (2d Cir.
1973); and SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1096 (2d Cir. 1972). See also I
A. BROMBERG, SECURrrtEs LAW § 2.6(l) (1975); Berner & Franklin, supra note 16, at 781-92;
Note, Scienter and Rule 1ob-5, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 1057 (1969).
The Sixth Circuit had a higher standard than that embraced by the Second, Seventh, and
Tenth Circuits. SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
stemmed from an SEC enforcement action based, in part, on § 10(b) of the 1934 Act and
Co,
rule l0b-5. The court in Cofy decided that the Commission must prove that the defendants
acted with a "wilful or reckless disregard for the truth." Id. at 1314.
22. Compare Woodward v. Metro Bank, 522 F.2d 84; 93 (5th Cir. 1975) (scienter required)
denied, 390 U.S. 951 (1968) (mere
with Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 735 (8th Cir. 1967), cert.
negligence required). Hochfelder settled this disagreement.
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The Tenth Circuit followed a dual approach that was initially developed in the Second Circuit. 23 In Clegg v. Conk,24 the TenthCircuit ruled that
"scienter or conscious fault" is required in a private action for money damages based on rule lOb-5. 2 5 In contrast, when the SEC sought to enjoin a
fraudulent practice based, in part, on section 10(b) of the 1934 Act, the
Tenth Circuit, in SEC v. Pearson,26 concluded that "[piroof of scienter or
intent to defraud is not required to show violations justifying preliminary
injunctive relief."' 27 Similarly, the court in SECy. Ggyser Minerals Corp.2 8 held
that "[m]otive and intent, however, are not material in determining, in a[n]
[SEC] civil injunctive suit, whether the defendants have violated the antifraud provisions of the 1933 Act and the 1934 Act [section 10(b)]. . . . The
state of mind of the violators is not germane."' 29 In sum, a pre-Hochfelder
private plaintiff seeking money damages would have needed to prove scienter in the Tenth Circuit; however, if the Commission sought a statutory injunction it would not have been required to probe the state of the
defendant's mind.
B.

Pre-1976 Violations of Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act

Section 17(a), unlike section 10(b) and rule 10b-5, 30 applies only to sellers of securities. 3 ' The Seventh Circuit was confronted with a Commission
injunctive proceeding based solely upon alleged violations of section 17(a) in
SEC v. G.N. Van Horn. 32 The court reasoned that given the "plain language ' ' 3 and the peculiar legislative history of section 17(a), 34 "under
17(a) (2) and (3) proof of scienter or fraudulent intent is not essential in a suit
' 35
for injunctive relief."
23.

See generally New Light on an Old Debate, supra note 16, at 765-68.
24. 507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975). See also note 5 supra.
25. 507 F.2d at 1361-62. See generally Krendl & Krendl, Securities, Second Annual Tenth Circuit
Survey, 53 DEN. L.J. 261 (1976).
26. 426 F.2d 1339 (10th Cir. 1970).
27. Id. at 1343. There is some confusion, however, as to whether Pearson's holding was
rooted in section 10(b) of the 1934 Act or in section 17(a) of the 1933 Act. See notes 40-43 in/fa
and accompanying text.
28. 452 F.2d 876 (10th Cir. 1971).
29. Id. at 880-81.
30. For the text of § 10(b) and rule lOb-5, see note 20 supra.
31. Section 17(a) of the 1933 Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any security by the use of any
means . . .
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a material
fact or any omission to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
made, in light of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
7
15 U.S.C. § 7q (1976).
32. 371 F.2d 181 (7th Cir. 1966). In this case, the SEC also alleged violations of § 5 of the
1933 Act; however, § 5 is not relevant for the purposes of this survey. It is significant, however,
that the Commission did not couple its § 17(a) claim with a § 10(b) allegation.
33. The text of § 17(a) of the 1933 Act is set forth in note 31 supra.
34. 371 F.2d at 185. For an extended discussion of the legislative history of § 17(a) of the
1933 Act, see notes 173-80 in/ta and accompanying text.
35. 371 F.2d at 186.
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The Sixth Circuit stood alone in imposing a scienter standard in an
SEC enforcement action as declared in SEC v. Coffy. 3 6 In C0ffy, unlike the
charges made in Van Horn, the Commission alleged violations of section 17(a)
of the 1933 Act and section 10(b) of the 1934 Act and rule 10b-5 thereunder.
Although a violation of section 17(a) was asserted by the Commission, the
CoAq court focused on the language of section 10(b), 37 concluding that the
legislature's use of the words "manipulative" and "deceptive" ruled out any
39
38
liability for mere negligence -regardless of the identity of the plaintiff.
The Tenth Circuit addressed the culpability standard of section 17(a) of
the 1933 Act in SECv. Pearson,40 a case in which the SEC sought to enjoin
alleged securities violations based upon section 17(a) 4 ' and section 10(b)
charges. Judge Holloway, speaking for the court, did not indicate whether
section 17(a) or section 10(b) formed the analytical base for his conclusion
that the SEC was not required to prove that the defendant acted with scienter. 42 Pearson did, however, cite the Seventh Circuit's decision in Van Horn as
support for its conclusion. 4 3 Since the SEC had not asserted a section 10(b)
violation in Van Horn, one can infer that Pearson'sholding is grounded solely
on section 17(a).
As in Pearson, the Tenth Circuit case of Geyser Minerals involved securities violations based upon both section 17(a) and section 10(b).4 Citing Van
Horn, Judge Hamley in Geyser Minerals ruled that the SEC need not prove
scienter in establishing securities violations under "the anti-fraud provisions
of the 1933 Act [section 17(a)] and the 1934 Act [section 10(b)]." ' 4 5 Van Horn
does support the Tenth Circuit's finding of a section 17(a) violation. Moreover, by linking the 1934 Act to the 1933 Act, Judge Hamley suggested that
section 10(b) provides independent justification for a court's grant of an SEC
36.

493 F.2d 1304 (6th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).

See the discussion of

Coy, in the context of a § 10(b) violation, in note 21 supra.
37. The text of § 10(b) is found in note 20 supra.
38. 493 F.2d at 1314.
39. The Sixth Circuit, in Coifey,
relied on the private damages action of Lanza v. Drexel &
Co., 479 F.2d 1277 (2d Cir. 1973). The court reasoned that the statutory language that controlled in Lanza has equal force in an SEC injunctive proceeding. 493 F.2d at 1314.
Other circuits, by way of dicta, have dealt with the degree of culpability required under
§ 17(a) in an SEC injunctive proceeding. Each of the following cases contains dicta to the effect
that § 17(a) does not impose the strict state-of-mind requirements ofa common law fraud action
for money damages: Norris & Hirshberg, Inc. v. SEC, 177 F.2d 228, 233 (D.C. Cir. 1949) (Every
element of common law fraud need not be proven to revoke a broker-dealer's registration.);
Charles Hughes & Co. v. SEC, 139 F.2d 434, 437 (2d Cir. 1943) ("We need not stop to decide,
however, how far common-law fraud was shown. For the business of selling investment securities has been considered one peculiarly in need of regulation for the protection of the investor.");
Archer v. SEC, 133 F.2d 795, 799 (8th Cir. 1943) ("But the Commission is not bound by the
strict common law rules as to the reception and consideration of such evidence.").
40. 426 F.2d 1339 (10th Cir. 1970).
41. Id. at 1340 n.I.
42. Id. at 1343.
43. Id. Judge Holloway also cited SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S.
180 (1963). Capttal Gars involved an SEC action based on § 206(2) of the Investment Advisers
Act. Id. at 181. An examination of Capt'alGains is found at notes 124-47 iqfa and accompanying text.
44. 452 F.2d 876, 877 n.l (10th Cir. 1971).
45. Id. at 880-81 (emphasis added).
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request for a statutory injunction, even in the absence of any evidence of the
defendant's intent to deceive.

II.

HOCHFELDER: PRIVATE ACTIONS UNDER SECTION 10(B)

In Ernst &Ernst v. Hochfe/der, a private plaintiff sought money damages
from an accounting firm; charging that the defendant had conducted improper audits and, consequently, aided and abetted its client's violations of
section 10(b) and rule lOb-5. 46 The plaintiff failed to allege that the defendant acted with scienter, and Justice Powell, speaking for the Court, found
this omission fatal to the action. 4 7 Justice Powell rested the decision on three
pillars: 1) the wording of section 10(b); 2) the legislative history surrounding
the 1934 Act; and 3) the relationship of section 10(b) to the express civil
remedies in the 1933 and 1934 Acts.
The Text of Section 10(b)

A.

Looking to the language of section 10(b) as the starting point in statutory interpretation, 48 Justice Powell viewed the phrase "manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance" as clearly substantiating Congress' intent to
impose liability only for "intentional misconduct." '49 The Court reasoned
that whether the words were given their "commonly accepted meaning" 50 or
read as "term[s] of art,"' the outcome was the same: Section 10(b) contem'52
plates "conduct quite different from negligence."
The Court found the statutory language so compelling that any court
need look no further: "[M]indful that the language of a statute controls
' 53
when sufficiently clear in its context, further inquiry may be unnecessary.
Nevertheless, the Court went on to examine whether a negligence standard
for section 10(b) could be inferred from the legislative history of the 1934
54

Act.

B.

The Hzstogy of the 1934 Act
While conceding that the legislative history surrounding the 1934 Act

46. 425 U.S. at 190. The plaintiff did not claim that the defendant aided and abetted any
securities violations under § 17(a) of the 1933 Act. Moreover, Hochftlder expressly refrained
from deciding whether civil liability for aiding and abetting a securities fraud exists under
§ 10(b) and rule lOb-5. Id. at 192 n.7. Seegmeraly GA. L. REv., supra note 15, at 883 n.
47. 405 U.S. at 193.
48. Id. at 197. The text of § 10(b) and rule lOb-5 appear at note 20 supra.
Justice Powell chose to follow his concurring opinion in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975). ("The starting point in every case involving construction of a
statute is the language itself." Id. at 756.). This represented a departure from the approach
adopted in SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180 (1963). Capital Gais
noted that securities statutes should be construed "flexibly to effectuate [their] remedial purposes." Id. at 186.
49. 425 U.S. at 197-98.
50. Id. at 199.
51. Id. Justice Powell noted that "manipulative" connoted "intentional or willful" deception of investors in the securities markets. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 201.
54. Id.
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was inconclusive as to the proper culpability standard, 55 the Hochfelder Court
was satisfied that there was no congressional history to support the plaintiff's
contention that section 10(b) was intended to impose liability for mere negligence. 56 The Court placed great weight on the comments of Mr. Corcoran,
a spokesman for the drafters of the 1934 Act, who stated that section 10(b)
was " 'a catch-all clause to prevent manipulative devices.' -57 It appears,
therefore, that it was not a case of the legislative history providing convincing support for the Court's literal reading of section 10(b), but rather it was
the failure of the plaintiff to adduce legislative history supporting a contrary
58
interpretation that proved decisive.
The Scheme of the Securities Laws

C.

The Hochfelder Court ruled that the 1933 and 1934 Acts are to be viewed
as "interrelated components." ' 59 The Court then proceeded to point to the
particularized culpability standards of the 1933 and 1934 Acts' civil liability
provisions as evidence that mere negligent conduct would not support a section 10(b) private action. Justice Powell noted that when Congress wanted
to create civil liability based on negligent conduct, it did so expressly.'
As
an example, the Court cited section 11 (b)(3)(B) of the 1933 Act, 61 concerning the liability of experts for their misrepresentations in registration statements, and the associated availability of a due diligence defense. 62 The
Hochfelder decision failed to explain, however, why the express creation of the
scienter standard in section 9'of the 1934 Act would not, by the same reason63
ing, suggest a negligence culpability standard for section 10(b).
In addition, the Court in Hochfelder drew a distinction between the judicially implied private damages action under section 10(b)6 and the ex55. The Court noted that "the extensive legislative history of the 1934 Act is bereft of any
explicit explanation of Congress's intent ....

"

Id. at 201.

56. Id.
57. Id. at 202.
58. Justice Powell concluded by saying: "There is no indication that Congress intended
anyone to be made liable for such practices unless he acted other than in good faith. The catchall provision of § 10(b) should be interpreted no more broadly." Id. at 206.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 208.
61. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976).
62. "The express recognition of a cause of action premised on negligent behavior in § 11
[of the 1933 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77k] stands in sharp contrast to the language of § 10(b) ......
425 U.S. at 208.
An expert's due diligence defense is a shorthand expression of the defense reflected in the
language of § 11 itself. The expert may avoid civil liability by showing that "after a reasonable
investigation" he had "reasonable ground[s] to believe" his statements were not materially misleading. See, e.g., Escott v. Barchris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643, 697-703 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
63.

See generally The Scienter Requirement, supra note 16, at 422-28.

64. The existence of a private action for money damages based on § 10(b) or rule lOb-5
violations is now well settled. Eg., Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 730
(1975); Superintendent of Insurance v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 404 U.S. 6, 13 n.9 (1971);
Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
Because it was the SEC, and not a private party, who sought the injunction in Aaron, the
Supreme Court did not have "occasion to address the question whether a private cause of action
exists under § 17(a) [of the 1933 Act)." 100 S. Ct. at 1951. Cf Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor
Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 733-34 n.6 (1975) (reserved for another a day a decision on an
implied right to a private action under § 17(a) of the 1933 Act). Judge Doyle, in Trussel v.
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pressly created civil liability provisions based upon a negligence standard. 65
The express remedies, sections 11,66 12(2),67 and 1568 of the 1933 Act, contain certain "procedural limitations;" namely, the posting of a bond for costs
70
69
(including attorney's fees), an authorization for the court to assess costs,
71
In contrast, a judicially creand a relatively short statute of limitations.
ated private damages action has no comparable limitations. If section 10(b)
were extended to unintcntcnina! conduct, the Supreme Court argued, plaintiffs would bring their securities actions under section 10(b), instead of under
sections 11, 12(2), and 15. This, of course, would nullify the procedural limi72
tations Congress intended to place on the express actions.
Lastly, Hochfelder addressed the ambit of rule 10b-5.1 3 Justice Powell
acknowledged that rule 10b-5 may be read to prohibit unintentional conduct. 74 Noting, however, the administrative history of the rule 75 and the
authority of the SEC to promulgate rules under section 10(b), 76 the Court
concluded that rule lob-5 provided no basis for extending the reach of sec77
tion 10(b) beyond intentional misconduct.
United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964), concluded that there are no implied civil remedies under § 17(a).
65. 425 U.S. at 208-11.
66. 15 U.S.C. § 77k (1976).
67. 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1976). Section 12(2) imposes liability, based on a negligence standard, on a seller of securities who makes misrepresentations in connection with the sale.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 77o (1976). Under § 15, a "controlling person" is liable, under a negligence standard, for the violations of § 11 and § 12 committed by a controlled person.
69. Section 1 (e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1976), empowers a court to require a plaintiff suing
under § 11, § 12(2), or § 15 of the 1933 Act to post a bond for the costs. This bond could prove
to be an insurmountable hurdle, especially when attorney's fees are included. See Dabney v.
Alleghany Corp., 164 F. Supp. 28 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
70. In specified circumstances, § 11(e), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(e) (1976), also authorizes a court to
assess costs at the conclusion of the litigation.
71. Section 13, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1976), specifies that an action brought under § I1,
§ 12(2), or § 15 can be filed no later than one year from the time the violation was, or should
have been, discovered. Regardless of the date of discovery, under no circumstances can the
period exceed three years from the time of the offer or sale.
The statute of limitations for § 10(b) actions is governed by state law. See generally Raskin
& Enyart, Which Statute Of Lmitatons In A 10b-5 Action?, 51 DEN. L.J. 301 (1974). The Tenth
Circuit's position is that the state's fraud limitation period applies to lOb-5 claims. Id. at 313.
72. 425 U.S. at 210.
73. Id. at 212-14. The text of rule lOb-5 is found in note 20 supra.
74. "Viewed in isolation the language of [rule l0b-5(2)], and arguably that of [rule lOb5(3)], could be read as proscribing. . . any course of conduct . . . whether the wrongdoing was
intentional or not." 425 U.S. at 212.
75. Id. at 212-13 n.32. First, Hochfelder urged that rule lOb-5 was promulgated in "response
to a situation clearly involving intentional misconduct." Id. at 212 n.32. Second, the Court
stressed the use of the word "fraud" in the Commission's announcement of the rule. Id. at 213
n.32 (quoting SEC Rel. No. 34-3230 (May 21, 1942) and 8 SEC ANN. REP. 10 (1942)).
For a critical examination of the administrative history of rule lOb-5, see Cox, Ernst &Ernst
v. Hochfelder: A Critique and an Evaluation ofIts Impact upon the Seheme ofthe Federal Securities Laws,
28 HASTINGS L.J. 569, 582 (1977). One commentator has concluded that "Hochfelder's establishment of a scienter requirement must be read to stand solely upon the interpretation of the
statutory provision itself." The Sienter Requirement, supra note 16, at 424 n.39.
76. 425 U.S. at 213-14. The scope of rule lOb-5 cannot exceed the power delegated to the
SEC through § 10(b). Id. "The rule-making power granted to an administrative agency
charged with the administration of a federal statute is not the power to make law." Id. at 213.
Since the Court in Hoch/elder found "the language and history of § 10(b) dispositive," it
refused to examine policy considerations. Id. at 214 n.33.
77. Id. at 214.
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III.

AARON V SEC: SCIENTER REQUIREMENT IN

SEC

A.

INJUNCTIVE ACTIONS

Factual Background of Aaron

E.L. Aaron & Co. (Aaron & Co.) was a registered brokerage firm.78 Peter Aaron had supervisory responsibility over Aaron & Co.'s registered representatives, including Norman Schreiber and Donald Jacobson. In
connection with the solicitation of orders for the purchase of Lawn-A-Mat
Corporation's (LAM) securities, Schreiber and Jacobson made the following
representations: that LAM was in the process of developing a new type of
small car, that LAM's stock was about to enjoy a substantial price increase,
and that LAM was financially prospering. LAM, however, was not manufacturing, nor did it plan to manufacture, any cars. Furthermore, the company was losing money during the relevant period. 79 Peter Aaron both
knew 8° and had reason to know 8 ' of Schreiber and Jacobson's misleading
statements. Nevertheless, Peter Aaron failed to take affirmative steps to cor82
rect or stop the misstatements.
The SEC filed a complaint in the District Court for the Southern District of New York seeking injunctive relief. The Commission charged that
the defendant had violated and aided and abetted violations of section 17(a),
section 10(b), and rule lOb-5. The trial court agreed and enjoined Peter
Aaron from future violations of these antifraud provisions.8 3 While noting
that "negligence alone may suffice as a standard for liability in Commission
enforcement proceedings," the district court found the defendant's intentional failure to terminate the misleading statements sufficient to establish
84
scienter.
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed the lower court's
decision;8 5 however, the Second Circuit ruled that negligence alone was suf86
ficient to support injunctive actions under section 10(b) or section 17(a).
The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the appellate court, finding
that although scienter is not required in SEC injunctive proceedings based
on section 17(a)(2)-(3), scienter is a prerequisite to a judicial grant of an SEC
request for an injunction based upon either section 10(b) or section
17(a)(1).87
78.

For a general discussion of the functions of a broker-dealer, see JAFFE, BROKER-DEAL-

ERS AND SECURITIES MARKETS

(1977).

79. SEC v. E.L. Aaron & Co. [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,043, at 91,682-83 (S.D.N.Y. May 5, 1977).
80. Peter Aaron was personally contacted by two representatives of LAM and told of the
misrepresentations. Id. at 91,683.
81. The defendant also maintained due diligence files on LAM. These files contained no
information regarding the manufacture of a car, but did indicate a deteriorating financial condition. Id.

82. Id.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at 91,687.
Id. at 91,685.
SEC v. Aaron, 605 F.2d 612 (2d Cir. 1979).
Id. at 624.
Aaron v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1945, 1958 (1980).
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Hochfelder to Aaron: The Federal Courts Grapple with Scienter

At the outset, it is important to note the distinction between the SEC's
enforcement authority as compared with the private damages action at issue
in Hochfelder. Unlike the judicially implied private remedy for violations of
section 10(b), the Commission is expressly authorized to enjoin section 10(b)
transgressioas in section 21(d) of the 1934 Act. Similarly, for violations of
section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, the SEC is expressly empowered under sectio
20(b) of the 1933 Act 88 to enjoin such acts. Both section 21(d) of the 1934
Act and 20(b) of the 1933 Act condition a court's power to issue an injunction upon "a proper showing" by the SEC that the defendant "is engaged or
about to engage in any acts or practices which constitute or will constitute a
violation" of the respective anti-fraud provisions. The text of these sections
is devoid of any culpability standard.
Shortly after Hochfelder was decided, the Office of the General Counsel
of the SEC issued a staff memorandum 89 that predicted that "[t]he
Hochfelder decision clearly will have an impact upon pending and future
Commission injunctive actions." 9 The first decision to assess such impact in
the context of a section 10(b) violation was the Southern District of New
York's opinion in SECv. Bausch &Lomb, Inc. 91 Prior to Bausch &Lomb, the
Second Circuit had consistently granted injunctions against defendants
based merely on their unintentional misdeeds. 92 After reviewing Hochfelder's
conclusion that the language and history of section 10(b) proscribed only
intentional misconduct, the district court in Bausch &Lomb reasoned that the
same must be true for all plaintiffs pursuing remedies under section 10(b)regardless of the identity of the plaintiff or the nature of the remedy
sought. 93 Since Hochfelder refused to consider policy considerations supporting a relaxed culpability standard, 94 the district court felt constrained to do
likewise. 95
The continued vitality of the Second Circuit's pre-Bausch & Lomb view
88. For the text of § 20(b) of the 1933 Act and § 2 1(d) of the 1934 Act, see note 6 supra.
89. Memorandum from The Office of the General Counsel of the Securities and Exchange
Commission to Commission Staff Attorneys Regarding Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfe/der (Apr. 26,
1976), reprinted in SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) F-I (May 26, 1976), [hereinafter cited as SEC
Staff Memo].
90. Id. at F-I (footnote omitted).
91. 420 F. Supp. 1226 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affdon othergrounds, 565 F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977). The
Supreme Court's decision in Hochfetder was rendered during the course of the trial in Bausch &
Lomb. On appeal to the Second Circuit, the Court of Appeals specifically refrained from deciding "whether scienter is a necessary predicate for injunctive relief." Id. at 14.
92. See note 21 supra and accompanying text.
93. The Bausch & Lomb court stated:
Argument drawing upon the words of § 10(b) and the history, legislative and administrative, of both § 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 applies equally to private suits and actions
brought by the Commission.
A careful analysis of Hohfelder has convinced this Court that the distinction is no
longer to be drawn and that the identical standard under § 10(b) and Rule l0b-5
must be applied whether the plaintiff is the SEC or a private litigant.
420 F. Supp. at 1241, 1243 n.4.
94. 425 U.S. at 214 n.33.
95. 420 F. Supp. at 1241. The district court noted that "[olnly policy considerations . . .
could support" a relaxation of the scienter requirement. Id.
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in injunctive proceedings was suggested in Arthur
of the culpability standard
96
The court reviewed an SEC order revoking a brokerLipper Corp. v. SEC.
97
Judge Friendly
dealer's registration because of violations of section 10(b).
likened a private damages action to an SEC administrative disciplinary proceeding: both remedies visit "serious consequences on past conduct," and
proof of scienter is, therefore, warranted in both actions. This is in contrast,
the court urged, to SEC injunctive suits whose design "is solely to prevent
threatened future harm." 98 In view of this distinction as to the nature of the
remedies, Arthur Lipper intimated that Hochfeder's scienter rule did not apply
to Commission injunctive proceedings. 99

The Second Circuit further questioned Bausch &Lomb's holding in SEC
v. Universal Major Industries Corp."°° The Commission in this case sought an
injunction against an attorney who allegedly aided and abetted his client in
01
selling unregistered securities in violation of section 5 of the 1933 Act.'
The defendant argued that, pursuant to Hochfe/der, intent to deceive must be
proved. The court in UniversalMaj'or granted the injunction, noting, by way
of dictum, that "Hochfe/der, which was a private suit for damages, does not
undermine our prior holdings" that scienter is not required in SEC injunctive proceedings. 102
Notwithstanding the Second Circuit's aversion to the Bausch & Lomb
rationale, the Fifth Circuit required scienter in an SEC injunctive su:it in
SECv. Blatt. 10 3 The Fifth Circuit essentially echoed the analysis of Bausch &
Lomb1°4-with one significant wrinkle. The Hochfelder Court had read the
language and history of section 10(b) to require scienter; however, Hochfe/der
involved a remedy not rooted in the language of the statute-it was con05
cerned with a judicially created private cause of action. 1 The Blau court
reasoned that since Congress had expressl'y empowered the SEC to seek injunctive relief for section 10(b) violations through section 21(d) of the 1934
96. 547 F.2d 171 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1009 (1977).
97. Id. at 173. The statutory culpability standard in SEC administrative enforcement actions is "willfully." Section 15(b)(4) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(5) (1976). The Tenth
Circuit in Mawod v. SEC, 591 F.2d 588, 596 (10th Cir. 1979), considered the reach of Hochfelder
in the context of SEC sanctions against broker-dealers. See generaly Securities, Sixth Annual Tenth
Circuit Survey, 57 DEN. L.J. 319, 323-28 (1980).
When considering broker-dealer suspensions and revocations, courts have traditionally
viewed this remedy as more prophylactic than punitive. Accordingly, the courts have relaxed
the § 15(b)(4) willfulness requirement. See generally The Seienter Requirement, supra note 16, at 433
n.79.
98. 547 F.2d at 180 n.6.
99. Id.
100. 546 F.2d 1044 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977).
101. 15 U.S.C. § 77e (1976). It is noteworthy that the Commission did not allege a § 10(b)
violation, especially since the defendant's conduct appeared to be actionable under rule lOb-5.
See, e.g., SEC v. Spectrum, Ltd., 489 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1973); see generally GA. L. REv., supra note
15, at 886 n.35.
102. 546 F.2d at 1047. The Second Circuit did not rest its holding on the "negligencescienter argument." Rather, Universal Major found that the defendant acted with scienter (ze.,
with knowledge or reckless disregard for the truth), obviating the good faith defense.
103. 583 F.2d 1325 (5th Cir. 1978).
104. Id. at 1332-34.
105. See note 64 supra.
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Act, 10 6 arguably "the scienter requirement implicit in the statute [section
10(b)] must have been intended for SEC proceedings."' 10 7 Therefore, the
Blatt court drew "a stronger inference that Congress intended to require scienter in SEC actions than in private damages suits."' 0 8
C.

The Subreme Court Decides That Scienter Is a Necessag Element of a Section
10(b) Violation
1.

The Court Relies on the Hochfelder Rationale

Delivering the opinion of the Court in Aaron, Justice Stewart ruled that
the Hochfelder rationale "ineluctably leads to the conclusion that scienter is
an element of a violation of section 10(b) and rule 1Ob-5, regardlessof the identity of the plaintiffor the nature of the rehef sought."' 0 9 Justice Stewart reasoned
that Hochfelder's reading of section 10(b)'s language and legislative history
controlled, regardless of whether the plaintiff was a private party suing for
damages or the Commission seeking injunctive relief." 0 This view is consistent with the district court's decision in Bausch & Lomb and with the Fifth
Circuit's opinion in Blatt. Aaron also embraced the novel reasoning expressed by the Fifth Circuit in Blatt."'I Since Hochfelder involved a judicially
implied action not within Congress' contemplation, it would be "quite
anomalous" if Hochfelder's interpretation of section 10(b) would not similarly
govern the express remedy Congress created for the SEC.'2
Justice Blackmun, dissenting in Hochfelder, had argued that the culpability standard "should not depend upon the plaintiff's identity."' "I 3 The
dissent could "see no real distinction" between private damages actions and
SEC enforcement proceedings, both predicated on section 10(b). 114 The
Aaron decision at least settles Justice Blackmun's concern for judicial inconsistency.
In its treatment of Aaron, the Second Circuit had looked to section 21 (d)
106.
107.

The text of § 21(d) of the 1934 Act is contained in note 6 supra.
583 F.2d at 1333 n.21.

108.

Id.

109. 100 S. Ct. at 1952 (emphasis added).
110. Id. Aaron noted that the third leg of Hochfelder's analysis-the structure of civil liability
provisions in the 1933 and 1934 Acts-would not be relevant in a statutory injunctive action.
Id. at 1952-53 n.9. Hochfelder did not rest its decision solely on this third factor. Rather, justice
Powell urged that the text of § 10(b), standing alone, was sufficient to support a scienter standard. 425 U.S. at 201.
111. See notes 103-08 supra and accompanying text.
112. 100 S. Ct. at 1952-53.
113. 425 U.S. at 217 (1976) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The Commission also advanced the
position that the plaintiff's identity was irrelevant to imposing a scienter standard. Brief for
SEC as Amicus Curiae at 8, 16-17, Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185 (1976).
114. 425 U.S. at 217-18. Justice Blackmun also dissented in Aaron. His assertions in
Hochfelder seem somewhat incongruous with his position in Aaron that the SEC--and not a
private party--should be granted an injunction under § 10(b) when the defendant is merely
negligent. In fairness to Justice Blackmun, however, it appears that he is consistently advocating the view that Hochfelder reached the wrong conclusion, and both private damages actions
and SEC injunctive proceedings should be successful if the plaintiff can show mere unintentional conduct.
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116
of the 1934 Act' ' 5 to determine if scienter was required in SEC actions.
The Second Circuit noted that during enactment of the Securities Acts
Amendments of 1975, Congress expressed an intent to exempt the Commission from the scienter requirement.' 17 The Senate Report provided: "In
particular, issues related to matters of damages, such as scienter, causation
and the extent of damages are elements not required to be demonstrated in a
Commission injunctive action."' ' 8 The Second Circuit concluded that the
legislative intent of section 21(d) indicated that scienter was not contemplated for SEC injunctive suits, i9

Justice Stewart rejected, without discussion, the notion that the legislative history of section 21 (d) suggests a relaxation of the scienter requirement
in SEC actions. 120 Moreover, a closer examination of the language of section 21(d) belies the Second Circuit's position. Section 21(d) provides that
the SEC is authorized to seek injunctive relief only when it appears that the
defendant "is engaged or is about to engage in acts or practices constitutig a
violation of [section 10(b)]" and that "upon a proper showing" a district court
shall grant the injunction. 1 2 ' As Justice Stewart explained, at minimum "a
proper showing" must include proof that the defendant is presently engaged
in, or is about to engage in, a substantive violation of section 10(b). 1 2 2 Since
the Court in Hochfe/der read the language and history of section 10(b) as
requiring a showing of scienter before a court can conclude that section
10(b) has been violated, an injunction likewise is not authorized under sec123
tion 21(d) until scienter has been proven.
2.

The Aaron Court Distinguishes a Prior Decision

The Commission urged the Court in Aaron to look to SECV. CapitalGains
Research Bureau, Inc. 124 for precedential guidance. ' 25 Justice Stewart refused
115. Section 2 1(d) is the explicit statutory provision in the 1934 Act which empowers the
Commission to seek an injunction. The text of § 2 1(d) is found at note 6 supra.
116. SEC v. Aaron, 605 F.2d 612, 621-22 (2d Cir. 1979).
117. Id. at 622.
118. S. REP. No. 75, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 76 (1975), repnrttedtn [1975] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 179, 254 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original).
119. 605 F.2d at 622.
120. The Supreme Court did not address the Senate Report referred to in the court of
appeals decision. Justice Stewart simply declared that "there is nothing in the legislative history
of [ § 2 1(d)] to suggest a contrary intent." 100 S. Ct. at 1958.
121. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d) (1976) (emphasis added).
122. 100 S. Ct. at 1957-58. The Aaron Court said:
The elements of "a proper showing" thus include, at a minimum, proof that a person
is engaged in or is about to engage in a substantive violation of either one of the Acts
[1933 or 1934 Acts] . . . .Accordingly, when scienter is an element of the substantive
violation sought to be enjoined, it must be proven before an injunction may issue.
Id.
123. In response, the Second Circuit and the Commission would probably argue that, under
§ 2 1(d), itis not necessary to first prove a past violation of § 10(b) to obtain an injunction to
prevent conduct that will violate the act. See general/y GA. L. REV., supra note 15, at 890-91;
Comment, SEC Injnclte Suit'r, supra note 16, at 1023. As a practical matter, however, courts
generally are reluctant to enjoin future violations without a showing that the defendant has
already acted with scienter. This is apparent even in those circuits that concluded § 10(b)
would be violated if the defendant engaged in mere negligent behavior. See Lowenfels, supra
note 16, at 790; New Light on an Old Debate, supra note 16, at 784.
124. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
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this advice, concluding "that the controlling precedent here is not Capital
126
Gains but rather Hochfelder."'
In CapitalGains, the Court decided whether section 206(2) of the Investment Advisers Act of 1940127 (IAA) required the Commission to prove scienter when it sought injunctive relief.' 2 8 The Court ruled that a showing of
29
The. decision rested upen the legislaintent to defraud was not required.'
tive intent apparent in enacting the IAA, the elements of common law fraud,
and the appropriate scienter requirement when a fiduciary duty is pres-

ent.

13 0

Justice Goldberg, speaking for the Capital Gans Court, focused chiefly
on the IAA's purpose: to expose or eliminate all of an investment advisor's
conflicts of interest in connection with his fiduciary position.1 3 ' The
Supreme Court held, accordingly, that "[it would defeat the manifest purpose" of the IAA if the SEC was required to prove the advisor's state of
mind. 132 Second, Capital Gains drew a distinction between actions at law
and actions in equity.' 33 Courts traditionally have relaxed the culpability
requirement in light of the nature of the action (at law or in equity), the
character of the transaction, 34 and the special relationships of the parties. 3 5 Additionally, the Court observed that the elements of a fraud action
should be tempered when a fiduciary relationship is part of the factual set-

ting.

t
36

The Aaron Court distinguished CapitalGains on three grounds: the legislative history, the statutory language, and the special fiduciary relationship.' 3 7 The majority in CapitalGains had looked to the congressional intent
surrounding the IAA to support its conclusion that scienter is not required in
actions under section 206(2). In contrast, the Court in Hochfelder inferred,
from the legislative history of section 10(b), a congressional reluctance to
expand the ambit of liability to include unintentional behavior.' 38 Justice
Stewart in Aaron indicated that the phrase "any . . . course of business
which operates as a fraud or deceit," in section 206(2) is concerned with the
125. Aaron v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1945, 1953 (1980).
126.

Id. at 1954.

127. 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (1976).
128. 375 U.S. at 181-82.
129. Id.

For the text of§ 206(2), seenote 201 infra.

130. See generaly Berner & Franklin, supra note 16, at 781-85; The Scienter Requirement, supra
note 16, at 435-37; Comment, SEC Injunctwie Suits, sup-a note 16, at 1021-23.

131. 375 U.S. at 191-92.
132. Id. at 192.
133. Id. at 192-95.
134. Id. at 194. The Court noted:
There has also been a growing recognition by common-law courts that the doctrines of
fraud and deceit which developed around transactions involving land and other tangible items of wealth are ill-suited to the sale of such intangibles as advice and securities,
and that, accordingly, the doctrines must be adapted to the merchandise in issue.
Id. (footnote omitted).
135. Justice Goldberg stressed that in a fiduciary relationship, it was not necessary at common law to establish all the elements of an arm's-length transaction. Id.
136. Id.
137. 100 S. Ct. at 1954-55.
138. d. at 1954. See generally Note, The Investment Advsers Act andthe Supreme Couri's Interpretatzon of its Antifraud Aovisions, 37 S. CAL. L. REV. 359, 366 (1964).
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effect of the transaction-not the state of mind of the actor.' 39 Section
10(b), however, contains the terms "manipulative" and "contrivance" that
in Lochfelder were held to clearly refer to a state-of-mind requirement. The
Court noted that section 206(2) governs a special fiduciary relationship, that
of an investment advisor to his client. Section 10(b), in contrast, applies
equally to fiduciary relationships and arm's-length transactions.'4 An additional factor served to circumscribe Capital Gains's precedential value to the
Court in Aaron: Justice Goldberg had specifically found that the defendant's
conduct was purposeful; the case did not involve unintentional misconduct. 1 4 1 In addition, Justice Goldberg cited authority for the proposition
142
that at common law, fraud had a broader sweep in equity than at law.
Indeed, equitable relief traditionally was granted without a showing of the
defendant's state of mind. ' 4 3 The relief granted was usually rescission, reformation of contract, or imposition of an equitable lien. 144 An injunction was
viewed as a more drastic remedy.' 45 The Court in Capital Cainr, however,
reasoned that an injunction was a "mild prophylactic" and thus the elements of common law fraud ought to be moderated. 146 Lower federal courts
subsequently have recognized that an injunction can be a punitive sanc47
tion.
D.

Post-Hochfelder Cases Predicatedon Section 17(a) Violations

The SEC Staff Memo that followed in the wake of lochfelder correctly
anticipated an avenue of escape from the scienter burden involved in SEC
attempts to enjoin conduct violative of section 10(b). The memorandum
urged the staff to include allegations of violations of section 17(a) of the 1933
Act in their complaints. It was asserted that even if the court should read
Hochfelder "in a manner hostile to the Commission," the court still would
have "an alternative basis upon which to find a violation and to issue an
1 48
injunction." t
Less than two months after Bausch & Lomb was decided, the First Circuit, in SECv. World Radio Misston, Inc. ,149 was faced, not surprisingly, with a
139. 100 S. Ct. at 1954. Section 206(2) of the IAA is essentially identical to rule 10b-5(c)
and Section 17(a)(3) of the 1933 Act. Aaron interpreted the similar wording of these sections in

a consistent fashion, since the high Court read section 17(a)(3) not to include a scienter requirement. See notes 224-29 infra and accompanying text.
140. 100 S. Ct. at 1954.
141. 375 U.S. at 192 n.39. The conduct of Peter Aaron, similarly, involved an intent to
defraud.
142. Id. at 193.
143.

W.

PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 687-88 (4th ed. 1971).

144. Id. at 687.
145.

See generally Chayes, The Role of th Judge in Public Law Lltigatin, 89 HARV. L. REV.

1281, 1292-96 (1976).
146. 375 U.S. at 193. Chief Justice Burger, in his Aaron concurrence, urged that "[aln injunction is a drastic remedy, not a mild prophylactic." 100 S. Ct. at 1959.
147. E.g., SEC v. Caterinicchia, 613 F.2d 102, 105 (5th Cir. 1980) (characterizing statutory
injunctive relief as an extraordinary measure); SEC v. Cenco Inc., 436 F. Supp. 193, 198 (N.D.
Ill. 1977) ("We agree that no injunction should be lightly issued, for the ramifications are very
serious.") See notes 281-300 infra and accompanying text.
148. SEC Staff Memo, supra note 89, at F-3.
149. 544 F.2d 535 (1st Cir. 1976).

DENVER LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 58:2

Commission enforcement action founded both on section 17(a) and section
10(b). 150 The First Circuit, limiting Hochfelder's good faith defense to private
actions for past anti-fraud violations, 15 1 concluded that a defendant's state
of mind is irrelevant to an injunction determination.' 5 2 The function of an
injunction, the court explained, was to "protect the public against conduct,
not to punish a state of mind."' 153 World Radio Mission did not concern itself
with the sweep of Hochfelder; rather, the First Circuit rested its decision solely
on section 17(a) and ignored the section 10(b) claim.' 54 The defendant argued that since section 17(a) contains language virtually identical to rule
10b-5(2),' 155 and since Hochfelder read section 10(b) as requiring scienter, section 17(a) should be similarly interpreted.156 The First Circuit recognized
the fallacy in this argument. 57 The Supreme Court in Hochfelder acknowledged that the language of rule 10b-5, of its own force, may be read to include negligent behavior. 158 Justice Powell, however, held that such a
reading of the rule would exceed the statutory rulemaking authority of the
Commission, since the Court interpreted section 10(b) to require a showing
of scienter. 159 If anything, Hochfelder's narrow interpretation of rule lob-5
reinforces World Radio Mission's view of section 17(a).1 6 0 Although both Section 17(a) and section 10(b) are commonly referred to as the antifraud provisions of the securities laws, section 17(a) has its own language and legislative
history,' 6 ' which should be accorded independent vitality and not swal16 2
lowed by the Hochfelder view of section 10(b).
63
upIn a well-reasoned opinion, the Second Circuit, in SEC V. Coven,'
held an SEC injunction based on section 17(a) violations in the absence of an
intent to defraud. Following the First Circuit's lead in World Radio Mission,
Judge Mansfield, for the Coven court, focused solely on section 17(a) and
explicitly refrained from deciding whether scienter was required in SEC actions under section 10(b).1 64 Judge Mansfield's examination of section 17(a)
virtually paralleled the Hochfelder treatment of section 10(b). Specifically,

150. Id. at 537.
151. Id. at 540.
152. Id.
153. Id. at 541.
154. World Radio Mission noted: "Thus, strictly speaking, since this action is founded on
both section 17(a) and Rule l0b-5, we need not decide what result would obtain in an SEC
injunction action based solely on section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 .... " Id. at 541 n.10.
155. For the language of rule lOb-5 and section 17(a) of the 1933 Act, see, respectively, notes
20 and 31 supra. Indeed, the language of rule lOb-5 was borrowed by the SEC from § 17(a).
The Commission sought to make § 17(a)'s proscriptions applicable to buyers as well as sellers. 3
L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1426-27 (2d ed. 1961).
156. 544 F.2d at 541 n.10.
157. Id.
158. See notes 73-77 supra and accompanying text.
159. 425 U.S. at 212-14.
160. Eg., SEC v. Coven, 581 F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 950
(1979). See generally Comment, SEC lnjimctve Suits, supra note 16, at 1021 n.24; Note, Scinter and
SEC Injunctive Actions Undr Securtiies Act 17(a), 63 IOWA L. REV. 1248, 1255-56 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Note, Securittes Act 17(a)].
161. See notes 174-80 infra and accompanying text.
162. For an argument that scienter should be required for actions predicated on § 17(a), see
Berner & Franklin, supra note 16, at 796 n.221.
163. 581 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1978), cert.
denied, 440 U.S. 950 (1979).
164. Id. at 1026 n.10.
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Coven reviewed the language of section 17(a), the legislative history, and the
structure of the remedies of the securities acts.
The Coven court viewed section 17(a)(2)'s language as giving no indication of a good faith defense that would imply a culpability standard requiring scienter.' 65 In addition, the Second Circuit read the clause "operate as a
fraud or deceit" of subsection (3) as focusing attention on the eect of the
misrepresentation on the investing public, not on the actor's state of
mind.' 66 Some courts 167 and commentators 68 have maintained that the
use of the terms "fraud" and "deceit" in subsection (3) inherently entails an
intent requirement. The Coven court disagreed. 169 Judge Mansfield viewed
the legislative thrust of section 17(a) as expanding common law fraud to
allow actions in the absence of scienter. 170 Indeed, frustration with the ineffectiveness of a tort action in fraud was one of the considerations in drafting
the 1933 Act. 7 ' Moreover, Justice Powell in Hlochfelder noted that "[v]iewed
in isolation the language of [rule lOb-5(2)] and arguably that of [rule 10b5(3)], could be read as proscribing . . . any course of conduct . . . whether
172
the wrongdoing was intentional or not."'
After canvassing congressional history regarding the appropriate culpability standard for section 17(a), the Second Circuit concluded that its "reading of the language of section 17(a) is in accord with its [section 17(a)'s]
legislative history."' 7 3 Without recounting the details of the legislative his165. Id. at 1026.
Most commentators agree that § 17(a)(2) has no scienter requirement. Eg., 6 L. Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION 3552-53 (2d ed. Supp. 1969). Contra, Meisenholder, infia note 168, at
41. Section 17(a)(2) contains no reference to fraud, deceit, or manipulation. It prohibits the
procurement of property through a material misrepresentation. Of course, one can negligently
or intentionally mislead another. This statutory subsection looks to the end result and appears
indifferent to the actor's state of mind.
166. Id. at 1026 n.1l.
167. Eg., Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., Inc., 554 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1977); Trussell v.
United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 770 (D. Colo. 1964). Sanders argued that "even if
such a private cause of action does exist under § 17(a), it would require proof of scienter. Proof
of scienter is unquestionably required as to subsections (I) and (3) which specifically refer to
fraud. Subsection (2), on the other hand, does not expressly refer to fraud." 554 F.2d at 795.
168. Eg., 3 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD, SEC RULE lOb-5 § 8.4(330), at
204.23 (1977); 3 L. Loss, SECURITIEs REGULATION 1440-41 (2d ed. 1961). Seegenerall Meisenholder, Scienler and Reliance as Elements in Buyer's Suit Against Sellers Under Rule 10b-5, 4 CORP.
PRAC. COMMENTATOR 1963, at 27, 44-47.

169. 581 F.2d at 1026 n. 11.
170. Id.
171. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 2 (1933); H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong.,
1st Sess. 1-3 (1933); 77 CONG. REc. 2983 (1933) (remarks of the sponsor of the Senate bill).
Other commentators have argued for interpreting subsection (3) to include within its proscription negligent conduct, but for different reasons. One author, for example, emphasized
subsection (3)'s focus upon the effect of the defendant's conduct rather than his mental culpability. The Scienter Requirement, supra note 16, at 431 n.72. Still another commentator engaged in a
different analysis. See generaloy Note, Securities Act 17(a), supra note 160, at 1253-54. The author
begins with the premise that "a statute should be construed in a manner that would give effect
to all its provisions." Id. at 1253. Accordingly, the additional language of subsection (3) must
make it somewhat unique from subsection (I). Given that subsection (1) proscribes only intentional conduct, the commentators conclude that subsection (3)'s ambit should include actions
"done without the intent or knowledge of the defendant." Id. at 1254.
172. 425 U.S. at 212. Of course, the text of rule l0b-5(3) is virtually identical to subsection
(3) of section 17(a).
173. 581 F.2d at 1027.
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tory, 174 the essence of it is as follows: The House and Senate passed different
versions of the 1933 Act. The House bill, H.R. 5480, 7 -' did not include a
willfulness requirement, but the Senate bill, S. 875,176 included the phrases
"willfully to employ" and "with intent to defraud."' 1 77 After the House refused to agree to the Senate's bill, a Conference Committee was appointed.' 78 Section 17(a) of the Committee's bill was patterned after H.R.
5480,179 thus deleting the Senate's state-of-mind language. The Second Circuit in Coven reasoned that since the Conference Committee "opted for liability without willfulness, intent to defraud, or the like," the conferees could
not have intended to impose a showing of scienter under section 17(a).180
Finally, in Coven, the Second Circuit recognized a concern shared by the
Supreme Court in Ilochfelder: A reading of section 10(b) that would permit
private suits based upon unintentional conduct would undermine those sections of the 1933 Act explicitly based on a negligence standard. This is because unlike section 10(b), sections 11, 12(2) and 15 of the 1933 Act contain
procedural limitations that impinge upon a plaintiff's ability to bring suit.t"8
Even assuming the existence of a judicially implied private right of action
under section 17(a),' 8 2 the Second Circuit noted that Hochfelder's procedural
limitation concern could not properly act to limit the ambit of section 17(a)
when the SEC is the plaintiff.' 8 3 In the face of section 20(b) of the 1933 Act,
which explicitly authorizes the injunctive action for violation of, thier aha,
section 17(a), Congress clearly recognized the potential liability to defendants involved in Commission enforcement suits.
Shortly after Coven, the Fourth Circuit, in SEC v. American Realy
Trust, 18 4 decided that "in an action for an injunction against future violations brought by the Commission, proof of scienter is unnecessary."' 8 5 Fol174. For a thorough examination of the legislative history surrounding section 17(a), see
Note, Securities Act 17(a), supra note 160, at 1257-59. For the history of the 1933 Act in general,
see The Scienter Requirement, supra note 16, at 429-35, and Landis, The Legislative Hstoy Of the
Securities Act of 1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 29, 45 (1959).
175. H.R. REP. No. 85, 73d Cong., Ist Sess. (1933). During the House hearings, H.R. 5480
was substituted for H.R. 4314.
176. S. REP. No. 47, 73d Cong., 1st Ses. (1933), reprintedin Hearingson S. 875 Before the Senate
Committee on Banking and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 1-8 (1933).
177. The Senate bill, after amendment, included the following provision:
Sec. 13. It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, corporation, or other entity, directly
or indirectly, in any interstate sale . . . or distribution of any securities wil4f/y to
employ any device, scheme, or artifice . . . with the intent to deftaud or to obtain money
or property by means of any false pretense . . . or to engage in any transaction...
relating to the interstate purchase or sale of any securities which operates or would
operate as a fraud upon the purchaser. . . . S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933) (emphasis added).
178. 77 CONG. REc. 3000, 3085 (1933).
179. H.R. CON. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Ses. 12, 27 (1933).
180. 581 F.2d at 1027.
181. See notes 65-72 supra and accompanying text.
182. See note 64 supra.
183. 581 F.2d at 1027.
The Ninth Circuit, in SEC v. Blazon Corp., 609 F.2d 960 (9th Cir. 1979), relied almost
totally on Coven's rationale and held that "[a] showing of fraudulent intent is not required in an
action for an injunction brought by the Commission under § 17(a)." Id. at 965.
184. 586 F.2d 1001 (4th Cir. 1978).
185. Id. at 1002.
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lowing the blueprint established by the First and Second Circuits, American
Realty confined its attention to section 17(a),18 6 examining the language of
subsection (2) of section 17(a)18 7 and its legislative history. 188 In addition,
American Realy distinguished the decision of the Seventh Circuit in Sanders v.
John Nuveen & Co., Inc. ,189 which was based upon a private action for damages. The Fourth Circuit commented that pursuant to "the whole legislative
scheme," a court should not imply a private right of action under section
17(a) without simultaneously "including a requirement of fraud or willfulness." 19° In dictum,' 9 ' the American Realy opinion clearly indicated that it
probably would not create such a private action, and, therefore, the language of section 17(a)(2) could be accorded its commonly accepted meaning.
The American Realy court went on to conclude that those considerations were
immaterial when the Commission pursued its statutorily created injunction. 192
The circuit opinion most relevant to the Aaron decision is that of
Steadman v. SEC.' 93 The Court in Aaron 194 ultimately embraced the Fifth
Circuit's reasoning in Steadman. With this decision, the Fifth Circuit came
full circle. The Fifth Circuit had previously held in Blatt that the Commission must prove scienter in an injunctive action under section 10(b).1 95 In
Steadman, the court clarified its position on scienter when the Commission, in
an administrative proceeding under section 15(b) of the 1934 Act, 96 sought
to discipline an investment advisor based on alleged violations of section
17(a) of the 1933 Act. For the most part, the court followed existing postHochfelder precedent, 19 7 with special emphasis on Coven; 198 Seadmen offered
some unique contributions, however.
The petitioner in Steadman contended that Coven was distinguishablean injunctive action as opposed to an administrative disciplinary proceeding.
Judge Tjoflat, for the court, refused to interpret the language of 17(a) one
186. "And because of the Supreme Court's holding in [Hohfelder], that scienter must be
proven in a private action under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5, we will confine our attention to § 17
of the Securities Act of 1933." Id. (footnote omitted).
187. Contrary to Coven, the Fourth Circuit suggested it would have read § 17(a)(3), which
includes the language "operates or would operate as a fraud," as connoting a scienter requirement. Id. at 1006.
188. Ameriwan Realty found itself "in complete agreement" with Coven's reading of § 17(a)'s
legislative history. Id.
189. 554 F.2d 790 (7th Cir. 1977). Sanders interpreted subsection (2) of§ 17(a) as mandating an intent requirement: "Even if we assume that an implied cause of action does exist under
§ 17(a), for the same reasons expressed by the Court in Hohfelr we do not believe that such
cause of action can be premised upon negligent wrongdoing." Id. at 796.
190. 586 F.2d at 1006-07.
191. The Fourth Circuit was faced with an SEC enforcement action, not a private damages
action. Id. at 1007.
192. Id. at 1006-07.
193. 603 F.2d 1126 (5th Cir. 1979).
194. For a discussion of Aaron, see text accompanying notes 207-29 thfa.

195.
196.
197.
§ 17(a),

See notes 103-08 supra and accompanying text.
A review of SEC administrative disciplinary proceedings iscontained in note 97 supra.
Pursuant to World Radio Mission, the Fifth Circuit was careful to concentrate on
and not § 10(b). Furthermore, Steadman discussed, as did Comn and American Reaby, the

language and legislative history of § 17(a).
198. Steadman specifically adopted Coven's interpretation of the legislative history of

§ 17(a)(3). 603 F.2d at 1132-33.
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way when the remedy was an injunction and yet another way when a
stronger sanction was sought. 199 In sum, the court ruled that the reach of
section 17(a) turned not on the character of the relief sought but rather it
20 0
turned on the language of the statute.
Steadman, like Coven, construed subsection (3) of section 17(a) as imposing li albility fnr rpre nglignrP Tn innnnrt thiq reading of suhsection (3),
Judge Tjoflat cited the Supreme Court's construction of identical language
in section 206(2) of the IAA 20 1 in Capital Gains.20 2 In Capital Gains, the
Supreme Court rejected the position that the terms "fraud" and "deceit"
required proof of scienter. 20 3 The Supreme Court reasoned that "Congress
intended the [IAA] to be construed like other securities legislation . . . not
technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes. "204

Perhaps the most significant discussion in Steadman was its interpretation of the clause "to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud"
contained in section 17(a)(1). 205 The court concluded that the phrases "device to defraud", "scheme to defraud", and "artifice to defraud", when
viewed separately, gave rise to a strong implication that this subsection re20 6
quired intentional misconduct.
E.

The Supreme Court Decided Against A Uniform Section 17(a) Culpability
Requirement

The Aaron Court prefaced its analysis of the language and legislative
history of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act with a discussion of some guidelines
for courts construing federal securities statutes. 20 7 Justice Stewart faced two
lines of precedent. Capital Gains stressed that securities legislation should be
interpreted "not technically and restrictively, but flexibly to effectuate its
remedial purposes." 20 8 SEC v. Sloan, 2° 9 however, emphasized that waving
the "remedial purposes" banner will not justify reading securities laws "more
broadly than [their] language and the statutory scheme reasonably per199.
200.
§ 10(b)
whether

603 F.2d at 1133.
A similar line of reasoning was followed in Blau regarding a good faith defense to a
violation. The court held that § 10(b) afforded the defendant a good faith defense
the relief sought was money damages or an injunction. See notes 103-08 supra and

accompanying text.

201.

15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(2) (1976). This section provides that:

It shall be unlawful for any investment adviser by use of the mails or any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, directly or indirectly(2) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which operates as
a fraud or deceit upon any client or prospective client.
202. 375 U.S. 180 (1963).
203. Id. at 195.
204. Id. See also Note, Securilies Act 17(a), supra note 160, at 1257.
205. 603 F.2d at 1133.
206. Steadman also noted that Hochfelder found the terms "device" and "employ" of § 10(b)
as suggestive of intentional misconduct. d.
207. 100 S. Ct. at 1955.
208. 375 U.S. at 195.
209. 436 U.S. 103 (1978).
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mit. ' ' 2 10 Aaron concluded that if the statutory text of the securities laws "is
sufficiently clear in its context and not at odds with the legislative history," a
court should look no further. 2 "1 Specifically, Justice Stewart admonished
2 12
courts not to examine policy considerations when reading such statutes.
1.

Subsection (1) of Section 17(a)

The Court in Aaron essentially adopted the position of Steadman. The
Supreme Court found that the language of subsection (1) of section 17(a)
"strongly suggests" some scienter requirement. 2 13 Justice Stewart read the
terms "device", "scheme", and "artifice" as connoting intentional misconduct.
Justice Stewart reviewed the legislative history surrounding section
17(a). As discussed in Coven, the Senate version of section 17(a) read "willfully to employ any device, scheme, or artifice. ' 2 14 The House bill, however,
omitted the term "willfully." ' 2 15 Since the Conference Committee patterned
its bill after the House bill, 21 6 the SEC urged that, by deleting this state-of21 7
The
mind requirement, Congress intended to reject a scienter standard.
Report
Conference
(since
the
the
inference
Court's decision, however, drew
was silent as to the scienter question) that Congress believed that adding the
term "willfully" would be "simply redundant. ' 2 18 Therefore, the Court in
Aaron could find no "conflict between the reasonably plain meaning and
2
legislative history." 19
Justice Blackmun, in his dissent in Aaron,220 disputed the Court's reading of section 17(a)(1). Looking to Capital Gains as the proper approach to
reading securities statutes, Justice Blackmun viewed the phrase "device,
scheme, or artifice to defraud" of subsection (1) as covering "a range of be210. Id. at 116.
211. 100 S. Ct. at 1955. A court still is vested with considerable discretion. For example,
when are the securities provisions "sufficiently clear" or "not at odds with" Congress' intent?
212. The Court cited Hochfelder. A court can still consider policy factors if the language is
not sufficiently clear or at odds with the statute's history. Moreover, this bar from examining
policy applies only when a court is construing a specific provision. The admonition does not
apply to a court considering whether to issue an injunction. Seenotes 255-59 ina and accompanying text.
213. 100 S. Ct. at 1955.
214. S. 875, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933).
215. H.R. 5480, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. (1933). The House also rejected a proposal to modify
the clause "to employ any device, scheme, or artifice," and to add "with intent to defraud."
Hearings on HR. 4314 Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign ComFederalSecurities Act."
merce, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 146 (1933).
216. H.R. CON. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Sess., 12, 27 (1933).
217. 100 S. Ct. at 1957.
218. Id. Justice Blackmun disputed this inference. The Justice contended that the Conference Report noted that several "clarifying changes" of the Senate bill were intended "to remove
uncertainties" regarding SEC powers. H.R. CON. REP. No. 152, 73d Cong., 1st Ses. 24 (1933).
Justice Blackmun concluded that "retention of the Senate's explicit state-of-mind language undoubtedly would have added clarity to Congressional intent." 100 S. Ct. at 1961 n.l.
219. 100 S. Ct. at 1957. Justice Stewart did acknowledge, however, that the history of
§ 17(a) was "ambiguous." Id.
220. Justice Blackmun, with whom Brennan and Marshall joined, concurred in part and
dissented in part. Chief Justice Burger wrote a separate concurrence.
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havior including but not limited to intentional misconduct." ' 22 1 The dissent
then proceeded to interpret "device to defraud" as reaching negligent acts as
well. 2 22 Justice Blackmun, who also dissented in Hochfelder, apparently did
not feel compelled to follow Hochfelder's reading of "device": "[a term] that
make[s] unmistakable a congressional intent to proscribe a type of conduct
'
quite diffprent from necigepne. "223

2.

Subsections (2) and (3) of Section 17(a)

Aaron's view of subsections (2) and (3) paralleled the decisions of Coven,
American Realy, and Steadman. Justice Stewart easily concluded that section
17(a)(2) "is devoid of any suggestion whatsoever of a scienter requirement." 224 Aaron cited Hochfelder's interpretation of the similar language of
22 5
rule 10b-5(2) as supporting its reading of section 17(a)(2).
Similarly, Justice Stewart held that subsection (3) did not require the
SEC to establish scienter. 226 After noting that section 17(a)(3) focuses on the
effect of one's conduct-not on the actor's state of mind-the Supreme
227
Court looked for further support to the argument advanced in Seadman.
That is, since the Supreme Court in Capital Gazins concluded that section
206(2) of the IAA, 22 8 which contains essentially the same language as section
17(a)(3), did not require a showing of intentional misdeeds, no different result could occur under section 17(a)(3). Finally, Justice Stewart examined
the legislative history of both section 17(a)(2) and 17(a)(3), and concluded
that the history was "entirely consistent with the plain meaning of section
17 (a)." 2 29
IV.

A.

IMPLICATIONS OF AARON

Only Seller's Neglgent MtsrepresentationsAre Actionable

Since the language of section 17(a) of the 1933 Act applies only to those
who sell securities, 2 30 rule lOb-5 was promulgated to cover both purchasers
and sellers. 23 1 In the wake of Aaron, however, courts will only be allowed to
221. 100 S. Ct. at 1961. Justice Blackmun noted that the terms are couched in the disjunctive and thus "each should be given its separate meaning." Id.
222. Id. Justice Blackmun relied principally on three grounds to support his reading of the
term "device": (1) the legislative history used "device" as a synonym for "practice," a word that
does not communicate a scienter requirement; (2) Congress has interpreted "device" in the context of § 15(c)(1) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(c)(1) (1976), as including unintentional behavior; and (3) other statutes have given "device" a broad sweep. Id.
223. 425 U.S. at 199.
224. Id. at 1955. In fact, it appears generally agreed that "[tihere is nothing on the face of
Clause (2) itself which smacks of scznter or intent to defraud." III L. Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1442 (2d ed. 1961). But see Berner & Franklin, supra note 16, at 796-97 n.221.
225. See notes 155-60 supra and accompanying text.
226. 100 S. Ct. at 1955-56.
227. See notes 201-04 supra and accompanying text.
228. 375 U.S. at 200.
229. 100 S. Ct. at 1957.
230. Section 17(a) uses the phrase "[i]t shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of
any securities ....
"
231. Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 S.E.C. 373, 381 (1943). Rule lOb-5 applies "in connection with the purchase or sale of any security."
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enjoin a seller's unintentional misconduct. Justice Blackmun, in his Aaron
dissent, denounced "this halfway-house approach" that "drives a wedge between" buyers and sellers.2 32 Justice Blackmun stressed that this is the result
of "the Court's technical linguistic analysis. ' 233 In the Court's defense,
Chief Justice Burger, in his concurrence, stated that Aaron was compelled by
Hochfelder and by the language of the anti-fraud provisions. 234 The Chief
Justice noted that "if. . . the result [of the Aaron decision] is 'bad' public
2' 35
policy, that is the concern of Congress where changes can be made.
As Justice Stewart noted, as recently as 1979 the Supreme Court had
2 36
examined the differences among the three subparagraphs of section 17(a).
Justice Brennan, writing for the Court in UnitedStales v. Naq/altn, 23 7 reasoned
that "by the use of the infinitive 'to' to introduce each of the three subsections [of section 17(a)], and the use of the conjunction 'or' at the end of the
first two, each subsection proscribes a distinct category of misconduct. ' 238
One commentator has urged that the reach of section 17(a) need not be
limited to sellers. 2 39 The same author emphasized that "the broader policies
of the 1933 and 1934 Acts [to place buyers and sellers on equal footing] sup4
port treating them identically.''
B.

When Will an Injunction be Granted?

The occurrence of past securities transgressions does not automatically
give rise to injunctive relief.24 ' Rather, the touchstone in a district court's
calculus is whether there is a reasonable likelihood that a future violation
will be committed. 242 Unlike a damages action, the purpose of an injunction is to prohibit continuing and future violations of the anti-fraud provi244
sions.24 3 An appeal to the equitable jurisdiction of the federal courts
245
permits a federal district court to weigh various factors,
such as the nature
of the prior securities violations,2 46 a past pattern of violations,2 47 and the
defendant's demeanor and cooperation, 2 48 when considering an injunctive
232.

100 S. Ct. at 1965.

233. Id.
234. Id. at 1958-59.
235. Id. at 1959.
236. Id. at 1956.
237. 441 U.S. 768 (1979).
238. Id. at 774 (footnote omitted).
239. See generaly The Seenter Requiremeni, supra note 16, at 433-34.
240. Id. at 434 n.84 (footnote omitted).
241. See SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785, 787 (9th Cir. 1979).
242. E.g., SEC v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1100 (2d Cir. 1972); SEC v.
Culpepper, 270 F.2d 241, 249 (2d Cir. 1959). Jaeger & Yadley, Equitabl Uncertani.s in SEC
lnjunctwe Actions, 24 EMORY L.J. 639, 640 n.5 (1975).

243. SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 807 (2d Cir. 1975).
244. "An appeal to the equity jurisdiction conferred on federal district courts is an appeal to
the sound discretion which guides the determinations of Courts of equity." Meredith v. City of
Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228, 235 (1943).
245. See generally Harkleroad, supra note 16, at 491-96; Note,Judtwial irreton,supra note 16,

at 343-53.
246. See SEC v. Coffey, 493 F.2d 1304, 1314 (6th Cir. 1974), cer. denied, 420 U.S. 908 (1975).
247. See SEC v. Shapiro, 494 F.2d 1301, 1308 (2d Cir. 1974).
248. See SEC v. Pearson, 426 F.2d 1339, 1343 (10th Cir. 1970).
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remedy.
The single most important measure used in the balancing scheme is the
defendant's mental culpability. 249 While a showing of good faith may not
conclusively bar injunctive relief,250 proof of misrepresentations made in bad
faith may present a formidable hurdle for the defendant. 25 ' Indeed, Chief
Justice Burger observed in Aaron that "it will almost always be necessary for
the Commission to demonstrate that the defendant's past sins have been the
result of more than negligence." 252 Although the Chief Justice did not cite
any authority, lower courts2 5 3 and commentators 254 support his observation.
C.

The Role of Poh

Considerations

Both Hochfelder2 55 and Aaron256 found the statutory language and the
legislative history of the securities acts sufficiently clear to preclude analysis
of the policy arguments advanced. This is not to say, however, that policy
considerations will not play a role under the securities statutes. Justice
Rehnquist was eager to weigh policy considerations 25 7 when he determined
the scope of standing under rule lOb-5 in Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores.2 58 In addition, a district court, in the exercise of its equitable discretion, will still balance the public and private interests involved before issuing
an injunction. Specifically, even after a trial court follows Aaron's holding on
the scienter requirement and ultimately finds securities violations-at all
times closing its eye to policy-the same court still must weigh the compet249. See Note, Judcatl Dscretion, supra note 16, at 343-46; Comment, SEC lnjuncie.Suits,
supra note 16, at 1025-26. The Court in Aaron noted that "lain important factor ... is the
degree of intentional wrongdoing evident in a defendant's past conduct." 100 S. Ct. at 1958.
250. See Harkleroad, supra note 16, at 494. It must be remembered that this discussion of
good faith is beyond the question of what constitutes a violation of § 17(a) or § 10(b).
251. See, e.g., SEC v. Broadwall Sec., Inc., 240 F. Supp. 962 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
252. 100 S. Ct. at 1959.
253. See, e.g., SEC v. Blatt, 583 F.2d 1325, 1334-35 (5th Cir. 1978); SEC v. Wills, [1979
Decisions] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 96,712 at 94,771-72 (D.D.C. Dec. 14, 1978).
254. Two commentators have examined post-Hohflder decisions and both conclude that
not one court has issued an injunction without a showing of scienter: Lowenfels, supra note 16,
at 790; New Light on an Old Debate, supra note 16, at 767 n.50.
As one commentator notes:
[A] survey of the cases would indicate that for the most part injunctive relief has not
been granted without an indication by the Court that the past conduct was willful.
Therefore, no matter what the articulated standard, Courts seem generally to search
for willful conduct upon which to base an injunction.
Brodsky, WilZ4lness in SEC Enforcement Proceedings, N.Y.L.J., Dec. 15, 1976, at 1,col. I, at 2, col. 3
(footnote omitted).
Finally, in Katz & Nerheim, .InjunctiveProceedings and Ancillayy Remedies Under Federal Securities
Statutes, in THE 10B SERIES OF RULES 183 (K. Bialkin ed. 1975) the authors quote Professor
Loss: "[Y]ou bring out all the dirt you possibly can, about bad faith and the like, but that is not
essential to the Court; it just helps you get the injunction." Id. at 195-96.
255. 425 U.S. 185, 214 n.33.
256. 100 S. Ct. at 1957 n.19.
257. Justice Rehnquist attacked the "vexatious" litigation in Blue Chip Stamps and expressed
the need to delimit private lOb-5 suits, describing the action as a "judicial oak which has grown
from little more than a legislative acorn." Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores 421 U.S.
723, 737 (1975). See generally Note, Judicial Retrenchment Under Rule /0b-5: An End to The Rule as
Law? 1976 DUKE L.J. 789, 798.
258. 421 U.S. 723 (1975).
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ing policy goals in fashioning the appropriate remedy. 259 Accordingly, the
competing interests, both public and private, will be examined here.
The underlying purpose of the 1933 Act is to protect investors by requiring full and accurate disclosure of all material information in connection
with a public offering of securities. 26° The purpose of the 1934 Act is to
protect investors from stock manipulations and to impose reporting requirements on certain companies. 26 1 Viewed in conjunction, these securities statutes are designed to foster market integrity and guard against the financial
262
bilking of investors.
The Commission is viewed as the "statutory guardian" of the investing
public. 263 To the extent that the SEC must prove the defendant's intent to
defraud, the evidentiary burden may obstruct Commission enforcement efforts. 2 6 4 The SEC was created with the intention that it possess flexible remedies deemed necessary for effective enforcement of the securities laws. 2 6 5
Moreover, the relief that the SEC seeks, a statutory injunction, has an objective quite different from a private damages action. An injunction is aimed
not at punishing past wrongdoing 266 but at protecting the public against
recurring and future securities violations. 26 7 The injunction is "prophylac268
tic" in nature.
An injunction, it is argued, also has a general deterrent function. The
Supreme Court, in an unrelated context, stated that "[tihe historic injunctive process was designed to deter, not to punish. ' 269 Nevertheless, the deterrence value of an injunction based on negligent violations of the antifraud provisions seems questionable. Indeed, it may be that negligent misrepresentations defy control by the injunctive method. 270 It seems implausible that an injunction could successfully enjoin negligent misstatements that,
27
by definition, are inadvertent and unintentional. '
Perhaps the most oft-repeated policy in support of the issuance of an
injunction based on negligent conduct is that "it would be preferable to
place liability for negligent misstatements on the shoulders of those responsible for their dissemination rather than to require innocent investors to suffer
259. See SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 541 (Ist Cir. 1976). See generall,
GA. L. REV., supra note 15, at 896-98. Once a past violation has been proved, "no per se rule
requires that an injunction issue." SEC v. Arthur Young & Co., 590 F.2d 785 (9th Cir. 1979).
260. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 195 (1976).

261.

Id.

262. See, e.g., SEC v. World Radio Mission, Inc., 544 F.2d 535, 540-41 (Ist Cir. 1976); SEC
v. Manor Nursing Centers, Inc., 458 F.2d 1082, 1095-97 (2d Cir. 1972).
263. See SEC v. Management Dynamics, Inc., 515 F.2d 801, 808-09 (2d Cir. 1975); See also
H.R. REP. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Ses. 5 (1934).
264. See SEC v. Shiell, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,190, at
92,386 (N.D. Fla. Sept. 27, 1977).
265. See S. REP. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1934); H.R. REP. NO. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 7 (1934).

266. The purpose of damages is to punish the wrongdoer and to make the defrauded investor whole. See general)y W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 2, 9 (4th ed. 1971).

267. Eg., Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 151 (1972).
268. SEC v. J. & B. Indus., Inc., 388 F. Supp. 1082, 1084 (D. Mass. 1974).
269. Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944).
270.
271.

See generally New Light on an Old Debate, supra note 16, at 781-82.
See SEC v. Universal Major Indus., 546 F.2d 1044, 1047 (2d Cir. 1976).
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in silence." 272 As a corollary to this philosophy, it is urged that the effect of
a misrepresentation is the same regardless of whether the misinformation
273
resulted from a negligent mistake or a fraudulent design.
What this argument fails to recognize, however, is the countervailing
considerations of policy. First, the Supreme Court in Hochfelder noted that
"[tqhe logic of this effect-oriented approach would impose liability for wholly
faultless conduct where such conduct results in harm to investors." '2 74 Indeed, since an investor's loss is identical whether the defendant's misrepresentation was purey znnocenl or negligent, should a court also impose an
injunction for inocent misstatements to better protect investors? However
one answers this question, it illustrates a second countervailing policy interest: There are social costs associated with strengthening the protections
granted the investing public. 275 In short, there are tradeoffs.
Undoubtedly, the more the culpability standard is relaxed, the more
protection investors receive. But exactly how much additional protection?
Investors, as a group, can be divided roughly into four classes: those subject
to purely faultless misrepresentations, those subject to intentional misrepresentations, those subject to negligent misrepresentations, and those not subject to any misrepresentations. Of course, the incremental benefits of an
injunction based on negligent securities violations accrue exclusively to that
class of investors victimized by neg/igent misrepresentation. 276 The benefits
flowing to that particular class of investors should be balanced against the
aggregate costs of enjoining negligent misconduct. The Roosevelt Administration intended the 1933 Act to achieve its goals with the least possible
disruption of genuine business interests. 2 77 Courts may properly consider
the burden imposed upon a defendant when an injunction issues on the basis
of negligent conduct. 2 78 The social cost all investors must bear, at least indirectly, 2 79 stemming from an unintentional culpability standard is the additiohal 'expense to securities dealers for insurance to cover their expanded
280
liability exposure.
A more important countervailing policy is that a sanction should be
272. Aaron v. SEC, 100 S. Ct. 1945, 1965 n.5 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
273. Id. See also SEC v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 860 (2d Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 976 (1969); 3 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD, SEC RULE lOb-5
§ 8.4(508) at 204.11 to -. 112 (1977).
274. 425 U.S. at 198.
275. See generally Note, Securities Regulation, 5 J. CORP. L. 377, 391-94 (1980) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Securties Regulation].
276. Those investors bilked by innocent, ie., non-negligent, misstatements probably would
have no recourse under § 17(a) or § 10(b). Those investors harmed by intentional misrepresentations would receive no additional protection because they would be covered under either a
negligence or a scienter culpability standard. Finally, that class of investors not encountering
any securities swindle needs no protection.
277. Message From the President-Regulation of Securities Issues, 77 CONG. REC. 937
(1933). See generally Note, Securities Act /7(a), supra note 160, at 1262-63 n. 150.
278. See A. BROMBERG, SEcURITIES LAW: FRAUD, SEC RULE lOb-5 § 8.4(508), at 204.113.114 (1977).
279. An implicit assumption is that, in the long run, securities dealers will be able to shift to
their clients, in full or part, any increased operating expenses incurred throughout the industry.
280. See Note, Securities Regulation, supra note 275, at 392.
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commensurate with the defendant's culpability. 28 ' Accordingly, at common
law the ambit of an actor's tort liability was contingent upon whether the
defendant made intentional or negligent misrepresentations.2 82 In light of
this policy, a court's inquiry should focus, not solely on the investor's injury,
but on whether the sanction bears some reasonable relationship to the actor's
mental culpability. 28 3 The upshot is that a trial court should carefully examine the consequences of an injunction vis-A-vis the defendant's unintentional misstatement.
Some courts, especially in the early decisions, 28 4 glossed over the serious
burdens imposed by injunctions. 2 5 Recently, however, courts 286 and commentators287 have re-examined the impact of SEC injunctions. Unquestionably, under some circumstances, injunctive relief cannot be accurately
characterized as a "mild" sanction.
The immediate result of an injunction is that the defendant is under a
court order to comply with the anti-fraud provisions. Failure to comply may
result in civil or criminal contempt proceedings. 2 8 The sanctions against
the individual include: disqualification of an attorney or accountant from
professional practice before the SEC under a rule 2(e) proceeding; 28 9 suspension or revocation of a broker-dealer's registration; 290 and disqualifications
under the 1933 Act and the IAA. 2 9 1 The rule 2(e) proceeding can be particularly distressing. The Commission may, under paragraph (3) of rule 2(e),
"temporarily suspend" any attorney or accountant who has been "permanently enjoined" from violating federal securities laws.2 92 This suspension is
it/houl notice or hearing.2 93 Furthermore, although the suspension is labeled "temporary," to lift it, the professional must: 1) file a petition within
281. See, e.g., Ultramares v. Touche, Niven & Co., 255 N.Y. 170, 174 N.E. 441 (1931). See
generally GA. L. REV., supra note 15, at 894-99.
282. GA. L. REV., supra note 15, at 895.
283. See 5 A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE l0b-5 § 63, at 3-161 to -162 (rev. ed. 1976).
284. Capital Gains characterized an injunction as a "mild prophylactic." 375 U.S. 180, 193
(1963).
285. E.g., Arthur Lipper Corp. v. SEC, 547 F.2d 171, 180 n.6 (2d Cir. 1976).
286. See, e.g., SEC v. Caterinicchia, 613 F.2d 102, 105 (5th Cir. 1980) (district court had
characterized an injunction as an "extraordinary measure"); SEC v. Petrofunds, Inc., 414 F.
Supp. 1191, 1198 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (noted "harmful impact of a receiver and an injunction on
the legitimate activities of the defendant").
One district court noted:
Despite SEC arguments to the contrary, what it seeks is more than a mere prophylactic related to the specific facts of the case. The broad, all-encompassing injunction
sought here against any conceivable future violations carries the strong inference that
the court believes the defendants would violate the law but for the court's intercession ....
SEC v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 1226, 1245 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), a 'don other grounds, 565
F.2d 8 (2d Cir. 1977).
287. See Mathews, Liabiltdies of Lawyers Under the Federal Securities Laws, 30 Bus. LAW. 105
(Sp. Issue, Mar. 1975); Note,Judacial Discretion, supra note 16, 340-43; New Light on an Old Debate,
supra note 16, at 780-81.
288. E.g., Frank v. United States, 395 U.S. 147 (1969).
289. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(3)(i) (1979). See generally Marsh, Rule 2(e) Proceedings, 35 Bus.
LAW. 987, 993-94 (1980).
290. Sections 15(b)(5) and (7) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(5), (7) (1976).
291. See generally Berner & Franklin, supra note 16, at 785-86.
292. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2e(3) (1979).
293. Marsh, supra note 289, at 999-1001.
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thirty days after being served with the order; and 2) bear the burden of
convincing the Commission that he or she should not be censured. 294 Even
worse, the consequences of being suspended from practicing before the SEC
are not de minimis. Apparently, the Commission considers any services rendered in connection with the federal securities laws to be included within the
suspended activities. 29 5 In effect, a rule 2(e) suspension could be the end of a
security attorney's livelihood.
The comparable penalties against the corporation include the loss of
business, the injury to reputation, 296 and the possible disclosure of the injunction in mandatory Commission and shareholder reports. 29 7 In addition,
the Commission has certain ancillary remedies at its disposal, such as disgorgement of profits, rescission, and appointment of a receiver.29 8 Aside
from the above punitive aspects of an SEC enforcement action, the legal fees
of defending against the injunction are usually very high. 299 In the face of
all this, some commentators have argued that especially if the defendant is a
securities lawyer, the imposition of an injunction is a more stinging sanction
than a private damages action, which might be covered, at least in part, by
3° °
insurance.
CONCLUSION

The Aaron decision seems compelled by the Court's holding in Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder and the statutory language of the anti-fraud provisions of
the securities laws. Indeed, the Hochfider Court's reading of the language of
section 10(b) of the 1934 Act must have universal application-regardless of
the identity of the plaintiff or the nature of the relief sought. Viewing the
text of sections 17(a)(2) and (3) of the 1933 Act, the Aaron Court could not
find language indicating that scienter is necessary to constitute a violation of
these provisions. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court recognized that a past
securities violation does not automatically give rise to injunctive relief.
Rather, a district court, in exercising its equitable discretion, must focus on
the likelihood of future violations. A key, if not decisive, factor in the district
294. 17 C.F.R. § 201.2(e)(3) (1979). Seegeneralo Marsh, supra note 289, at 1012-13.
Professor Marsh succinctly notes:
The Commission has constantly argued before the Courts that no one should object to
being subjected to the "mild prophylactic" of being enjoined against violating the law;
and that, if he has no present intention of doing so in the future, he should not resist
being required to conform to the law by order of the Court. However, in the next
breath the Commission, under this Rule, has asserted the right to deprive a professional subject to such an injunction of his right to practice solely as a result of the
injunction having been entered, unless he can carry the "burden of proof" of convincing them that he is not deserving of this punishment.
Id. at 1013.
295. Marsh, supra note 289, at 993-95.
296. Bauman, The Future ofRule lOb-5: A Comment onJacobs, The Impact afRule lob-5, 4 SEc.

REG. L.J. 332, 345 (1976).
297. See Note, Judicial Discretion, supra note 16, at 342.
298. See generally Jacobs, Judicial and Administrative Remedies Available to the SEC For Breaches of
Rule lOb-5, 53 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 397 (1979).
299. See Griggin, The B&leagured Accountants. A Defendant's Viwpoint, 62 A.B.A.J. 759, 761

(1976).
300.

See Berner & Franklin, supra note 16, at 785-86; Mathews, supra note 287, at 107.
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court's balancing of the public and private interests involved will be the defendant's mental culpability. Therefore, the battleground in securities litigation seems to have shifted away from whether scienter constitutes a securities
violation to whether a finding of scienter is crucial before a trial court may
grant an injunction.
Steve M. Skoumal

TAXATION
OVERVIEW

The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals considered a limited number of
federal taxation cases during the period covered by this survey. This overview will provide a brief summary of some of the published cases.'
I.

CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDENDS

In Dole,(e v. Urni'ed Stales,2 the issue before the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals was whether the costs of litigation, paid by a corporate taxpayer in
a divorce proceeding, were deductible. The case arose out of suits brought
by Roger Dolese, the Dolese Company (TDC), and Dolese Concrete Com3
pany (DCC) to obtain income tax refunds in the amount of $1.5 million.
These suits, in turn, flowed from the divorce proceeding of Roger and Ardith
Dolese. The divorce action began in 1957 and culminated nine years later.
The divorce litigation costs, including $1.3 million in fees and expenses, were
paid by Roger Dolese and the companies.
The divorce petition had named TDC, a company wholly owned by
Roger Dolese, and DCC, a company which in turn was wholly owned by
TDC, as party defendants. Also named as a defendant was the Dolese
Brothers Company, which had been wholly owned by Roger Dolese and
TDC, but was liquidated in 1970 and thereafter operated as a partnership
between Dolese and TDC. In the divorce petition, Dolese was accused "of
threatening to deplete and dissipate the assets of the companies in order to
deprive Ardith of her rights as wife. ' 4 Ardith Dolese sought an order to
prevent Dolese and the companies from engaging in any unusual business
1. Also published were:
United States v. Wase, 608 F.2d 400 (10th Cir. 1979), in which the Tenth Circuit held that
Congress, not the court of appeals, has the power to declare what is legal tender. The court held
that taxpayers may not value earnings in terms of gold dollars as a means of determining the
need to file an income tax return.
Portland Cement Co. v. Commissioner, 614 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1980), in which the Tenth
Circuit held that a miner manufacturer's first marketable product was bulk cement. The court
ruled that the expenses associated with bagging the cement could not be considered mining
costs and, therefore, could not be used to reduce the depletion deduction. The United States
Supreme Court has recently granted certiorari to determine: 1) if the costs of bags, bagging,
storage, distribution, and sales should be included as nonmining costs, and 2) if bulk cement or
if both bulk and bagged cement constitute the first marketable product for purposes of computing gross income from mining where the "proportionate profits method" is used. 49 U.S.L.W.
3212 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1980) (No. 79-1907).
Stahmann Farms, Inc. v. United States, 624 F.2d 958 (10th Cir. 1980), in which the Tenth
Circuit held that airplanes, which used only the taxpayer's private landing strip and flew only
over the taxpayer's property, were subject to the "use" tax of I.R.C. § 4491, since the planes
were operated within the statutorily defined navigable airspace.
2. 605 F.2d 1146 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 1647 (1980).
3. The case had been before the Tenth Circuit in 1976. It was remanded to the trial
court, where summary judgment was entered for the United States. SeeDolese v. United States,
541 F.2d 853, 854 (10th Cir. 1976).
4. 605 F.2d at 1149.
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activities. Early in the divorce litigation, the court ordered the companies
not to pay investigative expenses. 5 In 1967, Ardith Dolese filed a motion
alleging that her husband was incompetent and requesting that she be appointed to take his place in the management of the companies. In late 1968,
6
this motion was denied.
Ultimatehy, the state trial coiurt issied orders reniring Dolese and the
three companies each to pay one-fourth of the legal fees and expenses stemming from the divorce action. The state court reasoned that the legal proceeding was not just a divorce action, but was also a struggle for control of
the companies. TDC and DCC sought to deduct their respective shares of
7
the litigation expenses and fees as ordinary and necessary business expenses.
The United States, however, contended that these payments were actually
constructive dividends paid to Dolese and, as such, were not deductible ex8
penses.
The Tenth Circuit court used the "origin of the claim" test to determine
whether the costs of litigation were indeed ordinary and necessary business
expenses. 9 The court of appeals divided the previous litigation into two
categories, finding both a divorce action and an action against the companies. The court concluded that most of the expenses had their origin in the
divorce action and, therefore, the litigation costs were not deductible.' 0
The Tenth Circuit went on to rule that the costs of obtaining clarification of the court order and the costs of resisting the motion to oust Dolese
were deductible. " These expenses were found to have originated in the
business activities of the companies. The court remanded the case to the
trial court for a determination of the deductible amounts. The nondeductible expenses of litigation, representing "some direct benefit" to Dolese, were
2
held to be constructive dividends.'
The court of appeals also considered whether a series of payments, totalling over $150,000, made by the companies to discharge Dolese's personal
debts, were loans or constructive dividends. The Tenth Circuit court noted
that although some loan attributes were present,' 3 the debt was too large to
be liquidated without the sale of one of the companies. Consequently, the
14
payments were deemed to be constructive dividends.
5. Id. By mid-1967, Dolese had spent at least $350,000 investigating Ardith's infidelities
and her children's paternity.
6. Id.
7. I.R.C. § 162(a).
8. 605 F.2d at 1149.
9. "[Tihe origin and character of the claim with respect to which an expense was incurred, rather than its potential consequences upon the fortunes of the taxpayer, is the controlling basic test of whether the expense was 'business' or 'personal' and hence whether it is
deductible or not.
... United States v. Gilmore, 372 U.S. 39,49 (1963). Sealso Woodward
v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970).
10. 605 F.2d at 1151-52.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 1152.
13. Id. at 1153. Appellants argued that the advances were loans because "notes were given
, interest was paid, some payments were made on the principal, and the shareholder [Dolese] had a balance sheet strong enough to obtain a bank loan sufficient to pay off the entire
loan." Id.
14. Id. at 1154.
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INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT BONDS

The Tenth Circuit, in Kirkpatrck v. United States,' 5 considered whether
the interest derived from bonds issued by the Oklahoma Industries Authority, an agency of the State of Oklahoma, was subject to tax as gross income.
Plaintiff Kirkpatrick purchased $175,000 worth of bonds issued by the
Oklahoma Industries Authority, but did not include the interest from these
bonds as gross income on her 1973 and 1974 income tax returns. The Commissioner of Internal Revenue (IRS) assessed deficiencies, which the taxpayer paid. When her suit for refund was dismissed by the district court, the
taxpayer appealed to the Tenth Circuit.
The money raised by the bond issue was used to construct an office
building which was subsequently leased to Mercy Hospital, a tax-exempt
organization.1 6 The hospital sublet building space to nonexempt persons.
During 1973 and 1974, approximately six percent of the building was occupied by nonexempt subtenants. By the end of 1977, twenty-nine percent of
the building's total leasable space had been leased to nonexempt subtenants.
The interest on an industrial development bond must be included as
gross income for income tax purposes. 17 There are two tests used to determine if an obligation is an industrial development bond. To qualify for this
status, both tests must be met. If the major portion of the proceeds of an
obligation "are to be used directly or indirectly in any trade or business carried on by any person who is not an exempt person"' 8 and if a major portion
of the payment of principal and interest of an obligation is secured or derived from a property in a trade or business,' 9 the obligation is an industrial
development bond.
Since the obligations unquestionably met the second test, 20 the court of
appeals looked to see if the requirements of the first test were present. Kirkpatrick contended that since Mercy Hospital was a tax-exempt entity, the
criterion of the first test was not met. The Tenth Circuit noted that the
intent of the law was to make sure that a tax-exempt entity, such as Mercy
Hospital, would not become a conduit by which nonexempt persons would
benefit from bond proceeds. 2i Therefore, the status of the subtenants was a
determinative factor.
As the subtenants were nonexempt persons, the court looked to see if a
"major portion" of the proceeds were used by these nonexempt persons in
their trade or business. To make this determination, the court relied upon
Treasury Regulation section 1.103-7(b)(3)(iii), which states that "the use of
more than 25 percent of the proceeds of an issue of obligations in the trade or
business of nonexempt persons will constitute the use of a major portion of
22
such proceeds in such manner."
15.
16.

605 F.2d 1160 (10th Cir. 1979).
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) provides that hospitals may be exempt from taxation.

17. Id. § 103(b)(1).
18. Id. § 103(b)(2)(A).
19.
20.
21.
22.

Id. § 103(b)(2)(B).
605 F.2d at 1162.
Id.
Treas. Reg. § 1.103-7(b)(3)(iii) (1972).
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The taxpayer argued that since only six percent of the building was
leased to nonexempt persons in 1973 and 1974, the test was not met for those
years. The court concluded that as nonexempt subtenants occupied twentynine percent of the total leasable space in 1977, there was an indication that
the original intent was to use the building for nonexempt persons. 23 Therefore, the bonds were declared to be industrial development bonds and the
interest income thereon was deemed taxable.
III.

IRS CIVIL SUMMONS

In Untted States v. MacKay,24 the question before the Tenth Circuit was
whether the IRS had abused its civil summons power. 25 In April of 1978, a
criminal investigation of a Mr. and Mrs. Rodgers was initiated by the Criminal Investigation Division of the IRS, on the basis of information received
from a county sheriff's office and from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
The Criminal Investigation Division, asserting that there was a possibility of
unreported income, notified the Audit Division that the investigation should
26
be conducted jointly.
Denied access to the taxpayers' books and records, an IRS agent issued
a summons to the First National Bank of Gillette, Wyoming, requesting the
production of the Rodgers' bank records for 1975, 1976, and 1977. The IRS
agent notified the taxpayers of the summons. As instructed by Mr. and Mrs.
Rodgers, respondent Marshall MacKay, assistant vice president of the bank,
refused to comply with the summons. 27 The IRS sought enforcement of the
summons in district court. When the district court ordered compliance with
the summons, respondent MacKay and Mr. and Mrs. Rodgers, as interven28
ors, appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
The respondent contended that the summons was invalid since the IRS
had used its summons powers to pursue an investigation that was strictly
criminal. 2 9 The Tenth Circuit held that the summons was enforceable as it
was issued in good faith 30 prior to any recommendation to the Department
of Justice that a criminal prosecution be undertaken, and because the civil
3
tax determination had not been abandoned. '
23. 605 F.2d at 1163. Taxability of the interest income is not to be determined yearly by
the fluctuation in the amount of space rented to nonexempt persons.
24. 608 F.2d 830 (10th Cir. 1979).
25. I.R.C. § 7602.
26. 608 F.2d at 832.
27. Id. at 831.
28. Id.
29. The respondent also contended that the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 barred
the disclosure of the taxpayers' bank records. The court found this argument to be inapplicable
in view of the legislative history and the express and implied provisions of the Act. Id. at 834.
30. In United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964), the Supreme Court held that the Commissioner need not show probable cause after the ordinary limitations period expired. Instead,
a good faith standard was imposed. Good faith could be shown by establishing that the investigation was for a legitimate purpose, that the inquiry was relevant to the purpose, that the
Commissioner did not already possess the information, and that the proper administrative steps
required by the Code had been taken. The burden of showing abuse was placed on the taxpayer.
31. 608 F.2d at 833 (citing United States v. LaSalle National Bank, 437 U.S. 298 (1978)).
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CONSTRUCTIVE RECEIPT

The constructive receipt of interest, which is taxable as income, was
examined by the Tenth Circuit in Estate ofShelton v. Commisszoner.32 In 1970,
the IRS refunded over $150,00033 of improperly assessed taxes and interest
to the Osage Indian Agency, on behalf of the Elkins estate. 34 Because
Shelton, the sole residuary beneficiary of the Elkins estate, had died in 1967,
the Indian Agency advised the co-executors of the Shelton estate that they
had to obtain an additional co-executors' bond before the funds could be
paid to them. The co-executors did not obtain the bond until 1974.
The Commissioner determined that the Shelton estate's gross income
for 1970 should have included that part of the tax refund allocated to interest. 35 The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner's decision, but reduced the
amount of the deficiency by twenty percent, the amount withheld by the
Indian Agency to pay the legal fees arising from the litigation to obtain the
36
original refund.
In upholding the Tax Court, the court of appeals found that the agency
had tendered payment to the Shelton estate in 1970, 3 7 and the requirement
that the co-executors obtain an additional bond did not place "substantial
limitations or restrictions" on the right to receive the income. 38 Therefore,
the interest on the tax refund was constructively received by the estate, and
taxable as income, in 1970.

V.

TIME FOR ASSESSMENT-THREE YEAR LIMIT

Dowell v. Commissioner3 9 involved taxpayers who had filed fraudulent tax
returns for the years 1963 through 1966 and who, in 1968, filed nonfraudulent amended returns for those years. The government had used the
amended returns in the investigation and prosecution of a fraud case against
the taxpayers. 4° The IRS used the amended returns to make a determination of additional taxes, and to assess penalties and interest due. In late
1974, the IRS advised the taxpayers of deficiencies. The taxpayers petitioned the United States Tax Court, seeking a refund and a bar against any
additional assessment of deficiencies. 4 1 The Tax Court upheld the Commissioner, and the taxpayers appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
32. 612 F.2d 1276 (10th Cir. 1980).
33. Over $92,000 was allocated to interest. Id. at 1278.
34.

Mary Jacqueline Elkins was a noncompetent Osage Indian who died in 1932. Id.

35. Id.
36. Estate ofJacqueline E. Shelton, 68 T.C. 15 (1977).
37. The taxpayer had argued that the income should be taxed to the Elkins' estate. The
court noted that I.R.C. § 661(a)(2) provides that an estate can properly deduct any amount
paid or credited to a beneficiary and I.R.C. § 661(a)(2) provides that such amounts are taxable
to the beneficiary. Therefore, even if included in the Elkins' estate, the interest income was
taxable when constructively received by the Shelton estate. 612 F.2d at 1278-79.
38. 612 F.2d at 1279.
39. 614 F.2d 1263 (10th Cir. 1980).
40. Se United States v. Dowell, 446 F.2d 145 (10th Cir. 1971) (affirming the convictions of
defendants Alfonzo and Vivian Dowell for attempting to evade or defeat federal income taxes).
41. The Tax Court found that the nature of original returns determined the applicable
statute of limitations. Since the original returns were fraudulent, the Commissioner could assess
the tax at any time, according to I.R.C. § 6501(c)(1). The Tax Court found the three year
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The taxpayers argued that the filing of the amended returns had started
the statute of limitations 42 to run and that, under this accounting, the government had failed to make an assessment within the allotted three year
period. The IRS responded with the argument that, because the original
returns were fraudulent, the assessment against taxpayers could be made at
a"
"e 4 3 TheTenth Circuit resoe that as t.. amcnidcd filings satisfied
the definition of a return, 44 the statute of limitations began to run in 1968. 4 5
Accordingly, the judgment of the Tax Court was reversed, and the case was
remanded.

46

The government also had contended that because the 1963 and 1964
amended returns were unsigned, the statute of limitations period never began to run. 4 7 The court concluded that the use of the amended returns in
the fraud action constituted acceptance by the government, and commenced
48
the running of the statute.
VI.

Two YEAR LIMIT ON REFUNDS

Snyder v. United Slates49 presented the question of whether a taxpayer is
entitled to obtain a refund of gift taxes which were erroneously paid more
than two years prior to filing of the refund claim. In May of 1973, the IRS
made a jeopardy assessment5 0 against the taxpayer. When no payments
were forthcoming, the IRS began collecting the income from the taxpayer's
rental properties. The assessment was not paid in full until March 1976.
Three months later, the taxpayer filed a claim for refund of the full amount
assessed and collected."
The IRS eventually conceded that the assessment
was entirely unfounded, but the Commissioner refused to refund that portion of the assessment not paid within two years of the first claim for regeneral statute of limitations provided in I.R.C. § 6501(a) to be inapplicable. Dowell v. Commissioner, 68 T.C. 646 (1977).
42. "Except as otherwise provided in this section, the amount of any tax imposed by this
title shall be assessed within 3 years after the return was filed .....
" .ROC. § 6501(a).
43. "In the case of a false or fraudulent return with the intent to evade tax, the tax may be
assessed, . . . at any time." I.R.C. § 6501(c)(1).
44. "Perfect accuracy or completeness is not necessary to rescue a return from nullity, if it
purports to be a return, is sworn to as such . . . , and evinces an honest and genuine endeavor
to satisfy the law. This is so though at the time of filing the omissions or inaccuracies are such as
to make amendment necessary." 614 F.2d at 1265 (quoting Zellerbach Paper Co. v, Helvering,
293 U.S. 172, 180 (1934)).
45. I.R.C. § 6501(a). The court noted that the "at any time" provision of I.R.C.
§ 6501(c)(1) is necessary to give the government ample time to uncover information which the
taxpayer fails to provide. But once the taxpayer provides the government with the necessary
information, the three year statute takes over.
46. 614 F.2d at 1267.
47. Id. at 1266. See Kalb v. United States, 505 F.2d 506 (2d Cir. 1974); Doll v. Commissioner, 358 F.2d 713 (3d Cir. 1966).
48. 614 F.2d at 1267.
49. 616 F.2d 1187 (10th Cir. 1980).
50. If the Secretary believes that the assessment or collection of a deficiency, as defined in section 6211, will be jeopardized by delay, he shall, notwithstanding the provisions of section 6213(a), immediately assess such deficiency (together with all interest,
additional amounts, and additions to the tax provided for by law), and notice and
demand shall be made by the Secretary for the payment thereof.
I.R.C. § 6861(a).
51. 616 F.2d at 1187.
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fund. 52 The taxpayer initiated a suit in district court contesting the IRS
53
The IRS
disallowance, The taxpayer was granted a summary judgment.
appealed to the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
In reversing the decision of the district court, 54 the Tenth Circuit court
relied on Internal Revenue Code section 6511(b)(2)(B) which states that
"the amount of the credit or refund shall not exceed the portion of the tax
paid during the 2 years immediately preceding the filing of the claim." The
court noted that this provision had been consistently interpreted to mean
that the taxpayer's recovery was limited to the amounts paid within two
years of bringing suit. 55 The court reasoned that any other construction
would allow a taxpayer to extend the time for filing a claim by making small
periodic payments. 5 6 The taxpayer asserted that a strict reading of the Code
results in a hardship on a taxpayer who is unable to pay an assessment
within two years. The court answered that an alternative remedy was available. A taxpayer may petition the United States Tax Court for a redetermi57
nation of the assessment prior to making any payment.
VII.

PENALTY UNDER SECTION 6672 OR 3505

In Fidehly Bank v. Unied States,58 the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court for improperly instructing the jury that the government bore the risk of nonpersuasion in the action below. The case arose
when a bank sought a refund of penalties assessed in accordance with section
6672 of the Internal Revenue Code. 59 In 1971, CDI Homes, Inc. (CDI) had
obtained a one million dollar revolving credit line from Fidelity Bank, N.A.
(Fidelity). By 1973, CDI had overdrawn its credit line and had ceased operations. Fidelity had agreed to permit CDI to overdraw its account, but Fidelity reserved the right to examine and approve each overdraft.
Checks clearly marked with the word "payroll" were among those approved by Fidelity in 1973. These payroll checks included gross wages, less
income taxes and FICA taxes which had been withheld. CDI had no other
source of funds and relied on Fidelity to honor checks for the amount of the
52. The IRS relied on I.R.C. § 6511(a), which states that a
claim for credit or refund of an overpayment of any tax imposed by this title in respect
of which tax the taxpayer is required to file a return shall be filed by the taxpayer
within 3 years from the time the return was filed or 2 years from the time the tax was
paid, whichever of such periods expires the later, or if no return was filed by the taxpayer, within 2 years from the time the tax was paid.
53. The district court held that the two year period of limitation of I.R.C. § 6511 (a) did
not begin to run until all of the assessment had been collected. 616 F.2d at 1188.
54. Id. at 1189-90.
55. Id. at 1188.
56. Id.

57. Id See also I.R.C. § 6213.
58. 616 F.2d 1181 (10th Cir. 1980).
59. Section 6672(a) provides: Any person required to collect, truthfully account for,
and pay over any tax imposed by this title who willfully fails to collect such tax, or
truthfully account for and pay over such tax, or willfully attempts in any manner to
evade or defeat any such tax or the payment thereof, shall, in addition to other penalties provided by law, be liable to a penalty equal to the total amount of tax evaded, or
not collected, or not accounted for and paid over. No penalty shall be imposed under
section 6653 for any offense to which this section is applicable.

I.R.C. § 6672(a).
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withholdings. 60 On June 26, 1973, Fidelity dishonored CDI checks which
had been presented through normal banking channels on June 25. The dishonored checks included one for the withholdings of the second quarter of
1973. In late June, the bank commenced the liquidation of the company.
Fidelity used the proceeds of subsequent sales to pay wages and to reduce
CDI's overdrawn account. Taxes were withheld from the wages, but the
61
taxes were not paid to the IRS.
The Commissioner assessed a one hundred percent penalty against Fidelity. 62 Although Fidelity paid a portion of the assessment, 63 the bank subsequently brought suit for refund. The Commissioner counterclaimed,
demanding payment of the unpaid balance of the penalty and payment of
the taxes due and owing. The IRS counterclaim was based upon section
3505(b) of the Code. 64 The trial court found for Fidelity, and the government appealed.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decided that each overdraft constituted a separate loan to CDI. The court asserted that since the checks were
clearly marked "payroll," Fidelity must have known that it was providing
funds for wages. 65 The court reasoned that Fidelity also must have known
that CDI could not make a timely payment or deposit to cover the taxes.
Furthermore, after CDI's closure, Fidelity controlled CDI's income. 66 The
appellate court concluded that Fidelity was clearly liable for the unpaid tax
under section 3505(b). The Tenth Circuit remanded the case for a determination of the exact amount of penalty to be imposed. 67 As to the government's original claim under section 6672, the Tenth Circuit court found that
the jury properly could have concluded that Fidelity was not a responsible
person. 68 Nevertheless, because the jury had been improperly told that the
government bore the risk of nonpersuasion, the case was remanded on the
69
section 6672 issue as well.
Leah Amer Harmony
60. 616 F.2d at 1183.
61. Id.at 1184.
62. Id.at 1182.
63. Normally, the taxpayer must pay the full tax or penalty before bringing suit in district
court. To challenge a penalty under I.R.C. § 6672, however, the taxpayer need pay only one
employee's taxes.
64. Section 3505(b) provides: If a lender, surety, or other person supplies funds to or
for the account of an employer for the specific purposes of paying wages of the employees of such employer, with actual notice or knowledge (within the meaning of section
6323(i)(1)) that such employer does not intend to or will not be able to make timely
payment or deposit of the amounts of tax required by this subtitle to be deducted and
withheld by such employer from such wages, such lender, surety, or other person shall
be liable in his own person and estate to the United States in a sum equal to the taxes
(together with interest) which are not paid over to the United States by such employer
with respect to such wages. However, the liability of such lender, surety, or other
person shall be limited to an amount equal to 25 percent of the amount so supplied to
or for the account of such employer for such purpose.
I.R.C. § 3505(b).
65. 616 F.2d at 1184.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1185.
68. Id.at 1186.
69. d.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT REVIEW
OF TENTH CIRCUIT DECISIONS
I.

A.

SUPREME COURT REVERSALS

United States v. Ward

In United States . Ward,' the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals' decision in Ward v. Coleman. 2 The Court held that fines,
imposed by the United States against owners and operators of onshore facilities from which oil is discharged, in violation of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act (FWPCA),3 constituted a civil rather than a criminal penalty.
The Court thus concluded that a provision in the Act requiring dischargers
to report their own violations 4 did not infringe upon a discharger's constitutional right to be protected from compulsory self-incrimination.
By the terms in effect at the time this case arose, 5 section 31 1(b)(3) prohibited the discharge of oil or hazardous substances in "harmful" quantities
into navigable waters or onto adjoining shorelines. 6 Persons in charge of a
vessel or responsible for an on-shore or off-shore facility were required to
7
report any such hazardous discharge to the appropriate federal agency.
Failure to report the discharge would subject violators to possible fine or
imprisonment. 8 A "civil penalty" was imposed against the owner or operator of a facility found to be in violation of the Act. 9 In 1977, a maximum
penalty of $5,000 per violation could be assessed.' 0
In March 1975, oil escaped from a retention pit at a drilling facility
located in Oklahoma and owned by L.O. Ward Oil and Gas Operations.
The oil washed into Boggie Creek, a tributary of the Arkansas River System.
Ward cleaned up the oil spill and notified the Environmental Protection
Agency that the discharge had occurred. A more complete report was forwarded to the Coast Guard,1 which assessed a $500 penalty against Ward.12
Ward appealed the Coast Guard's ruling, contending that the reporting
requirements of the Act violated the fifth amendment privilege against selfincrimination. After the administrative appeal was denied, Ward filed suit
1. 100 S. Ct. 2636 (1980).
2. 598 F.2d 1187 (10th Cir. 1979).
3. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1376 (1976) as amendedby The Clean Water Act of 1977, Pub. L. No.
95-217, 91 Stat. 1566, and The Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1978, Pub.

L. No. 95-576, 96 Stat. 1566.

4. Id. § 1321(b)(5).
5. The Clean Water Act of 1977 and the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1978 amended § 311 of the FWPCA. The amendments, however, have no bearing on
the case.
6. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(3).

7. Id. § 1321(b)(5).
8. Id.

9. Id. § 1321(b)(6).
10. Id.
11. The Coast Guard was responsible for assessing civil penalties under § 31 l(b)(6).
12. 100 S. Ct. at 2640.
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in the United States District Court for the Western District of Oklahoma
seeking to enjoin enforcement of the penalty. Ward's action, and a separate
action filed by the United States to collect the unpaid penalty, were consoli13
dated for trial.
The district court, on motion for summary judgment, rejected Ward's
constitutional claim. 14 The case was thereafter tried to a jury on the sole
issue of the occurrence and harmfulness of the discharge. The jury found
that Ward's facility did indeed spill oil in harmful quantities into navigable
waters. The district court assessed a penalty in the reduced amount of
$250.15
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found the penalty provision, section 311 (b) (6), to be criminal in nature. The appellate tribunal invalidated
the self-reporting requirement as violative of Ward's fifth amendment
rights. 16
In examining the statute, the court of appeals focused on the legislative
aim in imposing the sanction. The court asserted that a determination of
whether Congress sought primarily to punish violators or to regulate and
clean up oil spills was significant. Legislative intent was analyzed by reference to the plain language of the statute, and by an examination of the enforcement mechanism established by the Coast Guard pursuant to the
statute. A punitive intent was indicated by the fact that the penalty was
assessed automatically; that the amount of the penalty was determined by a
consideration of the size of the business, the effect of the penalty on the owner or operator's ability to continue in business, and the gravity of the violation 17 further evidenced a punitive intent. The court of appeals believed
that these statutory factors bore no relation to the government's purported
goal of maintaining an adequate clean-up fund. A violator's removal efforts
and expenses could not be considered in fixing the amount of the penalty.
Furthermore, under Coast Guard order, intentional discharges, and those
discharges resulting from gross negligence, were to result in the most severe
penalties.' 8 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that this statutory and administrative enforcement scheme lacked any semblance of regulatory or remedial intent. 19
The court of appeals confirmed this conclusion by examining the statute in light of an often used, but erratically applied test, set forth by the
Supreme Court in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Marlzez. 20 The test requires the application of seven "indicators of congressional intent" to a statute as a means of
determining whether the statute is criminal (punitive) or civil (regulatory) in
nature. 2 ' The court declared that application of the Mndoza-Marttnez in13.
14.
15.

Id.

Ward v. Coleman, 423 F. Supp. 1352 (W.D. Okla. 1976).
100 S. Ct. at 2640.
16. 598 F.2d at 1194. See Overview, Lands and Natural Resources, Sixth Annual Tenth Circuit
Survey, 57 DEN. L.J. 293, 297-99 (1980).
17. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(6).
18. United States Coast Guard Commandant Instruction 5922.1 IA (Feb. 23, 1973).
19. 598 F.2d at 1190-92.
20. 372 U.S. 144 (1963).
21. A sanction may be deemed punitive if it: (1) involves an affirmative disability or re-
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dicators to section 311 (b) (6) of the FWPCA revealed a punitive intent. The
section 311 (b) (6) factors used to determine the amount of the penalty indicated the presence of a scienter requirement. The court emphasized that a
party could act in good faith and undertake clean-up measures, yet that
party would still be penalized for even an unavoidable discharge. The appellate court felt that these facts indicated that the statute promoted the
traditional aims of punishment; namely, retribution and deterrence. The
court also noted that the behavior to which the statute applied was already a
crime under section 13 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899.22
Whereas the legislative aim in adopting the section 311 (b) (6) sanction
was to punish, rather than to regulate, a water polluter, the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that the sanction actually imposed a criminal penalty
for the discharge of oil and hazardous substances into navigable waters. The
court therefore declared that information obtained through the statutorily
required notification procedure could not be used by the government to determine liability for violations of section 311 (b)(3). The court of appeals
added that self-reported information could not be used in the calculation of
the amount of a violator's penalty under section 311 (b) (6). The Tenth Cirof an illegal discuit court declared that evidence to establish the existence
23
source.
independent
an
from
derived
be
to
had
charge
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Rehnquist, overruled the court of appeals' decision without fully addressing many of the
issues raised by the lower court. The Court's inquiry as to whether the statutory penalty was criminal in nature proceeded in two stages. Justice Rehnquist looked for either an express or an implied congressional preference for
a civil or criminal penalty. The labelling of the sanction as a "civil penalty,"
in juxtaposition with the criminal penalties set forth in the immediately preceding subparagraph, 2 4 was considered by the Court as2 a5 sufficient indication of a congressional intent to impose a civil sanction.
The Court's second level of analysis focused on whether the statutory
scheme was so punitive in nature, either in purpose or effect, as to negate the
legislature's express intention. In searching for a punitive effect, the Court
failed to assess the section 311 (b) (6) factors considered by the government in
26
Justice Rehnquist also failed to
determining the amount of the penalty.
27
The criteria were
set forth his assessment of the Mendoza-Martihez criteria.
straint, (2) has historically been regarded as punishment, (3) comes into play only on a finding
of scienter, (4) promotes the traditional aims of punishment, namely retribution and deterrence,

(5) applies to behavior which is already a crime, (6) may rationally be connected to an alternative purpose, or (7) is excessive in relation to its alternative assigned purpose. 372 U.S. at 16869.
22. 33 U.S.C. § 407 (1976).
23. 598 F.2d at 1194.
24. 33 U.S.C. § 1321(b)(5). See text accompanying note 8 supra.
25. 100 S. Ct. at 2641.
26.

See text accompanying note 17 supra. Justice Stevens, the lone dissenter, agreed with

the Tenth Circuit's opinion that the failure to calculate penalties on the basis of the government's actual clean-up costs indicated a lack of remedial intent. Justice Stevens noted that, in
light of the Mendoza-Martinez criteria, the section 311 (b)(6) factors indicated a legislative intent
to create a criminal sanction. 100 S. Ct. at 2646-47.
27.

The majority acknowledged that the behavior to which the sanction applied is already
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believed to be "neither exhaustive nor conclusive on the issue," and therefore
were "in no way sufficient to render unconstitutional the congressional classification of the penalty established in section 311 (b)(6) as civil." 2 8 Based on
this limited examination, the Court found no punitive effect which might
render the sanction criminal.
Respondent Ward's alternative claim, that the sanction was "quasicriminal," and therefore sufficient to invoke the protection of the fifth
amendment, was also rejected. 2 9Ward attempted to draw support for this
claim from Boydv. United States. In the Boyd case, the Court had held that
forfeiture proceedings, held as a result of a violation of a revenue statute,
were sufficiently criminal in nature for the purpose of the fifth amendment.
The majority found Boyd, and other similar cases, readily distinguishable on
the basis that the penalty involved in those cases was not related to damage
sustained by society or to the cost of enforcing the law. The FWPCA penalty involved in the Ward case was considered more analogous to traditional
civil damages. 30 Weight was again given to the existence of separate statu3
tory criminal remedies to punish similar activities. 1
As the penalty imposed on discharges of oil and hazardous substances
was neither criminal nor "quasi-criminal" in nature, Ward's fifth amendment privilege against compulsory self-incrimination did not relieve him of
the duty to comply with the statutory notification procedure. A violator's
own report of an illegal discharge, which is required by law, can be used as a
means of determining liability for the violation, and the facts contained in
the report may be used to determine the amount of the violator's penalty.
Dan Scheid

B.

Andrus v. Utah

In Andrus v. Utah, 32 the Supreme Court reversed the Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals' decision in Utah v. Kleppe33 wherein the Tenth Circuit
court had held that section 7 of the Taylor Grazing Act, as amended, 34 did
not empower the Secretary of the Interior (Secretary) to classify land as eligible for indemnity selection pursuant to the school indemnification selection
statutes. The court of appeals had ruled that the selection of school indema crime (the fifth indicator), but considered the point to be of little significance. Justice Blackmun, in a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Marshall, applied the Mendoza-Martnez factors
and found that they indicated a remedial intent. 100 S. Ct. at 2644-45.
28. 100 S. Ct. at 2642.
29. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
30. No explanation was offered as to why the money penalty involved in the Ward case is
"much more analogous" to a civil penalty than to a criminal fine.
31. 100 S. Ct. at 2643-44.
32. 100 S. Ct. 1803 (1980).
33. 586 F.2d 756 (10th Cir. 1978). For a discussion of the Tenth Circuit's opinion, see
Overview, Landr and Natural Resources, Fifth Annual Tenth Circuit Surve, 56 DEN. L.J. 517-23
(1979).
34. 43 U.S.C. § 315f (1976).
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nity lands was to be based on equal acreage-not equal value-with the lost
base lands.
Between 1965 and 1971, the State of Utah exercised its right, granted
under the Utah Enabling Act of 189435 and the federal school indemnification statutes, 36 to select indemnity lands in lieu of original school land grants
which Utah never received due to federal preemption or private entry prior
to survey. Utah selected 194 parcels of land, embracing approximately
157,255.9 acres, all of which were located within federal grazing districts
created under the Taylor Grazing Act. The selections included extremely
valuable oil shale lands while the original land grants were of significantly
lesser mineral value. Utah filed its selection lists with the Secretary for approval, but the Secretary responded that he would not approve any indemnity applications that involved "grossly disparate values."' 3 7 The Secretary
added that although the land values of the lost base lands and the indemnity
lands had not been precisely determined, it appeared that they involved
grossly disparate values as judged by departmental guidelines. 38 The State
of Utah filed suit in the federal district court seeking injunctive relief. The
state sought a court order directing the Secretary to approve or disapprove
Utah's indemnity selections by December 15, 1976. The district court
granted Utah's motion for summary judgment, and the Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed. 39
The controversy in this statutory construction case turned upon
whether the 1936 amendment 40 to section 7 of the Taylor Grazing Act or
4
sections 851 and 852 of the federal statutes governing state land grants '
controlled the disposition of school indemnity lands. As amended, section 7
authorizes the Secretary to compare the selected lands with the original
school land grants on an equal value basis and to refuse the exchange if the
selected lands are grossly higher in value than the original grants. Section
851, on the other hand, specifically states that whenever a state does not
receive its allotted school land grant due to federal preemption or private
entry, then the state is entitled to "other lands of equal acreage" selected in
accordance with the provisions of section 852.42 Section 852 provides, in
part, that lands "mineral in character" cannot be selected as in lieu lands
43
unless the lost base lands were also "mineral in character.
The Tenth Circuit court reasoned that section 7 of the Taylor Grazing
Act, as amended, was not applicable to school indemnity lands as neither the
Act, nor its legislative history, evidenced an intent that section 7 was to ap35. Ch. 138, 28 Stat. 107.
36. 43 U.S.C. §§ 851-852 (1976).
37. 100 S. Ct. at 1805.
38. Department of Interior guidelines provided that the grossly disparate value policy
would only be applied in cases where the estimated value of the selected lands exceeded that of
the base lands by the greater of $100 per acre or 25%. Id. at 1805 n.3.
39. 586 F.2d 756 (10th Cir. 1978).
40. Act of June 26, 1936, ch. 842, § 7, 49 Stat. 1976 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 315f (1976)).
41. 43 U.S.C. §§ 851-852 (1976).
42. Id. § 851 (emphasis added).
43. Id.§ 852(a)(1).
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ply to selected school lands. 44 Rather, after examining the legislative history
and the express language of sections 851 and 852, the court of appeals found
that school indemnity lands were governed by sections 851 and 852.4 5 Consequently, the court of appeals concluded that once it was determined that
both the original grants and the indemnity lands were mineral in character,
the indemnity lands were to be selected on an equal acreage basis and not on
the equal value basis mandated by section 7.46 The court of appeals viewed
the Secretary's function as ministerial, requiring that he approve indemnity
47
applications upon a showing of compliance with sections 851 and 852.
Reversing the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held
that section 7 of the Taylor Grazing Act, as amended, confers broad discretion on the Secretary to classify lands within a federal grazing district as
eligible for school indemnity selection and that the grossly disparate value
policy was a lawful exercise of the Secretary's discretion when applied to
school indemnity lands. 48 Thus, under the Court's view, the correct standard for school indemnity lands is the equal value principle-not the equal
acreage principle.
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, capsulized the majority opinion by stating that the district court and the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
had misinterpreted the congressional policy underlying the provision for indemnity selection and had misconstrued section 7 of the Taylor Grazing
Act. 49 Justice Stevens emphasized that the history of the general statutes
elating to school indemnity grants repeatedly demonstrated that the purpose of these statutes was to provide the states with lands roughly equivalent
to the lost original lands. 50 No evidence suggested that Congress intended
the states to select lands of substantially greater value than the original
grants. 5 ' Rather, the entire history of these statutes evidenced a congressional intent only to make the western states whole for the forfeited original
52
grants.
The Court further reasoned that the Taylor Grazing Act, as amended,
and Executive Order 691053 had the effect of withdrawing all unappropriated federal lands in the western states from entry or selection pending subsequent congressional or presidential action except, at the Secretary's
discretion, for the purposes specified in section 7.54 Consequently, indemnity lands were only available as permitted by the Secretary in the exercise
of his discretion under section 7. Therefore, Justice Stevens concluded that
44. 586 F.2d at 767.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 760-61.
100 S. Ct. at ,1813.
Id. at 1806.

50. Id. at 1807.
51. Id. at 1808.
52. Id.
53. Executive Order 6910, issued by President Roosevelt in 1934, withdrew all unappropriated and unreserved public lands in twelve western states from all forms of entry and selection
pending further determination of the best use of the land. 54 Interior Dec. 539 (1934).
54. 100 S. Ct. at 1813.
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the grossly disparate value policy employed by the Secretary was wholly consistent with the congressional intent underlying indemnity selections of giving the states a rough equivalent of the lost school grants. 55
Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice Blackmun, and
Justice Rehnquist, raised a vigorous dissent. Justice Powell perceived the
majority opinion as resting on three fundamental misconceptions: 1) that
the states had no right to equal acreage since the indemnity lands were given
as compensation to the states; 2) that the creation of grazing districts under
the Taylor Grazing Act had the same effect as a withdrawal of lands under
the Pickett Act; 56 and 3) that the Secretary had authority under the Taylor
Grazing Act to reject indemnity selections by applying standards which were
inconsistent with the standards enunciated in the indemnity selection statutes.

57

Justice Powell noted that the majority's first misconception could not
stand in light of the long line of statutes dating from the early 1800's which
demonstrated that Congress specifically adopted an equal acreage standard
to compensate the states for the lost base lands.5 8 Justice Powell viewed the
majority's second misconception as displayinj a serious misunderstanding of
the history of federal land management and the language of the Taylor
Grazing Act. 59 Moreover, Justice Powell stated that withdrawals under the
Pickett Act of 191060 had the effect of halting entry on and selection of public lands pending further determination of the best use of the land. 6 1 Since
Taylor Grazing Act lands were exempted from Executive Order 691062 by
Executive Order 7274,63 such lands were limited solely by the Taylor Grazing Act which allowed entry or selection upon classification of the land by
the Secretary. 64 The majority's third misconception also could not stand,
reasoned Justice Powell, as section 165 of the Taylor Grazing Act exempts
school grant indemnity rights from' the Act. 66 Furthermore, even if indemnity rights are not exempted from the Act, section 7 does not authorize the
Secretary to apply the equal value standard when the school indemnification
67
statutes specify that the proper standard is the equal acreage standard.
In concluding his dissent, Justice Powell implied that the application of
the equal value standard rather than the equal acreage standard results in a
55. Id. at 1813-14.
56. Pickett Act of 1910, ch. 421, 36 Stat. 847. The Pickett Act was repealed by the Federal
Land Policy and Management Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-579, tit. VII, § 704(a), 90 Stat. 2792.
57. 100 S. Ct. at 1814 (Powell, J., dissenting).
58. Id. at 1815.
59. Id. at 1814.
60. Set note 56 supra.
61. 100 S. Ct. at 1820.
62. See note 53 supra. Executive Order 6910 was a Pickett Act withdrawal. 100 S. Ct. at
1819-20.
63. Executive Order 7274, which was issued two years after Executive Order 6910, excluded all grazing district lands from the operation of Executive Order 6910. 100 S. Ct. at 1820.
64. 100 S. Ct. at 1820 & n.21.
65. Section 1, codified at 43 U.S.C. § 315 (1976), specifies that the Act shall not affect "any
land . . . which . . . [otherwise] would be a part of any grant to any State ....

66. 100 S. Ct. at 1821.
67. Id. at 1822.
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breach of the covenant that the United States made with Utah upon Utah's
admission to the Union. 68 Consequently, Justice Powell stated that he
would have upheld the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' affirmance of the
district court's decision as he believed that the district court had reached a
'6 9
"just conclusion."
Julannj.Sitoski

II.

SUPREME COURT AFFIRMANCES*

Andrus v. Glover Construction Co.
In Andrus v. Glover Construction Co. ,70 the Supreme Court affirmed a 1979
Tenth Circuit decision wherein the court of appeals had held that a federal
highway construction contract could not be awarded to an Indian construc71
tion company without the government first publicly advertising for bids.
In March 1976, the Commissioner of the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
issued a memorandum interpreting the Buy-Indian Act, 72 said memorandum providing that bidding on contracts with the BIA was restricted to Indian owned companies; non-Indian owned companies were allowed to bid
only if Indian owned companies were not available. In an attempt to comply with the Commissioner's directive, the BIA invited three Indian owned
construction companies to bid on a contract for the reconstruction of a fivemile segment of road in an area within the jurisdiction of the BIA. The
contract was awarded to Indian Nations Construction Company, an Indian
owned enterprise, in May, 1977. No public advertising occurred in relation
to the bidding. Glover Construction Company, a non-Indian contracting
operation, brought suit, alleging that the Federal Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 (FPASA) requires public advertising for such
bids. 73 The district court found that the contract was invalid, and that the
government should be enjoined from entering into any future road contracts
without complying first with the public advertising requirements of the
74
FPASA.
In affirming the district court's holding, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected the government's claim that the Buy-Indian Act was an excep68.
69.

Id. at 1823.
Id.

70. 100 S. Ct. 1905 (1980).
71. Glover Construction Co. v: Andrus, 591 F.2d 554 (10th Cir. 1979).
72. 25 U.S.C. § 47 (1976). The Act, in relevant part, provides that "(slo far as may be
practicable Indian labor shall be employed, and purchases of the products of Indian industry
may be made in open market." Id.
73. 41 U.S.C. §§ 252-253 (1976).
74. Glover Construction Co. v. Andrus, 541 F. Supp. 1102 (E.D. Okla. 1978).
* Two other decisions of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals were affirmed by the
United States Supreme Court during the 1980 term. These decisions, Trammel v. United
States, 445 U.S. 40 (1980), and Andrus v. Shell Oil Co., 100 S. Ct. 1932 (1980), are discussed in
case comments within this Seventh Annual Tenth Circuit Survey.
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tion "otherwise authorized by law" under the FPASA, 75 thus rendering
public advertising unnecessary. In reaching its decision, the Tenth Circuit
Court relied upon rules of statutory construction and upon legislative history
indicating a congressional intent to exclude highway construction projects
76
from the operation of the Buy-Indian Act.
77
The Supreme Court affirmed the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals.
Using the same rules of statutory construction as were employed by the court
of appeals, the High Court concluded that the Buy-Indian Act was an exception "otherwise authorized by law," but found it questionable whether a
road constructed or repaired by an Indian owned company was "a product
of Indian industry" as contemplated by the Act. 78 The Court continued,
stating that even if the road were a product of Indian industry, a second
provision of the FPASA relating to road construction contracts 79 evinced a
congressional intent to bar the negotiation of such contracts under the authority of laws like the Buy-Indian Act. Thus, the Court held that the
FPASA required public advertising before such a road construction contract
was entered. 80

Chrtintte Cooke Parker

75. The FPASA provides a broad exception to the advertising requirement:
All purchases and contracts for property and services shall be made by advertising, as
provided in section 253 of this title, except that such purchases and contracts may be
negotiated by the agency head without advertising if otherwise authorized by law
41 U.S.C. § 252(c)(15) (1976).
76. 591 F.2d at 560-61.
77. 100 S. Ct. at 1911.
78. Id. at 1910.

79. 41 U.S.C. § 252(e) (1976).
80.

100 S. Ct. at 1911.
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